Plаintiff appeals from a judgment in favor of defendants predicatеd upon the granting of defendants’ motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict of the jury (sec. 629, Code Civ. Proc.) in favor of plaintiff in an action to recover damages for personal injuries.
Viewing the evidence most favorable to plaintiff, as we must in reviewing a judgment predicated upоn the granting of defendants’ motion for a judgment
non obstante veredicto (Myers
v.
Southern Pac. Co.,
14 Cal. App. (2d) 287, 292 [
On January 30, 1937, plaintiff was a pаssenger in an automobile bus owned and operated by defendants, whiсh was traveling in a westerly direction on Biberón Street in the San Pedro district оf the city of Los Angeles. As the bus approached the intersection at Biberón and Cabrillo Streets, plaintiff arose from her seat, walked tо the front of the bus and stood on the step of the bus as it traveled alоng the street, the exit door being open at the time. The bus gave a sudden jerk and plaintiff was thrown to the street and injured.
These are the questions presented for determination:
First: Was plaintiff contributorily nеgligent as a matter of law in riding upon the step of the automobile bus?
Second: Was the issue of plaintiff’s contributory negligence one which should properly have been left to the determination of the trial jury?
Thе first question must be answered in the affirmative. The law is settled that (1) the violation of a statute or ordinance constitutes negligence
per se,
and (2) it constitutes contributory negligence if the failure to comply with the statute оr ordinance contributes directly to the plaintiff’s injury.
(Hurtel
v.
Albert Cohn, Inc.,
5 Cal. (2d) 145, 147 [
In the instant case at the time of the accident section 80.47 of the Municipal Code of the city of Los Angeles read:
“No person shall ride upon the fender, steps, or running board of any street car or vеhicle.” (Italics added.)
*682
As plaintiff violated a provision of the forеgoing ordinance in riding upon the step of the automobile bus, she was guilty of negligence
per se,
and since the accident would not have occurred had plaintiff remained in any other portion of the bus, her negligence was one of the proximate causes of the accident, and therefore she cannot recover for her injury.
(Steinberger
v.
California Elec. etc. Co.,
The second question must be answered in the negative. It is the general rule that the issue of contributory negligence is one to be left to the determination оf the trier of fact and that such determination will not be disturbed upon appeal, if there is any substantial evidence to sustain it. This general rule, however, is subject to this well-established exception : If the violation of a statute or ordinance contributes directly to plaintiff’s injury, the issue is not one of fact but is an issue of law and is therefore removed from thе consideration of the trier of fact. In
Lorry
v.
Englander Drayage etc. Co.,
“In the absence of the ordinance the question of whether appellants were negligent in riding on the running-board would depend upon whether a person of ordinary prudence would have so ridden under the circumstances then existing and this wоuld have been a question properly to be left to the jury. (Ivancich v. Davies,186 Cal. 520 [199 Pac. 784 ] ; Strong v. Olsen,74 Cal. App. 518 [241 Pac. 107 ].) Bu,t the ordinance enacted an absolute standard of conduct and remоved from the jury the right to speculate as to what that ideal composite the man of ordinary prudence might or might not have done under similаr circumstances. It thereby substituted certainty of conduct for uncertainty. If the violation of the ordinance proximately contributed to thеir injuries appellants were guilty of negligence as a matter of law.” (Italics added.)
See, also,
Schultheiss
v.
Los Angeles Ry. Corp.,
11 Cal. App. (2d) 525, 527 [
For the foregoing reasons the judgment is affirmed.
Grail, P. J., and Wood, J., concurred.
*683 A petition for a rehearing of this cause was denied by the District Court of Appeal on May 4, 1938, and an application by appellаnt to have the cause heard in the Supreme Court, after judgment in the District Court of Appeal, was denied by the Supreme Court on June 2, 1938.