41 Neb. 202 | Neb. | 1894
The plaintiff in error sued the defendants in error to recover three sums of money: the first on a promissory note for $102, alleged to have been executed by Bishop ,to one Harris and signed by plaintiff as surety, and which plaintiff paid; the second, $10, in payment of a livery bill at Bishop’s request, and the third, $9, paid to the county judge at the request of Bishop. The petition alleged that since the transactions Bishop has been adjudged insane and his guardian was made a party defendant. The guardian answered for herself and Bishop, not denying any of the facts stated in the petition, but alleging that, at the time of all of the transactions Bishop was insane, and that the plaintiff knew that fact when he incurred the. obligation upon the note and paid the two sums of money. The reply was practically a denial of these allegations.
Error is assigned upon the court’s permitting to the defendants the opening and close of the case. An inspectiqn of the record does not disclose who made the opening statement to the jury. The objection was taken to. the court’s permitting the defendants first to introduce evidence; Upon this subject section 283 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides: “When the jury has been sworn the trial shall proceed in the following order, unless the court .for
The principal question discussed is as to the liability of an insane person upon his contracts, when made without fraud or deception with one not aware of his insanity. This argument is of course based upon the instructions. The record does not show that any exceptions were taken to the instructions given by the court, and they cannot, therefore, be reviewed. As to the instructions requested by plaintiff and refused, the assignment of error both in the motion for a new trial and in the petition in error is as follows: “The court erred in refusing instructions asked by the plaintiff numbered one to eleven inclusive, and which was duly excepted to by the plaintiff.” Under such an assignment we can consider these instructions no further than to ascertain that one of them was correctly refused. (Hiatt v. Kinkaid, 40 Neb., 178; McDonald v. Bowman, 40 Neb., 269.) The second of these instructions refused was as follows: “The jury are instructed that an executed contract of an insane person cannot be rescinded, neither can it be successfully resisted in an action at law, unless the person contracted with can be placed in statu quo; that is in the same condition in which he stood before entering into the contract with the insane person.” To have given
Some argument is addressed to errors alleged to have occurred in the admission of evidence. These questions we cannot consider, for the reason that in the petition in error there is no assignment upon the subject.
Judgment affirmed.