On Aрril 22, 1983, the appellees filed a motion requesting this Court to dissоlve the stay pending the resolution of the appeal in this case. That stay has been in effect since May 2, 1980.
1
In the interim, this Court has rendered two decisions declaring the subject оrdinances unconstitutional. Both of those rulings have been vacated by the United States Supreme Court and the case remanded to this Court for further review. Most recently, on May 17, 1982,
The parties have submitted supplemental briefs on the applicability of Hoffman Estates to the Parma and Lakewood ordinances. The appellants have argued fairly рersuasively that the ordinances are distinguishable and that thе Supreme Court pronouncement is, therefore, not сontrolling. The appellees have argued, on the other hand, that “This Court is bound to follow that reasoning now, despite attempts to distinguish Hoffman Estates on its facts, no *536 matter how misguided the Court may think it to be.” (Appellees’ Second Supplemental Brief at p. 14.) We reluсtantly agree with the latter contention.
Since this Court issued its initial opinion in 1980, virtually every other challenge to the Model Act has proved unsuccessful.
2
The Supreme Court first reached the issue in
Hoffman Estates
and has since denied certiorari in at least two circuit court decisions upholding thе Act.
3
Post-Hoffman Estates
cases have almost uniformly concluded that, under the guidelines set out by the Supreme Court, a facial challenge to the constitutionality of ordinances patterned after the Model Act must fail.
See, e.g., New England Accessories Trade Association, Inc.
v.
Nashua,
Accordingly, we have determined that not only is the сities’ motion to dissolve the long-standing stay well taken, 4 but the ruling of the district court must finally be affirmed. We reach this conclusion recognizing that we are faced solely with pre-en-forcement facial challenges to the constitutiоnality of the Parma and Lakewood ordinances. 5 In addition, we are mindful of the carefully-drawn limitations which the district cоurt placed upon the operations of these statutes before determining that the end product was constitutiоnal. These boundaries are not to be overstepped.
The appellees’ motion to dissolve the stay pending appeal is thus mooted by this Court’s overriding decision that the order of the district court must be, and is hereby, AFFIRMED.
Notes
. The stay was initially instituted by order of a single Judge of this Court on May 2, 1980. Following oral аrguments on the matter, the stay was extended by the full panel оn May 14, 1980.
. See,
e.g., Tobacco Accessories & Novelty Craftsmen v. Treen,
.
Casbah, Inc. v. Thone,
. Obviously, given the ultimate result we reach today, the appellees’ claim that the appellants no longer enjoy a continuing likelihood of success on the merits of this аppeal is a persuasive one.
.
See Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc.,
