2 Nev. 262 | Nev. | 1866
Opinion by
This action was brought to foreclose a mortgage executed by the defendants to secure the payment of a promissory note, bearing date at Marysville, in the State of California, March 16, a.d. 1863, and made payable one year from the date thereof. The only defense pleaded by the defendants is the Statute of Limitations, and to support it the following facts are set up: that the money for which
The allegation of these facts is made in the answer in the following manner : “ Said defendant Evans, then and there, at said city of Marysville, signed said note sued on, and executed and acknowledged said mortgage, and then and there delivered said note and mortgage to plaintiff; and that the signing and execution, of said note and mortgage by defendant Edwards was afterwards done by him in the county of Humboldt, and was only the consummation (in part) of the said contract of loan which had been previously entered into by said defendant Evans, for himself and defendant Edwards, in said city of Marysville, in the State of California.”
Upon these facts it is claimed that the action is barred by that Act of the Territorial Legislature, approved December 19th, a.d. 1862, which declares that “ an action upon any judgment, contract, obligation, or liability, for the payment of money or damages, obtained, executed, or made out of this Territory, can only be commenced within six months from the time the cause of action shall accrue.” If the note sued on in this case be a contract, or obligation obtained or executed out of the State or Territory of Nevada, there can be no doubt that, so far as the note is concerned, the defendants’ plea is good. But, in our opinion, it does not come within the Statute referred to. The action is not assumpsit for money loaned in the State of California, but a suit in equity upon instruments, the execution of which was completed in the Territory of Nevada. The execution of the note and mortgage was not perfected until signed by all the parties to them. Until the execution is perfected, the instrument is inchoate and imperfect. The plea of the Statute of Limitations is never looked upon with favor by the Courts, hence a party relying upon it must clearly make out his defense. In this case, the defendants allege in their answer that the signing by Edwards at Humboldt was the consummation of the transaction, left inchoate by Evans ; and, in our opinion, it is necessary for the
We agree with counsel for respondent that when an appeal is taken merely from the judgment, the Appellate Court cannot review errors which do not appear on the judgment roll, and in this case we have not done so. The defense disclosed by the answer being insufficient, even if established by proof, we have not deemed it necessary to look beyond the judgment roll. The Court below erred in dismissing the bill, and its judgment must be reversed.