REFRESHMENT MANAGEMENT SERVICES, CORP., Appellant, v COMPLETE OFFICE SUPPLY WAREHOUSE CORP., Doing Business as INTERNATIONAL COFFEE SYSTEMS, INC., et al., Respondents.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York
2011
[933 NYS2d 312]
The defendants moved, among other things, pursuant to
The Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the defendants’ motion which was to dismiss the cause of action alleging fraudulent inducement. Generally, a cause of action alleging breach of contract may not be converted to one for fraud merely with an allegation that the contracting party did not intend to meet its contractual obligations (see Introna v Huntington Learning Ctrs., Inc., 78 AD3d 896, 898 [2010]). Indeed, “[general] allegations that defendant entered into a contract while lacking the intent to perform it are insufficient to support [a] claim” of fraudulent inducement (New York Univ. v Continental Ins. Co., 87 NY2d 308, 318 [1995]; see Marlowe v Ferrari of Long Is., Inc., 61 AD3d 645, 646 [2009]; cf. Introna v Huntington Learning Ctrs., Inc., 78 AD3d at 898). Here, the complaint failed to allege any material misrepresentation that was not part of the defendants’ contract with the plaintiff (see Lee v Matarrese, 17 AD3d 539, 540 [2005]).
The Supreme Court also properly granted that branch of the defendants’ motion which was to dismiss the cause of action alleging breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Although every contract contains an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing (see Rowe v Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 46 NY2d 62, 68 [1978]; Aventine Inv. Mgt. v Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 265 AD2d 513, 513-514 [1999]), and “[t]his covenant is breached when a party to a contract acts in a manner that, although not expressly forbidden by any contractual provision, would deprive the other party of the right to receive the benefits under their agreement” (Aventine Inv. Mtg. v Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 265 AD2d at 514), a cause of action alleging breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing must be dismissed if it is merely duplicative of a breach of contract claim (see New York Univ. v Continental Ins. Co., 87 NY2d at 319-320). Here, the cause of action alleging breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing merely duplicated the cause of action alleging breach of contract (id. at 320).
Lastly, the Supreme Court properly determined that the entire complaint insofar as asserted against Cordovi should be dismissed. In addition to the flaws in the particular causes of action discussed above, the complaint failed to sufficiently allege that Cordovi should be held individually liable for the causes of action alleging breach of contract or unjust enrichment under the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil. Specifically, the complaint failed to allege that Cordovi “exercised complete domination over [Complete] in the transaction at issue and, in doing so, abused the privilege of doing business in the corporate form, thereby perpetrating a wrong that resulted in injury to [Complete]” (East Hampton Union Free School Dist. v Sandpebble Bldrs., Inc., 66 AD3d 122, 126 [2009], affd 16 NY3d 775 [2011]). Prudenti, P.J., Skelos, Balkin and Sgroi, JJ., concur.
