OPINION
Appellants Hayden Reaves and Billy Ro-chier sued appellee the City of Corpus Christi (“the City”) for personal injury allegedly caused by its employee. The suit alleged that Officer Jorge Fernandez negligently conducted a high-speed chase of a drunk driver named Kimberly Balboa, which ended when Balboa ran a red light and struck appellants’ vehicle. The City filed a rule 91a motion to dismiss, arguing that because the City had governmental immunity, the suit against the City had no basis in law. The trial court agreed. The resulting dismissal under rule 91a is the subject of this appeal.
Appellants bring what we construe as three issues on appeal. By their first issue, appellants argue that the trial court reversibly erred when it granted the City’s motion long after the 45-day deadline for ruling on a 91a motion. By their second issue, appellants argue that the City’s motion should be reviewed as a rule 91a motion and "not as a plea to the jurisdiction, as the City suggests. By their third issue, appellants contend that their peti
I. Background
A. Allegations in Appellants’ Petition
Appellants filed their original petition in Nueces County Court at Law No. 2 on May 23, 2014. Named as defendants were Officer Fernandez of the Corpus Christi Police Department, the City, Balboa, and Randy Vasquez, who allegedly ¿ñtrusted the car to Balboa. Appellants’ first amended petition was the live petition, and we judge this appeal based on its contents.
The petition alleged as follows. Appellants were injured on August 4, 2012, after Officer Fernandez initiated a high-speed chase of Balboa. The pursuit ended when Balboa ran a red light and struck appellants’ vehicle on its passenger door. Officer Fernandez was driving the patrol car in the course and scope of his employment with the City, and he did so “recklessly and without regard to public safety.” This collision caused appellants “severe personal injuries,” which were specified. Appellants were transported to Christas Spohn Memorial Hospital for treatment.
The petition further alleged that their negligence claims qualified for a waiver of sovereign immunity through Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 101.021(1) because: Officer Fernandez acted within the course and scope of employment, the personal injury claims were caused by Officer Fernandez’s -negligent operation of a vehicle, and Officer Fernandez would be personally liable otherwise under Texas law. Appellants further alleged that in the absence of immunity, the City was liable through respondeat superi- or. Appellants also alleged direct negligence against the City, including theories of negligent entrustment, negligent hiring and/or screening of driver qualifications, negligent training and supervision, negligent retention, negligent contracting, and negligent maintenance. Appellants sought damages and other relief.
B. Further Procedural History
On July 81, 2014, the City filed its 91a motion, which argued that appellants’ petition had no basis in law. “Not only have Plaintiffs completely failed to claim a waiver of immunity, there is no valid waiver of governmental immunity that they can claim.” The City theorized that under the Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA), only one form of waiver was potentially applicable to the events alleged: a claim for “personal injury ... arising] from the operation or use of a motor-driven vehicle....” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.021(1) (West, Westlaw through 2015 R.S.). The City cited appellants’ allegation that it was Balboa, not Officer Fernandez, who ran a red light and struck appellants’ car. According to the City, these allegations made it per se impossible for appellants to demonstrate the required causal “nexus” between the injury and the government employee’s operation of the vehicle, which is necessary to establish a waiver of immunity under the TTCA. See id. § 101.025(a) (West, Westlaw through 2015 R.S.); City of Dallas v. Sanchez,
A hearing was scheduled, and appellants filed their first amended petition on September 5, 2014. On September 29, 2014, Officer Fernandez was dismissed on grounds unrelated to the City’s 91a motion, and appellants do not protest his dismissal on appeal. On January 5, 2015, the trial court granted the City’s 91a motion and dismissed appellants’ suit against the City in its entirety, with prejudice. On appeal, appellants do not challenge the dismissal of their direct negligence claims, but instead solely challenge the dismissal of their claims relating to Officer Fernandez’s alleged negligence and recklessness, and the corresponding waiver of immunity under section 101.021.
II. General Applicable Law
A.. Rule 91a
In 2011, the Legislature directed the supreme court to adopt rules providing for the dismissal of causes of action that have no basis in law or fact, to be achieved “on motion and without evidence.” Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 22.004(g) (West, West-law through 2015 R.S.). The result was Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a, enacted in 2013. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 91a. The rule provides in part:
[A] party may move to dismiss a cause of action on the grounds that it has no basis in law or fact. A cause of action has no basis in law if the allegations, taken as true, together with inferences reasonably drawn from them, do not entitle the claimant to the relief sought. A cause of action has no basis in fact if no reasonable person could believe the facts pleaded.
Id. R. 91a.l. The court may not consider evidence in ruling on a 91a motion and must decide the motion based solely on the pleading of the cause of action, together with any pleading exhibits permitted by the rulés of civil procedure. Id. R. 91a.6; In re Butt,
A trial court’s determinations of whether a cause of action has any basis in law and in fact are legal questions that we review de novo. Sanchez,
B. Fair Notice
Our procedural rules merely require that the pleadings provide fair notice of the claim and the relief sought such that the opposing party can prepare a defense. In re Lipsky,
C. Texas Tort Claims Act
Political subdivisions of the state, including cities, are entitled to governmental immunity unless it has been waived by statute or the constitution. Reata Constr. Corp. v. City of Dallas,
The Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA) “provides a limited waiver of governmental immunity.” Alexander v. Walker,
The phrase “arises from” requires a causal nexus “between the operation or use of the motor-driven vehicle or equipment and a plaintiffs injuries.” Ryder,
“Because proximate cause is ultimately a question for a fact-finder, we
III. Timing of a 91a Motion
Appellants’ first issue complains of the lapse of time between the Sling of the 91a motion and the resulting order of dismissal—roughly 159 days. A rule 91a “motion to dismiss must be ... granted or denied within 45 days after the motion is Sled.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 91a.3(c); see Butt,
A. Applicable Law
In construing a statute, this Court’s objective is to determine and give effect to the Legislature’s intent. In re Lopez,
However, even if a statutory requirement is mandatory, this does not mean that compliance is necessarily jurisdictional. Helena Chem.,
The Third and Fourteenth Courts of Appeal have held that rule 91a’s deadline is not jurisdictional. See Koenig,
B. Application of Helena Chemical Factors to Rule 91a
1. No Consequences for Noncompliance
First, the Legislature prescribed no “consequences for noncompliance” with the requirement to rule on the 91a motion within 45 days. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 91a.3(c); Helena Chem.,
Rule 91a stands in contrast to statutes like the Texas Citizen’s Participation Act (TCPA), which expressly provides that if “a court does not rule on a motion to dismiss under Section 27.003 in the time prescribed by Section 27.005, the motion is considered to have been denied by operation of law and the moving party may appeal.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 27.008(a) (West, Westlaw through 2015 R.S.). In light of these consequences, courts have held that automatic denial of the motion follows when the trial court misses the deadline. See, e.g., Inwood Forest Cmty. Improvement Ass’n v. Arce,
Unlike the TCPA, rule 91a prescribes no consequences for failure to rule within the deadline. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 91a.3(c). The absence of any ramifications is a clear signal that the Legislature did not intend that the 45-day deadline be jurisdictional. See Helena Chem.,
As a substitute recourse for missing the deadline, there is the possibility that mandamus relief is available to ensure that the trial court complies with its duty to timely rule. In State v. $135,000.00, the Texas Supreme Court ruled that where a statute lacked any consequences for its deadline, the mandatory deadline afforded “the parties the right to compel the trial court to hear the case promptly,” and to do so by mandamus if necessary—but not by threat of automatic dismissal.
2. Overall Statutory Objective
3. Implications from Each Interpretation
The same considerations show that a non-jurisdictional view would have far better implications “resulting] from each possible interpretation.” See id. Moreover, “Rule 91a was intended to benefit [the movant] by the creation of an early dismissal procedure....” Walker,
4. Summary
In view of the Helena Chemical factors, we agree with our sister courts that rule 91a’s deadline for ruling on a motion to dismiss is not jurisdictional. See Koenig,
C. Conclusion
Appellants’ first issue contends that because the trial court missed the 45-day deadline specified in rule 91a.3(c), the trial court had no authority to grant the City’s motion. Having concluded that this deadline is mandatory but not jurisdictional, we cannot agree. Accordingly, we overrule appellants’ first issue.
IV. Rule 91a Motion and Plea to the Jurisdiction
Appellants’ second issue anticipates the City’s primary argument on appeal: the City asserts that their 91a motion was, in actuality, a plea to the jurisdiction on the basis of immunity. The City reasons that any motion which raises the issue of governmental immunity is actually a plea to the jurisdiction, and because of this, any unique requirements of rule 91a do not apply to its motion. Thus, the City’s appellate brief relies exclusively on numerous authorities dealing with pleas to the jurisdiction—in particular, cases finding that the plaintiff failed to prove a waiver of sovereign immunity under the TTCA. The City urges us to uphold the trial court’s ruling as fully consistent with the standards for pleas to the jurisdiction.
Because appellants’ second issue is a rebuttal to the City’s argument, we begin by exploring the City’s contentions. The City primarily relies on City of Austin v. Liberty Mutual Insurance to support its position that the 91a motion was actually a plea to the jurisdiction.
Such an approach would be supported by other related precedent. For one, the Houston First Court of Appeals has disregarded the label on a 91a motion and instead treated it as a generalized motion to dismiss, though not as a plea to the jurisdiction. See AC Interests LP v. Tex. Comm’n on Envtl. Quality, No. 01-15-00378-CV,
For another, many courts have recognized the similarity between the standards of review for 91a motion and a plea to the jurisdiction. The Texas Supreme Court recently wrote that the “dismissal grounds under Rule 91a have been analogized to a plea to the jurisdiction, which requires a court to determine whether the pleadings allege facts demonstrating jurisdiction.” Sanchez,
One basis for comparison is that, in reviewing a plea to the jurisdiction, courts construe the pleadings liberally in favor of the plaintiff, look to the pleader’s intent, and accept as true the factual allegations in the pleadings to determine if the plead
However, while we approve of the useful analogy between a 91a motion and a plea to the jurisdiction, we are wary of turning analogy into actuality. As Chief Justice Frost observed, the two procedures are not identical or fully interchangeable:
[Pjarties who succeed under a plea to the jurisdiction are not thereby entitled to recover their attorney’s fees; successful parties under Rule 91a are entitled to attorney’s fees. Pleas to the jurisdiction may be (and often are) based on evidence extrinsic to the live pleading; Rule 91a motions may not be based on such evidence. Grounds for a plea to the jurisdiction may be added for the first time on appeal; grounds for Rule 91a motions must be raised in the trial court.
Wooley,
The most critical and relevant distinction between a 91a motion and a plea to the jurisdiction is that a ruling on a 91a motion must not be based on extrinsic evidence, whereas the trial court must consider extrinsic evidence if necessary to resolve a plea to the .jurisdiction. See Wooley,
If we readily allowed the blending of standards for 91a motions and pleas to the jurisdiction, this could enable government defendants to “challenge[ ] the existence of jurisdictional facts” but artfully avoid any responsive evidence. See Miranda,
We find the City’s primary citation— City of Austin v. Liberty Mutual Insurance—to be distinguishable to the facts of this case.' City of Austin held that “because the Rule 91a motion was used to challenge the trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction,” the motion could be treated as a plea to the jurisdiction for all purposes, including disregarding any requirements unique to rule 91a. See
The reference to “plea to the jurisdiction” [in Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 51.014(a)(8) ] is not to a particular procedural vehicle but to the substance of the issue raised. Thus, an interlocutory appeal may be taken from a refusal to dismiss for want of jurisdiction whether the jurisdictional argument is presented by plea to the jurisdiction or some other vehicle, such as a motion for summary judgment.
Simons,
If Simons had so held, it. would disrupt the branch of precedent which deals with summary judgment on the basis of immunity. Cases in this branch have made clear that an immunity claim does not erase the established rules which apply to motions for summary judgment. For instance, in Miranda, the supreme court made clear that a plea to the jurisdiction entails different deadlines than a motion for summary judgment on immunity. See
Among those conditions is rule 91a.2, which defines the required content of a 91a motion. Tex. R. Civ. P. 91a.2. It provides that the motion to dismiss must state that it is made pursuant to this rule, must identify each cause of action to which it is addressed, and must state specifically the reasons the cause of action has no basis in law, no basis in fact, or both. Id.
Here, the City’s motion specifically stated that the motion was brought under rule 91a, addressed itself towards appellants’ causes of action, and contended that these claims had no basis because the allegations rendered it impossible to state a valid waiver of immunity under the TTCA, See id. We are of the opinion that this case must therefore be judged under the constraints of rule 91a, since that is the procedural framework which the City’s motion
We sustain appellants’ second issue.
V. Sufficiency Under Rule 91a
In their third issue, appellants respond that they successfully pleaded a claim with a valid “basis in law.” a claim for “personal injury ... arising] from the operation or use of a motor-driven vehicle” which, appellants argue, triggered a waiver of immunity. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 101.021, .025. In light of this basis, appellants argue that their claims should survive under rule 91a’s standard, which appellants liken to the standard of dismissal for “failure to state a claim” under federal rule 12. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Appellants, equate this standard to the federal touchstones of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
In comparison, the City’s 91a motion argued that appellants pleaded a cause of action with no basis in law. In particular, the City’s motion argued that one of the facts alleged by appellants— that it was Balboa who ran a red light and collided with appellants, not a government employee—rendered it categorically “impossible” for appellants to show that the officer’s operation of the vehicle caused their injuries.
A. No-Basis-in-Law Decisions
Since rule 91a was enacted, our courts have recognized categories of cases where a claim clearly has no basis in law. The Houston First Court of Appeals summarized these categories and held that a cause of action has no basis in law under Rule 91a “in at least two situations:” (1) the petition alleges too few facts to demonstrate a viable, legally cognizable right to relief; and (2) the petition alleges additional facts that, if true, bar recovery. Guillory v. Seaton, LLC,
As to the first category noted by the Guillory court, we agree with the general substance of this observation—that inadequate content may justify dismissal of a petition—but we disagree to the extent it implies that notice-pleading is no longer the rule in Texas. See Stedman,
For instance, in DeVoll v. Demonbreun, dismissal was upheld where the petition did not include any allegations from which the reliance or damages elements of his fraud claim could be reasonably inferred. — S.W.3d—, —,
As to the second category noted by the Guillory court, we agree that when the plaintiffs own allegations, taken as true, trigger a clear legal bar to the plaintiffs claim, the cause of action has no basis in law. See
For instance, where a plaintiff sued an insurer directly, but the pleadings showed that the plaintiff had not first secured a judgment against the insured party, the Texas Supreme Court held that the claim had no basis in law: it triggered a clear legal bar in the form of Texas’s “no direct action” rule. See Essex,
Taken together, these cases counsel that a court reviewing a petition for a basis in law should evaluate whether the plaintiff has provided fair notice of a cognizable claim for relief and whether the petition alleges facts that, if true, bar recovery. See Guillory,
B. Appellants’ Reliance on Twombly and Iqbal
Appellants’ third issue is largely premised on the notion that rule 91a replaced Texas’s notice pleading standard with the federal fact pleading standards in the mold of Twombly and Iqbal. Tivombly and Iqbal cases revised a long-standing interpretation of pleading standards under the federal rules of civil procedure. See Fed. R. Civ. P.. 8(a)(2), 12(b)(6). Prior to Twombly and Iqbal, the Supreme Court had interpreted the federal rules as only requiring that the pleading give “fair notice of what the plaintiff’s'claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Conley v. Gibson,
We cannot agree that rule 91a replaced Texas’s notice pleading standard. Certain fundamental features of Texas law make it impracticable to incorporate Iqbal’s standard into this state’s pleading requirements.
Conley did not authorize dismissal of a pleading “for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”
When reading a petition under the Conley standard, federal courts were generally bound to take the allegations of the complaint as true. Gardner v. Toilet Goods Ass’n,
The text of rule 91a states that a “cause of action has no basis in law if the allegations, taken as true, together with inferences reasonably drawn from them, do not entitle the claimant to the relief sought.” See id. 91a.l. This language mirrors one formulation of the 12(b)(6) test that was issued before Twombly: a “complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim if the allegations, taken as true, show the plaintiff is not entitled to relief.” Jones v. Bock,
It should be no surprise, then, that the forms of dismissal which have appeared in early Texas cases under rule 91a have mirrored an important line of pre-Twombly federal 12(b)(6) cases. Perhaps the purest application of the Conley “no set of facts” test is where a plaintiff “plead[s] himself out of court by alleging facts that render success on the merits impossible.” See Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc.,
In light of the many points of comparison between the two, we agree with those of our sister courts who have found a likeness between the principles of rule 91a and the traditional, federal “no set of facts” test under Conley. See Aguilar, — S.W.3d at—,
We cannot agree that Iqbal is now the rule in Texas, in light of Iqbal’s, incompatibility with well-established Texas pleading principles, as well as our supreme court’s continued holding that Texas remains a fair-notice state. See Lipsky,
C. Application
With these standards in mind, we will review de novo whether appellants’ first amended petition, set out below, coheres with any basis in law:
On or about August 4, 2012, Hayden Reaves and Billy Rochier were lawfully travelling in a 2003 Ford F150 in Corpus Christi, Texas.... Both Mr. Reaves and Mr. Rochier were wearing their seat-belts while they were traveling southbound on the 400 block of Crosstown Access, when Plaintiffs’ vehicle was suddenly, violently, and without warning struck directly on the passenger’s side by a vehicle driven by Defendant Kimberly Balboa, who ran a red light at the intersection of Agnes Street while fleeing from a Corpus Christi Police Department patrol car operated by Officer Jorge Fernandez. Plaintiffs would show that sovereign immunity has been waived in the instant case under Tex. Civ. Pbac. & Rem. Code § 101.021(1)(A)-(B) because: (1) at the time of the collision in question, Officer Jorge Fernandez, was acting within the scope of his employment with Defendant CITY OF CORPUS CHRISTI; (2) Plaintiffs’ personal injury claims arise from Officer Jorge Fernandez’s negligent operation and use of a motor-driven vehicle; and (3) Mr. Fernandez would be personally liable to Plaintiffs under Texas law. Further, Officer Fernandez recklessly and without regard for public safety, initiated and continued pursuit of Defendant Kimberly Balboa in a high speed chase which resulted in the violent collision with the Plaintiffs’ vehicle. Officer Fer-nandezes] negligent operation and use of his motor-driven patrol unit proximately caused the collision and severe personal injuries to Plaintiffs as set forth below. Each of these acts and/or omissions, whether taken singularly or in any combination constitutes negligence and negligence per se and gross negligence which proximately caused the collision and injuries and other losses as specifically set forth herein, all of which Plaintiffs suffered and which Plaintiffs will continue to suffer in the future, if not for the remainder of their natural lives.
Later in the petition, appellants alleged that Officer Fernandez breached a duty owed to appellants to exercise ordinary care in the operation of the vehicle he was driving, failed to keep a proper lookout or such lookout, drove at a rate of speed which was greater than that which an ordinary person would have driven under similar circumstances, and he entered into “a reckless high speed pursuit with wonton [sic] disregard for the public’s safety.” The petition further alleged that these negligent actions were causally responsible for appellants’ specified injuries.
The City’s 91a motion contended that these allegations triggered a per se rule which makes it impossible for appellants to demonstrate the causal nexus required under TTCA. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 101.021(1). The City claims that such a per se rule is demonstrated, foremost, in Teague v. City of Dallas,
The facts of Teague are highly similar to the case at hand. But rather than supporting the City’s argument, we are of the view that Teague undercuts it. The critical analysis in Teague comes not just from the plaintiffs pleading and the resulting application of a per se rule against causation, but from evidence introduced at a
Instead, liberally construing appellants’ petition according to the pleaders’ intent, we must conclude that the trial court erred in dismissing the lawsuit as entirely—and incurably—without a legal basis. See id. Appellants provided fair notice of a cause of action that is cognizable under Texas law: allegations that, when taken as true, would correspond to relief sounding in negligence, see Stedman,
Accordingly, we sustain appellants’ third issue.
VI. Appellants’ Other Claims
The City’s 91a motion did not mention appellants’ direct claims against the City for negligent entrustment, negligent hiring and/or screening of driver qualifications, negligent training and supervision, negligent retention, negligent contracting, and negligent maintenance. Nonetheless, the trial court ordered that Plaintiff take nothing against the City and that appellants’ suit against the City be dismissed in its entirety, with prejudice. On appeal, appellants do not mention these claims or protest their dismissal. Accordingly, “nothing is presented for our review” concerning these claims, and we will not address their dismissal. See Garcia v. State Farm Lloyds,
VII. Conclusion
We reverse the trial court’s order granting the dismissal of appellants’ cause of action against the City for the alleged negligence and/or recklessness of Officer Fernandez and the potential waiver of immunity under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 101.021, and we remand that cause of action to the trial court for further consideration consistent with this opinion.
Notes
. On January 27, 2015, after the 91a motion had been granted, appellants filed a second amended petition. However, a trial court determines a 91a motion on the allegations of the live petition and any pleading exhibits attached thereto. Stedman v. Paz, 511 S.W.3d 635, 637-38 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2015, no pet,). The first amended petition was the live petition, and it forms the basis for our review.
. Exceptions to this 45-day deadline exist, but none apply here.
. But see Koenig v. Blaylock,
. Similarly, former Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 40(a)(3)(E) provided a 10-day deadline for ruling on challenges to affidavits of indigence. See Ramirez v. Packer,
. We offer no opinion on whether a failure to comply with the 45-day deadline specified in rule 91a may result in reversible error. Cf. Walker v. Owens,
. Simons's only relevance to this case is its word of caution against allowing a government unit to exploit "the procedural guise” of a plea to the jurisdiction to avoid the rules which apply to all other parties. See Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice v. Simons,
. Our determination does not foreclose the City from filing a plea to the jurisdiction, since rule 91a "is in addition to, and does not supersede or affect, other procedures that authorize dismissal.” See Tex, R. Civ. P. 91a.9.
. The City's motion generally asserted that appellants’ “suit should be dismissed for failing to state a cause of action that has a basis in law or fact,” However, the City’s 91a motion did not provide any argument or explanation clearly relating to why appellants’ claims lacked a basis in fact. Cf. Wooley v. Schaffer,
. In this view, rule 9la’s mechanism strongly resembles the traditional practice of summary judgment on the pleadings, except enhanced with the promise of attorney’s fees, a speedy resolution, and clear guidelines under the rules of civil procedure. As with rule 91a, summary judgment on the pleadings is appropriate where a party "plead[s] himself out of court; e.g., the plaintiff may plead facts which affirmatively negate his cause of action.” See Tex. Dep’t of Corr. v. Herring,
. For one, unlike the federal system, "fair notice” is not a creature of case law; it has been enshrined in the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure themselves since 1940: “That an allegation be evidentiary or be of legal conclusion shall not be grounds for objection when fair notice to the opponent is given by the allegations as a whole.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 45(b); see id. R. 47(a); see Cox v. Ekstrom,
As a result, this Court has rejected the argument that rule 91a replaced Texas's notice-pleading standards with federal fact-pleading standards. See In re Butt,
A key change ushered in by Iqbal was isolating "conclusory statements” and refusing to give them any pull in a plaintiff's climb towards the ultimate goal of the pleading: stating a plausible claim. See Iqbal,
. See also Scheuer v. Rhodes,