Opinion by
This is thе second appeal by the same parties involving the same transaction. The former case is reported in
“That the judgment of the trial court was wrong in adjudging and decreeing that the plaintiffs in errоr, Jack Reed and J. C. Reed, should account to the plaintiff below for any rents and profits from this lease after July 20, 191S, the date of the execution and delivery of the dеed to Reed Royalty Company, a corporation.”
The only facts necessary to an understanding of the questions presented are that the plaintiff commenced her 'action October 6, 1917, for the cancellation of the deed to the Reeds and for an accounting. While that action was pending, and on July 20, .1918, Jack Rеed, in so far as he could, deeded their royalty interests to the Reed Royalty Company, a corporation, just previously organized with J. C. Reed as president and Jack Reed as vice president. That action was thereafter dismissed by the court on the - day of October, 1918, for want of prosecution. April 19, 1919, Eell Robinson filed her seсond suit against the Reeds, involving the same issues, which resulted in the judgment above referred to. The Reed Royalty Company was not mado a party to that action but the рlaintiff, for some ¡purpose, lintiioduced the deed) from Jack Reed to the Reed Royalty Company in evidence on that trial. The deed to the Reed Royalty Cоmpany was filed for record July 24, 1918. All the products from the lease were taken by the Prairie Pipe Line Company, and the royalty was paid monthly by that company’s check, payable to Jack Reed, and mailed to him. Since the 20th day of July, 191S, Jack Reed, in person, or some one acting for him, indorsed (he. monthly checks and turned them оver to the Reed Royalty Company.
The defendant in error contends that that part of the decree in the former case that the Reeds should account fоr all monies received by them, and all persons claiming under them, was a ■ final adjudication of that question, while the plaintiffs in error contend that that question was not within the issues and therefore not a final adjudication and cite authorities in support of their contention, and also contend that the plaintiff, having notice of the conveyance to the Reed Royalty Company, both constructive and actual, the Reed Royalty Company was a necessary party to the accounting. Tо sustain their contention that (he court erred in requiring the Reeds to account for the royaltes after the execution of the deed by Jack Reed to the Reed Royalty (Company, ^counsel have devoted their brief largely to three propositions:
(1) That the plaintiff had constructive notice of the conveyance to the Reed Royalty Company prior to the commencement of the last action, and, therefore, that company was a necessary party, both аs to the cancellation of the deed and to the accounting.
(2) That tlie plaintiff having introduced the deed to (he Royalty Company in evidence, although introduced for a particular purpose, was in fact admitted for all purposes and that the plaintiff was bound by it, and,
(3) That that part of the decree in the former case that the Reeds should account for all sums received by any person claiming under them was not binding upon them in the accounting for the reason that the question was not an issue.
We will dispose of the three propositions together. We agree that the plaintiff had constructive notice of the conveyance from the date it was recorded, July 24, 19118, and that she had actual notice at the time she offered the deed in evidence. The trial court must have entertained the same view сontended for, that is, that the deed was in evidence for all purposes. To reach the conclusion that (he Reeds should account for all sums received by аny person claiming under (hem, he must have applied the doctrine of lis pendens, and if correctly applied then the Reeds Company was not a necessary parly. 17 R. C. L., 1027-1032. Whether that doctrine was wrongfully or rightfully applied is not now to be determined. When that decree was affirmed by this court it became, and is, the law of the case. This court has-, held in Smith v. Kennedy,
“That the district court erred in assessing the amount of recovery as against thе plaintiffs in error as being too large.”
The question was not expressly decided for the reason that it was not argued in the brief and, as this court has often held, was waived; аnd, by necessary implication, decided. To say that a question fairly presented by the record, and' assigned as error, and not expressly decided because of
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failure to present the question in the brief could be made the ground for a second appeal, would be'- to hold that the case could be disposed of by рiecemeal, which this court has held cannot be done. In St. L. & S. F. R. Co. v. Hardy,
•‘A party may not settle the law oi his case by piecemeal before this court, any more than he may settle the facts in that way before the district court. When the case is tried, he must be prеpared to present his entire c-laim, or his entilre defense.”
In a later Kansas ease, Harwi Hardware Co. v. Klippert,
“Where a case is brought a second time on error to this court, the first decision will be deemed the settled law of the case, and will not be made a subject of re-examination. This rule extends, not merely to all questions actually presented by counsel, but to all questiоns existing in the record, and necessarily involved in the decision.”
Also upon the evidence adduced the judgment should bo affirmed.
The court found that the Prairie Pipe Line Cоmpany took all the products from the lease from the time Reeds first secured title until the accounting, and paid for the same 'by monthly checks, made payable to Jack Reed, and mailed to him. The evidence fully sustains the finding. We think the judgment should- be affirmed.
Defendant in error hasi asked in, her brief that in case the judgment be affirmed, judgment be entered upon the sup.r e-deas bond, but the record shows that the bond was omitted from the case-made by agreement of the parties.
By the Court: It is so ordered.