ORDER
1. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Linda Reed (“Reed”) suffers from several disabilities, including tardive dyskinesia (“TD”) and bipolar disorder. Her TD makes it difficult for her to speak, so she often uses a computer-based communication device.’ In March 2012, she sought treatment at Defendant Columbia St. Mary’s Hospital (“Columbia”) because she was feeling suicidal. In'this lawsuit, she asserts that during her four-day stay, Columbia staff' discriminated against her on the basis of her disabilities and refused to make adequate accommodations for her impairments.
She brings claims for violations of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12181, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794. She also asserts several claims arising under the Wisconsin Mental Health Act, Wis. Stat. § 51.61, for violations of her rights as a medical patient. Columbia filed a motion for summary judgment on October 14, 2016. (Docket # 49). Columbia seeks dismissal of all of Reed’s federal claims. First, it argues that it enjoys a religious exemption from liability under the ADA. Second, it asserts that there is inadequate evidence to show that it discriminated against Reed solely based on her disabilities, as is required to sustain, a claim under the Rehabilitation Act. Finally, Columbia requests that the Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims. Reed opposed Columbia’s motion and filed a motion to strike Columbia’s religious exemption defense, contending that it had not been timely asserted. (Docket # 54 and # 55).
2. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that the court “shall grant summary-judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Boss v. Castro,
3. RELEVANT FACTS
3.1 Reed’s Treatment at Columbia
Reed suffers from TD, bipolar disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, and acute anxiety. (Docket # 55 ¶ 11). TD is a neurological disorder that substantially limits a person’s ability to speak and swallow due to uncontrollable, involuntary movements in the mouth, limbs, and hands. To cope with the disease, Reed uses various communication techniques and aids, including a computer-based communication device called a Dynavox. See (Docket # 37 ¶ 9).
Reed entered the Columbia emergency department in mid-afternoon on Thursday, March 8, 2012, reporting suicidal thoughts. (Docket # 55 ¶ 11). She was admitted for treatment to Columbia’s inpatient behavioral health unit. Id. She remained there until her discharge on the morning of Monday, March 12, 2012. Id. ¶ 12; see also (Docket# 59 ¶ 36).
While being treated at Columbia, Reed claims she was subjected to discrimination because of her disabilities. First, Columbia staff would repeatedly refuse to give her the Dynavox when she asked for it, including during her discharge meeting on March 12, 2012. (Docket # 37 ¶ 13); (Docket # 55 ¶¶ 17, 24). (The Dynavox was held at the nurse’s station at night in order to recharge its batteries.)
Second, she says she was prescribed psychotropic medication despite telling Columbia staff that she is allergic to it. (Docket # 37 ¶ 14). She refused to take it when offered. Id. At times, she asked to see her medication records so she could determine whether she was being given any such medications, but these requests were refused. Id. ¶¶ 14, 23; (Docket # 55 ¶ 13). Third, she was repeatedly denied use of the telephone to call her “case manag
The record reveals that Reed’s stay at Columbia was fraught with difficulty and punctuated by confrontations between her and the staff. See (Docket # 55-11 at 21) (examination note stating that Reed was discharged for “behavior issues” and was “sent away by staff’). At the intake interview on March 8, 2012 with psychiatrist Dr. Eric Kaplan (“Dr, Kaplan”), she was “angry and agitated” and in a “manic state” — so much so that Dr. Kaplan had to leave the intake interview and another doctor completed it later. See id. at 46, 83-84. It was also noted by a nurse that at intake, Reed communicated in “explosive verbal volleys” along with using her Dynavox. Id. at 100.
Additionally, throughout her stay, Reed refused some of Columbia’s treatment recommendations, including certain medications on her stated fear that she was allergic to them. (Docket # 55-22 at 2 ¶ 3); (Docket # 55 ¶ 75); (Docket # 55-11 at 24) (progress note that Reed was “all over the map, refuses to take any psych meds”); see also (Docket # 55-13 at 30-31) (May 30, 2013 note from Dr. Kathryn Gaines, who treated Reed for over a decade, that Reed visited her in a disturbed stated and refused to take her medication). Although Reed claims that she was prescribed psychotropic drugs at Columbia after warning the staff of her allergy, there is no evidence that she was ever administered such medications, only that she was concerned about the possibility. (Docket # 55 ¶ 76); (Docket # 59 ¶¶ 75-76); but see (Docket # 55-11 at 17) (March 8, 2012 note showing order for psychotropic medications). In any event, she claims she refused all such medications when they were offered to her. (Docket # 59 ¶ 75); (Docket # 55-11 at 34), Similarly, while she asserts that she was not allowed to see her medication records, (Docket # 59 ¶ 77), Donna Taylor, Director of Risk Management at Columbia, later explained to her that this was due to Columbia policy, which provides that a patient can review her records after discharge, (Docket # 55-22 at 1). The right to review records is not, as Reed believed, an unfettered right to see all such records immediately upon request. See id.
Further, she was often disruptive, loud, agitated, and could not easily be understood in her speech as a result of her TD. See (Docket # 55-11 at 34) (Reed describing her disabilities as “noisy”); id. at 35 (Reed writing that on one occasion, she became “spooked” and “los[t] control over [her] disorder”); id. at 42 (progress note that Reed exhibited bipolar disorder with “severe mania”); id. at 85 (progress note that Reed became “distraught” in the afternoon on March 10 and was “unable to speak”); id. at 86 (progress note that Reed’s mood was “up and down all shift” late on March 11). Her behavior was so hard to control that the nursing supervisor, William Fry (“Fry”), testified that staff would only provide Reed her Dynavox “if her behavior was appropriate.” (Docket # 55 ¶¶ 62-64); (Docket # 59 ¶ 64). There is also evidence that she became belligerent when counseled about appropriate behavior during group therapy sessions and while she was being escorted out of the hospital at discharge. (Docket # 55-22 at 3 ¶ 7, 4 ¶ 13); (Docket # 55-11 at 86-87).
Andrew Miller (“Miller”), a Columbia patient care assistant, witnessed the inci
Miller claims that Reed' refused to move although he explained several times that she needed to return to her room so that the nurses could help her. Id. ¶¶ 38-45. During this time, she was screaming so' loudly that other patients came out of their rooms to see what the commotion was. Id: He decided that she was not'going to move voluntarily, so he helped her stand. Id. At this, she screamed at Miller, asking him to stop, but he responded that she could not stay in the middle of the floor, that she was causing a disturbance, and that the nurses could help her once she was back inside her room. Id.
According to Miller, Reed’s screaming continued at such a volume that the nurses came out of their morning meeting as he was escorting her to her room. Id. ¶¶ 46-51. Fry, who was at the meeting, directed Miller to take Reed to a “seclusion” room instead of her own room. Id. Fry helped Miller walk Reed, to this room, and she did not resist. Id. They then lowered her gently to the bed on the floor. Id. She remained in the room, which.was unlocked and open, for two hours. Id,. Fry claims that Reed was never placed in forced isolation. Id.
Reed tells the story differently.
Fry testified that he chose the seclusion room for Reed to decrease her stimulation and allow her an opportunity to calm herself down. (Docket # 55 ¶ 48). Reed asserts that Fry chose the seclusion room as a punitive measure without first'attempting less drastic methods for de-éscalating the situation, which was a violation of Columbia policy. Id. She also argues that Columbia’s existing policies were insufficient for the situation, claiming that they were threadbare on how to accommodate speech-impaired patients. (Docket # 59 ¶¶ 49-55).
The medical record shows that sometime later in the day on March 11, Reed expressed a desire to leave Columbia. (Docket # 55 ¶ 52); (Docket # 55-11 at 32-36). Columbia staff counseled her not to go, informing her that she was at a risk of experiencing worsening .psychiatric symptoms and that she was a danger to herself and others. (Docket # 55-11 at 33). On this advice, she rescinded her notice of intent to leave. Id. at 32; (Docket #55 ¶ 52).
At the discharge meeting with Dr. Kaplan on the morning of Monday, March 12, 2012, he' noted that although Reed had sought help for suicidal thoughts, “from the moment she came to the ward, she has been totally uncooperative.” Id. For instance, as noted above, at the intake interview f on March 8, she “practically kicked [Dr. Kaplan] out.” Id. Similarly, “over the weekend she signed an intent to leave [form], but then rescinded it.” Id. Dr. Kaplan observed that there was “no reason to believe that she is acutely suicidal. At this point, [Reed] is being disruptive to the milieu and I do not think [she] would benefit from an acute inpatient hospitalization.” Id. Reed was then discharged from Columbia’s care.
3.2 Columbia’s Ownership Structure
Columbia’s complex chain of ownership is relevant to its religious, exemption defense to Reed’s ADA claims, and so the Court must describe it in some detail. To better illustrate the parties’ competing views on the matter, the Court will first
On June 30, 2011 the Congregation of Consecrated Life and Societies of Apostolic Life of the Vatican (the “Congregation”) conferred public juridic personality on Ascension Health Ministries. Id. ¶ 16.
Ascension Health Ministries is subject to and accountable to the Congregation. Id. ¶ 19. It must submit an annual report to the Congregation which provides evidence that the integrity of faith and moráis is preserved and that its apostolic activity is in accord with the Congregation’s purposes. Id. Its 2011 report confirms that it is a ministry of the Catholic Church. Id. ¶ 25. Seven of the eleven members of Ascension Health Ministries for fiscal year 2012 were members of religious orders. Id. ¶ 20.
Ascension Health Alliance, a Missouri non-profit corporation, was formed to carry out the mission of Ascension .Health Ministries. Id. ¶ 21. Its bylaws provide that it would be governed according to the “mission, vision, and values” of Ascension Health Ministries and “in accordance with the official teachings of the Roman Catholic Church.” Id. ¶ 22. Ascension Health Ministries approved the creation of Ascension Health Alliance as the new parent organization for the Ascension healthcare system. Id. ¶¶ 23-24, 26.
Ascension Health is a Missouri non-profit and a subsidiary of Ascension Health Alliance. Id. ¶ 27. Its articles of incorporation (in effect at the relevant time) provided that it was to serve in the health ministry of the Roman Catholic Church, “to carry out its mission and ensure that the elements of Catholic identity are integrated and implemented throughout the health ministry.” Id. At the relevant time, five members of the Ascension Health board of trustees, including the chair, were members of religious orders. Id.
Columbia St. Mary’s, Inc., a Wisconsin non-profit corporation, is “sponsored” by Ascension Health and Columbia Health System, Inc., which is a non-sectarian community health system. Id. ¶ 28. Ascension Health enjoys broad powers with respect to Columbia St. Mary’s, Inc., including the power to approve its mission and vision statements; approve changes to its governing documents; appoint or remove directors, including the chairman; approve transfer , of assets and reallocation of debt among Columbia St. Mary’s, Inc. and other Ascension Health ministries; and approve of the incurrence of debt. Id. ¶ 31. Columbia St. Mary’s, Inc.’s bylaws provide that it will control any subsidiaries, including having the power to approve the subsidiary’s mission and value statements and its governing documents; approve or remove the members of the governing board; approve the operating and capital budget of the subsidiary; and approve the subsidiary’s senior executive. Id. ¶ 32.
Columbia (the defendant here) — whose legal name, is Columbia St. Mary’s Hospi
Reed does not take issue with the broad outlines of this corporate structure. Rather, she attacks it at discrete points, noting inconsistencies in the documents submitted and instances where a particular entity is nonsectarian or controlled by lay persons. For example, she claims that, based on an Ascension webpage she accessed in November 2016, it is arguable that Ascension Health Ministries may not have existed in 2012, at least not in the form Columbia describes. Id. ¶¶ 16-17. Although she does not thoroughly explain her point, the Court gathers that this would, in Reed’s view, defeat the notion that Ascension Health Ministries oversaw Ascension Health Aliance and used it to carry out Ascension Health Ministries’ Catholic mission. See (Docket # 59 ¶¶ 26-28).
Next, she contends that Ascensión Health Ministries’ 2011 report to the Congregation is not a credible source for information about its religious identity. (Docket # 55 ¶¶ 19-20). According to Reed, the report submitted by Columbia was drafted by an entity other than Ascension Health Ministries and was in fact drafted for Ascension Health Aliance. Id. She also states that “annual reports are not governing documents and are usually drafted, edited, and produced by staff members or outside contractors who may not be assumed to understand the intricate relationships among the corporate and governance structures referenced.” Id. She submitted no evidence that this report was drafted by an uninformed staff member or contractor.
Further, Reed contends that under its bylaws in effect at the time of her treatment, Ascension Health had only one corporate member, Ascension Health Alliance, which was not itself a religious order. (Docket # 59 ¶¶ 17-22). Before that time, Ascension Health had corporate members that were religious orders. Id. ¶ 19. She also asserts that Ascension Health Alliance exercised essentially complete control over Ascension Health. Id. ¶¶ 23-25. Columbia rejoins that Ascension Health and Ascension Health Aliance had several board members who were members of religious orders. Id. ¶ 18. Additionally, Ascension Health Aliance’s parent, Ascension Health Ministries, had members of religious orders in seven of its eleven board seats. Id. ¶ 22.
Of critical importance to Reed is the involvement of Columbia Health System, Inc. in this governing structure. Columbia Health System, Inc., was a co-sponsor, along with Ascension Health, of Columbia St. Mary’s, Inc. (Docket # 59 ¶ 9). It" is a non-profit but has no religious purpose,according to its bylaws. Id. In terms-of governing Columbia St. Mary’s, Inc., Columbia Health System, Inc. had the power to approve the sale, transfer or substantial change in use of all or substantially all of the assets of Columbia St. Mary’s, Inc. or its divestiture, dissolution, closure, corporate merger, corporate consolidation, change in corporate membership or corporate reorganization; to approve Columbia St. Mary’s, Inc.’s mission and vision statement; and to approve any changes to its
Reed also emphasizes that Columbia St. Mary’s, Inc.’s bylaws state that it “shall not be a Catholic facility or institution, but will not perform procedures that are inconsistent with the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services as approved .. .by the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops.” Id. ¶¶ 4-7, Under its bylaws, it does not have an express religious purpose. (Docket # 50-21 ¶¶ 1.2, 1.3, 1.4). Nevertheless, Columbia’s bylaws state that it “will respect the nonsectarian traditions and values of Columbia Health System, Inc. (“CHS”) and the statements of Mission, Vision and values of Ascension Health in accordance with the official teachings of the Roman Catholic Church and the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services[.]” (Docket # 50-20 ¶ 1.2). Further, one of its central roles is “[t]o serve in the health ministry of the Roman Catholic Church and carry out its mission.” Id. ¶ 1.3-a.
4. .ANALYSIS
As noted above, in her amended complaint, Reed brings claims for violations of Title III of the ADA, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and the Wisconsin Mental Health Act. Columbia claims exemption’ from the requirements of the ADA because it is controlled by a religious organization. It also asserts that it did not discriminate against Reed solely on the basis of her disability, 'thereby undermining her Rehabilitation Act claims. Finally, Columbia urges that in the absence of viable claims under federal law, the Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her remaining state-law claims. The Court will discuss each argument in turn. .
4.1 Religious Exemption Under the ADA
Title III of the ADA forbids discrimination against disabled individuals in places of public, accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a); PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin,
Before reaching the merits of the defense, the' Court must first determine whether Columbia has waived it. It is undisputed that Columbia formally asserted this defense for the first time in its summary judgment motion. Most affirmative defenses must be stated in a defendant’s answer or they can be deemed'waived. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c). However, if an affirmative defense is not listed in Riole 8(c), it is not clear that failure to' assert it in the answer waives it. See Winforge, Inc. v. Coachmen Indus., Inc., 691 F.Sd 856, 872 (7th Cir. 2012). The moré appropriate inquiry in these circumstances is to inquire whether Reed suffered any prejudice from Columbia’s delay in asserting the defense. Matthews v. Wis. Energy Corp., Inc.,
The Court finds no prejudice here. Reed claims that because of the late notice of this defense, she has had “neither fair notice of the defense nor a fair opportunity to conduct proper discovery on the issue.” (Docket # 64-1 at 2). Yet, in February 2016, six months before the close of discovery, Reed deposed one of Columbia’s employees about its ownership structure. At that time, Reed learned that Columbia claimed to be a “religious organization” that was “a ministry of the Roman Catholic Church.” See (Docket # 55-8 13:13-15:20). Thus, Reed has known for a substantial period that the religious exemption defense was a possibility. She also knew upon filing the suit that she was suing a hospital at least nominally associated with the Roman Catholic faith. See Spann v. Word of Faith Christian Ctr.,
The Court now turns to the merits of the religious exemption defense. As noted above, the ADA does not' apply to “religious organizations or entities controlled by religious organizations.” 42 U.S.C. § 12187. The statute does not define what it means to be a “religious organization” or to be “controlled” by one. See id. The Department of Justice, however, has explained that
[t]he ADA’s exemption of religious organizations and religious entities controlled by religious organizations is very broad, encompassing a wide variety of situations. Religious organizations and entities controlled by religious organizations have no obligations under the ADA. Even when a religious organization carries out activities that would otherwise make it a public accommodation, the religious organization is exempt from ADA coverage. Thus, if a church itself operates a day care center, a nursing home, a private school, or a diocesan school system, the operations of the center, home, school, or schools would not be subject to the requirements of the ADA or this part. The religious entity would not lose its exemption merely because the services provided were open to the general public. The test is whether the church or other religious organization operates the public accommodation, not which individuals receive the public accommodation’s services.
Religious entities that are controlled by religious organizations are also exempt from the ADA’s requirements. Many religious organizations in the United States use lay boards and other secular or corporate mechanisms to operate schools and an array of social services. The use of a lay board or other mechanism does not itself remove the ADA’s religious exemption. Thus, a parochial school, having religious doctrine in its curriculum and sponsored by a religious order, could be exempt either as a religious organization or as an entity controlled by a religious order, even if it has a lay board. The test remains a factual one — whether the church or other religious organization controls the operations of the school or of the service or whether the school or service is itself a religious organization.
28 C.F.R. Part 36, App. C; see also Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
No appellate court has yet construed Title Ill’s religious exemption. Cole v. St. Francis Med. Ctr., Case No. 1:15 CV 98 ACL,
Third, while the nuns were not involved in “the daily operation and decision-making of Agnesian’s individual healthcare facilities,” this was insufficient to defeat the exemption. Id. As the Court explained,
[a] religious organization need not directly determine the rates for medical services or directly engage in the hiring and firing of employees to control a healthcare institution. Indeed, the regulations specify that many religious organizations use lay boards and other secular mechanisms to operate social service entities, and that such “use of a lay board or other mechanism does not itself remove the ADA’s religious exemption.” 28 C.F.R. Part 36, App. B. Requiring a religious organization to be involved in the daily operations of its social service providers in order to qualify for the § 12187 religious organization exemption undermines the intended broad application of the statute.
This Court’s decision in Bose controls the outcome here. Columbia has traced its lineage back to the Vatican. The corporate entities that exist in between are overseen- in significant part by religious orders or members of religious orders. Those entities exercise control, one over the other, in accordance with Catholic dogma, as does Columbia itself. See Cole,
Reed’s response to all of this, as described previously, is to try and poke holes in Columbia’s Catholic pedigree. Throughout her submissions, Reed points to incorrect dates, missing signatures, documents that look like drafts, and webpages that suggest that certain of the entities might have existed in different forms during March 2012. See (Docket # 55 ¶¶ 16-35). These types of disputes are trivial, and generally raise only “metaphysical” doubt as to Columbia’s proffered facts regarding its ownership and control. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
Reed makes more substantive challenges to Columbia’s ownership, but they still fall short. First, although it is true that Ascension Health, one of the co-sponsors of Columbia St. Mary’s, Inc., did not have religious orders as corporate members, members of religious orders occupied many seats on the board of trustees. Further, its parent company, Ascension Health Alliance, had members of religious orders on the board as well. Tracing back one step further reveals even more members of religious -orders involved with the oversight of Ascension Health Ministries. If Reed’s argument is that this is too
Second, Reed emphasizes Columbia’s non-sectarian affiliations with her evidence regarding Columbia Health System, Inc. That entity is not itself a religious organization and is not managed by members of religious, orders. In this way, Reed’s case is similar to Rose, where. the plaintiff showed that the religious entities that controlled Agnesian shared power with other corporate members. Rose,
More importantly, Columbia Health System, Inc. does not exercise primary control over Columbia St. Mary’s, Iric. That power lay with Ascension Health, which has direct religious oversight. Ascension Health can -approve Columbia St. Mary’s, Inc,’s mission statement, approve changes to its bylawsi appoint or remove its directors, including the: chairman, and control major aspects of its finances. By contrast, Columbia Health System, Inc. exercises some similar powers, but only insofar as changes to governing structure or membership affect its interest in Columbia or in Columbia St. Mary’s, Inc. Review of Columbia St. Mary’s, -Inc.’s governing documents reveals that Ascension Health undoubtedly enjoys broader, powers than Columbia Health System, Inc. See (Docket # 50-19 at 6-7). While the precise contours of each entity’s control may be subject to debate, it is enough to say that the level of non-sectarian involvement in Columbia St.. Mary’s, Inc.’s governance does not displace the “primary role” that the Catholic Church occupies therein. Rose,
Finally, the fact that Columbia St. Mary’s, Inc. does not itself have a religious purpose does 'not undermine Columbia’s religious connection. The company’s bylaws speak of adherence to Catholic teachings regarding what procedures may be performed. Like its subsidiary, Columbia St. Mary’s, Inc.’s respect for non-sectarian involvement in its governance does not mean that it cannot be controlled by a religious organization. The undisputed facts demonstrate that the two principles can and do operate side-by-side in this instance.
For these reasons, the Court concludes that Columbia .falls within Title Ill’s, religious exemption because it is “controlled by a religious organization.” 42 U.S.C. § 12187. As a result, the Court must dismiss all of Reed’s claims brought pursuant to. the ADA.
4.2 Rehabilitation Act Claims.
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act provides that “[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability ... shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance[.]” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). For cases other than those involving employment discrimination, the Rehabilitation Act incorporates “[t]he remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq.)” Id. § 794a(2);
Yet, under either theory — and unique to claims under the Rehabilitation Act — the plaintiff must show that she was subjected to discrimination “solely by reason of’ her disability, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a); Wis. Cmty. Serve.,
Some decisions downplay this important distinction between the Rehabilitation Act and other, similar statutes like the ADA. See Wagoner v. Lemmon,
[the Rehabilitation Act] bars differential treatment “solely by reason of” an individual’s disability; the [ADA] barsdifferential treatment “because of’ the individual’s disability. No matter the common history and shared goals of the two laws, they do not - share the same text. Different words usually convey different meanings, .and that is just the case here. A law establishing liability against employers who discriminate “because of’ an employee’s disability does not require the employee to show that the disability was the “sole” cause of the adverse employment action.
Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., Inc.,
Columbia does not challenge whether Reed is disabled, whether it knew of her disabilities, or whether it could have provided additional accommodations to her. Instead, Columbia argues that Reed cannot establish that it discriminated against her solely by reason of her disability. Reed alleges that, throughout her stay at Columbia, she was subjected to systematic discrimination because of her .communication and personality disorders. Columbia asserts that its actions stemmed from the fact that Reed was an unruly, demanding, and uncooperative patient, not because of her disabilities.
The parties focus on Reed’s encounter with Miller on the morning of March 11, 2012, and although there are certainly other aspects to her claims, March 11 is the focal point. Columbia presénts the testimony of Miller and Fry that they placed Reed in seclusion that morning because of her disruptive behavior and refusing to follow instructions. Reed disagrees with their version of events, arguing instead that Miller overreacted to Reed’s request for her Dynavox, her requést to speak to her case manager, or her act of spilling coffee on herself. Critically, however, she admits that she spilled her coffee and thereafter fell to the floor screaming. She further concedes that Miller told her that she could not remain on the floor in the middle of the hallway. (Docket # 55 ¶ 43).
These concessions are fatal to her claim. In the employment context, the Seventh Circuit has explained that
[a]n employer may fire an employee for engaging in unacceptable workplace behavior without violating the ADA (or the Rehabilitation Act), even if the behavior was precipitated by a mental illness. The Rehabilitation Act protects qualified employees from discrimination ‘solely by reason of disability, meaning that if ah employer fires an employee for any reason other than that she is disabled— “even if the reason is the consequence of the disability” — there has been no violation of the Rehabilitation Act.
Brumfield v. City of Chicago,
Brumfield’s reasoning applies directly to this case. It is undisputed that Reed fell to the floor screaming after spilling coffee on herself and that Miller instructed her that she could not remain on the floor. Assuming that the rest of her story is true — that Miller brusquely carried her to a . seclusion room and left her there for two hours — it is indisputable that some portion of his
Additionally, because of the stringent causation standard applied to Rehabilitation Act claims, it does not matter whether Miller or Fry followed Columbia’s procedures for secluding Reed — or indeed, whether Columbia had any appropriate procedures. The uncontroverted facts establish that Reed’s disruptive conduct motivated their actions, and there the inquiry must end. See Johnson,
The same principle forecloses Reed’s claims about the rest of Columbia’s conduct during her stay. This includes: (1) Columbia’s refusal to show Reed her medication records; (2) Columbia’s refusal to allow Reed to use the telephone; (3) Columbia’s refusal to allow Reed to see a chaplain; (4) Columbia’s refusal to allow her the use of her Dynavox at various times; and (5) her security escort at discharge. (Docket # 37 ¶¶ 36-39). There is no dispute that throughout her time at' Columbia, Reed engaged in loud, disruptive behaviors and that she was oftentimes uncooperative in her plan of care. She attributes her conduct to her TD and other disorders, but the fact remains that Columbia responded to her actions, not solely to her disabilities. It matters not whether those actions were precipitated by her disabilities. Brumfield,
This Court’s decision in Rose, which also involved a Rehabilitation Act claim, serves as a useful contrast. There, the plaintiff, who had HIV, was referred to á surgeon for removal of her gallbladder. Rose,
Unlike Rose, here Columbia has amassed a substantial body of evidence showing that Reed’s conditions caused her to be loud, unruly, and uncooperative. Columbia’s actions were motivated, at least in part, at controlling this behavior. For instance, although Reed, complains that Fry unilaterally decided that she should not be given her Dynavox upon request, he did so because her behavior was poor. Even if he was wrong to deny her the machine for that reason, this undisputed evidence establishes that his actions were not based solely upon her disabilities. Likewise, assuming Columbia staff ignored Reed’s warning that she was allergic to psychotropic medications, there is no evidence that this was done solely because of her disabilities. The same goes for her allegations about being refused' access to her medication records, the telephone, and the hospital chaplain, as well as her discharge escort. In short, she has not shown that Columbia’s decisions in these instances were based only on stereotypes about her disabilities rather than on Reed’s behavior. Arline,
Viewed from the proper perspective, Reed’s claims are, at best, for medical malpractice or violation of her Wisconsin statutory rights, not discrimination. The Rehabilitation Act, like the ADA, “does not create a remedy for medical malpractice.” Bryant v. Madigan,
Because no reasonable factfinder could conclude that Columbia discriminated against Reed based solely on her disabilities, the Court is constrained to dismiss her Rehabilitation Act claims.
4.3 Supplemental Jurisdiction
The Court has dismissed each of Reed’s claims arising under federal law. Because no federal claims remain in this case, there is a presumption that .the Court will relinquish supplemental jurisdiction over her Wisconsin state-law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (a district court may decline to exércise supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim if it “has dismissed all claims oyer which it has original jurisdiction”); Al’s Serv. Ctr. v. BP Prods. N. Am., Inc.,
Apparently confident that her federal claims would survive, Reed devotes no argument to why the Court should retain jurisdiction over her state-law claims. On this basis alone, the Court could find that the presumption in favor of dismissal has not been rebutted. Nevertheless, the Court’s independent consideration of the factors from Sharp Electronics also adequately demonstrates that dismissal is appropriate. First, the parties have not cited and the Court has not located definitive authority on which statute of limitations applies to her Wisconsin Mental Health Act claims, so it cannot say-that a later attempt to file those claims in a Wisconsin court will be barred.
Further, although substantial time and resources have been committed to this liti
Additionally, the mere fact that this case is close to its trial date is not enough to require retention of jurisdiction. Id. at 481-82. Nor is the case’s age dispositive; although this action is over two years old, it should be noted that nine months of its life was spent on appeal to the Seventh Circuit. Compare id. at 481 (affirming decision to decline supplemental jurisdiction in 15-month-old case), with Miller Aviation v. Milwaukee Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors,
5. CONCLUSION
As detailed above, Columbia enjoys immunity from the requirements of Title III of the ADA under the statute’s religious exemption. All of Reed’s ADA claims must, therefore, be dismissed. Further, the undisputed facts show that Columbia’s alleged mistreatment of Reed during her stay in March 2012 was not premised solely on Reed’s disability. Consequently, she cannot maintain claims under the Rehabilitation Act. Finally, as no claims arising under federal law remain -in this case, the Court will exercise its discretion to dismiss Reed’s state-law claims without prejudice.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendant Columbia St. Mary’s Hospital’s motion for summary judgment (Docket # 49) be and the same is hereby GRANTED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff Linda Reed’s motion to strike Columbia’s motion for summary judgment (Docket # 51) be and the same is hereby DENIED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff Linda Reed’s motion to restrict documents (Docket # 53) be and the same is hereby GRANTED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff Linda Reed’s motion to strike Columbia’s religious exemption defense (Docket # 54) be and the same is hereby DENIED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff Linda Reed’s first, second, third, fourth,, and fifth claims in her First Amended Complaint (Docket # 37), arising under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, be and the same are hereby DISMISSED with prejudice;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff Linda Reed’s sixth, seventh, and eighth claims ini her First Amended Complaint ’ (Docket # 37), arising under the Wisconsin Mental Health Act, be and the same are 'hereby DISMISSED without prejudice; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this action be and the same is.hereby DISMISSED.
Notes
. Reed also filed a motion to strike the entirety of Columbia's motion for summary judgment on the ground that if did not state with particularity the relief sought, in violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7(b). (Docket # 51); Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(b), Reed does not explain precisely what is deficient in Columbia’s motion, and the Court finds no ambiguity in Columbia’s request that her suit be dismissed. Perhaps Reed is complaining about Columbia’s decision not to file a motion separate from its memorandum in support? She
. Reed’s version of events is based almost exclusively on an online complaint about her experience at Columbia she purportedly filed with the Wisconsin Department of Health Services in July 2012. (Docket # 55-26); (Docket # 59 ¶ 1). Defendant disputes the foundation for the document, claiming it was never produced in discovery despite being responsive to its requests for production. (Docket # 59 ¶ 1). Defendant requests that the document, not be considered here. (Docket # 56 at 5-6). The Court notes that the online complaint is not sworn. However, Reed incorporated the document by reference into her affidavit she submitted along with her opposition to Columbia’s motion for summary judgment, See (Docket # 55-25). Because the statements in the online complaint do not save Reed’s claims, the Court will assume without deciding that the online complaint has a sufficient foundation and should not be stricken for its prior nondisclosure.
. Reed appears to deny the entirety of Miller’s and'Fry’s account of events in her responses to Columbia’s proposed statements of fact. See (Docket # 55 ¶¶ 38-50). Yet the 2012 online complaint she submitted, see supra note 2, which in most cases is the only basis for her denial, does not actually contain express denials of everything that her opponents say occurred, such as her screaming while she was on the floor; The online complaint is inadequate to dispute those facts it does not address. See Johnson v. Shinseki, No. 08-C-471,
. Columbia explains that this is the Roman Catholic Church’s equivalent of creating a corporation under civil law. (Docket # 49 at 5 n.3).
. Reed also attempts to show that Columbia Center Birth Hospital, a hospital owned by Columbia St. Mary’s, Inc., performs contraceptive operations like vasectomies, in violation of Catholic doctrine. See (Docket # 59 ¶¶ 14-16). She does not explain why the operations of that facility are relevant here, nor does she draw a competent evidentiary chain between that hospital and those who control Columbia. For example, Columbia St. Mary's, Inc. does not list this entity in its bylaws as one which it controls. (Docket # 50-21 ¶ 1.4-c). The Court does not find Reed’s evidence .on this point — an image of a webpage captured in November 2016 — to be competent evidence on the question of Columbia's organizational affiliations in March 2012. See (Docket # 55-7).
. If she did not have .the necessary materials for responding to the defense, she could have sought more time to respond to Columbia’s motion pursuant to Rule 56(d), but she did not. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d)(2) ("If a nonmovant shows by affidavit or declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition, the court may ,.. allow time to obtain affidavits or declarations or to take discovery.”).
. The Act also contemplates a cause of action for retaliation after an individual asserts her rights under the Act. Reed,
. Reed relies heavily on the Court of Appeals' prior opinion in this case, but that reliance is misplaced. In reviewing Reed’s initial complaint, the Seventh Circuit addresséd Reed’s allegation that she asked for her Dynavox and was then,, without provocation, thrown into seclusion. See Reed,