22 A.2d 906 | Pa. | 1941
This is an action instituted by petition of the Attorney General to the judges of the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County for the escheat and award to the Commonwealth of certain unclaimed wages and increments thereof. It was filed pursuant to the Act of Assembly, approved April 9, 1929, P. L. 343 (
The following is the question here presented: Having exercised his authority under the Act of 1929, is the Attorney General bound to stay within that act and institute the action in Philadelphia wherein the principal office of the corporation is located, or can he take *322 advantage of the jurisdiction fixed by the Act of 1870, as supplemented by the Act of 1937, and bring his petition in Dauphin County? Both of the above acts are in full force. One is a procedural statute prescribing a method of enforcement and fixing a jurisdictional status. The other is a remedial act, with the evident purpose of allowing the Commonwealth to prosecute her claims of any nature at the seat of government, regardless of the defendant's residence. Are they in irreconcilable conflict? If they are the jurisdiction founded in the Act of 1929, which is a special statute providing a venue for an action relating to a particular matter, must prevail because "where special statutes exist prescribing the venue for particular actions against officers or actions relating to particular matters, such statutes are controlling with respect to the more general statutes in force": See 67 C. J. 78, Section 123. If the statutes are not irreconcilable the Act of 1870, as supplemented, is available to the Commonwealth and its claim can be prosecuted at the seat of government.
These acts are reconcilable and the Commonwealth "still has the absolute right to litigate her claims" of any nature, at law and in equity "in Dauphin County, if she chooses so to do":Commonwealth v. Wilkins,
The court below was right in deciding that "the Commonwealth may pursue its remedy either in the County of Dauphin or in Philadelphia County at its option".
The decree is affirmed at appellant's cost.