Reed v. StateReed v. State
- Reporters:
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- Before:
- Corbin
Appellant Adrian Reed appeals the judgment of the Pope County Circuit Court convicting him of driving while intoxicated
Appellant was arrested for DWI on June 15, 1996. He was initially stopped and detained by Constable Bill Parks in Pope County near Pea Ridge, which is outside the constable’s jurisdiction of Jackson Township. Appellant moved to suppress the evidence that resulted from his arrest on the ground that the constable lacked the authority to pursue a criminal suspect beyond his jurisdiction without first having a reasonable behef that the suspect had committed a felony. The trial court concluded that Constable Parks was a peace officer and that
On appeal, Appellant challenges Constable Parks’s authority to arrest him outside the constable’s jurisdiction. He contends that pursuant to
(a) Each constable shall be a conservator of the peace in his township and shall suppress all riots, affrays, fights, and unlawful assemblies, and shall keep the peace and cause offenders to be arrested and dealt with according to law.
(d) Nothing in this section shall prevent the fresh pursuit by a constable of a person suspected of having committed a supposed felony in his township, though no felony has actually been committed, if there are reasonable grounds for so believing. “Fresh pursuit” as used in this section shall not necessarily imply instant pursuit, but pursuit without unreasonable delay. [Emphasis added.]
Appellant asserts that the language in subsection (d) prohibits a constable from engaging in the fresh pursuit of any person unless that person is suspected of having committed a felony.
The State argues that the trial court correctly ruled that a constable’s authority to freshly pursue a suspect beyond his jurisdiction is derived from
Any peace officer of this state in fresh pursuit of a person who is reasonably believed to have committed a felony in this state or has committed, or attempted to commit, any criminal offense in this state in the presence of such officer, or for whom the officer holds a warrant of arrest for a criminal offense, shall have the authority to arrest and hold in custody such person anywhere in this state.
The State contends that a constable is included within the definition of the term “peace officer” as used in
The sole issue for our resolution is whether a constable’s authority to engage in the fresh pursuit of a person suspected of committing a misdemeanor beyond the limits of the constable’s jurisdiction originates from
Statutes relating to the same subject should be read in a harmonious manner if possible. City of Ft. Smith v. Tate, 311 Ark. 405, 844 S.W.2d 356 (1993). All legislative acts relating to the same subject are said to be in pari materia and must be construed together and made to stand if they are capable of being reconciled. Id. We adhere to the basic rule of statutory construction, which gives effect to the intent of the legislature, making use of common sense and giving the words their usual and ordinary meaning. Kyle v. State, 312 Ark. 274, 849 S.W.2d 935 (1993). In attempting to construe legislative intent, we look to the language of the statute, the subject matter, the object to be accomplished, the purpose to be served, the remedy provided, legislative history, and other appropriate matters that throw light on the subject. Tate, 311 Ark. 405, 844 S.W.2d 356. The commentary to a statute is a highly persuasive aid to construction, although it is not controlling over the clear language of the statute. Kyle, 312 Ark. 274, 849 S.W.2d 935.
In construing two acts on the same subject, we first must presume that when the General Assembly passed the later act, it was well aware of the prior act. Salley v. Central Arkansas Transit Auth., 326 Ark. 804, 934 S.W.2d 510 (1996). We must also presume that the General Assembly did not intend to pass an act without purpose. See Clark v. State, 308 Ark. 84, 824 S.W.2d 345 (1992). Furthermore, the General Assembly is presumed to have enacted a law with the full knowledge of court decisions on the subject and with reference to those decisions. See, e.g., Scarbrough v. Cherokee Enter., 306 Ark. 641, 816 S.W.2d 876 (1991); Tovey v. City of Jacksonville, 305 Ark. 401, 808 S.W.2d 740 (1991); J.L. McEntire & Sons, Inc. v. Hart Cotton Co., Inc., 256 Ark. 937, 511 S.W.2d 179 (1974).
Moreover, we are not convinced by Appellant’s contention that these two provisions are necessarily in conflict with one another. Instead, we view the two statutory provisions as complementary of one another, with
A great need was filled by the Interstate Fresh Pursuit Act, drafted by the InterstateCommission on Crime, to prevent criminals from utilizing state lines to handicap the police. This is proven by its almost instant enactment in some two thirds of the states. Furthermore, there have been repeated requests from the police to extend the principles of the interstate act to permit fresh pursuit of criminals across county and municipal lines.
The Act on Interstate Fresh Pursuit is the result. This act follows the sovereignty into another, it applies not only to felonies, but to any criminal offense committed in the presence of the officer, or to a person for whom an officer holds a criminal warrant. Simple provisions, as in the case of the interstate act, are made to safeguard the rights of the person arrested. The requests of law enforcement authorities themselves prove the need for this new, simple, and sensible law.
Considering the language of both statutes, the respective subject matters, and the objectives sought to be accomplished by the legislature in passing them, we conclude that although a constable’s general powers and duties are established by
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err in determining that, under the circumstances of this case, Constable Parks was acting as a peace officer and, as such, had the authority to pursue Appellant beyond the limits of his township on the ground that Appellant had committed an offense in the constable’s presence.
Affirmed.