REDMAN ET AL., APPELLANTS AND CROSS-APPELLEES, v. WATCH TOWER BIBLE AND TRACT SOCIETY OF PENNSYLVANIA ET AL., APPELLEES AND CROSS-APPELLANTS.
No. 92-2041
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
April 27, 1994
69 Ohio St.3d 98 | 1994-Ohio-514
MOYER, C.J.
Submitted November 9, 1993. APPEAL and CROSS-APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Wood County, No. 91-WD-071.
Evidence—Evid.R. 610—Religious beliefs or opinions—Trial court improperly permits admission of evidence of a witness‘s religious beliefs or opinions for the purpose of impeachment, when.
{¶ 1} Otterbein W. Duesler died testate in 1988 at the age of ninety-one. By his last will and testament, Duesler left most of his $338,000 estate to defendant-appellee and cross-appellant, Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society of Pennsylvania, the parent organization of the church known as Jehovah‘s Witnesses. The will, which superseded a previous will executed by Duesler, was drafted by defendant-appellee and cross-appellant, Walter Kobil, himself a member of the Jehovah‘s Witnesses. Claiming undue influence, three of Duesler‘s four surviving sisters, plaintiffs-appellants and cross-appellees, Irene Redman, Edna Blasis and Opal Atkin, instituted this will-contest action.
{¶ 2} At trial, plaintiffs elicited expert testimony from Dr. Gerald Bergman concerning the beliefs and practices of the Jehovah‘s Witnesses. Bergman, a former Jehovah‘s Witness, has written extensively about the church. He testified that the church engaged in a practice he termed “theocratic warfare.” This practice allegedly includes a church policy to encourage members to perjure themselves in order to protect the church and its followers. Plaintiffs also questioned several other witnesses about subjects including: the depth of Duesler‘s commitment to the church, the effects of baptism within the church, the consequences of disfellowship, and the effect religion had on Duesler‘s marriage.
{¶ 3} Most of plaintiffs’ case was controverted by the defense. Kobil testified that he was a member of the Jehovah‘s Witnesses, but that lying under oath was not a tenet of their teachings. Kobil‘s testimony was corroborated by John Schabow, an elder in the local Jehovah‘s Witnesses congregation. Schabow also contradicted plaintiffs’ evidence concerning Duesler‘s level of activity within the church.
{¶ 4} Ultimately the jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiffs, finding that the will was the product of undue influence. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the trial court improperly permitted the admission of evidence of a witness‘s religious beliefs or opinions for the purpose of impeachment.
{¶ 5} The cause is now before this court upon the allowance of a motion and cross-motion to certify the record.
Kolb & Kolb, Richard Kolb and Matt Kolb, for appellees and cross-appellants.
MOYER, C.J.
{¶ 6}
{¶ 7} This case presents us with the distinction between two related but separate evidence concepts: bias and credibility. Conversely, nothing in the rule prohibits the admission of religious evidence to show interest or bias on the part of the witness. See Staff Note to
{¶ 8} The use of one‘s congregational affiliation to show bias is acceptable under
{¶ 9} Generally, a witness‘s credibility is put at issue whenever he or she testifies. However, this general rule is subject to various exceptions. Examples include: restrictions on impeachment of one‘s own witness found in
{¶ 10}
{¶ 11} The courts of Ohio have had little opportunity to interpret
{¶ 12} Much of plaintiffs’ case centered on Dr. Bergman‘s testimony concerning theocratic warfare and his allegations that Jehovah‘s Witnesses would lie to protect their congregation. Questions addressed to Kobil‘s congregational affiliation with the Jehovah‘s Witnesses and work he had performed for the church were permissible to show bias. Beyond that, the bulk of plaintiffs’ questioning
{¶ 13} The Rules of Evidence supply several methods for attacking a witness‘s propensity towards truthfulness, including those listed above under
{¶ 14} Defendants on cross-appeal dispute the jury‘s ultimate finding of undue influence. Many of defendants’ evidentiary arguments are rendered moot by our affirmance of the court of appeals’ order of reversal and remand. However, there are two specific issues that we will address.
{¶ 15} The first concerns the effect on the ultimate issue of undue influence of a sixteen-year passage of time between the execution of Duesler‘s will and his death. Defendants argue that the passage of time should be construed as a reaffirmation and, hence, bar a finding of undue influence. We believe the better-reasoned approach is to consider the extended period of time between execution of the will and the testator‘s death as some evidence of the testator‘s freedom from undue influence but that it should not be deemed presumptive.
{¶ 16} If the will was never the product of undue influence, then the mere passage of time after its execution would have no effect. Only where a will is invalid at its inception would a reaffirmation bear on the issue of undue influence. This court has previously held that to later cure deficiencies in a will, the same formal requirements of execution found in
{¶ 17} Defendants’ second proposition suggests that we refine our holding in West v. Henry (1962), 173 Ohio St. 498, 20 O.O.2d 119, 184 N.E.2d 200. In West, we held that to succeed on a claim of undue influence, one must establish “(1) a susceptible testator, (2) another‘s opportunity to exert [undue influence], (3) the fact of improper influence exerted or attempted and (4) the result showing the effect of such influence.” Id. at 510-511, 20 O.O.2d at 126, 183 N.E.2d at 208.
{¶ 18} Defendants contend that in order to show that the testator‘s wishes have been altered by undue influence, plaintiffs must first prove what the testator‘s original testamentary wishes were.
{¶ 19} Defendants’
{¶ 20} In this case, there was evidence that Duesler revoked an earlier will when he drafted the document at issue. It could therefore be reasonably inferred that Duesler did change his wishes without ever establishing what those wishes were. As it now stands, West presents a framework best suited to the ultimate issue, and we decline to modify our previous holding.
{¶ 21} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed, and this cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Judgment affirmed.
A.W. SWEENEY, WRIGHT, BRYANT, F.E. SWEENEY and PFEIFER, JJ., concur.
DOUGLAS, J., not participating.
PEGGY BRYANT, J., of the Tenth Appellate District, sitting for RESNICK, J.