2010 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 84 | Tax Ct. | 2010
Recovery Group, Inc. (RG), an S corporation, redeemed all of the stock held by E, a minority shareholder and employee. In addition to paying E for his 23-percent interest in the company, RG also paid E $ 400,000 to enter into a 1-year covenant not to compete. RG deducted the cost of the covenant not to compete over its 12-month term. The IRS determined that RG could not immediately
deduct the covenant not to compete and determined built-in gains taxes under
MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION
GUSTAFSON,
Docket | *2*Deficiencies | *2*Accuracy-Related Penalties | |||
Petitioner | No. | 2002 | 2003 | 2002 | 2003 |
Recovery Group,Inc. | 12430-08 | $46,138 | $70,011 | $9,288 | $14,002 |
The IRS determined the following deficiencies in the Federalincome taxes of Recovery Group's shareholders:
Petitioner(s) | Docket No. | 2002 | 2003 |
Robert J. & Yvonne M. Glendon | 29314-07 | $ 2,599 | $ 2,825 |
John S. & Mary V. Sumner | 29321-07 | 2,824 | 3,071 |
Stephen S. Gray & Linda Baron | 29326-07 | 20,790 | 22,603 |
Michael & Barbara Epstein | 29333-07 | 1,970 | -0- |
Anthony J. Walker & Pamela S. Mayer | 29335-07 | 1,695 | 1,431 |
Andre & Helen Laus | 29336-07 | 5,197 | 4,494 |
Parham Pouladdej | 29385-07 | 10,395 | 11,301 |
Total | 45,470 | 45,725 |
All of the disputed deficiencies result from the IRS's determination that the cost of a covenant not to compete 2010 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 84">*86 must be amortized over 15 years. The IRS determined accuracy-related penalties against Recovery Group only; it determined no penalties against the subchapter S shareholders.
The issues for decision are:
1. Whether Recovery Group may amortize the cost of a covenant not to compete over its 12-month term or whether it must amortize that cost over 15 years pursuant to
2. Whether Recovery Group is liable under
FINDINGS OF FACT
The parties do not dispute the facts in 2010 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 84">*87 these cases that relate to the amortization of the covenant not to compete, but they do dispute the facts related to the accuracy-related penalty. We incorporate by this reference the stipulation of facts filed June 24, 2009, and the attached exhibits.
Recovery Group is a "turn-around, crisis-management business" providing consulting and management services to insolvent companies, together with services as bankruptcy trustee, examiner in bankruptcy cases, and receiver in Federal and State courts. Recovery Group had its principal place of business in Massachusetts when it filed its petition in this Court. 3
Employee/Shareholder's departure
In 2002 James Edgerly, one of Recovery Group's founders, employees, and minority shareholders, 2010 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 84">*88 informed its president, Stephen Gray, that he wished to leave the company and to have his shares bought out and settle various debts between himself and the company. Mr. Gray, who is also a founder and shareholder, discussed the departure with the remaining shareholders and developed a framework for the buyout. He then asked the company's accountant, Ron Orleans, to calculate the buyout numbers and tell Mr. Gray how the transaction should work. Mr. Gray explained to Mr. Edgerly the structure and the financial details of the proposed buyout agreement. Mr. Edgerly considered the offer and then accepted it.
Mr. Edgerly held 18,625 shares of Recovery Group stock, which represented 23 percent of the outstanding stock of the company. The agreement between Mr. Edgerly and Recovery Group called for the company to pay him a total of $ 805,363.33, in payment of which the company gave him a $ 205,363.33 check and a $ 600,000 promissory note payable over three years. The company and Mr. Edgerly itemized the buyout payment as follows:
Description | Amount |
Stock purchase price | $ 255,908 |
Noncompetition payment | 400,000 |
Company's debt to stockholder (principal) | 25,000 |
Company's debt to stockholder (interest) | 2,553 |
Company's note payable to stockholder (principal) | 122,177 |
Company's note payable to stockholder (interest) | 11,976 |
Shareholder's debt to company | (12,250) |
Total due from company to stockholder | 805,364 |
The 2010 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 84">*89 "Noncompetition payment" was for a "noncompetition and nonsolicitation agreement" that prohibited Mr. Edgerly from, inter alia, engaging in competitive activities from July 31, 2002, through July 31, 2003; and the $ 400,000 that Recovery Group paid for the covenant was comparable to Mr. Edgerly's annual earnings.
Mr. Orleans, Recovery Group's accountant, was involved with the buyout throughout. As is noted above, he calculated the buyout amounts. Mr. Gray, Recovery Group's president, did not discuss the tax implications of the buyout with Mr. Orleans when he asked him to compute the numbers. When Recovery Group executed the buyout, Mr. Gray did not consider the tax ramifications of the deal; but he understood that some portion of the buyout payment was tax deductible while the remainder was not. Deductibility was not a consideration in his structuring the deal; rather, he assumed that the tax results would be what the accountants determined.
Mr. Orleans began practicing as an accountant in 1973 and has been a certified public accountant (C.P.A.) since 1976. At his accounting firm -- Kanter, Troy, Orleans & Wexler, LLP -- Mr. Orleans was the relationship partner 2010 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 84">*90 assigned to Recovery Group. He was responsible for overseeing Recovery Group's accounting operations and managing the preparation of Recovery Group's financial statements and tax returns. Mr. Orleans worked with Donald Troy, a tax specialist at his firm. Mr. Troy was licensed as a C.P.A. in 1986, and he held a bachelor's degree in accountancy and a master's degree in taxation. During the years in issue, Mr. Troy was the accounting firm's tax director.
Mr. Orleans relied upon Mr. Troy to make the technical decisions on how Recovery Group's tax returns should be prepared, and Recovery Group relied upon the accountants to make these decisions correctly.
When considering how to report Recovery Group's expense for the covenant not to compete on its tax returns, Mr. Troy consulted case law, together with the statutory language, regulations, and legislative history of
Each year, Mr. Orleans presented the tax return for Recovery Group to Mr. Gray. Mr. Gray held brief discussions with Mr. Orleans during those meetings, but he did not ask specific questions or closely review the returns prepared 2010 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 84">*92 by the company's accountants. Rather, he asked Mr. Orleans whether the returns represented what the company had to file, and he accepted Mr. Orleans's representations that they did. Mr. Gray did not discuss tax issues with Mr. Troy or specifically approve tax decisions he made, nor did he question Mr. Orleans about the positions taken in the returns or seek a second opinion on his accountants' work. Rather, because Mr. Gray's expertise is in business areas other than accounting and taxes, he left accounting and tax decisions to the professionals at the accounting firm that the company had hired. Mr. Gray did not review or inquire into the tax treatment of the covenant not to compete, which was reflected on pages 19 and 27 of the 50-page 2002 return and on pages 18 and 26 of the 55-page 2003 return.
Mr. Orleans signed the returns as the preparer, and Mr. Gray signed them as Recovery Group's president. Recovery Group timely filed its returns for the years in issue.
The IRS determined that the covenant not to compete was an amortizable
The disallowance of most of the deductions claimed for the covenant for each year increased Recovery Group's income for each year and hence each shareholder's share of Recovery Group's income. In notices of deficiency issued in October and November 2007 to the shareholders, the IRS determined deficiencies for the shareholders accordingly. 2010 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 84">*94 The shareholders' deficiencies all turn on the appropriate treatment of the covenant not to compete, and they require no separate analysis.
The IRS issued a notice of deficiency to Recovery Group in March 2008. The shareholders and Recovery Group all timely filed petitions in this Court.
OPINION
As a general rule, the IRS's determinations are presumed correct, and the taxpayer has the burden of establishing that the determinations in the notice of deficiency are erroneous.
The principal issue in these cases is whether the covenant not to compete that Recovery Group and its departing 23-percent shareholder entered 2010 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 84">*95 into was, for purposes of
The residual goodwill of a business is an intangible asset that is deemed to have an unlimited useful life, so that it cannot be amortized by the business that developed that goodwill.
One such intangible is a covenant not to compete (or a "noncompetition covenant"), which is a "promise, usu[ally] in a sale-of-business, partnership, or employment contract, not to engage in the same type of business for a stated time in the same market as the buyer, partner, or employer." Blacks's Law Dictionary 420 (9th ed. 2009). Someone purchasing a business or buying out a departing shareholder-employee's share of a business may benefit from the seller's assurance that he will not thereafter undermine the business by using his status in and familiarity with the business -- that is, his assurance that he will not carry out with him, when he 2010 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 84">*97 leaves, the intangible assets of the business (such as know-how, or customer relationships, or the identities of suppliers). Thus, a covenant not to compete may have real and important value. See
A covenant not to compete is an intangible asset that, unlike goodwill, does have a limited useful life, defined in the terms of the covenant; and the cost of obtaining such a covenant is, therefore, amortizable ratably over the life of the covenant, apart from the statute at issue in these cases (
However, intangible assets in general -- and covenants not to compete in particular -- do present opportunities for distortion and abuse in reporting one's tax liability. While the cost of purchasing a shareholder's stock is a capital expenditure that does not yield any tax benefit until the stock is disposed of, the cost of a covenant not to compete will be promptly amortized over its life (again, apart from
In the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (OBRA), Pub. L. 103-66, sec. 13261, 107 Stat. 532, Congress enacted
Congress
(a) General Rule. A taxpayer shall be entitled to an amortization deduction with respect to any amortizable * * * * * * * (c) Amortizable 2010 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 84">*100 (1) In general. Except as otherwise provided in this section, the term "amortizable (A) which is acquired by the taxpayer after the date of the enactment of this section, and (B) which is held in connection with the conduct of a trade or business or an activity described in section 212. * * * * * * * (d) (1) In general. Except as otherwise provided in this section, the term " * * * * * * * (E) any covenant not to compete (or other arrangement to the extent such arrangement has substantially the same effect as a covenant not to compete)
Thus, Mr. Edgerly's covenant not to compete with Recovery Group is a
However, Recovery Group contends that Mr. Edgerly's 23-percent stock interest was not "substantial" -- a contention that requires careful attention to the precise language of o What does "interest" mean? o What does "thereof" modify? -- "interest" or "trade or business"? o If "thereof" modifies "interest", then what is a "substantial portion" of an interest?
Recovery Group maintains that "interest in a trade or business" must mean a 100-percent ownership interest and that "thereof" modifies "interest". Recovery Group therefore concludes that a covenant gets 15-year amortization only if it was obtained either in an acquisition of a 100-percent "interest in a trade or business"
Respondent maintains that "thereof" modifies "trade or business", and that "interest" means an ownership interest of
The phrase "trade or business" appears in five different places in
In
Recovery Group counters with the argument that interpreting "an interest" to mean even a minority interest nullifies the subsequent language that looks to whether the acquisition is of a "substantial portion"; but this argument reflects confusion about what the "portion" is that the statute requires to be "substantial". Recovery Group contends that in the statutory phrase at issue -- "an acquisition * * * of an
The fallacy in Recovery Group's position is a grammatical mistake about the antecedent of "thereof". Respondent contends, and we agree, that the antecedent of "thereof" is "trade or business", so that 15-year amortization is required when a covenant is entered into in connection with an acquisition of either an interest (i.e., an entire or fractional stock interest) in a trade or business or assets constituting 14 a substantial portion of a trade or business. This reading coincides both with explicit language in the legislative history and with the legislative purpose.
The legislative 2010 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 84">*109 history is unmistakable on the point that the "substantial portion" in Exceptions to the definition of a In general. -- The bill contains several exceptions to the definition of the term " The determination of whether acquired assets constitute a * * * * * * * In determining whether a taxpayer has acquired an intangible asset in a transaction 2010 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 84">*110 * * * that involves the acquisition of assets that constitute a trade or business or a
Congress's purpose in enacting
Recovery Group's interpretation of the statute would impose the 15-year amortization 2010 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 84">*112 in the case of an acquisition of an entire stock interest or a substantial stock interest but would find the statute silent about asset acquisitions, thus failing to vindicate the legislative purpose. We prefer instead the interpretation that accomplishes Congress's aim to reach covenants not to compete in both stock acquisitions (i.e., acquisitions of "an interest in a trade or business") and acquisitions of a "substantial portion" of the assets of "a trade or business". Under this reading of the statute, the question whether an acquisition is "substantial" arises only with reference to asset acquisitions. On the other hand, where a covenant not to compete is entered into in connection with a stock acquisition of any size -- substantial or not substantial-that covenant is an amortizable
Even if "thereof" modified "an interest" and thereby limited the application of
There are at least two fatal flaws in this argument. First, the percentages in
The second flaw in this argument is that the "empowerment zone" provisions of
In other provisions one could find, in a variety of circumstances, "substantial" percentages that are much less than 50 percent. For example -- o For some retirement plan purposes, a "substantial owner" is one who, inter alia, "owns, directly or indirectly, more than 10 percent in value of either the voting stock of that corporation or all the stock of that corporation." o A "substantial understatement" of tax is an understatement that "exceeds * * * 10 percent of the tax required to be shown on the return". o "[N]o substantial part" of a tax-exempt organization's activity may be political activity, o For income tax treaty purposes, a "substantial interest" in a foreign company's stock could be "10 percent or more". See o For estate tax purposes, former
However, we see no reason to suppose that the purposes of
If, on the other hand,
Thus, Recovery Group has not convinced us that a 23-percent interest would not be considered "substantial". And in any event, "thereof" does not modify "an interest"; and therefore an interest need not be "substantial" to trigger the application of
Recovery Group cites
We held in The parties do not dispute that they entered into the covenant after the effective date of We need not and do not decide whether all stock redemptions made in connection with an execution of a covenant 2010 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 84">*122 not to compete constitute an acquisition of an interest in a trade or business within the meaning of
However, the taxpayer in
We 2010 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 84">*123 therefore answer in these cases a question not asked in
The car dealership in
In both
We hold that Recovery Group's redemption of 23 percent of its stock was an acquisition of an interest in a trade or business, that the covenant not to compete is thus a
A taxpayer who is otherwise liable for the accuracy-related penalty may avoid the liability if it successfully invokes one of three other provisions:
Recovery Group reported negative taxable income for both 2002 and 2003. See
a.
Only where the weight of the authorities supporting the treatment is substantial in relation to the weight of the authorities supporting contrary positions does substantial authority for a tax treatment exist. See
Mr. Troy testified that the legislative history convinced him that some covenants not to compete could still be amortized over their useful lives under
While "a taxpayer may have substantial authority for a position that is supported only by a well-reasoned construction of the applicable statutory provision",
b.
Provided the taxpayer adequately disclosed the relevant facts affecting the tax treatment of an item and had a reasonable basis for its treatment, no accuracy-related penalty may be imposed for a substantial understatement of income tax with respect to that item.
Recovery Group's returns for the years in issue list the deductions for the covenant not to compete as individual line items on two statements itemizing "other deductions" for each year. These entries recite "NON COMPETE EXPENSE" and the amount deducted; they provide no further details, such as Recovery Group's entering into this covenant not to compete in the redemption transaction with Mr. Edgerly. We find that Recovery Group's returns did not include sufficient facts to provide the IRS with actual or constructive knowledge of the potential controversy involved with Recovery Group's deduction of the cost of the covenant not to compete. While Recovery Group did list the deduction on its return, merely claiming the expense was insufficient to alert the IRS to the circumstances of the acquisition of the covenant or the decision by Recovery Group's accountants not to treat the covenant as an amortizable
c.
For purposes of
Mr. Orleans, a certified public accountant, was involved with the buyout agreement from the beginning, and he had access to correct information and to all the information he needed to properly evaluate the tax treatment of the cost of the covenant. Mr. Orleans relied in turn on Mr. Troy, another qualified professional and a tax 2010 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 84">*132 specialist in his accounting firm, to determine the tax treatment of the covenant. Recovery Group's president, Mr. Gray, testified that he was a businessman and not a tax expert and that he hired accountants to ensure that his company's books were properly kept and its tax returns were properly filed. We are satisfied that Recovery Group's accountants were competent professionals with sufficient expertise to justify Recovery Group's reliance, that they had the necessary information, and that Recovery Group actually relied on its accountants in good faith.
In When an accountant or attorney
After considering all the facts and circumstances, we find that Recovery Group has established that it had reasonable cause and acted in good faith with respect to the substantial understatements of income tax for the years in issue. Respondent's determination of the accuracy-related penalty will not 2010 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 84">*134 be sustained.
To reflect the foregoing,
Footnotes
1. Cases of the following petitioners are consolidated here:Robert J. Glendon and Yvonne M. Glendon, docket No. 29314-07;John S. Sumner, Jr., and Mary V. Sumner, docket No. 29321-07;Stephen S. Gray and Linda Baron, docket No. 29326-07; MichaelEpstein and Barbara Epstein, docket No. 29333-07; Anthony J.Walker and Pamela S. Mayer, docket No. 29335-07; Andre Laus andHelen Laus, docket No. 29336-07; and Parham Pouladdej, docket No.29385-07.↩
2. Except as otherwise noted, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code (26 U.S.C.), and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.↩
3. The residences of the Recovery Group shareholders when they filed their respective petitions were as follows:
↩ Petitioner Docket No. Residence Robert J. & Yvonne M. Glendon 29314-07 Massachusetts John S. & Mary V. Sumner 29321-07 North Carolina Stephen S. Gray & Linda Baron 29326-07 Massachusetts Michael & Barbara Epstein 29333-07 Massachusetts Anthony J. Walker & Pamela S. Mayer 29335-07 Massachusetts Andre & Helen Laus 29336-07 Rhode Island Parham Pouladdej 29385-07 Massachusetts 4. The Forms 1120S, U.S. Income Tax Return for an S Corporation, filed by Recovery Group reported the following:
Item 2002 2003 Gross receipts or sales $ 15,387,209 $ 14,768,403 Total deductions 15,342,784 14,787,971 Ordinary income (loss) 19,889 (14,046) Federal taxable income (23,571) (6,639) Total deductions included the $ 166,663 claimed in 2002 and the $ 233,337 claimed in 2003 for the covenant not to compete, which in turn represented 1.09 percent of Recovery Group's total deductions for 2002 and 1.58 percent of its deductions for 2003.↩
5. The disallowance of the deductions resulted in positive Federal taxable income and triggered a corporate-level built-in gains tax for both years in issue under
section 1374(a) .Section 1374 imposes a corporate level tax on built-in gains recognized by an S corporation during the 10 years following the corporation's conversion from C corporation to S corporation status.Sec. 1374(a) ,(d)(3) ,(7) . The parties agree that if respondent's position is sustained and the covenant not to compete must be amortized over 15 years, thensection 1374↩ applies.6. Under certain circumstances the burden can shift to the IRS with respect to factual disputes pursuant to
section 7491(a)↩ . However, Recovery Group does not contend that the burden has shifted.7. In contrast, a departing individual employee-shareholder has an incentive to allocate more of the price to the shares of stock and less to the covenant not to compete, because he will obtain capital gain treatment for his gain on the stock but ordinary income treatment for the consideration for the covenant not to compete. See
, 598 F.2d 464">467 (5th Cir. 1979), affg.Sonnleitner v. Commissioner , 598 F.2d 464">598 F.2d 464T.C. Memo. 1976-249↩ .8. The effective date of
Section 197 was August 10, 1993. See OBRA sec. 13261(g), 107 Stat. 540; , 110 T.C. 62">110 T.C. 62, 110 T.C. 62">87 n.30 (1998), affd. without published opinionSpencer v. Commissioner , 110 T.C. 7">110 T.C. 7194 F.3d 1324">194 F.3d 1324↩ (11th Cir. 1999).9. Furthermore, a covenant not to compete that is a
section 197 intangible may not be treated as disposed of (or becoming worthless) even if the covenant expires or actually becomes worthless, unless the entire interest in a trade or business that was acquired with the covenant is also disposed of or becomes worthless.Sec. 197(f)(1)(B) ; H. Conf. Rept. 103-213, at 694-695 (1993),3 C.B. 393">1993-3 C.B. 393 , 572-573. Recovery Group does not assert that the 23 percent of itself that it redeemed from Mr. Edgerly became worthless when the term of the covenant expired; accordingly, we need not and do not consider whether a deduction is allowable under the disposition rules ofsection 197(f)(1) . These cases turn on whether the instant covenant not to compete is an amortizablesection 197↩ intangible. If it is, then a 15-year amortization is required by the statute.10. If there were any doubt, the legislative history of
section 197 makes it clear that "For this purpose, an interest in a trade or business includes not only the assets of a trade or business, but also stock in a corporation that is engaged in a trade or business or an interest in a partnership that is engaged in a trade or business." H. Conf. Rept. 103-213,supra at 677,1993-3 C.B. at 555 . See , 116 T.C. 289">294-295 (2001) (redemption of stock qualifies as the indirect acquisition of an interest in a trade or business for purposes ofFrontier Chevrolet Co. v. Commissioner , 116 T.C. 289">116 T.C. 289section 197 ), affd.329 F.3d 1131">329 F.3d 1131↩ (9th Cir. 2003).11. See
section 197(c)(1)(B) (an "amortizablesection 197 intangible" is "held in connection with the conduct of a trade or business"), (2) (flush language) (self-created intangibles are subject tosection 197 if "created in connection with a transaction * * * involving the acquisition of assets constituting a trade or business or substantial portion thereof"),(d)(1)(E) (covenants not to compete);(e)(3)(A)(ii) (computer software is not subject tosection 197 if it "is not acquired in a transaction * * * involving the acquisition of assets constituting a trade or business or substantial portion thereof"); and(e)(7) (rights to service a mortgage are subject tosection 197 if "acquired in a transaction * * * involving the acquisition of assets * * * constituting a trade or business or substantial portion thereof").12. As "interest" is used outside the context of
section 197 , one who owns an "interest" may own a "fractional interest", see, e.g., Estate of , 112 T.C. 26">33 (1999), which might consist of a "minority interest", see, e.g.,Mellinger v. Commissioner , 112 T.C. 26">112 T.C. 26 , 130 T.C. 170">183 (2008), or a "majority interest", see, e.g., Estate ofHolman v. Commissioner , 130 T.C. 170">130 T.C. 170 , 124 T.C. 95">123 (2005), also referred to as a "controlling interest", see, e.g.,Bongard v. Comissioner , 124 T.C. 95">124 T.C. 95 , 121 T.C. 168">195 (2003); or one might own an "entire interest",Square D Co. & Subs. v. Commissioner , 121 T.C. 168">121 T.C. 168 , 115 T.C. 376">378 (2000), affd.Shepherd v. Commissioner , 115 T.C. 376">115 T.C. 376283 F.3d 1258">283 F.3d 1258↩ (11th Cir. 2002).13. We decide only the 23-percent case before us and do not address hypothetical facts not present here (e.g., a de minimis stock interest in a publicly traded company).↩
14.
Section 197(d)(1)(E)↩ does not include the words "assets constituting" that we interpolate in the text above, but those words are implicit there for the reasons discussed hereafter.15. See
("both stock acquisitions and redemptions involve acquiring an interest in a trade or business by acquiring stock of a corporation engaged in a trade or business").Frontier Chevrolet Co. v. Commissioner , 329 F.3d 1131">329 F.3d at 1135↩16. The phrase "
assets constituting a trade or business or substantial portion thereof" (emphasis added) appears insubsection (c)(2) (flush language) (self-created intangibles);subsection (e)(3)(A)(ii) (computer software); andsubsection (e)(7)↩ (rights to service a mortgage)).17. See Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997,
Pub. L. 105-34, sec. 956(a)(1)-(3), 111 Stat. 890">111 Stat. 890 ,1997-4 C.B. (Vol. 1) 104 ↩.18. Cf.
, 227 F.2d 907">912 (6th Cir. 1955) (where "something less than 5% of the time and effort of the League was devoted to the activities that the Tax Court found to be 'political' * * * the so-called 'political activities' of the League were not in relation to all of its other activities substantial"), revg.Seasongood v. Commissioner , 227 F.2d 907">227 F.2d 90722 T.C. 671">22 T.C. 671↩ (1954).19. In 1990, former
section 2036(c) was repealed, and former subsection (d) was redesignatedsection 2036(c)↩ ). See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-508, sec. 11601, 104 Stat. 1388-490.20.
H. Conf. Rept. 103-213,The anti-churning rules of
section 197(f)(9) aim to:prevent taxpayers from converting existing goodwill, going concern value, or any other
section 197 intangible for which a depreciation or amortization deduction would not have been allowable under present law into amortizable property to which the bill applies.supr a at 691,1993-3 C.B. at 569 . Congress sought specifically to prevent taxpayers from transferring property for the purpose of generating deductions, and it imposed more stringent definitions of "related person" to prevent transfers among related parties from qualifying an intangible for amortization under the new provisions.21. We emphasize that we do
not↩ hold here that to be "substantial" an interest must equal or exceed 20 percent.22. Under
section 6662(b)(1) , the accuracy-related penalty is also imposed where an underpayment is attributable to the taxpayer's negligence or disregard of rules or regulations; and respondent argues that Recovery Group's position reflects negligence. However, as we show below, respondent has demonstrated that Recovery Group substantially understated its income tax for the years in issue for purposes ofsection 6662(b)(2) . Thus, we need not consider whether, undersection 6662(b)(1)↩ , Recovery Group was negligent or disregarded rules or regulations.