On July 19 аnd 20, 1973, Judges of the Criminal Court of the City of New York viewed certain films: “ Behind the Green Door ”, “ High Rise ”, “ The Newcomers ” and “ The Innocent Abroad ”. The Judges determined that thеse films were obscene, search warrants were issued and they were seized.
On July 24, 1973, the District Attorney of New York County and the Corporation Counsel of the City of New York jointly commenced actions against the theatre owners and distributors, pursuant to CPLR 6330. This section confers upon the Supreme Court jurisdiction to enjoin the distribution of a motion picture “of an indecent character, which is obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, indecent or disgusting * * * or in any other respect defined in section 235.00 of the penal law ”. The plaintiffs sought an injunction pendente lite.
On August 14, 1973, Mr. Justice Gellinoff, at Special Term, dismissed the complaints, denied the applications for a preliminary injunction, holding that CPLR 6330 was overbroad, therefore unconstitutional, and that the court had no evidence to gouge the cоntemporary standards of the community. We do not agree.
Although the defendants refused to present expert testimony, Mr. Justice Gellinoff himself found the films “ obscene ” and in the court’s personal opinion “patently offensive”. We concur. In the case of “ The Green Door ” movie, the advertisements vаunted it as “ hard-core ”, and a movie critic noted that it depicted acts of sexual perversion. In so advertising, the defendants were exploiting pornography for its own sake and were blatantly pandering to prurient interests for commercial gain alone. Actually, it is beyond question, all four films graрhically depicted various acts of sexual misconduct, including performances of sodomy and sadism, sometimes involving several participants in grossly perverted acts. These multiple and variegated ultimate acts of sexual perversion would have been regarded as “obscene” by the community standards of Sodom and Gomorrah.
Turning now to the statute, we feel CPLR 6330 is well within the three basiс guidelines set forth by Miller v. California (
In holding, as we do, that the New York courts should synthesize by judicial construction thе requirements of the Miller standards into CPLR 6330, we note also that in section 235.00 of the Penal Law [which is referred to in CPLR 6330 for an alternative description of obscene sexual conduct], most of the language is the same as in the California statute considered in Miller and also in the Georgia statute involved in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton (supra). We note also that in considering the New York statute in People v. Heller (supra) the Supreme Court had an opportunity to declare it unconstitutional. But it did not do so.
Finally, we note that the constitutionality of the injunctive relief set forth in section 22-a of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the predecessor to CPLR 6630, was upheld in Broivn v. Kingsley Books (1 N Y 2d 177), which the Supreme Court subsequently affirmed sub nom. Kingsley Books v. Brown (354 IT. S. 436).
And by stepping into the breach and saving the statute by incorporating into it the Miller postulates, we do so in the light of settled law that (a) the courts may interpret statutory
We further find on the basis of history, common sense and the legislative policy which lead to the enactment of our obscenity laws, that the failure to grant a preliminary injunction would cаuse grave public harm and constitute an unwarranted rejection of legislative intent. (Tenney v. Liberty News Distrs. Co., 13 A D 2d 770; Lazarus v. Yorkview Theater Corp.,
Hence, the orders appealed from should be reversеd, on the law and on the facts, the complaints reinstated, and the preliminary injunctions requested granted, with costs.
Nunez, Kupferman, Lane and Capozzoli, JJ., concur.
Four orders, Supreme Court, New York County, еach entered on or about August 14, 1973, unanimously reversed, on the law and on the facts, the cross motions denied, the complaints reinstated, and the motions for preliminary injunctions granted, and, in each action, appellants shall recover of respondents $60 costs and disbursements of the appeal.
