Lead Opinion
In this case, we granted certiorari to determine whether the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that there was insufficient evidence to support a jury’s finding that Chang Sop Chong breached an oral contract he entered into with Reebaa Construction Company, Inc. to build out the unfinished basement of his home. See Chong v. Reebaa Constr. Co.,
In the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, the record shows that, in early 2003, Chong, an attorney, entered into a “handshake agreement” with Reebaa Construction to finish the 4,000 square foot basement of his home. Chong initially represented that he wanted a simple basement with few frills, and a “Construction Memo & Job List” was generated to reflect this desire. The total renovation price set forth in the memo was approximately $96,000. Construction began, and Chong started making regular payments to Reebaa. Chong, however, decided that the original construction plan was too basic and began requesting significant changes to the simple renovation, including, among other things, marble floors, granite coun-tertops, oversized doors, and a steam shower. Chong personally requested each of these changes, chose the materials, and repeatedly instructed Reebaa that “money was no object.” Prior to carrying out Chong’s requests, Reebaa informed Chong that it would cost considerably more than initially quoted to complete the work, and Chong was made privy to the cost of many of the additional materials. Nonetheless, Chong simply stated that Reebaa should do the additional requested work and submit a bill to him at a later time. The expense of the changes requested by Chong amounted to approximately $128,000 over the original “memo” price.
Although Chong paid Reebaa approximately $108,000 while work was ongoing, Chong refused to make any more payments after the work was substantially completed in August 2003. Reebaa then sued Chong for breach of contract. Following a jury trial, Reebaa was awarded $154,954 in damages and $140,112 in attorney fees. Chong then filed an appeal, and the Court of Appeals reversed the verdict and remanded the case for a new trial, finding that, because there was insufficient evidence to show that the parties agreed upon a definite price for the change-order work, no enforceable contract existed and Reebaa’s only remedy was based on quantum meruit, not breach of contract.
1. In this case, the trial court’s affirmance of the jury verdict and denial of Chong’s motion for new trial should be affirmed if there is any evidence supporting these decisions.
The general rule undoubtedly is that, where there is some evidence to support the verdict found by the jury, and where the verdict found by the jury has been approved by the trial judge, manifested by his overruling of the motion for new trial upon the general grounds, we are bound to conclude that the judge exercised the sound discretion which the law wisely placed in his hands, and this court will be reluctant to interfere.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Jackson v. State,
In this case, there was evidence that supported the jury’s determination that the necessary elements of an enforceable contract between Chong and Reebaa existed for the change orders, including price. Chong was intimately involved in the renovation of his basement, and when he began requesting construction upgrades, he was instructed that substantial changes of the kind that he was requesting would significantly increase the price of construction. Nonetheless, Chong responded by saying that money was no object and that he should simply be billed for the additional work. This evidence would
“The law does not favor destroying contracts on the basis of uncertainty, and a contract that may originally have been indefinite may later acquire more precision and become enforceable because of the subsequent words or actions of the parties.” Sanders v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co.,
2. Moreover, even if the contract in this case could be considered too indefinite to enforce,
[a] party may enter into a contract invalid and unenforceable, and by reason of the covenants therein contained and promises made in connection with the same, wrongfully cause the opposite party to forego a valuable legal right to his detriment, and in this manner by his conduct waive the right to repudiate the contract and become estopped to deny the opposite party any benefits that may accrue to him under the terms of the agreement.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. of Dothan, Ala. v. First Nat. Bank of Columbus,
3. Because the Court of Appeals wrongly determined that the trial court erred, it did not reach the merits of Chong’s argument that the trial court improperly assessed attorney fees against him pursuant to OCGA § 13-6-11. Accordingly, we must remand this case to the Court of Appeals for consideration of this issue.
Judgment reversed and case remanded.
Concurrence Opinion
concurring.
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the modification to the parties’ original contract was enforceable. I write to emphasize that, although the price of the work beyond that envisioned in the parties’ original contract was initially indefinite, once that work was completed pursuant to the parties’ general agreement, the price of the work became definite and the modification of the initial contract enforceable. When parties enter an agreement that is too indefinite as to price, “ ‘they may cure this defect by their subsequent conduct. . . . Actual performances under a general indefinite arrangement may . . . make the general arrangement an enforceable contract.’ ”
In conclusion, in the present case, although the price of the variations and additions requested
Notes
Pine Valley Apts. Ltd. Partnership v. First State Bank,
Pine Valley Apts. Ltd. Partnership,