delivered the opinion of the court.
On August 24, 1963, the minor plaintiff, Peggy Ann Reeves, aged two, was bitten on the face by the dog of the defendants. This suit was filed alleging in Count I, a common-law negligence action; in Count II, a wilful and wanton misconduct action and in Count III, an action seeking recovery for the mother’s medical expenses based upon a common-law negligencе theory.
Initially, the trial court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the statute (Ill Rev Stats 1963, c 8, § 12d) had abrogated the common-law cause of action for recovery in a dog bite case. The case was then appealed to this court and in Reeves v. Eckles, 77 Ill App2d 408,
Only the minor, Peggy Ann Reeves, referred to herein as plaintiff, appeаls claiming prejudicial error in that the defendants gave an inaccurate answer to an interrogatory and failed to answer a supplementary interrogаtory; that the jury’s verdict was a compromise and that the trial court failed to adequately protect her interests as a minor when it denied her motion for a new trial on damages only.
Prior to trial, plaintiff served interrogatories inquiring of “liability coverage” and “other applicable insurance covering liability for damages or injuries.” The defendants answered these interrogatories stating the amount of the liability coverage and then answering “medical payments: not applicable.”
On July 21, 1965, plaintiff filed additional interrogatories, this time making specific inquiry as to medical payment coverage. The case went to trial on June 22, 1968, almost thrеe years later and the supplemental interrogatories had not been answered nor had there been any effort on the part of plaintiff to require an answer.
The plaintiff now argues that the failure of defendants to answer the supplemental interrogatory made it necessary to try the actions of her mother and herself together. Because of this, and due to the fact that the mother was guilty of contributory negligence, as the jury subsequently found, it prejudiced the plaintiff in the еyes of the jury and thereby reduced her recovery.
The plaintiff’s conclusion can only be based on speculation. The jury verdict was five times the amount of out-of-pocket expense and there is no basis in the record from which we can conclude that the jury was prejudiced by combining the actions of mother and daughter or that their verdict was a compromise. Indeed, the actions of mother and daughter were combined by the plaintiff in the same cause of action and plaintiff made no subsequent motion to separate them, nor did plaintiff make any effort to require the answers to supplemental interrogatories, despite the fact that they went unanswered for three years and despite the fact that plaintiff had numerous remedies to enforce the requirement of an answеr. The mother could even have waived her right to recover her out-of-pocket expense and permitted her daughter to recover this amount, McHugh v. Hirsch Clothing Co., Inc., 308 Ill App 272, 275,
In a real sense if there was a difficulty, it was created by the plaintiff when mother and daughter were joined upon the filing of the case. This could have been remedied at any time before trial but no such steps were taken. Having now tried the case before the jury, the plaintiff is not entitled to change her theory in this court. Lewy v. Standard Plunger Elevator Co., 296 Ill 295, 304,
The plaintiff directs our attention to Muscarello v. Peterson, 20 Ill2d 548,
The trial court did not find and we cannot conclude from the record before us that the jury’s verdict was a compromise. On the contrary, the jury appears to have understood the law and the instructions and they rendered a verdict fоr the plaintiff five times the out-of-pocket expenses. The sum of money which will compensate an injured party entitled to recover is a matter which is peculiarly one for the jury and this court should not interfere unless the damages are palpably inadequate. Lazarro v. Garrett, 100 Ill App2d 452, 456,
In this latter connection, plaintiff’s counsel advises us in his brief that the defendants offered to settle the matter for a substantially greater sum. Obviously, that is not in the record before us and we are only favored with counsel’s gratuitоus remarks. The fact that counsel made an offer simply indicates that they were willing to settle the case. It did not go to the jury and is not a proper factor tо be considered, either by the jury or by us in determining whether or not the jury’s verdict was correct. Therefore, we do not consider that information and counsel should refrain from straying from the record.
Finally, plaintiff argues that defense counsel made improper statements which prejudiced and deprived her of a fair trial. In final argument, defendants’ counsel said among other things, “They are trying to reach into my client’s pocket. . . . They want money. . . .” Plaintiff concludes from this argument, to which an objeсtion was sustained, that the jury was thereby prejudiced because they were led to believe that the money was coming from the defendants and that the defendants wеre not insured. The trial court sustained an objection to the argument and instructed the jury to disregard it. In addition, it is only by exercising the most liberal speculation that one сan reach the plaintiff’s conclusion. An almost identical argument was made in the case of Piechalak v. Liberty Trucking Co., 58 Ill App2d 289, 299,
Taking the case as a whole, we find that there were no “substantial irregularities” or, indeed, any errors in the trial of the above case. The judgment is therefor affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.