In this action for no-fault insurance •benefits, plaintiff appeals as of right the orders of the Clinton Circuit Court that granted defendant’s motion for specific performance of a settlement agreement and denied plaintiff leave to file a second amended complaint. Wе affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand the case for further proceedings.
i
Steven Troy was severely injured in an automobile accident on July 6, 1984, and left unable to care for himself. Steven resided in several different treatment facilities for the next 2Vi years before he moved into a house purchased by plaintiff, his mother, in trust for him.* 1 Defendant has paid personal injury protection benefits for numerous expenses sustained by plaintiff, including the cost of the twenty-four-hour nursing care Steven requires.
Plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant for damages and a first amendеd complaint for damages on February 3 and March 17, 1988, respectively, alleging that defendant had failed to pay certain expenses due plaintiff under the insurance policy and the no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq.; MSA 24.13101 et seq. After several months of negotiation, a proposed agreement was reached *446 that would have settled the bulk of the disputed claims. Plaintiff signed a copy of the settlement agreement and sent a facsimile to her attorney, who presented it to the trial court during a pretrial conference on September 22, 1989. At the conference, counsеl for both parties expressed their satisfaction with the agreement. The only issue remaining concerned plaintiffs claim, not yet pleaded, for "room and board” expenses for Steven. The trial court issued an order on September 25, 1989, that noted the settlement agreement, dirеcted how the parties were to proceed with regard to the remaining issue, and closed "If either attorney believes any provisions of this order should be modified, they are requested to so advise the Court and opposing counsel within seven days after receiving this order.”
A hearing was held on October 20, 1989, for the purpose of formally placing the settlement agreement on the record. At the hearing, plaintiff indicated that she was no longer satisfied with its provisions and declined defendant’s tender of the settlement amount. The trial court reserved its judgment regarding thе enforceability of the agreement.
Plaintiff thereafter moved for leave to file a second amended complaint that included a claim for room and board. The trial court denied leave, holding that an injured person’s daily living expenses or room and board are nоt recoverable under MCL 500.3107; MSA 24.13107, because such expenses would have been incurred regardless of the injury sustained. Thus, leave was denied because the proposed amended complaint had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Defendant was grаnted specific performance of the settlement agreement.
*447 ii
On appeal, plaintiff claims that the settlement agreement is unenforceable for a number of reasons. We disagree.
An agreement to settle a lawsuit is a contract that is subject to the legal principles generally applied to contracts.
Scholnick’s Importers-Clothiers, Inc v Lent,
A
Plaintiff argues that the agreement is not enforceable because it contains four conditions precedent that have not occurred. A "condition precedent” is a fact or event that the parties intend must take place before there is a right to performance.
Knox v Knox,
According to plaintiff, the following four terms in the settlement agreement аre conditions precedent: (1) plaintiff will create a record showing a *448 release of the claims resolved by the agreement; (2) plaintiff will dismiss pending litigation that is resolved by the agreement; (3) both parties will agree that the settled issues will not be raised in a future dispute; and (4) plaintiff will cоordinate with defendant’s medical manager any planned treatment changes that will be submitted to defendant for payment. These terms are not conditions precedent, rather, they are either rights or duties of the parties and do not limit performance. In particular, we note that the latter two "conditions” are perpetual.
B
Plaintiff also claims that no agreement was ever reached because her offer was withdrawn before defendant accepted. To the contrary, the record is clear that plaintiff accepted an offer made by defendant. Plaintiff executed a copy of the proposed agreement that defendant had sent to her. The agreement was then presented to the trial court as a binding agreement. This argument is without merit. Moreover, the agreement is in writing and signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought. MCR 2.507(H).
c
Finally, plaintiff claims that the agreement is void because it lacks mutuality of obligation and mutuality of assent. Plaintiff does not clearly distinguish between these two terms, but premises her argument on the erroneous assumption that she, not defendant, had made an offer that was revoked before defendant could accept. According to plaintiff, "[s]ince no representative of Defendant ever executed the document, Plaintiff would not *449 have a claim against Defendant for specific performance.”
Besides being based on an erroneous assumption, this argument confuses "mutuality of obligation” with "mutuality of remedy.” Sеe
Domas v
Rossi,
The order granting defendant’s motion for specific performance of the settlement agreement is affirmed.
hi
We agree with plaintiff, however, that the trial court erred in not granting plaintiff leave to file a second amended complaint seeking reimbursement
*450
for "room and board.”
3
The grant or denial of leave to amend is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
Ben P Fyke & Sons v Gunter Co,
The question befоre us is whether under MCL 500.3107(l)(a); MSA 24.13107(l)(a) room and board, admittedly an "allowable expense” where an insured’s injuries require that he reside in an institution, is also an allowable expense when the insured who could be institutionalized is cared for at home. We hold that it is.
MCL 500.3107(l)(a); MSA 24.13107(l)(a) defines "allowable expеnse”:
Except as provided in subsection (2), personal protection insurance benefits are payable for the following:
(a) Allowable expenses consisting of all reasonable charges incurred for reasonably necessary products, services and accоmmodations for an in *451 jured person’s care, recovery, or rehabilitation. Allowable expenses within personal protection insurance coverage shall not include charges for a hospital room in excess of a reasonable and customary charge fоr semiprivate accommodations except if the injured person requires special or intensive care, or for funeral and burial expenses in the amount set forth in the policy which shall not be less than $1,750.00 or more than $5,000.00.
In
Manley v DAIIE,
The no-fault act is remedial in nature and must be liberally construed in favor of persons intended to benefit thereby.
Gobler v Auto-Owners Ins Co,
We see no compelling reason not to afford the same compensation under the act to family mem-, bers who provide room and board. Subsection 1(a) does not distinguish between accommodations provided by family members and accommodations provided by institutions, and we decline to read such a distinction into the act. Moreover, holding that accommodations provided by family members is an "allowable expense” is in accord with the policy of this state. See
Sharp v Preferred Risk Mutual Ins Co,
*453
We hold that, where an injured person is unable to care for himself and would be institutionalized were a family member not willing to provide home care, a no-fault insurer is liable to pay the cost of maintenance in the home. We disagree with the rule stated in this Court’s opinion in
Manley
that expenses that are as necessary for uninjured persons as they are for injured persons are not allowable expenses. Rather, we agree with Justice Boyle’s opinion in
Manley
that the rule is unwieldy and unworkable. "Where a person who normally would require institutional treatment is cared for at home in a quasi-institutional setting made possible by the love and dedication of the injured victim’s family, the test for 'allowable expenses’ should not differ from that set out in MCL 500.3107(a); MSA 24.13107(a).”
Manley
Plaintiff’s proposed second amended complaint stated a claim upon which relief could be granted. Hence, the trial court’s basis for refusing to grant *454 leave to amend was erroneous. 4 We therefore reverse the order that denied plaintiff leave to amend her complaint and remand the case so that plaintiff may renew her motion.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
Notes
The parties dispute the nature of Steven’s and plaintiffs ownership interests in the house.
See also 1 Restatement Contracts, 2d, § 79(c), 200 (if the requirement of consideration is met, there is no additional requirement of mutuality of obligation prerequisite to the formation of a contract).
Plaintiffs proposed second amended complaint alleged, in pertinent part:
14. The following prоducts, services and accommodations are reasonably necessary for Steven Troy’s care, recovery or rehabilitation:
(a) The accommodations being provided by the Plaintiff at the home in Corpus Christi;
15. The following products, services and accommodations have been incurred for Steven Troy’s care, recovery and rehabilitation.
(a) Reasonable accommodation expenses from December 15, 1986 through the date of trial ....
Given the prior amount of uncertainty in this area of the law, the trial court cannot be criticized for its error.