In re Appeal of Chung
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Tsukiyama, Marumoto, Cassidy, Wirtz, McKinley
Louis Le Baron (also on the briefs) for appellee.
OPINION OF THE COURT BY MARUMOTO, J.
This is an appeal by Paul H.C. Chung, Clerk of the City and County of Honolulu, from a decision of the Board of Registration of Electors for the City and County of
The sole issue raised by the parties on this appeal is whether the procedure followed by the Japanese court in convicting the applicant was “in due course of law.” We have no warrant to consider that issue, for the appeal is not properly before this court.
Appeal from a ruling of a board of registration is governed by
The clerk appealed in his official capacity and not as a legal voter. That in itself may be fatal to this appeal. Crownover v. Millar, 45 Nev. 81, 197 Pac. 817. However, we need not rest our decision on that ground. We hold that the appeal is not properly before this court on the ground that the clerk, either in his official capacity or as
When the rules were promulgated, county governments had not yet been established, and there were no county clerks. So, registration was done by boards of registration, challenges were addressed to such boards, and board rulings were appealable to this court. R.L.H. 1905, § 47, provided that “Any lawful voter may challenge the right to register of any person claiming to be eligible to register as a voter, * * *.” The provision for appeal was contained in § 50, which read as follows:
“Sec. 50. To supreme court. If any board shall refuse to register the name of any person applying to be registered, the person refused, and, in case any name has been registered, any legal voter, may, at any time within ten days after the decision of such board, appeal to the supreme court in the manner provided by law for civil appeals to the supreme court from the circuit court, or in such manner as may hereafter be provided by law.” (Italics supplied.)
From a reading of § 50, we think that the section was designed to accord the right of appeal from a board ruling to this court to an applicant for registration, or a challenger, who was aggrieved thereby. An applicant came within the meaning of the words “the person refused.” A challenger was covered by the words “any legal voter.” Construing § 47 and § 50 as statutes in pari materia, we think that the words “any legal voter,” as used in § 50,
By S.L.H. 1905, c. 39, and S.L.H. 1907, c. 118, the legislature provided for the government of the counties of Hawaii, Maui and Kauai, and for the City and County of Honolulu, and, in so doing, established the office of clerk for each county and for the City and County of Honolulu.
Thereafter, by S.L.H. 1911, c. 68, the legislature transferred the duties of registration formerly performed by boards of registration to county clerks, defined as including the clerk of the City and County of Honolulu, and transformed boards of registration into appellate tribunals to hear appeals from the ruling of the clerks. S.L.H. 1911, c. 68, repealed R.L.H. 1905, § 47, and substituted the following provision therefor:
“Section 4. Any qualified elector may challenge the right of a person to be registered as a voter in the general county register at any time up to the next sitting of the board of registration. * * * In case a challenge is denied or in case of the refusal of the clerk to register the applicant, the party ruled against may appeal from such ruling to the board of registration for his district. * * *”
It is to be noted that the provision quoted above gave the right of challenge to “any qualified elector,” whereas under § 47 the person who had the right of challenge was “any legal voter.” We think that both expressions have the same meaning, and there is no significance in the mentioned change of language.
No change was made in § 50. So, the presumption is that the meaning of the words in that section remained the same and that only an applicant for registration or a challenger had the right of appeal to this court from an adverse board ruling. Nothing in S.L.H. 1911, c. 68, indicated that the legislature intended to include the clerk
Soon after the enactment of S.L.H. 1911, c. 68, the same legislature enacted S.L.H. 1911, c. 105, which contained amendments of S.L.H. 1911, c. 68, § 4, and R.L.H. 1905, § 50.
S.L.H. 1911, c. 68, § 4, was amended to read:
“Any qualified elector may at any time, for any cause not previously decided by the board of registration or the supreme court in respect of the same person, challenge the right of any person to be or remain registered as a voter in any precinct. * * * In case the clerk denies a challenge or refuses to register an applicant, the party ruled against may appeal from the ruling to the board of registration for his district or county. * * *”
The foregoing amendment made two matters very definite. First, after the amendment, there could be no question as to the person who might be challenged. Not only an applicant for registration but also a person already registered was subject to challenge; with this limitation, that the person whose right to be or remain registered was previously ruled upon by a board or by this court could not be challenged. Second, after the amendment, there could be no question as to the persons who had the right to appeal from a ruling of the clerk to the board. Only a person who was ruled against by the clerk could appeal to the board. That meant that only a person whose right to be or remain registered as a voter was in question or a challenger could appeal to the board. Thus, the right of appeal to the board did not extend to a person who was not a party in the proceeding before the clerk and who, for that reason, was not ruled against by the clerk.
R.L.H. 1905, § 50, was amended by striking therefrom the words “If any board shall refuse to register the name of any person applying to be registered, the person refused,
The provisions of S.L.H. 1911, c. 68, § 4, as amended, are compiled in
In a strictly literal sense, the words “any legal voter” mean a person who has met all of the conditions precedent to the exercise of suffrage, including registration. In that sense, they include within their meaning a challenger under
The inclusion of a challenger within the meaning of the words “any legal voter,” as used in
But we think that any interpretation of the words “any legal voter,” as used in
The only record in existence from which the purpose of the legislature in making the deletion might be deduced shows that it was done to “avoid conflict in our statutes.” The Sixth Legislature of the Territory of Hawaii, Senate Journal 1911, p. 827. The conflict in statutes which the legislature sought to eliminate was the fact that the deleted language carried an implication that boards of registration continued to perform the duties of registration despite the imposition of such duties on county clerks by S.L.H. 1911, c. 68.
We do not think that the clerk is entitled, on any logical basis, to the right of appeal to this court from a board ruling, either in his official capacity or as an individual.
First, let us consider the position of the clerk in his official capacity. As an official, he exercises a quasi-judicial authority of making the original rulings in registration proceedings. An officer whose ruling is appealed may be made a party in the appellate proceeding by statute. But there is no statute which makes the clerk, as such, a party in the proceeding before the board. So, he is not a party
If we consider the clerk as an individual, he is like any other registered elector who was not a party in the proceeding before the board. A registered elector who was not a party in the proceeding in which a ruling was made may not appeal from the ruling because he is not an aggrieved party; he may question the right of any person to be or remain registered as a voter only by a challenge. But, under
While this appeal is not concerned with the application of the words “any legal voter,” as used in
The problem of interpretation presented in this appeal is one in which the rule so succinctly stated in the following language of Clayton v. Colorado & Southern Railway Co., 51 F.2d 977, is applicable:
“The primary rule in the construction of statutes is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislative body. * * * Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, resort must not be had, ordinarily, to rules of construction, but the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning. * * * Where, however, the language is of doubtful meaning, or where adherence to the strict letter would lead to injustice or absurdity, or result in contradictory provisions, it devolves upon the court to ascertain the true meaning. * * * The general design and purpose of a statute should be kept in mind and its provisions should be given a fair and reasonable construction with a view to effecting its purpose and object. * * *
“It frequently happens that the true intention of a legislative body is not expressed by the language employed in a statute, when literally construed. In such cases, the intent of such legislative body can only be effectuated by a departure from the literal interpretation of the language employed. When such intention is clearly discernible from the provisions of the statute when considered as a whole, the real purpose
and intent of the legislative body will prevail over the literal import of the words employed. * * *” (Asterisks indicate omission of cited authorities.)
We applied such rule in Chang v. Meagher, 40 Haw. 96. If the rule is applied in this case, then the clerk will not be included within the meaning of the words “any legal voter,” as used in
Order will be entered dismissing the instant appeal for want of jurisdiction.
DISSENTING OPINION OF TSUKIYAMA, C.J., with whom CIRCUIT JUDGE McKINLEY joins, dissenting.
With due deference to the views stated in the majority opinion of this court, we are unable to concur in the conclusion reached. We do not believe that the term “any legal voter,” as used in
The words “elector,” “voter,” “qualified elector,” and “legal voter” have been variously defined and often used synonymously and interchangeably. Standing alone, the term “qualified elector” may at first blush appear to refer only to a registered voter or elector, but the provisions of
In defining the term “any legal voter,” as used in
The appellant in the instant case is the elected clerk of the City and County of Honolulu. To be elected, he is required by law to be a “qualified elector” of the (Territory) and of the City and County of Honolulu.
Finally, a noteworthy point remains.
It is well established that the right to appeal is purely a statutory right. In certain jurisdictions, the constitution or statute specifically grants the right to appeal only to a person whose petition for registration has been denied. Such was the case in State v. Crenshaw, 138 Ala. 407, 35 So. 456, where the court ruled that the state could not appeal under the Alabama constitution which provided that “an appeal will lie to the supreme court in favor of the petitioner.” It is also axiomatic that a statute must be construed in the light of its plain, perspicuous and unambiguous language. Territory v. Fasi, 40 Haw. 478. Resort to extrinsic matter, such as the history of a particular legislation, may be had only when an ambiguity exists. The purpose of the rule is to resolve an ambiguity
The majority opinion draws its conclusion from what it regards as the historic context of the statutory provisions relating to the registration of voters. Historywise, it is to be observed that the Constitution of 1894, Article 77, § 13, provided: “If any Board [of Registration] shall refuse to register the name of any person applying to be registered, the person refused, and, in case any name has been registered, any legal voter, may at any time within ten days after the decision of such Board, appeal to the Supreme Court in the manner provided by law for civil appeals to the supreme court from the circuit court or in such manner as may be provided by law.” It is reasonable to infer that if the framers of the constitution had intended to give the term “any legal voter” a restrictive meaning, it would have used the term “any applicant or challenger.” In 1911, the legislature amended said section by deleting that portion thereof which is italicized. S.L.H. 1911, c. 105, § 7. Since said amendment, the statute has read and still reads as it now appears in
The reason for the 1911 amendment is understandable. When the county governments were established, the duties pertaining to the registration of voters were transferred to the county clerk. The old board of registration was made an appellate body. It is significant, however, that the legislature in 1911 retained the words “any legal voter” without the use of any language to indicate its intent to give the words a restrictive meaning. Significant also is the fact that by the same amendatory act of 1911, the legislature provided in another section: “In case the clerk denies a challenge or refuses to register an applicant, the
The term “any legal voter” is clear and without ambiguity, and to construe it as including only the classes of persons mentioned in the majority opinion and not the clerk who is a legal voter and in fact a challenger, is to indulge in a hypertechnical construction not contemplated by such clear term. In fact, the clarity is so apparent that the jurisdictional aspect of the appeal was not adverted to in the original briefs or oral arguments before the court. It was not until this court later called for supplementary briefs that jurisdiction became an issue and that, only as a result of a question propounded by the court as to whether the clerk had the right to appeal. Although the Hawaii Rules of Civil Procedure govern the procedure in the circuit courts, it is to be noted by way of analogy that it is “not necessary to aver the capacity of a party to sue or be sued or the authority of a party to sue or be sued * * *,” and that when “a party desires to raise the issue * * * he shall do so by specific negative averment * * *.” H.R.C.P., Rule 9(a).
As stated, supra,
Accordingly, we are of the opinion that the clerk‘s appeal should be entertained and the decision of the Board of Registration reversed.