48 N.J. Eq. 415 | New York Court of Chancery | 1891
On the 15th of February, 1890, a jury of Gloucester county, •convened upon a writ de lunático inquirendo issued out of this •court, found Mrs. Isabella Iredell, of Mantua, in that county, a lunatic and of unsound mind, without lucid intervals, and incapable of the government of herself and her estate, and that she liad been in the same state of lunacy for five years before that date. The return of the inquisition embodying this finding was •duly confirmed by this court, and, upon being sent down to the •orphans court of Gloucester county, the complainant was, about .the 1st of April, 1890, appointed her guardian in lunacy.
By this bill he seeks to establish and enforce two several ¡bonds, one of which was secured by a mortgage, which he alleges 'were given to the lunatic by the defendants, or some or one of them, and which bonds, with the mortgage, have been lost or destroyed or have come to the hands of and are concealed by the defendants. The first of these securities is a bond with a war
The defence as to the $500 bond and mortgage is that it has-been paid in full and duly and properly cancelled of record. In support of this allegation a receipt is produced, signed by Mrs. Iredell, in these words—
“ Mantua, 17. X, May 19, 1887.
“ Received of Rebecca C. Morgan §525 for principal and interest in full for-bond and mortgage supposed to be lost or mislaid, I hold against the house and. lot on Mantua Avenue in Mantua R. X
“Isabella Ibedell.”
and also a satisfaction piece executed and duly acknowledged by Mrs. Iredell on the 26th of July, 1889, acknowledging payment' in full of the amount due upon that mortgage.
With regal’d to the alleged $600 bond the defendants admit that Mrs. Iredell did loan $600 to Allan S. Morgan on September 21st, 1883, and they allege that he gave her his bond for that amount without security, and that he paid the amount toiler in four several payments, the last, for $165, on August 25th,. 1887, and he produces her receipt for that payment in these-words: “ Mantua, N. J. August 25,188.7, Received of Allan S. Morgan $165 balance in full on bond which cannot be found.. Isabella Iredell.”
The value of these receipts and the sealed discharge as evidence depends upon the mental condition, of the lunatic at their-
At the hearing, witnesses upon the subject were produced by both parties, and upon the testimony given by them, and quite independent of the inquest, I come without difficulty to the conclusion that the condition of Mrs. Iredell’s mind at the date of the receipts in question was such, at best, as to render them practically worthless as evidence. Here, again, the defendants did not produce Mrs. Iredell at the hearing, although alleging that she was sane, and that her mind and health had both improved materially since her residence with them, which still continued. I do not deem it worth while to state the evidence at length. Mrs. Iredell is not far from seventy years of age. She has no children. Her husband was killed in the late war, and she has enjoyed, and still enjoys, a widow’s pension of $12 a month. For many years she kept, an ice cream, cake áhd candy shop in Mantua, and was very saving and careful in her expenditures, and saved money enough to own a house there, and had considerable loaned out on bonds and mortgages. Mrs. Rebecca C. Morgan is her sister of the whole blood, and a Mrs. Harriet
The remaining questions in the case are the following:
First. Was the $600 bond in fact executed by the three defendants, Allan S., Rebecca C. and William A. Morgan, as alleged by the complainant, or by the first-mentioned person alone, as alleged by the defendants ?
Second. Have either or both of the bonds above mentioned been paid ?
Third. If the $600' bond has .not been paid, has this court jurisdiction to enforce it?
Fourth. If so, then is it enforceable against Mrs. Morgan ?
To all this evidence the three defendants involved give on the stand an unqualified and complete denial. They each deny that any such joint bond was ever talked of, prepared or executed. The father and son swear that the father on his own account borrowed the $600, on September 21st, 1883, and gave his individual bond for it, which was prepared and witnessed by the son; that the check was written by the son and signed by Mrs. Ire-dell, and by it the amount transferred to the son’s credit, and that the amount was paid out by him to his father as he required it. The father swears that he paid the principal of this bond to Mrs. Iredell in four payments — the first, of $250, about six years before the hearing; the second, of $150, a few months later; the next, of $40, still later, and the balance of $165 on August 25th, 1883. The first three payments were, he says, endorsed on the bond, and for the last he produced the receipt of Mrs. Iredell of the date last mentioned. No witness is produced in corroboration of these payments, or either of them, nor any receipt shown except for the last. He denies that on the occasion of the entering up of judgment on the Middleton bond, or at any other time, he had any of Mrs. Iredell’s papers in his possession, or at his office, and he denies that he retained them
Now, upon this evidence the question whether the $600 Morgan bond was signed by all three, or by the father alone, stands upon the evidence of Samuel T. Sooy and his wife on the one side and the three Morgans on the other, with the aid of the attending circumstances and the probabilities of the case. Judging from these latter, and the manner of the witnesses on the stand, I became strongly impressed at the hearing with the truthfulness of the Sooys, and a careful review and consideration of the evidence, since being written out, has served to strengthen rather than weaken that impression. I think it highly improbable that this lady, who was very careful and thrifty in money matters, would in 1883, when her mind had not materially failed, have loaned her money to the elder Morgan, who was notoriously insolvent, without security, and I also find it difficult to believe that Samuel T. Sooy could have invented out of the solid the story which he related upon the stand. And then the drawing of the check to the son and the placing of it to his credit in bank was not, to my mind, satisfactorily explained on the basis of a loan to the father alone. Then the loss of the bonds and mortgage. It seems to me surprising, to say the least, that these Morgan securities alone of all those she had should disappear so mysteriously and permanently as the Morgans’s theory requires they should have done. It seems to me they would have sooner or later come to light. Then the evidence of the elder Morgan
There are one or two other matters Avorthy of consideration. Among the securities held by the old lady, in May, 1887, was’ the bond of Mr. Sooy for $400. This he paid off by depositing $400 to her credit the next spring, April 18th, 1888. That
Again, it seems to me improbable that so much money — $500' on the 19th of May, 1887, and $165 on the 25th of August, 1887 — could have been paid to Mrs. Iredell without sooner or later making its appearance and being known or heard of by
After a careful review of all the evidence, my conclusion is 'that the truth lies with the complainant; that the $600 bond was ■executed by all of the Morgans; that neither it nor the $500 bond and mortgage have ever been paid; that they were in May, 1887, on the occasion of the Middleton affair, taken to the Mor.gans and lodged with them; that after the settlement with Middleton it was thought best by the Morgans and Mr. Sooy, against whom she held a bond for $400, that for their mutual protection against Middleton the securities should not be returned to her; ■that to carry out that plan the Morgans declared them to be lost; 'that later on they conceived the plan of declaring that they were paid, and, to substantiate their assertion, procured her to sign the ■receipts in question, probably after she went to live with them, ■dating them back to the dates they bear; that desiring to have 'the record of the mortgage discharged, and knowing that .it was understood in the neighborhood that the papers had been lost, .and fearing on that account to present the mortgage for cancellation, they procured a commissioner of deeds, living at Glassboro, ■seven miles distant, and who had never heard of Mrs. Iredell’s mental infirmity, to come to their house and take her acknowl■edgement to a satisfaction piece. All this the condition of her ■mind enabled them to do with perfect ease, and without exciting the suspicion of the commissioner, who performed his duties in a perfunctory manner.
Third. The next question to be considered is as to the jurisdiction of this court to enforce the $600 bond.
No question was raised by the answer or by counsel of the defendants at the hearing as to the jurisdiction of this court to establish and enforce either of these securities, and there can be no doubt as to its power to restore the cancelled mortgage. But •as to the $600 bond, I suggested to complainant’s counsel at the
The only foundation of the jurisdiction of this court to grant relief upon lost instruments of this sort was that the remedy at law was either entirely wanting or inadequate. 1 Story Eq. Jur. § 81 et seq.; 1 Pom. Eq. Jur. § 71. The difficulty in the way of suing at law upon a lost bond in the ordinary form was the necessity of making profert. Whitfield v. Fausett, 1 Ves. Sr. 387. Says Lord Hardwicke, in a considered judgment (at p. 393): “ If a man has lost a bond he is entitled to come into equity not only for- a discovery but to have a decree for payment because he cannot declare without making profert, the defendant being entitled to oyer.” And such was undoubtedly the ancient rule of pleading at law. Leyfield’s Case, Co. pt. 10 p. 92; Com. Dig. Pl. O. & P.; Thoresby v. Sparrow, 1 Wils. 16; S. C. sub nom. Soresby v. Sparrow, 2 Str. 1186. This rule was relaxed in Read v. Brookman, 3 T. R. 151, in the case of a conveyance of land, on the-ground that the conveyance or grant of an interest in land is to-be presumed after long adverse possession or enjoyment, and hence it was unnecessary to make profert. And later on it was extended to all sorts of sealed instruments, the court establishing a rule that excuse might be stated and proven for not making: profert.
But it is entirely settled that if the jurisdiction of this court has once been established over a certain subject or class of cases,, it will not be taken away by the fact that courts of law have-acquired jurisdiction of the same subject or class of cases, whether that jurisdiction be acquired by relaxation of its own severe rules or by statute. Lord Thurlow, in Atkinson v. Leonard, 3 Brown Ch. C. 218 (at p. 224), speaking of the alleged relaxation of the rule at law, says: “ But the question is whether this court is ousted of its jurisdiction so that a demurrer would lie to a bill for [founded on] a lost bond. * * * It does not follow because the court of law will give relief that this court loses the concurrent jurisdiction which it always had.” And in Toulman
I have made these references and citations at length because they deal with the very instance of concurrent jurisdiction now before the court, and illustrate how deeply it is rooted, and how highly it has been cherished by the fathers of our equity system.
In support of the jurisdiction in this case, I would have contented myself with the authority of Force v. City of Elizabeth, 12 C. E. Gr. 408, which was affirmed, so far as concerns the point in question, in 2 Stew. Eq. 587, but for the slight difference in the circumstances of the two cases. The instrument here sued on is an ordinary bond, payable to Mrs. Iredell, the title to which would not pass by delivery without formal assignment, while the bond sued upon in Force v. City of Elizabeth was payable to
I conclude that the court has jurisdiction.
Fourth. The more troublesome question is as to whether Mrs. Morgan should be held liable. She was a married woman at the time she executed the bond, and for that reason would not be liable, even in equity, if she in fact occupied the position on the bond of a mere surety. This was so held in Perkins v. Elliott, 8 C. E. Gr. 526, at the common law, and before the Revision of March 27th, 1874. The act of that date for the first enabled married women to contract as if sole, with the proviso that nothing therein contained should enable her to become surety, &c.
But Perkins v. Elliott held that a married woman is liable in •equity for her contract, even though it be in effect one of surety-ship if she received any consideration whatever for it in the way ■of benefit to her separate estate. In that case the consideration alleged in the bill was that the note upon which the wife was .sought to be charged was given in payment and discharge of a mortgage executed by herself and her husband upon her husband’s land, and the increase of the value of her inchoate right •of dower by the discharge of the mortgage was held to be a sufficient consideration. And in Staats v. Van Sickel, 23 Vr. 370, the supreme court, following Perkins v. Elliott, sustained an ■action against a wife upon a bond given by the husband and wife for part of the purchase-money of land conveyed to the husband, ■the only consideration for which bond so far as regards the wife •being her inchoate right of dower in the land so conveyed.
“ That any married woman shall have the right to bind herself by contract in the same manner and to the same extent as though she were unmarried, and' which contracts shall be legal and obligatory, and may be enforced at law or ■ in equity, by or against such married woman, in her own name, apart from her husband; provided, that nothing herein shall enable such married woman to become an accommodation endorser, guarantor or surety, nor shall she be liable on any promise to pay the debt, or answer for the default or liability of any other person.”
Under the older act of 1862 (Nix. Dig. 1868 p. 548), which enacted that “ where a married woman transacts any business or • purchases any property, and debts or claims thereby remain unsatisfied,” an action may be brought at law &c., it was held by the supreme court that the declaration must allege, and the-plaintiff must prove as a part of his case, the special facts out of which the liability arose. Eckert v. Reutter, 4 Vr. 266; Lewis v. Perkins, 7 Vr. 133. In the later of these cases the chief-justice, in citing the earlier, said: “The necessary consequences of this decision is that, in displaying a cause of action against a feme covert, in a court of law, it is necessary to show the circumstances which make her contract obligatory. Her general condition is . one of incapacity to bind herself by her agreement. The particular facts, therefore, which remove such disability must appear, in order to make out a legal cause of action.” But in Hinkson v. Williams, 12 Vr. 35, the same court held that a suit could be-maintained and recovery had against the married under the later act — 1873—upon the common counts alone. The court said that under the earlier act of 1862 and prior to the act of 1874 (above-cited) the general condition of the wife was one of incapacity to • contract, and her liability was exceptional, and that the effect of the act of 1874 was to reverse the condition and to render her-capacity to contract general and the incapacity exceptional. •
The act in question was also before that court in Wilson v. Herbert, 12 Vr. 454; Cooley v. Barcroft, 14 Vr. 363; Van Deventer v. Van Deventer, 17 Vr. 461; Bank v. Dohm, 23 Vr. 363,
These cases all seem to go on the ground that the burden is on the married woman who is sued on her contract to set out and prove that she is within the the exception of the proviso. This is, I think, in accordance with the well-settled rule of construction that where an enacting clause is general, with a proviso containing exceptions, the burden is on the party claiming the benefit of the exceptions to set it out and prove that he is within it. Pott. Dwar. Stat. 119; 1 Chit. Pl. 223; Bennett v. Hurd, 3 Johns. 438; Teel v. Fonda, 4 Johns. 304, and Simpson v. Ready, 12 Mees. & W. 736. Of course, if the contract sued upon shows upon its face that it is of the character mentioned in the proviso, •the plaintiff in setting it forth states himself out of court.
The bill in this ease sets out the joint bond of the three defendants without any allegation as to the relation of the parties as between themselves. The answer, so far as relates to Mrs. Morgan, denies the making of the bond, and there is in it no* allegation of suretyship. The simple issue developed by the pleadings is, was the bond executed as alleged in the bill ? The complainant, therefore, was not called upon to prepare to meet the issue of suretyship, nor was it raised on the trial except incidentally.
The proofs show that the money was paid to the son and went to his credit in bank. He swears that' he paid it to his father, and I think it is fairly inferable from all the circumstances that he treated this money, as he did all other money which came to his hands from the business, as in reality his father’s money. As already observed, the business was managed by the. father in the name of the son, while the title to the property stood in the name
“And you say tliat when you borrowed this §600 you applied it to pay off some indebtedness on this property ?
“A. My own indebtedness.
UQ. There were some obligations against this property, were not there ?
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. And you applied these §600 to the payment of some of them?
“A. I did not.
“Q. What did you apply them to ?
“A. Other indebtedness I owed at places.
“Q. Were there any judgments against the property?
“A. Yes, sir.
“ Q. That is what I thought.
“A. The property first was sold and other parties — [interrupted].
“Q. That is enough — wait one moment — judgments were entered against you before the properties were sold, were they not ?
“A. Yes, sir.”
That is all the evidence given by this witness as to the disposition of this money.
William A. Morgan, who, it will be remembered, swore that he paid the $500 mortgage at the time when the title to the
“Q. This was your own money that you paid her?
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. Well, why did you pay her that mortgage with your own money; the property belonged to your mother ?
‘A. Yes, sir; all the property there belonged to my mother, and I always helped pay off all the mortgages.
“ Q. Did you take anything from your mother to show for it ?
‘A. Several thousand dollars between mother and I, and we have not taken anything, mother and I, to show for it.”
And further on he says that he took nothing from his father .to show for the $60.0 borrowed from Mrs. Iredell and paid over ■to him.
Now, it is quite easy to imagine from this evidence, in connection with the other circumstances, how it is possible, and perhaps probable, that this money went to the benefit of the estate of Mrs. Morgan. In the first place, if it be true that the elder Morgan paid debts which were outstanding against him with it, those •debts may have been and probably were incurred before the title •of the property came to Mrs. Morgan, and if, as it seemed to be admitted at the hearing, she had no separate estate of her own, -and paid nothing for the property, then a creditor of Morgan might well claim that she held it in trust for him, and that it was still liable in her hands for his debts, and in that way those ■debts were a menace to her title, and their payment and discharge ■tended to strengthen that title. Or, in the second place, considering the evidence of William A. Morgan, just quoted, it may have been that the money went to pay some obligation of the elder Morgan secured by mortgage on the premises, or some judgment which was a lien on the premises in the hands of the wife. Counsel for the complainant also relied upon the general aspects of the case, viz., that the wife held the property for the benefit of the husband and subject to his control, and that the money was paid to the son as the figure-head of the father, and ■■that their affairs were and are so inextricably mixed that whatever is paid to one is paid to all, and whatever goes to the benefit •of one goes to the benefit of all. And in support of this view is
Upon the whole case I am not satisfied that the wife occupied on this bond the position of a pure surety without any consideration of benefit to her, and therefore the decree must go against her.
I think it is not a case for indemnity, since the proofs satisfy me that the bond is either in the defendant’s hands or destroyed.
I will advise a decree that the bond and mortgage for $500 be declared valid and existing securities, and the mortgage a valid and existing lien on the mortgaged premises as of its original position in order of priority, and the satisfaction piece and entry of cancellation be set aside and declared void and of no effect, and that these defendants are indebted to the complainant on account of said $600 bond in the sum of $600, with interest from April 1st, 1886, up to which time Mr. Sooy swears that the interest was endorsed and paid upon it.
Complainant is entitled to costs.