90 Mo. 251 | Mo. | 1886
This is a suit by Catherine Reando, nee Catherine Boyer, and daughter of Mary Boyer, against the administrator of the estate of said Mary
The evidence of defendant, while it established the fact of the insanity of Mrs. Boyer, also tended to establish the fact that her condition was such as to require the care of some one, and that such service could have been performed by a twelve or fifteen-year-old child; and that one Misplay, who had procured some pension money for Mrs. Boyer, furnished her with necessaries, but to what extent does not appear. Two of defendant’s witnesses testified that plaintiff had told them that she did not intend to charge for her services, which was contradicted by the evidence of plaintiff. During the
“Gentlemen of the jury, the court instructs you. that where services are rendered and received, a contract of hiring, or obligation to pay, will be presumed, but a presumption may arise from the relationship of the parties, that the services rendered are acts of gratuitous kindness, and in this case it is a question for you, taking into consideration all the circumstances, including the nature and degree of the relationship of the parties and their circumstances in life, to determine whether there, was any implied contract for compensation or not; Now, if you find from the evidence in this cause, that, plaintiff rendered services to the mother in taking care-of her and waiting on her, and that she intended while rendering such services to charge the mother for the' same, and that her mother was insane at the time, and that such services were necessary for the comfort and' well being of her mother, then you will find the issues-for the plaintiff,'and allow her in your verdict such sum.
“If you find the issues for the plaintiff, in ascertaining what compensation you shall allow her, yon must confine yourself to the last ten years of Mary Boyer’s life, and you must also take into consideration the situation of the parties, the property occupied by her and her mother, and the kind and nature of the services rendered.
“But, on the contrary, if you believe and find, from the evidence in this cause, that plaintiff rendered the services sued for as acts of gratuitous kindness to her mother, and as a member of the family, with no intention of charging her for the same, then you must find; the issues for the defendant, and in such case it makes no difference how meritorious and valuable her services to her mother may have been.”
It is insisted that the instruction of the court is erroneous, because it allows a recovery on an implied contract, and it is contended that an insane person cannot be bound on an implied contract. In support of this contention we have been cited to the case of Halley v. Troester, 72 Mo. 73. It is only held in that case that an insane person cannot bind himself by express contract ; it does not go so far as to overthrow the rule that when necessaries are furnished an insane person, the law will imply a contract to pay for them. The rule is thus stated by Phillips on Lunatics, page 17: “The courts of law and equity imply a contract by one non compos mentis to pay for necessaries supplied to him, but, if he is already sufficiently supplied with any goods, it seems he is not liable for a further supply of such goods, although supplied without notice of the previous supply.” The principle announced by this author is emphasized in the case of Sawyer v. Lufkin, 56 Maine,
The fact that plaintiff might have sued the guardian of Mrs. Boyer, if such guardian had been appointed as provided by statute, cannot affect plaintiff’s right to sue her administrator, as such guardianship was terminated •on the death of Mrs. Boyer. In this view of the subject, we must uphold the ruling of the trial court, in rejecting the order of the county court offered in evidence. The judgment, we think, is for the right party, and, finding no error in the record affecting the merits of the controversy, it is hereby affirmed.