182 U.S. 419 | SCOTUS | 1901
REAGAN
v.
UNITED STATES.
Supreme Court of United States.
*423 Mr. William B. King for appellant.
Mr. Assistant Attorney General Pradt for appellee.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER delivered the opinion of the court.
Section 39 of the act of May 2, 1890, 26 Stat. 98, c. 182, provided:
"That the United States court in the Indian Territory shall have all the powers of the United States Circuit Courts or Circuit Court judges to appoint commissioners within said Indian Territory, who shall be learned in the law, and shall be known as United States commissioners; but not exceeding three commissioners shall be appointed for any one division, and such commissioners when appointed shall have, within the district to be designated in the order appointing them, all the powers of commissioners of Circuit Courts of the United States.
"They shall be ex officio notaries public, and shall have power to solemnize marriages.
"The provisions of chapter ninety-one of the said laws of Arkansas, regulating the jurisdiction and procedure before justices of the peace, are hereby extended over the Indian Territory; and said commissioners shall exercise all the powers conferred by the laws of Arkansas upon justices of the peace within their districts; but they shall have no jurisdiction to try any cause where the value of the thing or the amount in controversy exceeds one hundred dollars."
The act of March 1, 1895, 28 Stat. 693, c. 145, provided for additional judges of the court, and by section 4:
"That each judge of said court shall have the powers conferred by law upon the United States Circuit Courts to appoint commissioners within the district in which he presides, who, at the time of their appointment, shall be duly enrolled attorneys of some court of record of the United States or of some State, *424 and shall be competent and of good standing, and shall be known as United States commissioners, but not exceeding six commissioners shall be appointed for any district hereinbefore constituted:
"Provided, That the present commissioners shall be included in that number and shall hold office under their existing appointments, subject to removal by the judge of the district where said commissioners reside, for causes prescribed by law. The judge for each district may fix the place where, or the time when, each commissioner shall hold his regular terms of court.
"The order appointing such commissioners shall be in writing and shall be spread upon the records of one of the courts of the district for which they are appointed; and such order shall designate, by metes and bounds, the portion of the district for which they are appointed. They shall have all the powers of commissioners of the Circuit Courts of the United States.
"They shall be ex officio notaries public and ex officio justices of the peace within and for the portion of the district for which they are appointed, and shall have the power as such to solemnize marriages."
Appellant was appointed a commissioner April 25, 1893, and was such on March 1, 1895. In view of the proviso he was continued in office until January 31, 1896, when he was removed by the judge of the district where he resided, and another person appointed.
He now contends that the removal was void, because the cause assigned for the action of the judge was not a "cause prescribed by law," and because he was given no notice of any charge against him, and no hearing, contrary to the statute.
The commissioners appointed by the judges of the United States Court in the Indian Territory are inferior officers, not holding their offices for life, or by any fixed tenure, and they fall within the settled rule that the power of removal is incident to the power of appointment. Ex parte Hennen, 13 Pet. 230, 258; Parsons v. United States, 167 U.S. 324. But it is assumed that because of the language of the proviso, commissioners appointed by the court prior to March 1, 1895, formed an *425 exceptional class from commissioners appointed by the judges of that court after that date, and hold office until they are removed for causes prescribed by existing law, or until Congress passes a law defining such causes. The latter view may be rejected at once, for the words "causes prescribed by law, "manifestly relate to causes prescribed when the act was approved, or at least when the removal was made. Not only is there nothing here to give them any other meaning, but it cannot be presumed that Congress intended to forbid the exercise by the judges of their power in the matter of these appointments in the instance of these particular commissioners, or to provide that they should held office during life, or until Congress should specify causes subjecting them to removal, while all other commissioners were removable at the will of the power appointing them.
The proviso was enacted apparently out of abundant caution lest the legislation in respect of the United States Court in the Indian Territory might operate in itself to turn the then commissioner out of office, and if Congress had intended in addition that they should hold office free from the rule applicable to others, we think that the intention would have been plainly expressed.
The inquiry is therefore whether there were any causes of removal prescribed by law, March 1, 1895, or at the time of the removal. If there were, then the rule would apply that where causes of removal are specified by constitution or statute, as also where the term of office is for a fixed period, notice and hearing are essential. If there were not, the appointing power could remove at pleasure or for such cause as it deemed sufficient.
The suggestion that the proviso refers to such causes as courts might recognize as just will not do, for "prescribed by law" is prescribed by legislative act, and removal for cause, when causes are not defined nor removal for cause provided for, is a matter of discretion and not reviewable.
It does not appear that any causes for removal of these court officers were ever affirmatively specified by Congress; but it is said that Congress had prescribed such causes by the adoption *426 in the Indian Territory of certain laws of Arkansas. By section thirty-one of the act of May 2, 1890, some of those laws were put in force in the Indian Territory, and by section thirty-nine the commissioners were authorized to exercise all the powers conferred by the laws of Arkansas on justices of the peace within their districts, and the provisions of chapter ninety-one of those laws regulating the jurisdiction of and procedure before justices of the peace were extended to that Territory. By the act of March 1, 1895, these were reenacted, and chapters forty-five and forty-six of Mansfield's Digest, treating of criminal law and criminal procedure, were also put in force there.
The argument is that the effect of these provisions was to put the commissioners in the place of justices of the peace in Arkansas, and that consequently the causes prescribed by law for the removal of justices of the peace must be taken as prescribed by law as causes for the removal of commissioners.
In our opinion this conclusion does not follow. In order to clothe the commissioners with the powers pertaining to justices of the peace, this was conveniently accomplished by reference, but that did not convert these officers of the United States Court in the Indian Territory into justices of the peace or change the relations between them and the judges of that court. Justices of the peace in Arkansas by state constitution and laws hold office for two years, and cannot be removed except for cause, and on notice and hearing. The commissioners hold office neither for life, nor for any specified time, and are within the rule which treats the power of removal as incident to the power of appointment, unless otherwise provided. By chapters forty-five and forty-six, justices of the peace on conviction of the offences enumerated are removable from office, but these necessarily do not include all causes which might render the removal of commissioners necessary or advisable. Congress did not provide for the removal of commissioners for the causes for which justices of the peace might be removed, and if this were to be ruled otherwise by construction, the effect would be to hold the commissioners in office for life unless some of those specially enumerated causes became applicable to them.
*427 We agree with the Court of Claims that this would be a most unreasonable construction and would restrict the power of removal in a manner which there is nothing in the case to indicate could have been contemplated by Congress.
If causes of removal had been prescribed by law before the removal of appellant that would have presented a different question, but as there were then none such, the proviso did not operate to take him out of the rule expounded in Ex parte Hennen, and the mere fact that in that particular this part of the proviso was inoperative as to him did not change the result.
Judgment affirmed.