1 Sumn. 195 | U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Massachusetts | 1832
This libel presents a ease somewhat novel in the annals of our maritime jurisprudence. Upon the more general question suggested upon the posture of the facts, I have no difficulty. I am clearly of opinion, that a seaman, .who is taken sick, or is injured, or disabled in the service of the ship, without any fault on his own part, is by the maritime law entitled to be healed at the expense of the ship. I do not go over the authorities on this subject. They will be found in some measure collected In the opinion delivered in Harden v. Gordon [Case No. 6,047], to which I deliberately adhere. So far as any act of congress has changed or modified the principle of the maritime law, it is to be deemed, jiro tanto, repealed; so far as it stands unaffected by any such legislation, it is to be followed out to all its just results.
Various objections to the claim have been made on behalf of the respondents. It has been said, that there is no case of any claim in the admiralty for compensation after the voyage has been performed, and the party has been discharged from the ship; and in the present case, the voyage terminated, and the party was lawfully discharged in a day or two after the accident. But upon this point it is unnecessary to say more, than that, if the principle of the maritime law extends to cases circumstanced like the present, the admiralty is perfectly competent to administer a suitable remedy; since its jurisdiction attached to it as a right, while the party was in the maritime service; and the extent of the compensation is but an incident to the possession of the principal claim. It is but an ascertainment of damages, flowing from a claim of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.
Another objection is, that the maritime law applies only to sickness, and accidents, and injuries occurring in the ship’s service during the voyage abroad, and not, when she is in the home port, either at the commencement or termination of her voyage. But I know of no such qualification ingrafted upon the rule of the maritime law. It embraces all sickness, and all injuries, sustained in the service of the ship, and while the party constitutes one of her crew, without in the slightest manner alluding to any difference be
It has been suggested, that a seaman at home cannot be entitled to any claim against the owners of the ship for injuries received in the ship's service, any more than a mechanic or manufacturer at home for like injuries in the service of his employer. If the maritime law were the same in all respects with the common law, and if the rights and duties of seamen were measured in the same manner, as those of mechanics and manufacturers at home, doubtless the cases would furnish a strong analogy. But the truth is, that the maritime law furnishes entirely different doctrines upon this, as well as many other subjects, from the common law. Seamen are in some sort co-adventurers upon the voyage; and lose their wages upon casualties, which do not affect artisans at home. They share the fate of the ship in cases of shipwreck and capture. They are liable to different rules of discipline and sufferings from landsmen. The policy of the maritime law, for great, and wise, and benevolent purposes, has built up peculiar rights, privileges, duties, and liabilities in the sea-service. which do not belong to home pursuits. The law of the ocean may be said in some sort to be a universal law, gathering up and binding together what is deemed most useful for the general intercourse, and navigation, and trade of all nations. Who ever heard of salvage being allowed for saving property on land? Who ever heard of any civilized nation,, which denied it for salvage services at sea, or on the sea-coast? It is impossible, therefore, with any degree of security, to reason from the doctrines of the mere municipal cqde in relation to purely home pursuits, to those more enlarged principles, which guide and control the administration of the maritime law.
It is said, that the acts of congress respecting hospital money, and the relief of sick and disabled seamen, provide suitable means for the relief of seamen in the home ports; and therefore may be deemed to supersede the maritime law, even if it reaches to relief in cases like the present. But it appears to me, that they are rather to be deemed auxiliary to the maritime law. They reach cases, where the maritime law gives no relief: and are far different in their scope and operation from mere cases of injuries and sickness, while in the ship’s service. They are founded upon the great national policy of providing means for the relief of seamen, who are sick and disabled, by withdrawing a small fund, from time to time, from their maritime earnings. They compel seamen, (a most gallant, but improvident class of men,) to contribute somewhat in the day of their prosperity towards their own relief, when sickness and casualties overtake and cripple them. Act 179S, e. 94 [1 Story’s Laws, 554; 1 Stat. 605, c. 77], — the first of the series, — provides, that the master or owner of every ship or vessel of the United States, arriving from a foreign port into any port of the United States, shall pay to the collector at the rate of twenty cents per month, out of his wages, for every seaman employed on board of the vessel, since she was last entered at any port of the United States. Another section extends the like provision to vessels engaged in the coasting trade. By the same act the president of the United States is authorized, out of the funds so raised, to provide for the temporary relief and maintenance of sick and disabled seamen in the hospitals, or other institutions now established in the ports of the United States; or in ports, where no such institutions exist, in such other manner as he shall direct; .provided that the moneys collected in any one district shall be expended within the same. And the surplus is reserved as a fund for the erection of hospitals for the accommodation of sick and disabled seamen. I need not dwell upon the subsequent amend-atory acts (Act 1799, c. 142 [3 Bior. & D. Laws 2G6; 1 Stat. 729, c. 30]; Act 1802, c. 51 [2 Story’s Laws, 878 ; 2 Stat. 192]; Act 1811, c. 93 [2 Story's Laws, 1187; 2 Stat. G51, c. 29)1, because they have not changed the objects of the charity. These still remain,
It has been asked, if, in a claim of this sort, the expenses of cure are to be paid by the ship, what are the limits of the allowance? May they be extended over years or for life? Are they to be, like the pensions allowed by some of the marine ordinances, in cases of wounds and other injuries, received by seamen in defending the ship from ilie attacks of pirates? My answer to suggestions of this sort is, that the law embodies, in its very formulary, the limits of the liability. The seaman is to be cured at the expense of the ship, of the sickness or injury sustained in the ship’s service. It must be sustained by the party, while in the ship’s service; and he is not to receive any compensation, or allowance for the effects of the injury. But so far, and so far only, as expenses are incurred in the cure, whether they are of a medical or other nature, for diet, lodging, nursing, or other assistance, they are a charge on, and to be borne by, the ship. The sickness or other injury may occasion a temporary or permanent disability;, but that is not a ground for indemnity from the owners. They are liable only for expenses necessarily incurred for- the cure; and when the cure is completed, at least so far as the ordinary medical means extend,, the owners are freed from all further liability. They are not in any just sense liable for consequential damages. The question, then, in all such cases is, what expenses have been virtually incurred for the cure; not what might, under other circumstances, be incurred. The owner is not to respond for charity actually administered by others, but for expenses. He is not to pay what may remunerate the sufferer for his losses, or what in compassion or humanity he might demand; but what the law has measured out as the limit of justice. Cases, indeed, may occur, where a seaman may be entitled to a far different compensation, as where he has gone beyond the line of his duty, and saved the ship from impending perils. There, he may be entitled to a more ample compensation, in the nature of a salvage, to indemnify him for any wounds or injuries sustained in this extraordinary service. The-case, put by Cleirac and others, (see Cleirac, Jugemens d’Oleron, arts. 6, 7, and note by Cleirac; Consolato del Mare, c. 1S2, e. 137;. 2 Pard. Coll. Mar. 152,) of wounds sustained in defending the ship against pirates, may be of this nature. But it then probably falls under the head of a general average, for the benefit of all concerned, or of a salvage service, which entitles the party to a full recompense. That is not the present case; and it may well be left for decision, until it shall arise directly in judgment. And this leads me to remark, that the present is not a case, where the expenses are to be deemed a general average charge upon all, who are concerned in the voyage. It is strictly a charge upon the ship-owners; and comes out of their earnings, or arises from their proprietary interest in the voyage. Although seamen in whaling voyages are compensated by shares of the proceeds, this compensation is always treated as in the nature of wages. They are never deemed partners, although they may be said to partake of the profits of the voyage. And the very nature of the service excludes the notion of partnership. It would defeat the very objects of the parties. The apportionment of the proceeds is only a mode of ascertaining their compensa
The only remaining ground, upon which the claim is resisted is, that the injury was not sustained in the service of the ship, but by the fault of the libellant. And if this be maintained in xtoint of fact, it is certainly a sufficient answer to the claim. The ground is this, that the seamen, although in the ship's service at the time of the accident, were guilty of gross negligence in not returning to the ship at an earlier hour, according to the orders given to them by the mate on giving them leave to quit the boat; and that the accident would have been wholly avoided by a return at an earlier hour. The orders, it is said, were, that they should return in a half-hour; and they did not return until after the lapse of an hour or two. It is not very easy to reconcile the evidence on this point, either as to the nature of the •orders, or the time of the return. But some latitude must be allowed, in cases of this nature, in the construction of the orders, whatever may have been the exact terms, in which they were conveyed. They were probably understood to import no more than, that they must return to the ship at an early and reasonable hour. They could scarcely have been intended to tie up the seamen to the exact limit of a half-hour, without any departure from the punctum temporis. There was no pressing emergency leading to the necessity of such a construction of the orders. There was nothing in the then state of the weather, or the admonition of the mate, or the nature of the service, requiring such extraordinary punctuality. If there had been, and it might have been foreseen, that delay would be attended with a great accumulation of dangers, or serious mis-chiefs to the ship's service, the ease might admit of a very different consideration. Suppose the crew had overstayed the time but five minutes, and the accident had occurred, could it be contended, that the owners were exonerated? It would be a most inconvenient and unjustifiable course to tie up the maritime law to such niceties. We must look to the nature of the service, and the general import of the orders, in cases of this sort. The most rigid promptitude may be exacted in some cases; while in others a more indulgent rule may be fairly employed. All that could have been intended in this case is, that the boat should return to a ship in a reasonable time in the course of the evening. I think the weight of the evidence decidedly is, that she did return in a reasonable time, and not at a very late hour. And I am by no means satisfied, that it is clearly made out in proof, that the boat would not have met with the accident, if her departure had been at an earlier hour. Besides, the accident occurred, while the libellant and the others of the boat's crew were actually in the ship’s service. There is no pretence to say, that in the management of the boat there was any negligence. The neglect, if any, was in the non-compliance with the strict terms of the orders. They obeyed the orders in returning, but not as promptly as was required. Now, it may bo reasonably doubted, if under such circumstances, any thing short of gross negligence could forfeit, on their part, their ordinary rights. We must here, as in many other cases, not extend our inquiries too far back into independent causes. Causa próxima, non remota, spectator, is the doctrine of the law, founded upon common sense and convenience in the ordinary transactions of human life. The storm here was the immediate cause' of the injury,, and not, strictly speaking, the fault of the boat’s crew. But if such a rule were inapplicable, still, I think, there might be gross negligence, that is, that sort of negligence, which the law denominates crassa negligeutia, and which would operate somewhat like a fraud upon the owners. Ordinary negligence, consistent with entire good and a sober intention to comply with duty, and, much less, slight negligence, ought not to be visited with so deep a forfeiture. Repentance and a return to duty, even after a fault, are not in the maritime law visited with such extraordinary severity. It is rather the tendency of that law to wink at slight offenses, and to punish those only which are gross and deeply injurious to the ship’s service. It does not appear to me, that, in the present case. there was any gross negligence, or any unreasonable and intentional delay on the part of the boat's crew, in wilful -disobedience of orders. The case, therefore, is not made out in point of fact, so as to require the application of a forfeiture of the common claim.
Then, again, it is urged, that the claim comes too late, or so late, that it furnishes a strong reason for rejecting it. Certainly this court is not disposed to entertain old and stale claims. But the delay is here quite consistent with good faith. And, indeed, it is obvious, that it was founded wholly in a mistake of the party’s rights. The libellant was ignorant that such a claim was maintainable; and has been prompt enough to bring it forward, since he has been enlightened on the subject. If it had been clear, that this delay had worked any real mischiefs to the resj^ondents, the court would extremely regret it. But if the libellant’s ignorance of the law ought not to avail in his favor,'the respondents cannot avail themselves of a like ignorance to escape from
I do not understand, that there is any ob.jection to the amount awarded by the dis-triet court, if the principle is right. Being of opinion, that the principle is right. I shall, therefore, affirm the decree. But as the question is new, and the controversy most fairly submitted to the court, I shall direct, that each party pay his own costs in this court.