96 Iowa 330 | Iowa | 1895
I. The property in question is a.■dwelling house and lot in the town of Crestón, Union county, Iowa. The defendant Carter, being the owner of a judgment against the plaintiff and another, caused an execution to- issue thereon on the twentieth day of' September, 1893, and to be placed in the hands of the-defendant Davenport as sheriff. The sheriff levied upon said house and lot as the property of plaintiff,, and sold the same under said execution to the defendant Carter. Plaintiff claims that said property was exempt to her as a homestead, and that said judgment was not and is not a lien thereon. It is conceded that plaintiff had occupied said property as her homestead, and that it was exempt to her as such, for a number of years prior to October 5, 1893. The sole contention is whether, by reason of the facts, she lost her homestead right in said property prior to the time of said' execution sale. The facts shown in the evidence are in substance as follows: Plaintiff owned, and for a number of years prior to October 5,1893, occupied, said property as her homestead. On that day she was married to one Aron Reeseman, then and for some years prior a resident of Cass county, Iowa, and who- had never been a resident of Union county. In July, 1893, Mr. Reeseman leased a farm in Cass county for a period of one year commencing March 1, 1894. Prior to their marriage it was agreed between Mr. and Mrs. Reeseman, as a condition of their marriage, that when married the plaintiff would go and live with him on said farm until the expiration of the lease, and that at that time they would return, and thereafter reside on plaintiff’s said property in Crestón. In pursuance of that agreement they went to his home in Cass county
II. Section 1988 of the Code is as follows: “Where there is no special declaration of the statute to the contrary, the homestead of every family, whether owned by the husband or wife, is exempt from judicial sale.” The exemption is to “every family,” and not to the “head of a family,” as in section 3072, exempting certain personal property. Van Doran v. Marden, 48 Iowa, 186, and other cases are cited by appellants, holding to the effect that a woman entitled to certain personal property as exempt to her as the head of a family, under said section 3072, on being married ceased to be the head of the family, and was, therefore, no' longer entitled to the exemption. These cases are not in point, as the exemption in question is not to the plaintiff as. the head of the family. The fact of plaintiff’s marriage did not terminate her rights to the homestead, but the fact of her marriage is proper to be considered in determining, whether there was abandonment of the homestead. Appellants cite other authorities to' the effect that the domicile of the wife follows that of the husband, and they contend that, as Mr.
