OPINION
This аppeal challenging the denial of a post-judgment interest award against the State of Rhode Island (state) came before us pursuant to an order directing both parties to show cause why the plaintiff’s appeal should not be summarily decided. The рlaintiff Reagan Construction Corporation (Reagan) appeals from an order denying its summary-judgment motion 1 against the state. Reagan alleged that the state had failed to make a timely payment of a $170,000 arbitration-award judgment in its favor, thereby entitling it to recover postjudgment interest against the state. After reviewing the parties’ submissions, we conclude that no cause has been shown and we decide at this time that the Superior Court’s denial of summary judgment should be reversed.
Reagan received an arbitration award under the Public Works Arbitration Act (PWAA), G.L. 1956 chapter 16 of title 37, in the amount of $170,000, including interest, against the state in connection with a dispute involving a public works construction contract. On December 7, 1994, the Superior Court confirmed the award. Notwithstanding the court’s confirmаtion of this award, the state failed to tender the $170,000 until nearly four months after the judgment was due. We hold that the Superior Court erred when it ruled that plaintiff was not entitled to obtain postjudgment interest against the state pursuant to a judgment entered under the PWAA
The right to receive pre- or post-judgment interest on court judgments is a statutory right that was unavailable at common law. As a general rule, the doctrine of sovereign immunity insulates the state from the payment of interest in the absence of a waiver of immunity by express statutory language or by necessary implication therefrom.
See State, Department of Transportation v. Providence and Worcester. Railroad Co.,
In
Clark-Fitzpatrick
this Court considered G.L. 1956 § 37-13.1-1, a provision that allows lawsuits against the state in connection with certain public works contracts. We held there that § 37-13.1-1 constituted an express waiver of sovereign immunity relating to “аny disputed claims under the con
*374
tract but did not either in an express manner or by necessary implication waive the state’s immunity with respect to prejudgment interest.
In
Andrade
we considered whether pré-judgment interest is available on judgments against the state under the State Tort Claims Act, G.L. 1956, chapter 31 of title 9. Again we decided that the language of thát act, which provides that the state may be liable for tоrt damages, was neither explicit nor broad enough to waive immunity with respect to the addition of interest to a judgment for tort damages.
We have never had occasion, however, to consider whether the particular statute at issue in this case, the PWAA, wоuld allow interest on a judgment entered pursuant to its provisions. Section 37-16-24 of the PWAA, entitled “Effect of judgment,” provides as follows:
“The judgmеnt so entered has the same force and effect, in all respects as, and is subject to all the provisions of law relating tо a judgment in an action. The judgment may be enforced as if it had been rendered in an action in the court in which it was entered.”
We hold that the plain meaning of this text is that the post-judgment-interest provisions of §§ 9-21-8 and 9-21-10 are applicable to judgments entered pursuant to § 37-16-24. In contrast to the language employed in § 37-13.1-1 or in § 9-31-1, § 37-16-24 of the PWAA does not appear strictly to limit or to restrict purely to damages the state s liability under any arbitration award or confirmatory judgment. 2 Rather by its unequivocal terms § 37-16-24 mandates that a judgment entered pursuant to a PWAA arbitration award shall have the same force and effect as all other judgments and shall be “subject to all the provisions of law relating to a judgment in an action.” (Emphasis added.) Accordingly, by necessary implication the generic postjudgment interest provisions of law relating to a judgment in an action are applicable to a judgment entered against the state undеr the PWAA for the period during which the judgment remains unsatisfied.
Reagan raises one additional issue on appeal. The arbitration аward provided for Reagan to recover $350 from the state with respect to administrative fees and expenses relatеd to the arbitration. The state contends that it has paid this sum as required. Because the Superior Court justice did not consider whethеr this portion of the judgment has been satisfied, we direct the court to consider that issue on remand.
Accordingly the plaintiffs appeal is sustained, and the summary judgment is vacated. This matter is remanded to the Superior Court so that an amended judgment can be entered awarding the plaintiff postjudgment interest from the date the Superior Court entered a judgment confirming the award. We also direсt the court to consider whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover $350 in administrative fees and expenses arising out of the arbitrаtion. If so, such an amount plus interest should be added to the amended judgment. The papers in this ease are remanded to the Suрerior Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Notes
. Reagan's request for postjudgment interest took the form of a motion for summary judgment after a final judgment confirming the arbitration award had already entered. The Superior Court justice denied the motiоn for summary judgment but neither granted summary judgment against Reagan nor entered any final judgment pursuant tó Rule 58 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procеdure. However, because Reagan’s request for postjudgment interest was the only issue remaining before the Superior Court, we trеat the Superior Court’s order as a final judgment for purposes of appellate review.
. Our decision in
Jolicoeur Furniture Co. v. Baldelli,