33 W. Va. 159 | W. Va. | 1889
Anthony Reger brought a chancery suit in the Circuit Court of Barbour county against Lemuel O’Real and others to enforce a lien reserved upon a tract of land in that county for the payment of several notes executed by O’Real to Re-ger, admitting that all said notes had been paid, except one for $1,000.00 which he alleged to be wholly unpaid. The defendant O’Real demurred to the bill, aud his demurrer was overruled. Be filed an answer alleging that one of said notes for $2,000.00 carried interest at seven per cent, from date, and that he had paid that interest, which he branded as usurious; aud that on other notes after their maturity he had paid interest at the rate of eight per cent, per annum until the 1st of October, 1877; and that after that date, under an agreement with Reger, he had paid but six per cent.; and that he had paid all such interest annually; and that, if given credit for the usury paid, not only the other notes, but also that in suit, would be fully paid, and $53.75 in excess; and he demanded that such usury be applied to discharge that note, and, by way of affirmative relief, asked that the said excess of payment be decreed to him on the final hearing.
Afterwards, O’Real filed a further answer, alleging that a gross mistake existed in the cause, in the fact that at
The plaintifi filed a reply in writing to both these answers, denying that O’Neal had paid the money as claimed in his answers, and denying that he had by usury overpaid $53.75, and denying that there had been any mistake or miscalculation, and alleging that O’Neal had received credit for every dollar he had ever paid, whether at the residence of Joseph Baker or elsewhere; that the $2,000.00 note bore seven per cent as part of the purchase price for land as shown by the deed. This reply further alleged that on 27th of February, 1878, by an agreement with O’Neal, he bound himself to extend the time of payment of said several notes, and that' in consideration of such extension and $35.00 paid O’Neal he had agreed to waive and release all claim for usury paid.
The cause was referred to a commissioner, to audit the account between the parties, to report what usury, if any, had been paid, and what was due on the purchase-money note filed with the bill. Numerous depositions were taken by the commissioner. The commissioner’s report rejected the alleged credit of $535.00, but did not decide as to the usury claimed by O’Neal, but submitted that matter to the court upon a report presenting it in five aspects, viz: (1) On the basis that O’Neal was entitled to credit for usury to 1st of October, 1877; (2) on the basis that he was entitled to credit for usury to 1st of October, 1876; (3) on the basis
As to the demurrer to the bill, no ground for it has been assigned, either in this or the Circuit Court, and no ground is now seen for sustaining it. An important question in the cause is, should this Court reverse the decree below for not allowing O’Neal credit for $535.00, which he claims to have paid on the note for $2,000.00- atBaker’s residence ? The evidence bearing upon this question is conflicting and uncertain, and it would serve no purpose to detail it at large. The receipt which, it is alleged, was given for it has been lost, though O’Neal presents other receipts and papers, and does not 'explain definitely how this was lost. Both O’Neal and Reger say that money was paid Reger at Baker’s; but O’Neal says that it was on the $2,000.00 note, while Reger says it was paid on stock.
It may be true that such payment was made and applicable on that note, and it may be also true that O’Neal received credit for it in the many payments and transactions as to this debt from time to time during eight or ten years. Their business was transacted in an irregular way, neither being competent to draw papers or make entries or calculations, having to call on others to do this work. Reger states positively that O’Neal received credit for every dollar he ever paid, while O’Neal, after stating that he paid $530.00 or $535.00, on being asked if he had not received credit for it,
Thus, this agreement recognized that at its date the note was subject to a credit of $1,000.00, whereas, if it was subject to a credit of $535.00, this would be untrue, or at that date it had, besides several indorsements of interest paid to 1st October, 1877, indorsements of $665.00, $331.00, and $4.00, making up the $1,000.00 credit. It seems strange that O’Neal should have signed an agreement recognizing the note as subject to a credit of only $1,000.00, instead of $1,535.00. But here stands this written instrument, containing this admission, inconsistent with the idea that he was entitled to this large credit.
In a fourth deposition of O’Neal, he states that he claimed that three receipts should be credited on the $2,000.00 when he signed this article; but, being told by Reger that if he did not sign it he would sue him, he signed it. Three receipts might include this one for the $535.00, or for interest for 1874, which is not credited on the bond. O’Neal does not specifically state that he claimed that the receipt for this $535.00 was not credited. Now, this written agreement had been referred to and made an exhibit in the answer of O’Neal., filed 2d March, 1887, yet, though he gave three depositions
In addition to the facts which have been adverted to, there is considerable oral evidence on both sides bearing on this matter, more or less conflicting, inconclusive, and uncertain. Hpon it all the commissioner found against this credit of $535.00, and the Circuit Court approved his finding.
We must in this cause apply the rule laid down by this Court on several occasions. “The question is purely one of fact, and in such cases this Court will not reverse, unless the
As to the usury. Usury was undoubtedly paid each year to Reger from maturity of the several notes, except one, to October 1,1877. It is well settled that as long as the debt is unpaid the debtor can, if he see proper, have it applied as a payment on the debt. Norvell v. Hedrick, 21 W. Va. 523; Spengler v. Snapp, 5 Leigh, 478; Fox v. Taliaferro, 4 Munf. 243; Turner v. Turner, 80 Va. 379; Tyler, Usury, 448. As said by Sharswood, J., in Campbell v. Sloan, 62 Pa. St. 481: “These payments, as payments of interest, were avoided by the statute, and became payments on account of the principal.” And in Farwell v. Meyer, 35 Ill. 40, it is held that the usury received is considered as so much extorted by means of the debt, and is to be applied in part payment of the same. See Musselman v. McElhenny, 23 Ind. 4; Lockwood v. Mitchell, 7 Ohio St. 387; note to Zeigler v. Scott, 54 Amer.
Under the process adopted by the commissioner, he should have credited O’Neal with interest on usury paid from the time when paid. Correcting this error, by my calculation, O’Neal is aggreived $49.65. But in his statement, which is the basis of the decree, the commissioner charged Beger $20.05 for one per cent, usury on the $2,000.00 note from its date to maturity, and with $100.00 for two per cent. 'usury after its maturity to 1st October, 1877, but should have charged only $50.00, as one per cent, usury. This $2,000.00 note was, with the percentage of interest it called for, purchase-money for the lánd. Usury is interest exceeding the lawful rate for the loan or forbearance of money, and does not exist where such interest is essentially and honestly a part of the consideration in the purchase of land, even though it be called for in the form of a percentage on a principal sum, and be called “interest,” and be in excess of the lawful rate; the interest, in such case of an honest purchase, where it is not a mere cover for what is in fact a loan, being as , much a part of the purchase price as that part appearing as the principal. Tousey v. Robinson, 1 Metc. (Ky.) 663; Graeme v. Adams, 23 Gratt. 225; Kraker v. Shields, 20 Gratt. (in opinion on page 398;) 5 Rob Pr. 467.
In the king’s bench, in Beete v. Bidgood, 7 Barn. & C. 453, Lord TenteRDEN said the only difficulty arose from calling it “interest;” but the court, lookiug at the substance, and regarding the interest as a part of the purchase consideration, held it not usurious.
Therefore, it was error to charge Reger with said sums of $20.05 and $50.00, with interest from 1st October, 1877. This error against him, by my calculation, amounts to $78.45; and, substracting the $49.65 in favor of O’Neal, there remains a balance in favor of Reger of $28.80, which being added to $164.13, the amount decreed to Reger, makes $192.93 as the proper sum due him at the date of the decree. Therefore the said decree is corrected so as to require the payment by O’Neal to Reger of $192.93, with interest from the 2d day of January, 1888, instead of $164.13; and, being so corrected, the said decree is affirmed, with costs and damages to appellee.
Reger’s counsel insists that the consideration for which he agreed by the article of 27th February, 1878, to extend indulgence to his debtor, and paid him $35.00, was that O’Neal should waive all claim to usury. This may be so, but his evidence is contradicted by O’Neal’s, and the writing is silent as to any such waiver or release of usury, and the commissioner and court, as I think properly, found against such release: The writing is the repository of the transaction, and we can not make it speak or operate as a release on mere oral evidence of a contemporaneous understanding, even if it would bar O’Neal from claiming usury if it contained such waiver, on which we indicate no opinion. Decree .corrected and affirmed.
Aeeirmed.