Dale REBERNICK, Sandra Rebernick, and Gregory Rebernick, by his Guardian ad Litem, Plaintiffs-Appellants v. WAUSAU GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant, AMERICAN FAMILY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Respondent.
No. 04-0487
Court of Appeals of Wisconsin
December 14, 2004
Petition to review granted March 8, 2005
2005 WI App 15 | 692 N.W.2d 348
Oral argument December 2, 2004.
On behalf of the defendant-respondent, the cause was submitted on the brief of Emile H. Banks, Jr., of Emile Banks & Associates, LLC, of Milwaukee. There was oral argument by Emile H. Banks, Jr.
Before Fine, Curley and Kessler, JJ.
¶ 1. FINE, J. Dale Rebernick, Sandra Rebernick, and Gregory Rebernick appeal the trial court‘s order granting American Family Mutual Insurance Company‘s motion for summary judgment and dismissing the Rebernicks’ action. The Rebernicks sought underinsurance-motorist coverage under their American Family umbrella policy even though the policy expressly declared that it did not cover underinsured-motorist claims. We affirm.
I.
¶ 2. Dale Rebernick was seriously injured when the lawn mower he was riding was hit by a car driven by Denelius Heard. Heard had $25,000 in liability insurance. Heard‘s insurer paid Rebernick the $25,000, and Rebernick collected the maximum $100,000
¶ 3. The Rebernicks contend that the American Family umbrella policy should be reformed to provide underinsured-motorist coverage because, they assert, American Family violated
II.
A.
¶ 4. As we have seen, the trial court decided this case on summary judgment. The parties agree that there are no contested facts and that this case presents only an issue of law. Thus, our review is de novo. See Green Spring Farms v. Kersten, 136 Wis. 2d 304, 315-317, 401 N.W.2d 816, 820-821 (1987) (appellate review of summary-judgment determinations is de novo).
(a) 1. An insurer writing policies that insure with respect to a motor vehicle registered or principally garagеd in this state against loss resulting from liability imposed by law for bodily injury or death suffered by a person arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle shall provide to one insured under each such insurance policy that goes into effect after October 1, 1995, that is written by the insurer and that does not include underinsured motorist coverage written notice of the availability of underinsured motorist coverage, including a brief description of the coverage. An insurer is required to provide the notice required under this subdivision only one time and in conjunction with the delivery of the policy.1
. . . .
(b) Acceptance or rejection of underinsured motorist coverage by a рerson after being notified under par. (a) need not be in writing. The absence of a premium payment for underinsured motorist coverage is conclusive proof that the person has rejected such coverage. The rejection of such coverage by the person notified under par. (a) shall apply to all persons insurеd under the policy, including any renewal of the policy.
(c) If a person rejects underinsured motorist coverage after being notified under par. (a), the insurer is not required to provide such coverage under a policy that is renewed to the person by that insurer unless an insured under the policy subsequently requests such underinsured motorist coverage in writing.
Except as otherwise provided, this section applies to every policy of insurance issued or delivered in this state against the insured‘s liability for loss or damage resulting from accident caused by any motor vehicle, whether the loss or damage is to property or to a person.
As with our de novo review of summary-judgment determinations, a trial court‘s application of statutes to facts that are not contested is also reviewed by us de novo, see State v. Wilson, 170 Wis. 2d 720, 722, 490 N.W.2d 48, 50 (Ct. App. 1992), denial of habeas corpus aff‘d, Wilson v. McCaughtry, 994 F.2d 1228 (7th Cir. 1993), as is an interpretation of an insurance contract, Martin v. Milwaukee Mutual Insurance Co., 146 Wis. 2d 759, 766, 433 N.W.2d 1, 3 (1988).
¶ 6. We have recently recognized:
Application of statutes requires that we “faithfully give effect to the laws enacted by the legislature.” State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court, 2004 WI 58, ¶ 44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 662, 681 N.W.2d 110, 123-124 (“It is the enacted law, not the unenacted intent, that is binding on the public.“). In doing so, “[w]e assume that the legislature‘s intent is expressed in the statutory language.” Id., 2004 WI 58, ¶ 44, 271 Wis. 2d at 662, 681 N.W.2d at 124. If that language is clear, we apply it as it reads because the words used by the legislature are the best evidence of its intent. Id., 2004 WI 58, ¶ 45, 271 Wis. 2d at 663, 681 N.W.2d at 124. Further, we may use context to derive the meaning of words that, when viewed in isolation, appear unclear. Ibid. External sources of legislative intent, that is matters not appearing in statutes themselves, id., 2004 WI 58, ¶ 50, 271 Wis. 2d at 666, 681 N.W.2d at 125, сan help to discern legislative intent when the statutory language is not clear on its
face, id., 2004 WI 58, ¶¶ 50-51, 271 Wis. 2d at 666-667, 681 N.W.2d at 125-126. External sources may also help “confirm or verify a plain-meaning interpretation.” Id., 2004 WI 58, ¶ 51, 271 Wis. 2d at 666-667, 681 N.W.2d at 126.
State v. Swiams, 2004 WI App 217, ¶ 5, 277 Wis. 2d 400, 404-405, 690 N.W.2d 452, 454. Additionally, statutes should not be applied with a hyper-technicality that swamps common sense. Wisconsin Citizens Concerned for Cranes & Doves v. Wisconsin Dep‘t of Natural Res., 2004 WI 40, ¶ 6, 270 Wis. 2d 318, 329, 677 N.W.2d 612, 617 (statutes should be read and applied to avоid absurd results). We examine the applicable provisions of
B.
¶ 7. As the Rebernicks contend,
- American Family writes insurance for motor vehicles that are either “registered or principally garaged” in Wisconsin, and
- that insurance protects “against loss resulting from liability imposed by law for bodily injury or death
suffered by a person arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle.”
See
¶ 8. As we have seen, our task in applying statutes is to givе effect to what the legislature wanted to accomplish, and, unless the statutory language is ambiguous, the words of a statute are the best evidence of the legislature‘s intent.
¶ 10. As the trial court pointed out, on the umbrella policy‘s effective date the Rebernicks were already covered by an underlying automobile policy also issued by American Family. The underlying automobile policy not only gave them underinsured-motorist coverage but it also defined the coverage in a special full-page endorsement attached to the policy. That endorsement further explained: ”Underinsured motor vehicle means a motor vehicle which is insured by a liability bond or policy at the time of the accident which provides bodily injury liability limits less than the limits of this Underinsured Motorists coverage.” (Bolding in original.) The endorsement told the insureds: “You have this coverage if Underinsured Motorists Coverage is shown in the declarations.” The declarations page set out the following under the heading ”Coverages and Limits Provided” (bolding in original; uppercasing omitted):
ENDORSEMENT-SEE BELOW
UNDERINSURED MOTORISTS COVERAGE - BODILY INJURY ONLY $100,000 EACH PERSON $300,000 EACH ACCIDENT
(Typography as in original.)
¶ 12. Reformation of an insurance contract may be warranted if the policy as issued reflects a mutual mistake by the contracting parties. Jeske v. General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 1 Wis. 2d 70, 78, 87, 83 N.W.2d 167, 172, 176 (1957); see also First Nat‘l Bank of Kenosha v. Scalzo, 70 Wis. 2d 691, 700, 235 N.W.2d 472, 477 (1975) (deed of trust). Actual knowledge, of course, negates the “mistake” element. See Jeske, 1 Wis. 2d at 92-93, 83 N.W.2d at 179; Scalzo, 70 Wis. 2d at 700, 235 N.W.2d at 477; cf. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Blaha, 3 Wis. 2d 638, 645, 89 N.W.2d 197, 200-201 (1958) (timely formal notice not required where indemnitor had timely actual knowledge of both claim and that indemnitee was seeking to hold indemnitor liable).
By the Court.—Order affirmed.
¶ 14. KESSLER, J. (concurring in part; dissenting in part). I agree with the Majority that
¶ 15. Pursuant to
¶ 16. The Majority concludes that a single clаuse within the umbrella policy satisfies the
¶ 18. I conclude the American Family policy has failed to give either sufficient notice of the availability of an underinsured motorist coverage endorsement to the umbrella policy, or a sufficient description of this
¶ 19. American Family failed to comply with the requirements of
¶ 20. The Majority asserts there must have been a mutual mistake in order to provide a remedy. Majority, ¶ 12. If that analysis is correct, in my view, American Family‘s mistake was an incorrect analysis of its obligations under the law. The Rebernicks’ “mistake” in failing to purchase coverage was occasioned by American Family‘s actions. Because American Family provided no notices, there is no evidence in the record that the Rebernicks had the knowledge or the opportunity to decide whether to add this coverage to their umbrella policy, contrary to the Majority, ¶¶ 12-13.
