after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.
The petitioners base their application for relief in this court upon the contention that the Circuit Court had no jurisdiction in the case brought by the Pennsylvania Steel Company, and others,- against the New York City Railway Company, to appoint receivers, or to grant any relief asked for in the bill of complaint in that suit. And, as they have been denied leave to intervene therein, and they cannot appeal from the order denying such request,
Ex parte Cutting,
Without going into the question of the right of this court to grant the remedy sought, we prefer to place our decision upon the ground that the Circuit Court had jurisdiction, and that its action in exercising it was, therefore, valid.
The statutes defining the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court (1 Comp. Stat. 507, 508; Act March 3, 1875, c. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470; Act March 3,1887, c. 373, § 1,24 Stat. 552; Act August 13,-1888, e. 866, § 1, 25 Stat. 433), confer it, among other cases, where “there shall be a controversy between citizens of different States in which the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of interest and costs, the sum or value aforesaid,” ($2,000).
Although the amount involved in the suit in the Circuit Court was sufficient, it is insisted now that there was no dispute or controversy in that case within the meaning of the statute, because the defendant admitted the indebtedness and the other allegations of the bill of complaint, and consented to and . united in the application for the appointment of receivers. Notwithstanding this objection, we think there was such a controversy between these parties as is contemplated by the statute. In the bill filed there was the allegation that a demand of payment of the debt due each of complainants had been made and refused. This was not denied and .has not been. There was therefore- an unsatisfied demand made by complainants and refused by defendant at the time of the filing of the bill. We think that where there is a justiciable claim of some right made by a citizen of one State against a citizen of another State, involving an amount equal to the amount named in the
A case under the Constitution or laws of the United States does not arise against a railroad engaged in interstate commerce from that mere fact. It only arises under the Constitution, or laws or treaties of the- United States, when it substantially involves a controversy as to the effect or construction of the Constitution or on the determination of which'the result depends.
Defiance Water Co.
v.
Defiance,
It is also objected that the Circuit Court had no jurisdiction because the complainants were not judgment creditors, but were simply creditors at large of the defendant railways. The’ objection was not taken before the Circuit Court by any of the parties to the suit, but was waived by the defendant consenting to the appointment of the receivers, and admitting all the facts averred in the bill.
Hollins
v.
Brierfield Coal & Iron Company,
In the case in' the Circuit Court the consent of the defendant to the appointment of receivers, without setting up the defense that the complainants were not judgment creditors who had issued an execution which' was returned unsatisfied, in whole or in part, amounted to a waiver of that defense.
Brown
v.
Lake Superior Iron Co.,
It is asserted also, that there was collusion between the complainants and the street railway companies, on account of which the court had no jurisdiction to proceed, and therefore the suit should have been dismissed by the Circuit Court under § 5 of the act of 1875, already cited. By that section it must appear to the satisfaction of the Circuit Court that such suit does not really, and substantially involve a dispute or controversy properly Within the jurisdiction of that court, or that the parties to that suit have been improperly or collusively made or joined for the purpose of creating a. case cognizable under that act, in which case the Circuit Court is directed to proceed no further therein, but to dismiss the suit on that ground. Whether the suit involved a substantial controversy we have already discussed, and the only question which is left under that act is as to collusion. .
In this case we can find no evidence of collusion, and the Circuit Court found there was none. It does appear that the parties to the suit desired that the administration of the railway affairs-should be taken in hand by the Circuit Court of the United States,- -and to that end, when the suit was brought, the defendant admitted the averments in the bill and united in the.-request for the appointment of receivers.. This fact is stated by the Circuit Judge; but there is no claim made that the averments in the bill were untrue, or that the debts, named
The objection to the order permitting the Metropolitan Railway Company to intervene and making it a party defendant in the Circuit Court suit is not of a jurisdictional nature, and the granting of the order was within the. discretion of the court.
United States
v.
Phillips,
107 Fed. Rep.
824; Credits &c. Co.
v.
United States,
From this review of the various questions presented to us. it appears that the Circuit Court had jurisdiction in the suit brought before it, and therefore the application of the petitioners for a mandamus or for a prohibition must be denied.
While so holding we are not unmindful of the fact that a-court is a very unsatisfactory body to administer-the affairs of a railroad as ¿ going concern, and we feel that the possession of such property by. the court through its receivers should not
The orders appointing the receivers and giving them instruct tions are most conservative and well calculated to bring about the earliest possible resumption of normal conditions when those who may be the owners of the property shall.be in possession of and operate it. We have no doubt,- if unnecessary delays should take place, the'court would listen to an. application by any creditor, upbn due notice to the receivers, for orders requiring the closing of the trust as soon as might be reasonably proper, or else vacating the orders appointing the receivers..
The rules are discharged and the petitions
Dismissed.
