62 Pa. Super. 268 | Pa. Super. Ct. | 1916
Opinion by
The principal, contention of counsel on each side relates to the meaning to be given the word “porch” as used in an ordinance of the city which has been in force for a half century. The courts approach the interpretation of a statute or an ordinance with the presumption that words and phrases therein are used in their natural, plain, obvious, familiar and popular sense, and without any forced, subtle or technical construction to limit or extend their meaning: Philadelphia & Erie R. R. Co. v. Catawissa R. R. Co., 53 Pa. 20; Dame’s App., 62 Pa. 117; 26 A. & E. Encl, of Law Tit. Statute. All laws must be executed according to the sense and meaning which they imparted at the time of their passage: Commonwealth v. Erie, Etc., Railroad, 27 Pa. 339; Jermyn’s Account, 57 Pa. Superior Ct. 109. The meaning to be given to a word is not confined by the strict definitions given by lexicographers — if it clearly appears that another meaning was intended by the lawmakers. The definition found in the dictionaries is entitled to great weight though by no means conclusive. The reasoning of the trial judge, and the authorities cited by him fully warrants his conclusion that the “porch” of the defendant does not fall within the condemnation of the ordinance.
The plaintiff’s expert witness, while stating that it could not be considered architecturally a porch, yet the terms, porch, portico, terrace, veranda were in common usage in the city, and were sometimes used interchangeably to describe the same character of construction, The
The judgment is affirmed.