15 Mo. 137 | Mo. | 1851
delivered the opinion of the court.
This cause involves the force and effect of a certificate in bankruptcy, under the laws of the U. States. The precise question is, whether a certificate, relied on as a defence against the debt due by the bankrupt, the creditor can impeach by pleading facts which show, that the court, by which the certificate was granted, had no jurisdiction of the application for a discharge, even though the facts may appear upon the face of the record which gives the court jurisdiction. The courts of the U. States, though possessing a limited jurisdiction, yet, in the intendment of law, stand upon the same footing as courts of record of general jurisdiction. All the presumptions which are indulged in favor of superior tribunals of general jurisdiction, are equally extended to the courts of the United States. In pleading a judgment or decree of one of those courts, there is no more necessity for showing the facts which confer jurisdiction, than in a plea of judgment of the highest tribunal known to the law. Their judgment cannot be impeached for irregularity or error in a collateral proceeding; they can only be vacated on motion, in the courts in which they a^e rendered, or reversed for error in an appellate jurisdiction. The bankrupt act makes the proceedings in bankruptcy records. The fourth section of that act prescribes, that the discharge and certificate, when duly granted, shall, in all courts of justice, be deemed a full and complete discharge of all debts, &c., and shall, and may be pleaded as a full and complete bar to all suits brought in any court of jurisdiction whatever, and the same shall be conclusive evidence, of itself, in favor of such bankrupt, unless the same shall be impeached for fraud, or some wilful concealment, by him, of his property, &c. If it is competent for Congress to enact bankrupt laws, the force and effect of a discharge and certificate under the laws, may be declared by such enactment. When the statute declares, that a certificate shall be conclusive, of itself, in favor of a bankrupt, unless impeached for fraud, it is equivalent to saying, that nothing, in impeachment of the certificate, shall be pleaded but fraud. The expression of one cause, for its avoidence, is an exclusion of all others. If the words “duly granted” authorize an enquiry into the facts which give jurisdiction to the court granting the certificate, then the law enacts the solecism, that a writing may be impeached, but if it is not overthrown in the attempt, then it shall be conclusive. This is a strange sort of conclusiveness. What avail is the conclusiveness to the party, if he is only to have the effect of it after an unsuccessful effort to avoid his instrument? But what authority is there in the law for limiting the
The point made, as to the manner of serving the execution, cannot be maintained. This was a proceeding in chancery, and the rules established in relation to the preparation of causes for this court, in trials at common law, have never been regarded as applicable to proceedings in chancery.
The conflict of laws in the references, relate to foreign judgments.
The other judges concurring herein, the injunction is perpetuated.