R.D.S. v. STATE OF TENNESSEE
No. M2005-00213-SC-R11-JV
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE
October 3, 2007 Session - Filed February 6, 2008
Aрpeal by permission from the Court of Appeals, Middle Section; Circuit Court for Williamson County; No. II-CR04274; R.E. Lee Davies, Judge
WILLIAM M. BARKER, C.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which GARY R. WADE, J., and FRANK F. DROWOTA, III, SP.J., joined. JANICE M. HOLDER, J., filed a concurring and dissenting opinion. CORNELIA A. CLARK and WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JJ., not participating.
Joseph D. Baugh (on appeal) and Matthew T. Colvard (at trial), Franklin, Tennessee, for the appellant, R.D.S.
Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General & Reporter; Michael E. Moore, Solicitor General; Mark A. Fulks, Assistant Attorney General (on appeal); and Chris Vernon, Assistant District Attorney (at trial), for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
OPINION
On November 25, 2003, G.N., a student at Williamson County‘s Pаge High School, was taken to the office of Vice-Principal Tim Brown because of concerns that he was under the influence of some type of intoxicating substance. Mr. Brown summoned Deputy Sharon Lambert, a school resource officer (“SRO“), to his office. Deputy Lambert is a sworn law enforcement officer for Williamson County.
When Deputy Lambert arrived at Mr. Brown‘s office, she noticed that G.N. appeared to be “very sleepy or groggy, and his eyes were really bloodshot.” She asked him what he had taken, and he responded that he had drunk a quarter of a bottle of Robitussin cough syrup before coming to school. Because school had started several hours earlier, she wаs skeptical that the effects from cough syrup would last that long. It had been reported that G.N. had skipped some of his morning classes, so Deputy Lambert asked him where he had been. He said that he had been out in the parking lot in a truck belonging to the defendant, R.D.S.
Deputy Lambert decided to search R.D.S.‘s truck. She and Mr. Brown found R.D.S. in the school commons area. He did not appear to be under the influence of any intoxicants. Deputy Lambert explained to R.D.S. that she was going to search his truck based on G.N.‘s apparent intoxicated condition and statements he made regarding his earlier whereabouts. She requested that R.D.S. accompany her because it was his vehicle.
As Deputy Lambert, Mr. Brown, and R.D.S. walked out to the parking lot together, the deputy asked R.D.S. if there was anything in his vehicle that should not be there. He stated that there was not. She told him that he was responsible for anything that was in the truck and again asked him it there was anything there that should not be. He again answered no and referenced the sign in front of the school that cited the Tennessee Code provision1 that any vehicle on school property was subject to search.
The truck was unlocked. When Deputy Lambert opened the driver‘s side door, she immediately found a plastic bag containing green leafy material in a compartment of that door. She held it up and said, “[o]h, except for this marijuana.” R.D.S. admitted that it was his. The deputy continued to search the truck and found a glass pipe сontaining a tarry residue.
While they were walking back to the school building, Deputy Lambert asked R.D.S. where he had been that morning. He stated that he and G.N. had left school at about 9:30 a.m., smoked marijuana from a pipe, went to the bank, and then returned to school about an hour later. Tapes from the video surveillance cameras located in the parking lot confirmed that the two students left around 9:30 a.m. and returned around 10:30 a.m.
R.D.S. appealed to the circuit court, where he renewed his motion to suppress his statements and the seized evidence. The court denied his motion, finding that Miranda warnings were not required because R.D.S. was not in custody at the time he made the incriminating statements. The trial court also held that the statements were voluntary and not in response to any specific questions.
At the final trial, Deputy Lambert testified to the aforementioned sequence of events that occurred on the day R.D.S. was arrested.2 R.D.S.‘s mother testified as to her activities on the morning of the arrest. Her testimony was supplemented by a showing of the surveillance video tapes of that day taken from the parking lot at the high school. She testified that she arrived at the school for a meeting at about 10:30 a.m. and saw several students around her son‘s truck. They left as soon as she approached, except for G.N., who was inside the truck. She testified that before she opened the door, she saw G.N. reach into the front pocket of his hooded sweatshirt, take something out, and place it under the front seat. She asked him what he was doing, and he said that he was tired and that R.D.S. had given him permission to take a nap in the truck. The mother suggested that the marijuana found in her son‘s truck was not his, but had been left there by G.N., and that R.D.S. had said it was his in order to protect his friend.
The circuit court found R.D.S. to be delinquent. The court ordered him to serve forty-eight hours of juvenile detention and to remain on probation until the age of nineteen. His driver‘s license was revoked for one year, with the proviso that he could apply to have it returned in ninety days. R.D.S. filed a timely appeal with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court as to the admission of the incriminating statements, finding that R.D.S. was not in custody when he made his statements. The intermediate court disagreed with the trial court‘s finding that the statements were voluntary and not in response to any interrogation by Deputy Lambert. The Court of Appeals also affirmed the trial court with respect to the admission of the evidence, holding that because the search was conducted by a school resource officer, the reasonable suspicion standard should apply, and Deputy Lambert had reasonable suspicion to search the truck. The Court of Appeals also relied in part on
Analysis
This case involves a review of the trial court‘s findings of fact and conclusions of law in denying a motion to suppress evidence. Issues of whether a defendant was placed in custody and interrogated are primarily issues of fact, and we review these factual determinations by the trial court according to the standard set forth in State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18 (Tenn. 1996). See State v. Walton, 41 S.W.3d 75, 81 (Tenn. 2001). Under the Odom standard, “a trial court‘s findings of fact in a suppression hearing will be upheld unless the evidence preponderates otherwise.” Odom, 928 S.W.2d at 23; see State v. Damron, 151 S.W.3d 510, 515 (Tenn. 2004); State v. Munn, 56 S.W.3d 486, 493 (Tenn. 2001). Questions surrounding the credibility of witnesses and the “resolution of conflicts in the evidence are matters entrusted to the trial judge as the trier of fact.” Odom, 928 S.W.2d at 23; see Munn, 56 S.W.3d at 493. Notwithstanding this deference to the trial court‘s findings of fact, оur review of a trial court‘s application of law to the facts is conducted under a de novo standard of review. Damron, 151 S.W.3d at 515; Walton, 41 S.W.3d at 81; State v. Crutcher, 989 S.W.2d 295, 299 (Tenn. 1999).
I. Custodial Interrogation
The
In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the United States Supreme Court concluded that in the context of “custodial interrogation” certain procedural safeguards are necessary to protect against compulsory self-incrimination. Id. at 444. Specifically, the Court held that “the prosecution may not use statements . . . stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.” Id. Part of those safeguards include the now familiar Miranda warnings
he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.
Id. at 479; see also State v. Bush, 942 S.W.2d 489, 499 (Tenn. 1997).
Where the Miranda requirements are implicated, they “must be strictly enforced.” Walton, 41 S.W.3d at 82 (quoting State v. Goss, 995 S.W.2d 617, 629 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998)). However, Miranda warnings do not come into play in every circumstance in which police officers interact with citizens. Id. Instead, the requirements of Miranda are only required “when the defendant is in custody and is subjected to questioning or its functional equivalent.” Id.; see also Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300 (1980). “Absent either one of these prerequisites, the requirements of Miranda are not implicated.” Walton, 41 S.W.3d at 82.
The Court of Appeals held that the questions asked by Deputy Lambert as well as her statement upon finding the marijuana “constituted interrogation or its functional equivalent.” We agree. Interrogation includes not only direct questions, but also “any words or actions on the part of the police . . . that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.” State v. Sawyer, 156 S.W.3d 531, 534 (Tenn. 2005) (quoting Innis, 446 U.S. at 301).
The incriminating statements made by R.D.S. were in response to various statements and questions made by Deputy Lambert. When Deputy Lambert found the bag of marijuana, shortly after R.D.S. had denied the existence of anything in the truck that should not have been there, she said “[o]h, except for this marijuana.” Being prompted by that statement, R.D.S. admitted that the marijuana was his. He then admitted to smoking marijuana with G.N. as a direct response to Deputy Lambert‘s question regarding his whereabouts earlier in thе day. Deputy Lambert‘s questions and statements were clearly intended to elicit an incriminating response from R.D.S., thus bringing those questions and statements under the definition of “interrogation.” See Sawyer, 156 S.W.3d at 534.
That said, the fact of questioning does not by itself trigger the requirement for Miranda warnings. The questioning must amount to a “custodial” interrogation. Thus, in this case, the determinative issue is whether R.D.S. was in custody when he was interrogated by Deputy Lambert.
The Miranda Court defined custody as a situation in which the defendant is placed under formal arrest or is “otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. We have expanded this definition to mean “under the totality of the circumstances, [whether] a reasonable person in the susрect‘s position would consider himself or herself deprived of freedom of movement to a degree associated with a formal arrest.” State v. Anderson, 937 S.W.2d 851, 852, 855 (Tenn. 1996). To aid in determining whether a reasonable person would consider himself or herself in custody, we consider a variety of factors, including the following:
Id. at 855. This test is “objective from the viewpoint of the suspect, and the unarticulated, subjective view of law enforcement officials that the individual being questioned is or is not a suspect does not bear upon the question.” Id. at 852, 855; State v. Payne, 149 S.W.3d 20, 32-33 (Tenn. 2004) (affirming Anderson).
R.D.S. argues that he was in custody from the time Deputy Lambert and Mr. Brown apрroached him and “forced” him to accompany them to his truck. However, the circuit court concluded that “asking the young man to walk out while they searched his vehicle [did] not amount to any kind of custodial arrest.”
Deputy Lambert testified that when she and Mr. Brown found R.D.S. prior to searching his truck, she told him about G.N. and that they were “going out to the vehicle to search the vehicle because of his [G.N.‘s] condition.” She said that she did not “tell him” to accompany them, but rather “advised him” of their discovery of G.N.‘s condition and “requested that he go with us since it was his vehicle.” She stated that she “felt it was appropriate that he be aware that we were going to be searching his vehicle.”
The Court of Appeаls looked at the totality of the circumstances, including the language and substance of the deputy‘s request, the fact that the questioning took place in the parking lot and while walking between the school and the parking lot, and that R.D.S. was not confined to the principal‘s office or some other room in the school for questioning. The intermediate court upheld the decision of the circuit court and concluded that R.D.S. was not in custody because a reasonable person in his circumstances would not have considered his freedom limited to the degree of a formal arrest.
Because this issue of whether an individual is in custody is a question of fact, and because it was raised in the context of a suppression hearing, we uphold the trial court‘s findings of fact unless the evidence preponderates otherwise. Odom, 928 S.W.2d at 23. Similarly, questions of credibility of witnesses and resolution of conflicts in evidence are matters entrusted to the trial judge. Id. Given the fact-driven nature of the issue and looking at all the circumstances surrounding the questioning, we cannot say that the evidence preponderates against the circuit court‘s finding that R.D.S. was not in custody. Therefore, we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals permitting the admission of R.D.S.‘s incriminating statements into evidence.
A. Fruit of the Poisonous Tree
First, R.D.S. argues that the evidence seized is inadmissible as tainted under the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine.3 Because wе hold that R.D.S. was not subjected to a custodial interrogation and that his statements were admissible, any evidence obtained therefrom would not be tainted as “fruit of the poisonous tree.” Moreover, the marijuana was found not as a result of any statements made by R.D.S., but as a result of the appearance of and statements made by G.N. None of R.D.S.‘s incriminating statements were made until after Deputy Lambert found the marijuana. Therefore, there is no taint on the evidence.
B. Probable Cause v. Reasonable Suspicion
The issue of whether probable cause or reasonable suspicion should be applied to law enforcement officers conducting a search of a student in a school setting is a matter of first impression in Tennеssee. R.D.S. argues that Deputy Lambert was acting in a “specialized law enforcement capacity,” i.e. a “School Resource Officer” (“SRO“), but that her position did not “allow a relaxation of the constitutional requirement of probable cause” to search R.D.S.‘s truck. The State counters that the search was reasonable because Deputy Lambert had “probable cause to believe that some measure of criminality was afoot” after her encounter with G.N. and his statements about being in R.D.S.‘s truck.
The
Gеnerally, government actors cannot conduct a search unless they possess a judicial warrant that was obtained upon a showing of probable cause to believe a crime had been committed. Peyton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980). Therefore, a warrantless search is presumed unreasonable, “unless it falls within one of the narrow and well-delineated exceptions to the warrants requirement.”4 Flippo v. West Virginia, 528 U.S. 11, 13 (1999). Even if one of those exceptions applies and a warrant is not required, a search must still ordinarily “be based on ‘probable cause’ to believe that a violation of the law has occurred.” T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 742; see Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273 (1973); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 62-66 (1968). However, the need for “probable cause” is not the touchstone of the
Similarly, the
In T.L.O., supra, the United States Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of searches of students by teachers and school officials. In T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 328, a school official searched a student‘s purse and found marijuana and evidence implicating T.L.O. in marijuana dealing. T.L.O. sought to suppress the evidence of marijuana dealing, claiming the search was unconstitutional. Id. at 329. The Court upheld the search, holding that the standard of reasonableness applied to a search of a student by a teacher or other school official. Id. at 341.
The Court began its analysis by holding that the
Since T.L.O. was decided, there has been an increasing presence of law enforcement officеrs in public schools through a variety of programs and arrangements aimed at combating crime and providing students with a safe and secure learning environment. Michael Pinard, From the Classroom to the Courtroom: Reassessing Fourth Amendment Standards in Public School Searches Involving Law Enforcement Authorities, 45 Ariz. L. Rev. 1067, 1067-68 (2003) (“Pinard“); see generally Jacqueline A. Stefkovich & Judith A. Miller, Law Enforcement Officers in Public Schools: Student Citizens in Safe Havens?, 1999 BYU Educ. & L. J. 25, 31-32 (1999). Many local governments have elected to blend the traditional duties of school officials and law enforcement officers in an effort to protect students and teachers. One such program is the national School Resource Officer program,5 which places lаw enforcement officers in schools to perform traditional law enforcement duties in addition to teaching law enforcement-related classes and counseling students “based on the expertise of a law enforcement officer.” J.W. ex rel. Watts v. Maury County, No. M2001-02768-COA-R3-CV, 2003 WL 1018138, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 11, 2003); see Pinard, 45 Ariz. L. Rev. at 1068; see also Ferrell v. Gwinnett County Bd. of Educ., 481 F. Supp. 2d 1338, 1340-42 (N.D. Ga. 2007) (providing an in-depth discussion of the role of an SRO). Other programs place law enforcement officers in schools “through liaison programs between public schools and local police departments,” or “outside of physically placing officers in schools, some . . . school districts have forged interdependent relationships between school officials and local police departments.” Pinаrd, 45 Ariz. L. Rev. at 1068.
Increasingly, SROs and other law enforcement officers are becoming more involved in searches on school premises. The majority of jurisdictions which have faced the issue of what standard to apply to SROs or law enforcement officers assigned to schools have applied the reasonable suspicion standard. See, e.g., People v. Dilworth, 661 N.E.2d 310, 317 (Ill. 1996) (holding that reasonable suspicion applies to liaison officer searching on own initiative); Commonwealth v. J.B., 719 A.2d 1058, 1062 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998) (holding that searches of public school students conducted by school police officers are subject to reasonable suspicion standard); Russell v. State, 74 S.W.3d 887, 891 (Tex. App. 2002) (applying reasonableness standard to officer
These courts have considered such facts as whether the law enforcement officer was in uniform, had an office on the school‘s campus, and how long each day the officer remained at the school. See T.S. v. State, 836 N.E.2d 362, 369 (Ind. App. 2007); In re William V., 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 695, 697 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003). The Indiana Supreme Court in Dilworth relied in part upon a school handbook that delineated the duties of the school liaison officer. 661 N.E.2d at 320. Additionally, the Florida District Court of Appeals cited а Florida statute outlining the duties of law enforcement officers assigned to the schools. See State v. N.G.B., 806 So. 2d 567, 568 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (citing
In contrast, where law enforcement officers, not associated with the school system, initiate a search, or where school officials act at the behest of law enforcement agencies, the probable cause standard is generally applied. See, e.g., F.P. v. State, 528 So. 2d 1253, 1254 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that the “school official exception” to the probable cause requirement does not apply when search is carried out at direction of police); State v. Tywayne H., 933 P.2d 251, 254 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that probable cause was required when a search was conducted completely at the discretion of the police officers); In re Thomas B.D., 486 S.E.2d 498, 499-500 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that probable cause was required when police conducted a search in furtherance of law enforcement objective, rather than on behalf of school).
School officials and law enforcement officers play fundamentally different roles in our society. A school official‘s basic task is to educate students in a safe environment, whereas a law enforcement officer‘s primary duty is to detect and deter crime. Law enforcement officers must generally satisfy the higher probable cause standard in order to conduct a search, because they stand in an adversarial role to citizens and the punishment for violating a criminal statue is more severe than the consequences of violating a school regulation.
In turning to the case at bar, Deputy Lambert initiated and conducted a search of R.D.S.‘s truck on the grounds of Page High School. Mr. Brown accompanied Deputy Lambert to R.D.S.‘s
Here, the record before us is devoid of any factors that could allow us to decide which standard should apply to the search by Deputy Lambert. We know that Deputy Lambert was a duly sworn deputy sheriff conducting a search on her own initiative. Even though the parties have labeled Deputy Lambert an “SRO,” they failed to present any evidence about the duties of an “SRO” at Williamson County‘s Page High School. Accordingly, we remand this issue to the trial court for a new trial where the parties will be given the opportunity to develop the record in order for the trial court to determine whether the probable cause or reasonable suspicion standard applies to the search of R.D.S.‘s truck.7
The trial court should consider any evidence introduced regarding the specific duties of Deputy Lambert, including information about her daily activities, any interactions with students she has, any specialized training she has received, any agreements between the Williamson County Sheriff‘s Office and Board of Education about the SRO program, any stated policies in regards to the SRO program in Williamson County, which governmental entity pays her salary, who are Deputy Lambert‘s direct supervisors, what classes she teaches, what topics she lectures, what topics she
Reviewing courts should apply the reasonable suspicion standard when a law enforcement officer, whose duties more closely align with the duties of a school official, conducts a search of a student in a school setting. Here, the parties conclusively labeled Deputy Lambert an “SRO,” but did not provide sufficient facts for the trial court to appropriately label her as a school official or a law enforcement officer. As such, this case is remanded to the trial court for a new trial to determine whether Deputy Lambert should be held to a reasonable suspicion or probable cause standard.
Conclusion
In sum, we hold that the incriminating statements made by R.D.S. were properly admissible because he was not in custody at the time he made the statements, and therefore no Miranda warnings were required. With respect to the evidence seized, the parties failed to present sufficient evidence for the trial court to conclude whether Deputy Lambert‘s duties allow her to conduct a search based upon reasonable suspicion or whether the search should be based upon probable cause. Therefore, we remand this case to the trial court so the parties may present more evidence on this issue.
The costs of this appeal are taxed to the State of Tennessee.
WILLIAM M. BARKER, CHIEF JUSTICE