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Redmond v. Carter
247 N.W.2d 268
Iowa
1976
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*1 MODIFIED; refusing appoint discretion in AND MODIFIED, abused its AS AF- children, FIRMED, attorney represent an AND REMANDED FOR EN- 598.12, conformity with section OF parties TRY DECREE IN CONFORMITY Code, 1975. HEREWITH. MOORE, J., RAWLINGS, C. REES 598.12, Code, provides: Section REYNOLDSON, JJ., concur. an may appoint attorney rep “The court the interests of resent minor child or HARRIS, J., concurs in result. parties.” We children have not been required to address this heretofore. us, however, provi

It is obvious that the

sions of section 598.12 the Code are direc and not

tory only mandatory and acted per

trial court within latitude refusing missible discretion in REDMOND, Petitioner, appoint James M. attorney represent children. find no merit therefore issue stated Hon. James H. CARTER et by the appellant. review al., Respondents, appendix in this case consists of Turner, of Iowa State ex rel. Richard C. pages. The entire transcript of testi Attorney General, Intervenor. mony, pages plus about 40 pages of 59949. No. exhibits, reproduced is embraced in the ap pendix. Most of the transcripted testimony Supreme Court of Iowa. unnecessary and irrelevant to the issues Nov. 1976. stated. The cost certificates appellant’s attorney printer Rehearings indicate Denied Jan. the cost of appendix 10, 1977. printing glar $821.94. Feb. This ing 344.1, violation of rule Rules of Civil

Procedure, is more striking when we ob appellant’s

serve the brief and argument of only

consists 18 pages, including cap sheet, index and table authorities,

and appellee’s brief and consists pages

of 10 including caption page, one

page showing proof of service and two

pages index and table of authorities.

Certainly parties must share the respon

sibility for the expenditure wasteful of mo

nies in printer’s fees for the preparation of appendix. court the trial the decree of

We conclude II out in division as set modified

must be this case for remand

hereinabove by the trial orders proper

entry of to the’ regard with the decree

modifying minor money for the support

payment otherwise affirmed. This case is

children. respondent- taxed two-thirds

Costs are petitioner-appel- and one-third

appellant

lee. *2 M. pro

James Redmond se. Turner, Gen., Atty. C. Richard for inter- venor. Davis,

Eugene David J. Grace, John K. Davis, and Paul E. Horvath of Vernon Scott Grace, Moines, Des respondents for & Car- ter, Oxberger. Allbee and Harry Druker John B. of Cart- Grier Marshalltown, wright, Ryden, Druker & for Donielson and respondents Snell. McCORMICK, Justice. accepted original jurisdiction of this supervisory our power under order

case whether district court to decide are eligible to the Iowa Court Appeals. We hold are accordingly dismiss supervisory pe- review and petition court to which they nominated, intervention. tition of and shall be of such age will be able serve initial and one regular Appeals Court of is an interme- The Iowa term office which they are nominat- appellate diate court created Acts 66 reaching before ed age of seventy- G.A., July effective 1976. The S.F. *3 years. person two No shall be eligible for court, court, like the district has supreme by a nomination commission as judge always provided been for in the Iowa Con- during the term for which he was However, legislature the elected has al- stitution. to appointed commission.” empowered to create ways been additional supreme of the the level courts below court. Respondents Carter, James H. Robert G. V, art. 1. Ia.Const. § and Leo Oxberger Allbee were among From 1857 until the Constitution persons nominated to fill the five initial “ * * judge a district court provided on the court of positions appeals, and they any office, ineligible shall be to other ex- among five persons appointed were the to Judge Supreme Court, of cept that of by court the Governor. At the time of during the term for which he was elected.” their and appointment nomination they V, art. In 1962 the Ia.Const. § judges. were district court Respondents Iowa people adopted of to amendment and Snell, Allen Donielson Bruce M. Jr. establishing nonpartisan the Constitution persons the other two appointed were to the judicial of system merit selection and ten- of appeals court from the list of nominees. V, 5, repealed ure. amendment The art. § question No is raised regarding the statu- following and included the language re- tory eligibility of respondents to receive garding eligibility judges of district court appointments. Rather, their petitioner, hold other office: a taxpayer and who senator, state and Supreme “Judges Court and Dis- intervenor State of Iowa challenge the eli- ineligible shall trict Court other of gibility respondents Carter, Allbee and the state while of serving office said Oxberger V, under art. 18, of § the amend- thereafter, years and two court ex- Constitution. ed Petitioner also contends Judges cept that District shall be ineligibility of respondents these has office Supreme Judge.” to the of Court effect invalidating of appointments art. 18. Ia.Const. § respondents of Donielson Snell, and but in- The amendment added: tervenor does not share that view. judicial “Other officers shall be selected The determinative question is whether manner shall and have such ten- V, 18, art. must § be construed and applied ure, compensation qualification and other to make court judges ineligible for bemay by fixed law.” appointment court appeals until legislation creating The of ap- court years two after leave the district peals provides appointees court to the court. satisfy appeals require- the same arguments judges supreme ments as the parties court. on this G.A., along fall two Acts 66 S.F. principal 14. Statutory lines. One to ascertainment qualifications supreme for the relates and the intent court are prescribed 46.14, provision. district court framers Petitioner and intervenor Code: insist that its meaning is evident the language used and that “Such nominees shall be such lan- chosen guage plainly vote makes affirmative of a district court majority judges of the full ineligible for statutory number of commissioners years the basis of their until two qualifications and with- after leave the regard political Respondents Carter, out Nomi- court. affiliation. Allbee Iowa, nees shall be members of the Oxberger bar of insist that a reasonable shall be residents of state or district practical construction of provision, (Fla.1972); State, Johnson pur- demonstrable light of its evident and Civil Service application deny Department, its dis- precludes Minn. pose, N.W.2d 747 right of State ex Walsh, trict rel. Gralike v. higher judicial office. state See, 70 (Mo.1972). S.W.2d generally, An not., 28 A.L.R.3d 717. line of relates to second Carter, allegations respondents Allbee The fourteenth amendment provides Oxberger ap- that the construction and part in relevant that no state “deny shall provision urged by petition- plication any person jurisdiction within its the equal deprive and intervenor them of er protection of the A laws.” state cannot United rights assured under the States Con- provision any evade this more its consti stitution, right including equal pro- tution than by legislation. Turner v. tection the law under fourteenth Fouche, supra. Petitioner amendment. *4 The equal protection pro clause any deprivation that would deny occur. scribes state action which irrationally dis Because we is find the answered among criminates persons. Brightman v. of par- examination and resolution City Civil Serv. Com’n. of of Des Moines, argument, we second line of do not ties’ 588, (Iowa 1973). 204 N.W.2d 591 We rec Instead, we assume for first. reach ognize that it is often necessary for the petitioner of this that decision purposes persons into state to divide classes for legit are correct in construction intervenor purposes, imate state but the distinction V, 18, and we Ia.Const. art. hold that drawn between classes not be arbi judges as a rights of district class under trary or unreasonable. The classification equal protection of the four- clause must be based some apparent differ amendment United States teenth ence in situation or circumstances of the infringed by applica- would be Constitution subjects placed within one class or the make ineligi- them other which the necessity establishes pro or the court appeals. for ble priety of discrimination between them. provisions Federal constitutional have discrimination is Such unreasonable if the a of cases held in number in various been classification lacks a rational relationship to to bar enforcement of circumstances state legitimate purpose. state Weber v. Aetna statutory restrictions on constitutional Co., Casualty Surety 164, 172, & 406 U.S. 92 eligibility public for office. Turner v. 1400, 1405, 768, 31 L.Ed.2d (1972). S.Ct. 777 Fouche, 346, 532, 90 396 U.S. S.Ct. 24 analysis applied Traditional equal pro (1970); Rhodes, 567 v. L.Ed.2d Williams 393 challenges involving ordinary tection re 23, 5, (1968); U.S. 89 S.Ct. 21 L.Ed.2d 24 eligibility public strictions on office. McFarland, 138, 56 v. Ariz. 106 Stockton Carter, 134, Bullock v. 405 U.S. 142-143, 92 (1940); 328 Fort v. Civil Service Com’n P.2d 849, 855, 92, 31 L.Ed.2d (1972). S.Ct. 99 Alameda, 331, 61 Cal.2d County of 38 625, (1964); Cal.Rptr. 392 P.2d 385 v. Accordingly, State if classification is em Inc., Superior County, establishing qualifications Court of Marion 238 ployed 421, (1958); office, Riley 151 N.E.2d 508 public Ind. v. it must be based on a real and Cordell, 200 (1948); Okl. 194 P.2d 857 having substantial difference a reasonable Minielly State, legitimate object v. 242 Or. govern 411 P.2d 69 relation to a (1966); Beasley Cunningham, v. 171 of North Hemp Tenn. ment. Landes v. Town 334, 103 (1937); stead, 417, 420, S.W.2d 18 v. 284 State Zimmer N.Y.2d N.Y.S.2d man, (1946). However, 249 Wis. 24 N.W.2d 504 231 N.E.2d un held Restrictions have been to meet federal der this standard a classification does not equal protection simply deny constitutional standards other circum because in practice inequality. in other cases. See Jenness v. stances Fort results in some Prac son, problems permit 403 U.S. tical government rough S.Ct. L.Ed.2d Quinn Stone, accommodations, 259 So.2d 492 classification will upheld if reasonably appeals state facts court of does not promote the sepa justify conceived to Lunday powers.

can be it. ration of The district court and (Iowa Vogelmann, N.W.2d appeals court of nonpartisan; both 1973). hence such exclusion does not serve the goal of nonpartisanship. Judges are selected for The construction of Ia.Const. art. appeals the court of through nonpartisan by petitioner advocated and inter system, merit which intervenor acknowl making the effect of venor has district edges properly makes judges ineligible as a class for ap judicial other eligible officers for the su to the court of until pointment two court; preme thus the exclusion does not years after leave district court. the goal advance of inhibiting trafficking in meeting lawyers All other the statutory public office either. requirements, including judicial officers magistrates, part-time such as full-time Petitioner and rely heavi magistrates judges, and district associate ly principle on the that a person does not comprise persons the class of right a constitutional public em appeals. However, ployment. is not the issue. time, judges join At the same issue whether the state can arbitrari group up make the class persons eligi ly regulate public employment. It is well highest that, the state’s ble for court. Neither settled “To state that a person does petitioner nor intervenor contends that not have right govern *5 18, V, of art. framers intended to make employment § ment say that he in, Yet, defending such classification. comply must reasonable, with lawful, and their pro construction of constitutional nondiscriminatory terms by laid down prop vision, argues petitioner that the classifica er authorities.” Slochower v. Board of tion is as unavoidable as it Higher is absurd. This Education of New City, York 350 ignores the effect 551, 555, of four 637, U.S. 76 639, S.Ct. 100 L.Ed. teenth A 692, amendment. classification (1956). which 699 against is absurd cannot be sustained The same principle was applied in Turner challenge; equal protection absurd, if it is Fouche, v. 396 346, 532, U.S. 90 S.Ct. 24 it is avoidable. (1970), 567 L.Ed.2d a case in which the Petitioner and intervenor have not sug- Supreme United States Court sustained an any state facts gested of which reasonably equal protection challenge to Georgia con- of justify judges provision can exclusion district court conditioning stitutional eligibility class persons eligible appointment from the for to county for school board on appeals including while them freeholder status. The Court said: for among eligible the state’s highest those may “We appellants assume that court, and we have found none. right have no to be appointed to the Taliaferro County board of education. acknowledges provisions Intervenor appellants But the members V, 18, like supposed promote art. “are § do have class a federal constitutional separation governmental power, help re right to be public considered for service judges politics move and inhibit traf without burden invidiously dis- office,” ficking public citing ex State rel. criminatory disqualifications. The State Sutton, 147, v. Minn. Childs 63 65 N.W. 262 may deny not some the privilege of (1895), and rel. Reynolds Howell, State ex v. public holding office that it extends to 467, (1912). Wash. 954 70 126 P. But inter on others the basis of distinctions that does not suggest venor how such purposes federal violate guaran- constitutional rationally by served the classification at tees.” 396 362-363, U.S. at 90 S.Ct. at issue here. The court of is part of 541, 24 L.Ed.2d at 580. judicial department; therefore exclu judges of district sion from the class of The same situation legisla- exists here. The persons to the ture created' the intermediate court in the

273 la. power delegated exercise The conformance of a state constitu Const, V, Having 1. established art. § provision tional with the federal constitu involved, may the State not offices judicial tion is not fixed forever in every possible privilege deny district application by conditions existing when it such offices the basis of invidi- holding A adopted. provision discriminatory ously distinctions. stop not Moreover, does the clock. provi apparent applica- In an effort to defeat of law which is sion constitutional when principle, alleges tion of applied in one may situation be unconstitu absurdity classi- consideration applied tional when in another. Alabama making judges ineligible fication Federation State of Labor v. 325 McAdory, of appeals precluded by the court the fact 462, 450, 65 1384, 1390, U.S. S.Ct. 89 L.Ed. subsequent the court was created to the 1725, (1945). V, 18, adding 1962 amendment art. § result, As a a classification which does argues Iowa Constitution. Intervenor equal deny protection not in one set of a state constitutional is not circumstances do so when circumstanc- invalid under the federal when constitution es change. Chicago & N. W. Ry. v. Co. adopted cannot be made invalid subse- Fachman, Iowa 125 N.W.2d legislature. act of quent Intervenor see Chastleton v. Corp. suggests that if there is a choice between Sinclair, 264 U.S. 44 S.Ct. V, sustaining art. the statute (1924); Vigeant L.Ed.2d 841 creating Postal Tele- appeals, the court of the statute graph Co., Cable But, Mass. fall. without citation of 157 N.E. authori- us ignore intervenor then invites This is one ty, reason courts will equal protection clause and save ordinarily the court avoid formulating a rule of con- holding appeals by art. makes law stitutional required broader than judges ineligible facts precise which it is applied. course, agreed it. Of if with the rest of Raines, United States U.S. analysis, we could disre- intervenor’s 519, 4 L.Ed.2d 524 (1960). S.Ct. *6 equal protection Giving the clause. it gard Petitioner and question intervenor do not carrying intervenor’s effect authority legislature of the to establish conclusion, V, art. logical as to its § an intermediate court under Ia.Const. art. nullify would by construed V, legislature 1. When the § exercised undisputed V, legislature’s power art. under it authority, purport did not to affect 1, to appellate establish intermediate § V, equal conformance art. with the § court. protection clause of the federal constitution However, do not agree with interve- previous either on its face in applications. The analysis. principle nor’s that a state It created new simply circumstances. In- provision which is not constitutional invalid distinguish tervenor has failed to between adopt the federal constitution when under statute which creates new circumstances subsequent be made invalid ed cannot application of an old pro- constitutional legislature legisla only of the is a bar to act purports vision statute which to mod- purports which to invalidate a state tion ify prior such a constitutional provision. on its or in provision constitutional face The classification challenged by respon- applications. It previously constitutional Carter, dents Allbee and Oxberger arises legislation in resulting not bar new does V, from the construction of urged art. § the state constitu circumstances by petitioner and intervenor in the new provision may validly extend. tional circumstances and not from the statute. the principle limitation of in implicit This us is equal whether the on relied intervenor. Bev the cases See Lewis, protection bars application clause eridge 137 Cal. 70 P. provision Fire constitutional new (1902); Hanover Ins. Co. v. state these Harding, 327 Ill. 158 N.E. 849 circumstances. LeGRAND, judges in 1962 had the same Justice (concurring

District specially). equal protection clause of under rights I Although agree with the conclusion amendment as fourteenth do now. the majority, reached by I not agree do our V, applied be now to cannot Art. § should rest on decision a federal constitu- rights. The fact infringe those conflict. I tional therefore concur exist if would not circumstances problem result. changed by not been creation of had The majority correctly points out the re- does not diminish the fed- appeals spondent judges urge grounds two to sus- rights constitutional of district court eral validity tain the eligible judges. holding Nor does First, they say office. a reasonable and appeals enlarge sit on the court of those interpretation proper of the Iowa Constitu- recognizes rights; simply ap- them and supports Secondly, them. they claim them new circumstances. The ef- plies any other result would violate equal sustaining equal protection chal- fect clause protection under the 14th Amend- lenge is not strike state constitution- ment to the Federal Constitution. or to it in provision previous invalidate al majority bases decision its on the inapplicable but to make it applications, ground and second asserts it is therefore the overriding here because of the situation unnecessary to reach the first. I would equal protection clause. assurances process. I say reverse this the appoint- V, by petitioner Art. as construed § ments should be validated the first intervenor, equal pro- cannot withstand ground and that the second should not be analysis present application. tection in its considered. judges burdens district with an It particular provision disqualification. invidiously discriminatory repeated issue here for convenience: ap- hold that this cannot be We “Judges Supreme Court and dis- judges appoint- to bar plied trict court shall receive salaries from the to the court of because to do ment state, be shall members of the bar of the infringe rights so state, and shall have such other qualifica- equal protection class prescribed tions as by law. law. Judges the Supreme Court and District We do the constitutionality not decide ineligible Court shall be any other of- V, other application. art. serving fice of state while on said Carter, that respondents hold Allbee thereafter, years court and for two ex- Oxberger ineligible are not made cept Judges that District shall be Ia.Const. art. Supreme to the office of Court Judge. *7 Therefore, Appeals. Iowa the Court judicial Other officers shall be selected in reject plaintiff’s challenge the validity such manner and shall have tenure, all respondents. the compensation qualification and other ** not do not decide need and whether if the by be fixed law (Iowa judges ineligible district were the appoint- Constitution, 18.) Art. respondents ments Donielson and Snell persons appointed Three of five to the have been invalid. newly-created court of were then The petition supervisory review and judges. challenges Petitioner petition accordingly intervention are dis- right to qualify because of the constitution- missed. just set out. joined al He is in by General, the Attorney this contention Costs are taxed to intervenor. who intervened in cause. All LeGRAND, Justices except concur petitioner Both the and HARRIS, JJ., MASON and spe- who concur they concede the result argue is cially REES, J., and part. who takes by no and was absurd unintended the constitu- gard Yet question. amendment in purposes different tional they serve. is unavoidable because of statutes, result Unlike say constitutions set out broad clear, unambiguous lan- explicit and general principles. A constitution is a liv of the amendment. guage ing and vital Its very instrument. purpose is to endure for a long time and to meet partially case majority rests its conditions neither contemplated nor fore result must neces- conclusion an absurd at the time seeable of its adoption. Bechtel 14th Amendment sarily against the offend City of Des Moines, al., et 225 N.W.2d protection suggests clause. This equal (Iowa 1975). not tolerate ab- Constitution will Federal impotent we are to avoid surdity, but that polestar interpretation all is the our own consequences under Consti- similar intention with which the instrument is reject problem I view. This tution. 16 C.J.S. Constitutional drawn. Law 16§ under should—be resolved our may—and p. 72 at Am.Jur.2d Constitutional wring not Constitution. We need our (1964). Of equal 64 at 239 Law § impor- despair look elsewhere for hands of the purpose tance a determination Any other conclusion itself ab- succor. served. 16 Am.Jur.2d Constitutional surd. Law 65 at 241 Sometimes the why I discussing say Before we should language disregarded literal must be be- give language the constitutional not it does cause violence to the meaning and interpretation petitioner interve- literal of the enactment. intent urge, briefly background I relate nor In 16 Am.Jur.2d Constitutional Law 76§ When amendment the constitutional facts. (1964), principle is stated this adopted was Iowa was way: by only appellate one court—the served Su- “In accordance with the basic rules that no preme ap- Court. There was language in a constitution is to be then and none contemplated. was peals, deemed to have been used therein in its (which facts submitted affidavit Under sense, ordinary and that a constitution is challenged by petitioner are not or interve- construed, liberally the principle has nor), it is clear the purpose developed that in framing been a consti- judges was to remove amendment tution, words employed in a compre- fray limiting their state service political sense as expressive general hensive judiciary, as trial or appellate either rather, finer ideas than of shades of accomplished This was judges. specify- thought distinctions, or of narrow judicial in the two ing they could serve ordinarily words in an instrument like the (For existing. present pur- then positions United Constitution do not States judicial disregard positions.) I lesser poses narrow, meaning, pre- contracted but are concede, petitioner and intervenor Both ei- sumed to have sense, been used a broad explicitly tacitly, or ther intent covering with a view of all contingencies. limit service of judicial department. within the Where words are used which have both a admit, too, They expressly tacitly, either general meaning, restricted and a vigorously that the result for which so general prevail over the restricted strange inexplicable contend creates a subject unless nature of the *8 matter of anomaly. clearly context indicates that the lim- sense is ited intended. Stated different- then, we, adopt language Must the literal ly, forced, the rule is unnatural, that no defeats of the purpose which amend- narrow, or technical construction should That, course, is the ment? of ultimate deci- placed be ever language of a made. sion to be ”* * * constitution. are provisions Constitutional construed general principles A number the same of prob- under courts have considered construction, statutory with re govern due like that which lems this case raises. 276 ** * ex Dearing, ly rel. Dalton v. 364

In State nearly can, As as we 381, (1954), S.W.2d 386 Mo. 263 put place ourselves in the of those Supreme Court refused to Missouri invali- words, who uttered the try and to define gubernatorial appointment to a met- date they how would have dealt with the un- ropolitan transportation commission made situation; and, foreseen although their days the time fixed in the Constitu- after 67 are by far the words decisive most evi- tion. of they dence what would done, have reaching said, In conclusion court are no means final.” quoting case, mann, (1921): tive laid down tion case] “There are certain well-understood rules determining U* “Another constitutional or State ex intent the same as those of constitutional [*] enactments. in [*] discussing part Mo. general rule and purpose rel. the true the courts from an earlier City It was said statutory provisions 229 of provisions, meaning governing legisla- of the lawmakers. Carthage of general S.W. importance [in and construc- Missouri rules of v. Hack scope prior for the word “or,” said: substituting the word “and” junctive statutes, constitutional amendments and other ascertaining the is mere writing is the substance and the verbiage carelessly used, are interchangeable, disjunctive conjunction “It is familiar law in In Re discover the intent 41 So.2d writings, Opinion form, conjunction ‘and’, sometimes and courts are of the 563 that intent of the the intent of such Justices, ‘or’, interpretation hold that writing.” and the con- at liberty 252 Ala. court, of in provisions construction case, An Arizona Board of Supervisors v. organic subject law is Pratt, Ariz. 57 P.2d general rules same construction oth- as refusing depart while (1936), from the laws, due regard being er had to the language aof literal constitutional amend- objects scope former, broader ment, interesting had this comment: government. a charter popular as “It is where there is no doubt as to of such an intent instrument prime the intention of those who frame an object attained in construing it. amendment or statute that a court Corpus Juris, 700, “In 12 C.J.S.2d 16§ [16 alter or modify, supply words that will 73-74], Constitutional Law it at is said: any repugnancy to ‘obviate or inconsist- court, therefore, should constantly intention,’ ence with so doing objects keep sought in mind the to be ‘particular provisions’ permit to be read accomplished by its adoption, otherwise ‘according or construed than evils, any, sought prevented if ” meaning.’ the literal remedied. Thomson, al., In Schaefer et “And also 12 Corpus Juris, 702, [16 F.Supp. (D.C.Wy.1964), the court 80], 18 Constitutional Law C.J.S.-§ it is with a was confronted Wyoming statute interpretation If literal said: dealing reapportionment with which a num language used in a constitutional provi- citizens claimed provi violated the ber give would effect in sion contraven- Wyoming sions Constitution. purpose tion of the real and intent of the instrument deduced from considera- brought, a literal time suit At the its parts, all such intent must with compliance meaning.” over the literal prevail substantially in ex- legislature ain resulted this the discussing In members. cess Guiseppi Walling, In 144 F.2d 623- said: (2d 1944) Judge Cir. the late Learned Hand, Wyo- concurring opinion, “However, in a said: it is obvious *9 “ * * * Convention which Constitutional ming way There is no surer mis- intended constitution a state than agreed document to read it literal-

read legislative be com- analogous the bodies should Somewhat that to the present case small. It could have envi- not paratively Advisory is In Opinion Re to Governor, 223 would such an absurd result as be sioned N.C. 28 S.E.2d 570-571 (1944), brought about if the state senate is con- a which involved North Carolina constitu- county with each senatorial a stituted provision tional a prohibiting person from county district and the with the election holding two offices profit of trust or at the population fixing as near as be least comptroller time. The same the State representa- unit for minimum of Education a Board asked leave of ab- policy While wisdom or of con- tion. accept sence so that he could a temporary ques- be provisions are not to stitutional in captaincy the United Army. States The tioned, still to act required courts was direct whether the applicant brings such manner which about in a give up would have to his position State palpable absurdities. 16 Constitu- C.J.S. a order to become member of the Armed 18; Law 16 Am.Jur.2d Constitu- tional It conceded Forces. that the accept- Law 76.” tional ance of a second office forbidden Supreme The Illinois refused to Court operate would ipso language the literal constitutional follow facto to vacate first office. Lowden, v. Ill. N.E. Mitchell question was whether under these circum- (1919) when that course would captaincy in the stances Armed Forces con- consequences. led to unintended a accepting stituted second office. said: court held did not and doing so argued is language “[I]t significant made several statements includ- Constitution, itself, and the law is not following: ing uncertain, is but definite obscure “Certainly spirit of the Constitution unambiguous no con- and leaves room for envisage such * * ‘The * [no result]. true, literally is This struction. meaning found, of a Constitution is to be perfectly it is clear is not the that it but letter, not in a slavish adherence to the meaning of the the law Constitution that killeth, which sometimes but in the dis- not, therefore, receive a constitutional did spirit, covery of giveth its life.’ majority; meaning involves ** * nee(j ke; gives way If letter absurdity holding the framers promote equity spirit. An instrument, adopt- and the people prohibition usually inhibition or extends it, ing prohibit intended to the creation of * * * the reason on no farther than which it is proposition debt unless the a ** *” founded. its creation at an elec- should receive greater vote than all electors opinion Later in that the court said: ** * A consti- entitled to cast were should “A constitution not receive a tech- provision must like tutional be construed construction, as if it were nical an ordi- object statute with reference to nary or statute. instrument It should be accomplished, pur- real and when the carry as to out interpreted general so apparent language must be pose government, principles of and not carry purpose so as into construed defeat them.” * ** Not the letter of the effect. general lending For other statements only, words, spirit its its mere law but v. support my substantial view see State object, considera- must be taken into Fergus District No. 1 of County, School tion, particular to ef- and when a intent 797, 801, 348 P.2d Mont. 78 A.L.R.2d manifest, specific re- purpose fect Toberman, (1960); v. State 363 Mo. paid to that When must be intent. spect (1952) (an 250 S.W.2d en statute, literally words of followed banc); County Board Commissioners consequence, there is absurd lead McCulloh, 52 N.M. 195 P.2d reason the lan- depart sufficient City County Mahood of Den guage.” *10 278 338, 379, (1948); This

ver, Colo. 195 P.2d 380 means must meet and 118 be ap- State, 13, 174, plied 177 P.2d new v. 51 N.M. to and changing Flaska conditions.” Abbington, 176, (1946); Bailey v. 201 180 I am convinced the case now before us 1072, 176, 148 178-180 Ark. S.W.2d meets all criteria set out the forego- 136, 140 544, Boyce, P. v. 20 Ariz. 185 Clark ing degree. cases to a marked (1919). No matter which standard we turn to— language Iowa which Nor is without ” instrument; the “intent or “the of what our conclu- indication gives some ” objects sought to accomplished; be or the Pritz, Parte 9 be. In Ex Samuel sion should ” compulsion absurdities; “palpable avoid (1858), 32 this court stated: Iowa necessity or of meeting “new and ” interpretation of the “In the Constitution conditions; changing rule “a * * * we are to ascertain meaning usually extends prohibition no farther than those getting the intention of mak- it the reason is founded” —this instrument. ing the is a classic illustration case that it is some- thought “What in the minds of was those folly times to insist literal language must making the was [w]hat Constitution — be followed the exclusion of all else. intention, the great leading rule I am not unmindful of strong lan- of construction.” guage used cases like v. Hunter Colfax 710, 718, Edge Brice, In 253 Iowa 113 Company, Consolidated Coal Iowa 175 (1962) 759 N.W.2d said: 270-273, 154 N.W. I do proper “It is in our determination to con- place say not a court should a consti- sider the intention the framers of the (or upon provision statutory tutional a en- used, language object as the provision a actment) construction to suit its own ends attained, remedied, or the evil to be or to achieve what it considers desirable. I the circumstances at the time of say only that if a result by point- reached adoption indicate.” less adherence to words alone is indefensi- Cemetery In Cedar Park Memorial Asso doubt, all beyond ble need upheld. not be Associates, Inc., ciation v. Personnel I this recognize to be undertaken (Iowa 1970), N.W.2d this court said In lightly. Kruidenier v. McCulloch, 261 interpreting obligation that in statutes our 1309, 1315, 158 170, 174 N.W.2d (1968), Iowa legisla out the intention of the is “to seek the judicial we considered correction leg placing upon ture and avoid statutory way: islative errors this strained, a language impractical, or absurd specter “The resulting of abuses from a Fulton, construction.” See also Janson . quick too judiciary to intervene for the (Iowa 1968) 162 N.W.2d legislative correction ambiguities, mis- case, In a Pitcher recent v. Lakes Amuse- takes, errors and omissions is too obvious Co., (Iowa ment 236 N.W.2d 335-336 require extended discussion. The evils 1975), considering we were an attack on resulting greater therefrom would far I, 9 of the Iowa Constitution Article in- than those which such action was de- trial volving right by jury. In reach- prevent.” signed ing the conclusion that statute which au- give true Failure effect to consti- less jury thorized than did not intent case present tutional against offend Consti- slow, quick, too judiciary rather than too said: tution we intervene. increasingly has “Time demonstrated it illogical to our freeze forever concep- In the Kruidenier v. McCulloch case re- * * * jury trial. tion of 1121, 1131, ported at Iowa 142 N.W.2d “* ** (1966), Constitutions must we said this court is the flexibility interpreted so as to be enough final arbiter of what the Iowa Constitution must, the public should, accordance with interest. means. accord the *11 meaning the appointment of that instrument provisions objects to its gives life and substance judge office of of the court appeals. petitioner Instead purposes. For stated, the reasons I concur only in what court to thwart ask the the result reached majority intention of concede court. amendment. disputed are said to ab- Frequently courts reach HARRIS, JJ., join MASON spe- regard results when themselves surd cial concurrence. logical. sound conclusions is now Ironically, importuned the court an absurd result.

deliberately reach me, least,

For includes denial. I would hold the 1962 Con- own

its prohibit does not

stitutional Amendment

Case Details

Case Name: Redmond v. Carter
Court Name: Supreme Court of Iowa
Date Published: Nov 23, 1976
Citation: 247 N.W.2d 268
Docket Number: 59949
Court Abbreviation: Iowa
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