185 Iowa 958 | Iowa | 1919
In September, 1915, a guardianship was established by regular proceedings over Charles L. Hunter on the ground that he was air incompetent, and that he was squandering his property. Daugherty was appointed his permanent guardian. On July 28, 1916, while said guardianship was in full force and effect, and while Daugherty was still acting as his permanent guardian, the'plaintiff obtained from Charles L. Hunter the execution of the note in question, as the consideration for a secondhand automobile. Subsequently, Daugherty resigned as guardian, and the defendant Harrold was appointed, and is made defendant herein as such guardian. Counsel for defendant, appellant, contends that the note was void in its inception, and is of no force or effect; whereas counsel for the plaintiff, appellee, contend that the contract was voidable only, and that the restoration by the maker of the consideration received is a condition precedent to its avoidance. The brief of the appellant states the question as follows:
“Boiled down, the issue is, Can a person under guardianship execute an enforoible contract?”
“Boiled down, Can a person of apparent normal mind make an ordinary contract in the ordinary way with another person in ignorance of the fact that he was under guardianship, and avoid his obligation incurred therein without restoring the consideration received ?”
Cases from other jurisdictions are cited to us which hold that the fact of guardianship will not defeat a contract
None of the foregoing propositions quite reach the case at bar. The question presented must be answered by á consideration of our statute and the necessary effect thereof.
“The provisions of this chapter, and all other laws relating to guardians for minors, and regulating or prescribing the powers, duties or liabilities of each, and of the court or judge thereof, so far as the same are applicable, shall apply to guardians and their wards appointed under the fourth preceding section of this chapter.” The “fourth preceding section” referred to in Section 3223' is Section 3219, which is as follows:
“When a petition, verified by affidavit, is presented to the district court that any inhabitant of the county is:
“1. An idiot, lunatic or person of unsound mind;
“2. An habitual drunkard, incapable of managing his affairs;
“3. A spendthrift who is squandering his property; “And the allegations of the petition are satisfactorily proved upon the trial provided for in the following section,
The argument for appellee is made to rest largely upon Code Section 3189, which is as follows:
“A minor is bound not only by contracts for necessaries, but also by his other contracts, unless he disaffirms them within a reasonablé time after he attains his majority, and restores to the other party all money or property received by him by virtue of the contract, and remaining witMn his control at any time after his attaining Ms majority, except as otherwise provided.”
The argument is that, by the terms of Section 3223, the provisions of Section 3189 are made applicable to all persons under guardianship. It is to be noted that Section 3189 is not a part of Chapter 5, Title XVI, but is a part of Chapter 4. It declares the liability of a minor for his contracts, subject only to a right of disaffirmance upon certain conditions. It does not deal at all with the question of guardianship, nor with the “powers, duties or liabilities” of guardians. The argument that would make Section 3189 apply to the idiot and the insane, and to the drunkard and spendthrift, would make Sections 3190 and 3191 apply, likewise; and this would be a strained argument. We are clear, therefore, that the argument of appellee cannot be sustained at this point, and that the liability of the insane and the spendthrift is not to be ascertained from the terms of Section 3189.
Tn reaching our conclusion herein, we are not unmindful of the fact that a guardianship is sometimes permitted to become dormant, and to cease in fact, though it exists in form upon the records of the court. If the ward be, in fact, restored to mental competency, and if the guardian, recognizing such fact, surrenders to him his estate, and thereby becomes entitled to an order of discharge, but neglects to obtain the same, this would present an illustrative case of dormant guardianship. See, also, Hanrahan v. Hanrahan, 182 Iowa 1242, for illustrative case. Whether,, in such a case, the ward would be bound by his subsequent contracts, even though entered into before a formal discharge of the guardianship, is a question which we do not determine. The record before us presents a case of an active, “going” guardianship. Nor do we pass upon the question whether any remedy is open to the plaintiff to present his claim as for alleged necessaries furnished to the ward. No such question was passed upon by the trial court. The verdict appears to have been directed for the plaintiff upon the ground that the automobile had not been restored to the plaintiff. The court thereby treated the rights of the parties as being defined by Section 3189. This was error. The judgment below is, therefore, — Reversed.