24 S.D. 435 | S.D. | 1909
Elizabeth B. Reeves, the plaintiff and respondent, brought an action in the circuit court of Lincoln county, against Harry L. 'Reeves, defendant -and appellant, alleging in her complaint, that she and the defendant were husband and
Briefly stated, appellant’s contention was that the facts he
We fully concur with appellant’s counsel that a court of equity has inherent power to vacate its own judgments when the same are procured through extrinsic fraud. But Mr. Bishop, in his work on Marriage and Divorce, in discussing this question, says: “A verdict rendered on insufficient or perjured evidence, or on an erroneous direction from' the court, is not fraudulent within the present doctrine. The adequate fraud is not quite definable, but it is some grave and serious scheming whereby the court is misled to the perversion of justice.” And it is 'held by many courts that, even in equity, a suit to vacate a judgment upon such grounds cannot be maintained, even in the absence of other statutory methods of review. Greene v. Greene, 2 Gray 361, 61 Am. Dec. 454. But, see, Hard v. Hard, 51 Neb. 412, 70 N. W. 1122) Lawrence v. Nelson, 113 Iowa 277, 85 N. W. 84, 57 L. R. A. 583.
In Yorke v. Yorke, 3 N. D. 343, 55 N. W. 1095, an application upon motion to vacate a decree of divorce upon the ground that there had been no> valid service of the summons, and also upon .the ground' that the evidence upon which the decree was obtained was false and perjured, the application wais granted (citing Beach v. Beach, supra) upon the former, ground, the court saying: “When we apply these principles to the case before us, there is not the least doubt that the action of the court •in setting aside the decree was entirely correct; and in iso de
In Pico v. Cohn, 91 Cal. 129, 25 Pac. 970, 27 Pac. 537, 13 L. R. A. 336, the court points out the character of the fraud which may render a judgment void or voidable, and says: “That a former judgment or decree may be set aside and annulled for some frauds, there can be no question; but it must be a fraud extrinsic or collateral to the question examined and determined in the action. And we think it is settled beyond controversy that a decree will not be vacated merely because it was obtained by forged documents or perjured testimony. The reason of this rule is that there must be an end of litigation; and when parties have once submitted a matter or have had the opportunity of submitting it, for investigation and determination, and when they have exhausted every means for reviewing such determination in the same proceeding, it must be regarded as final and conclusive, unless it can be shown that the jurisdiction of the court has been imposed upon, or that the prevailing party, by some extrinsic or collateral fraud, has prevented a'fair submission of the controversy. What, then, is an extrinsic or co-lateral fraud, within the meaning of this rule? Among the instances given in the boobs- are such as these: Keeping the unsuccessful party away from the court by a false promise, or purposely keeping -him in ignorance of the suit; or where an attorney fraudulently pretends to represent a party, and connives at his defeat, or, being regularly employed, corruptly sells out his client’s interest. United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U. S. 65, 66, 25 L. Ed. 95, -and -authorities -cited. In all such cases the unsuccessful party is really prevented, by the fraudulent contrivance of his adversary, from having a trial; but when he
The order denying appellant’s motion is affirmed.