799 S.E.2d 754 | Ga. | 2017
Appellant Damien Kinard Reddick was convicted of murder in connection with the shooting death of Cory Johnson.
1. “To authorize a requested jury instruction, there need only be slight evidence supporting the theory of the charge. Whether the evidence presented is sufficient to authorize the giving of a charge is a question of law.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Hicks v. State, 287 Ga. 260, 262 (2) (695 SE2d 195) (2010).
The evidence presented at trial showed that two female graduates of Shiloh High School, Chame Baker and Lauren Jordan, had a quarrel via telephone and social media that escalated into threats. Apparently encouraged by Jordan’s friend, Danielle O’Grady, the girls agreed to meet to settle the argument at a house near the high school. By the time they arrived, a crowd had gathered to witness the fight. The girls brought various supporters to the location: Jordan and O’Grady invited appellant and his friend Nigel Lynch, who both attended a different school. The victim was a friend of a resident of the house, Shukriyyah Bascoe, who was aligned with Baker.
After the shooting began, O’Grady and her companions fled the scene but could not locate Lynch. Appellant and his female friend, Ashley Moe, waited at Lynch’s car for some time and then walked back toward the house. They found Lynch, who was bleeding severely from the head, and took him to the hospital; Lynch told them that “somebody hit him with a gun.” O’Grady testified that appellant told her that “Nigel had gotten jumped” and beaten. The witness who saw the shots fired testified that the shooter was one of two men with O’Grady’s group who came together and attempted to flee together after the shooting. The same witness testified that the shooter was the one who “ran away and left,” although she did not get a good look at his face, while his companion became involved in a fight and was left behind.
O’Grady pleaded guilty to involuntary manslaughter and testified at trial; she stated that she had invited appellant to accompany them and asked him to bring his gun to “scare” anyone from the other group who tried to “jump” them. She also testified that when she spoke to appellant on the phone after the incident, he told her that several individuals “were trying to jump... me” and when one of them was “coming toward me, I just closed my eyes and I shot.” O’Grady asked, “So you shot him?” and appellant replied, “Yeah, I shot his a_ twice.” In her testimony at her sentencing, which she read for the jury,
Moe told police that appellant displayed a firearm on the way to the scene and that appellant later told her he fired two rounds in the air. But she disavowed that statement at trial, saying that the only gun she saw was a long gun being held by “some dude standing outside the patio.” Appellant did not testify at trial, but in his videotaped police interview, which was played for the jury, he admitted that he brought “a green knife” to the scene, but repeatedly denied having a gun. While confined to jail, appellant had a telephone conversation with Moe which was monitored by the police; in that conversation he denied he had a gun that night, instructed Moe to say he did not have a gun, and told her to be sure that O’Grady said he did not have a gun.
Appellant argues that evidence was presented that he engaged in reckless gunplay by firing in the air, and that such an act would support a misdemeanor charge of reckless conduct, which in turn would support a charge of involuntary manslaughter under OCGA § 16-5-3 (a).
Even if the evidence presented authorized the requested charge, “[t]he failure to give a requested charge which is authorized by the evidence can be harmless error. The inquiry is whether it is highly probable that the error contributed to the verdict.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Brown v. State, 289 Ga. 259, 261 (2) (710 SE2d 751) (2011). Pretermitting whether the trial court should have given the requested charge, we find that any error in refusing to do so was
2. While Reddick does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence in his appeal, we note that it was sufficient to support his conviction under Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).
Judgment affirmed.
The crime occurred on December 28, 2011. On March 1, 2012, a Gwinnett County grand jury indicted Reddick for felony murder and aggravated assault. He was tried before a jury September 16-22, 2014. The jury found Reddick guilty on both counts, and the trial court merged the aggravated assault charge with the felony murder charge. See Malcolm v. State, 263 Ga. 369, 372-373 (5) (434 SE2d 479) (1993). His amended motion for new trial was denied on June 8, 2016, his notice of appeal was filed on June 15, 2016, and the case was docketed in this Court for the term beginning in December 2016. The case was submitted for decision on the briefs.
“A person commits the offense of involuntary manslaughter in the commission of an unlawful act when he causes the death of another human being without any intention to do so by the commission of an unlawful act other than a felony.”