Reese v. StateReese v. State
Lead Opinion
OPINION
Our оriginal opinion in this case was filed on September 1, 1987,
In our original opinion we overruled Rutledge v. Fort,
We disagree with the State. The State did not advise us that the real parties in interest in Reese v. State and Rutledge v. Fort were the same. The State in fact filed no response to Reese’s petition for writ of certiorari, and fоr that reason alone the State could be held to have waived its subsequent claim that the law of the case precludes our variant ruling in Reese. We do not, however, base our decision here on the State’s waiver of its claim to assert the law of the case. Instead, we base our decision on the broader policy rationale underlying the doctrine of the law of the case.
We long ago stated the theory underlying this doctrine as follows:
The doctrine of the law of the case is not a rule to which we are bound by any legislative enactment. In so far (sic) as we arе bound, it is because we have so bound ourselves, or choose so to bind ourselves by our decisions. By those courts which refuse, under some circumstances, to be bound by it, it is pointed out that when we conclude that a former decision is erroneous, and we still have the opportunity to correct it as affecting those parties whose interests are concerned in the original ruling, we should apply the law of the land rather than the law of the case. * * * [W]e feel that is better and more just to apply in this case what we find to be the law of the land. As affects the parties concerned, the evil effects of so doing are trivial as compared to the unfortunate consequences of perpetuating the error.
Farmers’ State Bank v. Clayton Nat’l Bank,
This decision is in keeping with the majority understanding of the doctrine of the law of the case which has been stated as follows:
[Sjince the doctrine of the law of the case is merely one of practice or court policy, and not of inflexible law, so that appellate courts are not absolutely bound thereby, but may exercise a certain degree of discretion in applying it, there are many holdings in which the courts have retreаted from any inflexible rule requiring the doctrine to be applied regardless of error in the former decision, and it has been said that the doctrine should not be utilized to accomplish an obvious injustice, or applied where the former appellate decision was clearly, palpably, or manifestly erroneous or unjust.
5 Am.Jur.2d Appeal and Error § 750 at 194 (1962). See also Killeen v. Community Hosp. at Glen Cove,
It is obvious from the above that we may deviate from the law of the case doctrine in the situation before us if to apply the doctrine would result in a manifest injustice. We hold that such would be the case here. Were we to adhere immutably to the law of the case, the defendant Reese would be denied a fair trial. As we stated in our original decision, to deny Reese the right to have the jury informed as to his apprehension of the identity of the person he assaulted would be to deny him the right to have the jury apprised of a necessary element of thе crime for which he was charged, and that in turn would be to deny Reese his constitutional guarantee of due process of law.
Accordingly, the State’s motion for rehearing is denied, and the holding in our original opinion is affirmed for the reasons set forth herein.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Concurrence Opinion
(specially concurring in opinion on rehearing).
I agree with the language cited from Farmеr’s State Bank v. Clayton Nat’l Bank, but I also agree that under the technical circumstances of that case the Court was not “endangering the orderly and expeditious administration of the law by refusing * * * to apply the doctrine of the law of the case.”
Another concern is that this Court's composition has altered since it decided Rutledgе. Dissenting in Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co.,
With these principles well in mind, I conclude that the precedential value of the Rutledge opinion is minimized by the fact that it was only recently decided by a divided court on a vote of three to two, and that its reliance on Feola [
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
In view of the fact that the majority opinion submitted in this case has been amended, I wish to amend my dissent to include the following pertinent points.
The lengthy review in this case was initiated by the district court’s October 3, 1985 order denying the State of New Mexico’s (thе State) motion to conform an instruction to the Uniform Jury Instruction in the case of State v. Reese. The State then filed a petition for writ of superintending control in the Supreme Court on November 4, 1985. On December 4, 1985, the Supreme Court issued an alternative writ of superintending control restraining and prohibiting thе district court from giving a jury instruction that did not conform to the Uniform Jury Instruction applicable to the criminal prosecution. On March 4, 1986, the Supreme Court issued an opinion and judgment making permanent the alternative writ of prohibition. Although the March 4, 1986 opinion was captioned Rutledge v. Fort, as the majоrity now concedes, the Rutledge case is the same case as Reese v. State; Thomas Rutledge, as the district attorney for the Fifth Judicial District, was named as petitioner for the State, and the Honorable Harvey W. Fort, as the district court judge hearing the case, was named as respondеnt. The real party in interest remained defendant Kenneth Reese (Reese).
It is my opinion that the doctrine of the law of the case precludes this Court from issuing a subsequent decision after the original March 4, 1986 judgment became final. The September 1, 1987 opinion and the current opinion in this casе should be recalled and certiorari quashed.
“The doctrine of law of the case has long been recognized in New Mexico, since before statehood and since soon after statehood.” Ute Park Summer Homes Ass’n v. Maxwell Land Grant Co.,
A previous ruling by the Appellate Court upon a point distinctly made may be only authority in other cases, to be followed and affirmed, or to be modified or overruled according to its intrinsic merits, but in the case in which it is made it is more than authority; it is a final adjudication, from the consequences of which the court cannot depart, nor the parties relieve themselves.
State v. Montoya,
It has long been the rule that a final judgment is conclusive as to a claim in controversy between the parties as to every matter which was offered to sustain or defeat the claim. “Public policy requires that there be an end to litigation and that rights once established by a final judgment shall not again be litigated in any subsequent proceeding.” Ealy v. McGahen,37 N.M. 246 , 251,21 P.2d 84 , 87 (1933). This rule of law has been consistently followed.
Royal Int’l Optical Co. v. Texas State Optical Co.,
In its most recent opinion in this case, the majority quotes a 1925 case wherein this Court reversed a judgment contrary to the principles of the law of the case doctrine. Hоwever, in order to justify this diversion, the Court in Farmer’ State Bank v. Clayton National Bank,
With respect to the second distinction, the Court noted:
While the two cases, which we are considering, are so interrelated that it is difficult to think of them otherwise than as the same case, still they are not technically such. Such a situation as this is not often likely to arise in our courts. Our search for precedents satisfies us that such a situation has not often arisen in other courts. We therefore feel that we are not endangering the orderly and expeditious administration of the law by refusing here to apply the doctrine of the law of the case.
Id. at 355,
With respect to the first distinction, the courts of New Mexico have addressed the effect of an alleged error in a former appellate decision since the Farmers’ State Bank case. See, e.g., Royal Int’l Optical Co.,
[Wjhere, upon an appeal, the Supreme Court, in deciding the appeal, states in its opinion a principle or rule of law, necessary to the decision, that principle or rule becomes the law of the cаse, and must be adhered to throughout its subsequent progress, both in the lower court and upon subsequent appeal, ... although in its subsequent consideration, this court may be clearly of the opinion that the former decision is erroneous in that particular.
Tally v. Ganahl,
The doctrine of the law of the case presupposes error in the enunciation of a principle of law applicable to the facts of a case under review by an appellate tribunal. It presupposes error because, if the governing principle of law had been correctly declared, there would be no occasion for the invocation of the doctrine. The sole reason for the existence of the doctrine is that the court, having announced a rule of law applicable to a retrial of facts, both parties upon that retrial are assumed to have cоnformed to the rule, and to have offered their evidence under it, under which circumstances it would be a manifest injustice to either party to change the rule upon the second appeal.
Allen v. Bryant,
In its current opinion, the majority also quotes an Am.Jur.2d article which proposed a more flеxible approach to the law of the case doctrine. The article also stated: “although an appellate court, on a subsequent appeal, has the ‘abstract power’ to reach a result inconsistent with its decision on the first appeal in the same case, this power should be exercised very sparingly and only under extraordinary conditions and that the law of the case will not be re-examined in the absence of unusual circumstances leading to injustice or unfairness.” 5 Am.Jur.2d Appeal and Error § 750 (1962).
The present case does not present unusual circumstances or extraordinary conditions. Further, neither the statute nor the facts of this case have changed since the original 1986 Reese opinion was filed. The only alteration since the first opinion is the composition of this Court, and as pointed out by Justice Ransom in his most recent special concurrence, the particular personalities of the bench should have no effect on the precedents binding on the Court.
Finally, for the reason stated in my first dissent in this case, it is my contention that regardless of the law of the case doctrine, the original Reese opinion should be affirmed as it correctly disposed of the issues in this case.