*1 judgment will vacate the recovery impor- is low but litigation. If the remand these implicated, interests are to counsel fees and governmental tant court as might justified. fee be a direction that the dis- then a substantial with proceedings run-of-the-mill, If, however, pro- the case is attorney’s enter an fee award trict court for the only duces minimum benefits and $10,200 to the uncontested in addition the same fee reduc- then prevailing party, in favor expenses. award of employed by compe- tion that would be a claim will be plaintiff ERISA should adversary tent cases practitioner affirmed. mere the district court. The applied by be by statute does
fact that a fee is authorized extravagant to set empower the courts word disproportionate key
or fees. The is that means in relation to
“reasonable” and litigation. “Billing judgment”
the main is responsi-
a consideration well known bar; when the disappear
ble it should setting statutory courts are fees. KUCERA, Appellant, Regina S. It should not to remind the necessary be bar that restraint is in its own best interest. LIFE INSURANCE METROPOLITAN legislative bodies that authorize fees CO. may undertake to limit them as well.6 In No. 83-5002. moderation, insisting on the courts do not bar, public disserve the but reassure Appeals, United Court of States and, that excesses will not countenanced Third Circuit. therefore, legislation ill-advised regulatory 12, 1983. unnecessary. Argued Sept. is Decided Oct. IV Measured against precepts, these a of law
having concluded that as matter
the evidence was insufficient a justify lodestar, nearly
bonus of over the we 100% authorizing attorney legislatures might Indeed the statutes fees Modern undertake agencies exercising regulate the United States and federal novel fees would not be already hourly have set maximum limits. authority. Jersey legislature In the New Equal Act, 96-841, Access Justice Pub.L. No. Fees, Regulate providing a Act to enacted the II, (codified title 94 Stat. 2325 at 5 § U.S.C. attorney’s fees. For schedule of maximum 2412). and 28 U.S.C. Fees in excess of § pleading, preparation plea $.70 was of a or per $75.00 hour are not to be awarded allowed; case, arguing trying $2.00. for special absence of circumstances. 5 U.S.C. Pleas, Pennsylvania’s fees of Common Court 504(b)(l)(A)(ii); U.S.C. § every prose- suit were fixed in 1795 at 2412(d)(2)(A)(ii). Attorneys handling tort re- § coveries filing judgment. For a suit and enter- cuted to government Fed- settled, ultimately ing appearance in a case eral Torts Claims Act are limited to 25% passed An $1.67. Delaware the amount was settlement, judgment or of a and those 20% Establishing Regulating Fees in Act for charge higher who or receive amounts are sub- subsequent charge pleadings for all 1793. The ject to criminal sanctions. 28 U.S.C. § line, per twelve $.01 to the declaration was nearly ago The scale set decades two $.40; line; writ, per drawing a words under the Criminal Justice Act of Court, every appeal Orphans 3006A(d) (1976), U.S.C. is conceded to be included These fees are of those only partial compensation, nonetheless has but original in the statutes of the thirteen colonies. today been so devastated inflation that Chroust, Legal The Rise of the Profession A. goal set the time of its fails to meet the America, (Univ. 252-58 of Oklahoma Press Berger, At- enactment. See “Court Awarded 1965). ‘Reasonable’?”, torneys What Fees: 312-13 n. 131 U.PA.L.REV. *2 SEITZ, Judge,
Before Chief and GIB- ROSENN, Judges. and Circuit BONS THE COURT OPINION OF GIBBONS, Judge: Circuit diversity Regina In this case removed Kucera, a in a life insur- beneficiary named a judg- ance appeals Life ment Insur- favor Summary judgment was Company. ance on that suit granted ground the sole on was time applicable to six-year statute of limitations 42 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. actions. 5527(2) (Purdon 1981). The trial court held that action was time barred in September, while Mrs. Kucera’s com- plaint filed on December 1981. Be- Mrs. Kucera’s cause action as a not arise until death of did the named re- insured on we verse, proceedings. and remand for further Kucera, an employee Metropoli-
Glenn applied a Company, tan Life Insurance $50,000 on term life insurance March Following an examination of Mr. Metropolitan’s Kucera a home physician, 1,May on 1974. It office issued a following day Metropoli- was mailed the office, where Mr. Kucera McKeesport tan’s it on employed. May He received and in his desk. Kucera in- kept through pay- tended pay deduction payroll roll deduction. The first Meanwhile, was made on June however, Kucera was hos- from the pitalized. hospi- his release Upon tal, completed on June notifying Metropoli- Metropolitan Form 074 $26.50, hospitalization, tan of He premium. the amount of the initial August, hospi- but was returned work again September talized October. continued, Meanwhile deductions October, aggregating, by Metropolitan, September of 1974 based in the Form which information Love, P.A., Pitts- Quinn, & John E. Sikow June, Kucera had declined furnished burgh, Pa., appellant. requested “place” Jones, McKeesport Metropoli- to return it. Reed Smith & office Shaw Craig W. check for Pa., appellee. tan also sent Kucera a McClay, Pittsburgh, designate a new Own- was in The Owner While Kucera cashed. which was Contingent designate change was removed from er and hospital will, if Contingent Owner to the home office. Owner. The and returned his desk in the event nonpay- living, defenses of become Owner Metropolitan asserts noncompliance not survive the In- and of the Owner does premium, ment of *3 application providing with the term of sured. liability by will incur no Company
that “the
Contingent
or
Owner
If a new Owner
has
policy
this
until
application
reason of
then,
spec-
unless otherwise
designated,
is
full first premium
and the
been delivered
ified,
of a Contin-
any prior designation
to
actually
therein has
specified
Owner,
Contingent
Beneficiary, or
gent
Company.”
at 10.
App.
accepted by
voided.
automatically be
Beneficiary will
concede, however, that
there
parties
Both
un-
rights
all
specified,
Unless otherwise
fact which would
are
of material
issues
Owner,
in the
or
policy
der this
are vested
on these
prevent
estate, successors, or as-
in the Owner’s
grounds.1
signs.
desig-
may
Owner
Beneficiary
that both Mr. Kucera
undisputed
It is
—The
1974,
or Contin-
knew,
change
Beneficiary
in the fall of
nate or
Mrs. Kucera
of
during the lifetime
Metropolitan’s McKeesport
gent Beneficiary
Manager
of
home
policy
had returned the
the Insured.
office
office.
Indeed Mrs. Kucera was aware
App. at 39.
in her husband’s view
removal of
had the absolute
Mr. Kucera
Since
in the
from his desk while he was
policy
during his life
right
change
beneficiaries
hospital following
intensive care unit of a
Kucera as the
time,
designation of Mrs.
injustice,
upset
heart attack was an
which
poli
in the
her no interest
beneficiary gave
him.
July
until her husband’s death
cy. Thus
1979
Upon
Mr. Kucera’s death in
of
2,
rights
no contractual
1979 she had
proof
Mrs. Kucera submitted
of death and
“It is clear that the
against Metropolitan.
payment as the named benefi-
requested
life
beneficiary on a
naming
mere
of a
ciary.
correspondence
There was
between
nothing
per
in that
policy
insurance
vests
representatives
her and
of
v.
Life Assur. Soc.
Equitable
son ....”
of
Finally
April
about the claim.
in late
523,
Stitzel,
Super.
Metro-
1981 she received a letter in which
expec
mere
(1982).
beneficiary’s
525
13,
politan
liability.
denied
On
1981
tance becomes a vested
requested
she
additional
information. On
the in
the death of
company only upon
December
1981 she filed her
Quinten
sured.
v. United States Steel
Allegheny
in the Court of Common Pleas of
384, 392, 142 A.2d
Corp.,
Pa.Super.
186
and it was removed to the district
County,
Provident Mut.
374-75
also
See
court.
Ehrlich,
v.
508
Philadelphia
of
Life Ins. Co.
(as
Cir.1975) (right
change
that if a
issued
undisputed
(3d
It is
F.2d
134
which
dispute)
to which there is a material factual
to insured
personal
is
ownership
insurer);
Mr.
was its owner. The
abrogated by
Sussman
cannot
provides:
clause
F.Supp.
v. New York Life Ins.
has
(E.D.Pa.1940) (named beneficiary
88-89
may exercise
Ownership
Owner
—The
proceeds
or its
no vested interest
during
this
rights
all
lifetime).
during insured’s
lifetime
the Insured.
Metropolitan’s prac-
premium payments,
and whether
waiver of
1. These include whether
disability
premiums
respect
benefit
be-
deductions
tices with
operative.
employees
applica-
Mr. Kucera retired on disabili-
provision
came
made the
in the
hospital-
ty
early
having
payment
then been
tion form about
of the first
may
Company’s
have been disabled
inapplicable,
times. He
an-
ized several
whether
meaning
policy earlier
position
it un-
within the
nounced
on cancellation made
tendering
necessary for the insured to continue
date.
true,
course,
beneficiary’s
It
that the
general application
rule of
It is a
compa-
of action accrues for limita
an insurance
rights against
that a cause
only
prose
when it could be
owner’s
purposes
tions
are
ny
derivative
E.g., Unit
successful conclusion.
Metropoli-
cuted to a
rights.
Thus it
well be
Wurts,
414, 418, 58
ed
303 U.S.
States
Mrs. Kucera’s
tan has valid defenses to
(1938); Grayson
tiff] it had ten notice that been cancelled Philadelphia, Home Man’s had been refused.” Petitioner, Kucera, 3. court slip op. at The district found that if there was breach it occurred RELATIONS NATIONAL LABOR latest, “when September BOARD, Respondent. returned.” the check for the No. 82-3594. Kucera, slip op. at 5. Appeals, States Court of United Thus, opin- I read the as Third Circuit.
ion, con- for breach of 8, 1980. tract barred on September Argued Sept. Regina Kucera commenced this action Decided Oct. 1983. If a promisee December pat- would be agreement, enforce an “[i]t allow a benefi-
ently unjust to mere donee Paxson
ciary enforce it.” Williams v. Co.,
Coal Assured Simmons Western See (5th (the Cir.1953) con- beneficiary of an insurance
third-party
tract no better to enforce acquire “can
the contract than that held the contract- Williston, themselves”); A
ing parties 2 S. Contracts, Law of 364A
Treatise on the
(3d ed.1959). in-
The district court found that
sured’s claim for the termination *6 insurance of lim- statute
barred filing plaintiff’s
itations
complaint. plaintiff’s claim could insured,
rise any higher than that of the successfully
and therefore she could not
demonstrate termination. the district
Although opinion clarity
not be a model of have might
explained the effect of time- plaintiff’s
action, properly court nonetheless summary judgment
entered for the defend-
ant. therefore affirm the I would
of the district court.