129 Ga. 435 | Ga. | 1907
(After stating the facts.)
1. In the case of Printup v. Mitchell, 17 Ga. 558, it is said, “A parol contract for land, like the reformation of a deed by parol proof, should be made out so clearly, strongly, and satisfactorily as to leave, no reasonable doubt as to the agreement. It is a serious matter to substitute a parol sale of real estate for a deed.” In the case of Dwight v. Jones, 115 Ga. 744, it is said that the rule just announced above is well settled. See also 26 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d ed.), 130. The evidence in this case fails entirely to measure up to .this standard of strength and clearness. In the petition as originally filed, it will be observed that the plaintiffs alleged a contract for the purchase of a lot of land described as follows: “A sufficient amount of land to erect a gin-house and yard therearound. Said premises being situated at Stark, Ga., in Butts Co., and bounded north by lands of J. A. Dodson, east by the Hoard estate, south by public road leading from Dempsey’s ferry to Jackson, Ga., west by road leading from said gin-house to Macedonia colored church. Said land being the land upon which said firm of Bedman Bros, erected and operated a public gin during the years 1897, 1898, 1899. Said land containing forty yards square.” Subsequently, by way of amendment, they alleged, “that the tract of land described in original petition is more fully described as follows: Bounded on the north by lands now owned by J. A. Dodson, east and south by lands of B. W. Mays, and west by road leading from public road to negro church; and that said tract or parcel of land contains 50 yards fronting road to negro church, and running back -east 40 yards, being 50 x 40 yards, and that wherever it appears on original declaration 40 yards square it be made to read 50 yards square.” Giving effect to the last averment in the amendment, it would seem that the plaintiffs were seeking to recover a lot fifty yards square. And inasmuch as the verdict was for the premises in dispute, the jury must have intended to find that the plaintiffs were entitled to a decree for the specific performance of a contract of sale of a lot of land of those dimensions. That finding is without evidence to support it, as will be seen from an examination of the testimony relating to the terms of the contract, the interest bought, and the dimensions and description of the lot alleged to have been purchased.
The testimony upon these points is in substance as follows: T.
Sufficient cause for the grant of a new trial being found in the general grounds of the motion, we have not thought, it necessary to decide the specific assignments of error, assuming that if there were errors in the charge of the court and the admission of evidence, the court will correct such errors upon the next trial, in-case the- same questions should then be raised.
Judgment affirmed.