The defendant appeals from his conviction of two counts of violations of the Georgia Controlled Substances Act. Held:
1. The trial judge did not err in permitting, over objection, the sheriff to testify that the undercover agent, Smarr, had told him that he had "fronted” part of the marijuana he had purchased from the defendant to another pеrson, meaning that he had loaned part of the marijuana to that person, who was to repay him in kind. This hearsay evidence was admissible under Code § 38-302 to explain a course of conduct by the undercover agent, viz., what he had done with the contraband received from the defendant, which was relevant to explain why some of it was missing when it was delivered to the sheriff. Although it would have been possible to elicit this evidence directly from the undercover agent, its admission in evidence by way of the sheriffs testimony had the advantage of possibly greater credibility than the testimony of the undercover agent, whose credibility was questioned because of his own previоus use of marijuana. Cf.,
Quick v. State,
2. Enumerated error 3 objects to the judge’s having permitted the sheriff to testify concerning the credibility, or "bolster the good character,” of witness Smarr at a time when the witness’ character had not been attacked or his credibility questioned. "To bolster a witness means to introduce evidence of the good reputation of a witness for truth and veracity, for the purpose of supporting the witness’ testimony and is not admissible when offered by the party calling the witness, until the character of the witness has been attacked by the adverse party.”
Quick v. State,
Furthermore, defense counsel waived such objection. The prosеcution asked the sheriff whether he had found anything dishonest that Smarr had done with his (sheriff’s) money all the time he worked with him. After defense counsel’s objection was made, the court pointed out her previously mentioned statement of intention to the jury whereupon she replied, "All right, in the event that he wishes to put in such evidence, the only evidence that’s admissible would be the reputation of the witness for good or bad character, not any particular transaction.” Thereafter, the sheriff was allowed to testify that the witness’ reputation for honesty was good and that he would believe him under oath, with no objection except "I still say it’s out of time.” Under the circumstances this tеstimony was not erroneously admitted in evidence.
3. Enumerated error 4 is the admission over objection of a photograph of the bearded defendant as he аppeared at the time of the "buys” in question. It is urged that this photograph was unnecessarily admitted, since counsel admitted the defendant’s identity, and that its admission — added tо the prosecution’s statement in the *890 presence of the jury, that Smarr had to have a long beard and long hair in order to make drug buys — created the prejudicial impression in the minds of the jurors that the defendant was the type of person who would deal in drugs.
The identity of the defendant in a criminal case is certainly a material fact. It was made so even more in this case, where evidence of alibi was introduced. "There is abundant case authority that photographs showing an accuratе and correct representation of a person or an object material to the issues in the case are admissible ... To rule otherwise would unfairly preclude the state from establishing a material fact by more than one source of
evidence.” Floyd v. State,
4. The appellant enumеrates error upon the judge’s failure to charge the language of Code § 26-601, which provides: "A crime is a violation of a statute of this State in which there shall be a union of
1
joint operation of act, or omission to act, and intention, or criminal negligence.” "It has been held, however, that a failure to charge in the exact language of this Code section is not error where, as here, the court fully instructs on the essential elements of the crime charged, including the requisite intent.
Fleming v. State,
5. Enumerated error 6, complaining that the judge failed to charge any portion of the language of the Georgia Controllеd Substances Act, is without merit. This information was conveyed to the jury by reading to them the indictment, which fully described the acts alleged to have been committed by the defendant, and calling upon them to render a verdict of guilty or not guilty.
Smith v. State,
6. Enumerated error 7 is the judge’s permitting the prosecution to cross examine the defendant as to his purpоrted alibi, in an "improper manner,” so as to attack the defendant’s credibility. Counsel overlooks the fact that attacking the defendant’s credibility is the precise purpose of cross examination. "The right of cross examination, thorough and sifting, shall belong to every party as to witnesses called against him.” Code § 38-1705. "The rule was аpplied in
Stephens v. State,
No such abuse apрears here, where the defendant denied committing the offenses; attempted to establish an alibi for the date referred to in Count 2; testified on direct that he had bеen at a ski resort in North Carolina; yet testified on cross examination that he didn’t know when he went to North Carolina or where he went, that he *892 stayed in a cabin near a ski lodge, skied on the slopes for two weeks without ever going to the lodge, and met only two persons while there, neither of whom was called as a witness to substantiatе the defendant’s alibi. This enumerated error is without merit.
7. Enumerated error no. 8 is the court’s "not transcribing opening and closing аrguments of appellant and appellees, even though the court had previously granted such a motion to appellant.”
There is no enumerated errоr based on the opening or closing arguments, nor is any such error argued in the appellant’s briefs, although a supplemental brief merely alleges that there were six objections made to the state’s argument and one motion for mistrial, which, in counsel’s opinion, should have been granted.
Notwithstanding the above, however, pursuant to this court’s order the transcript of the arguments (which should have been transmitted originally along with the record on appeal in accordance with the apрellant’s motion therefor) was sent up to this court. A review of the transcript reveals that the objections to the argument were all either unfounded or were ovеrcome by corrective instructions by the trial judge. The denial of the motion for mistrial was not error where it was not renewed or further instructions requested after corrective instructions were given. See
Martin v. State,
The judgment was not erroneous for any reason urged.
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
As we pointed out
in Maltbie v. State,