*283 OPINION OF THE COURT
In this action for declaratory judgment we are asked to determine whether plaintiffs have stated a cause of action in thеir pleadings and supporting papers in which they seek a declaration that New York’s system for financing its public elementary аnd secondary schools is unconstitutional.
Plaintiffs, Reform Educational Financing Inequities Today (R.E.F.I.T.), a not-for-profit membership organizаtion suing on behalf of itself and 40 member school districts, the Boards of Education of 21 Long Island school districts participating individually, individual tаxpayers, parents, and public school students residing in participating school districts, allege in their complaint that the statutory scheme by which New York finances its public schools violates the Education Article of the New York Constitution (art XI, § 1), and the Equal Protection Clauses of the Federal and State Constitutions.
*
Supreme Court dismissed plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a causе of action (
Our State Constitution requires that "[t]he legislature shall provide for mаintenance and support of a system of free common schools, wherein all the children of this state may be educated” (art XI, § 1). In
Board of Educ., Levittown Union Free School Dish v Nyquist
(
Plaintiffs in this action do not claim that students in their district are recеiving something less than a sound basic education. Rather, their pleadings and supporting papers demonstrate that there now еxists a greater disparity in the amount of money spent per pupil in property-poor as compared to proрerty-rich school districts than the disparity in existence at *284 the time Levittown was decided. Plaintiffs now claim that this disparity demonstrates a gross and glaring inadequacy in the State’s school financing scheme, and that this showing of great disparity calls into question the constitutionality of the finаncing scheme.
Plaintiffs’ argument rests on their assertion that Levittown left the door open for a challenge to the constitutionality of the educational financing structure on the basis of gross and glaring inadequacy in the funding of education and that such inadequacy can be demonstrated by extreme dispаrities in funding. However, even a claim of extreme disparity cannot demonstrate the "gross and glaring inadequacy” (id., at 48) we referred to in Levittown.
The Education Artiсle does not by its express terms contain an egalitarian
component. Nor
does a study of the history of the Article reveal an intent to preсlude disparities in the funding for education or in relative educational opportunities among the State’s school districts. Insteаd, "the evident purpose of [the Education Article] was to deprive the legislature of discretion in relation to the establishment and maintenance of common schools, and to impose on that body the absolute duty to provide a general system of common schools” (3 Lincoln, Constitutional History of New York, at 554). Thus, the primary aim of the legislation was to constitutionalize the estаblished system of common schools rather than to alter its substance
(see, e.g.,
Report of Comm on Education and Funds Pertaining Thereto, 2 Documents of NY Constitutional Convention of 1894, Doc No. 62, at 3;
Judd v Board of Educ.,
Therefore, even accepting plaintiffs’ allegations of gross disparities between the amount of money spent on students in property-poоr school districts and property-rich school districts, their cause of action based on a violation of the Educa
*285
tian Article due to such disparities cannot survive this motion to dismiss. Giving plaintiffs’ submissions the benefit of every favorable inference, they simply do nоt state a claim that these disparities have caused students in the poorer districts to receive less than a sound basic education, which is all that they are guaranteed by our Constitution. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division, insofar as it affirmеd dismissal of the cause of action based on the Education Article of our State Constitution, should be affirmed, without prejudice, hоwever, to the plaintiffs, if so advised, to apply at the trial court for leave to amend the complaint (CPLR 3211 [e];
see, People v New York City Tr. Auth.,
Moreovеr, neither in their pleadings and other submissions on this motion to dismiss, nor in their argument before this Court have plaintiffs advanced a legal or factual basis for us to overrule
Levittowris
equal protection analysis under the State and Federal Constitutions. In
Levittown
and again in
Campaign for Fiscal Equity v State of New York
(
Finally, rather than affirm the Appellate Division’s broad and definitive declaration of the constitutionality of the State educational finanсing system, we modify to declare that the school financing scheme of the State of New York has not been shown in this case to be unconstitutional (see, Campaign for Fiscal Equity v State of New York, supra).
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be modified, with costs to defendants, in accordance with the opinion herein and, as so modified, affirmed.
Chief Judge Kaye and Judges Simons, Titone, Bellacosa, Smith and Ciparick concur; Judge Smith concurring only in result.
Order modified, etc.
Notes
Unlike in
City of New York v State of New York
(
