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Raymond v. Raymond
36 S.W.3d 733
Ark.
2001
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*1 not an admission him for other any nor it be used purpose, him in against other proceeding. Giles, of our added.) Norrellv. (Emphasis light reasoning 36 S.W.3d 342 (2001) of Ark. R. plain language we Civ. P. reverse the trial court’s 36(b), grant summary judg ment. Matters admitted under Rule 36 in the nonsuited action were for the and were not purposes “pending only” admissions her “for other nor used purpose,” may they her in other See Ark. against “any R. Civ. P. proceeding.” 36(b) the evidence in most Viewing favorable to light appel lant, doubts resolving any against appellees, acknowledging fact, there remain no issues material we genuine hold that the trial court erred were entitled by finding to a appellees judg ment as a matter of law.

Reversed remanded. Diane M. RAYMOND v. Daniel A. RAYMOND 00-751 Court of Arkansas

Supreme delivered Opinion February denied March rehearing [Petition 2001.] *3 Smith, Mashburn & E. for Scott Taylor,by; appellant. Matthews, Rhoads, McClure, & Campbell, Thompson, Fryauf, BA., Matthews, David R. by: appellee. decree This involves a divorce appeal TOM Glaze, Justice. appellee

entered in Daniel A. favor Raymond’s against wife, Diane M. filed a Daniel divorce on Raymond. complaint 30, 1996, December but it is that Diane was never undisputed with ever served nor did Diane receive a process, copy Instead, both what was a complaint. parties signed designated “conditional reconciliation filed with the was agreement” 2, 1997, clerk on filed his chancery April days Daniel The it filed would as agreement complaint. provided “shortly” an attachment to the divorce complaint.

From Diane wording agreement, agreed, among .not to alcoholic things, other partake beverages illegal drugs, and she would and treatment. The undergo counseling parties that, into the and further agreed agreement entering resuming cohabitation, a trial their were reconciliation. they pursuing with consideration of Diane’s her abuse compliance discontinuing of alcohol and a six-month drugs, during agreement period, that recited Daniel would dismiss his divorce If Diane complaint. divorce, failed to she in turn leave the agreed comply, “accept car, $20,000.00,” with her house not belongings, personal real and make claims to marital or non- personal properties, marital. reconciliation efforts failed. They subsequendy and Diane settlement what

executed agreement, signed property however, labeled a “waiver and this was entry appearance”; did did not have her waive service of nor she process, pleading Rather, of Daniel’s divorce acknowledge receipt complaint. set- simply acknowledged receipt parties’ property pleading and reflected her waiver of the tlement agreement right appear further notice. were filed without These with papers along 12, 1997, divorce decree on or 133 after Daniel filed his May It is Diane was not (1) undisputed complaint. represented decree, counsel she never received a (2) prior of the divorce she never (3) waived copy specifically service of either when the was filed or before process divorce decree was entered. counsel, 5, 1999,

Diane later obtained and on March she 12, 1997, to the court to set aside petitioned May decree. While she the conditional acknowledged having signed and a settlement property time, Diane alleged was during dependent upon Daniel for and advice because she suffered guidance from alcohol- 12, 1997, ism. Her contention for aside the paramount setting May decree was that the court the decree had not chancery granting to do so because Daniel had never acquired perfected Diane, service of on nor did he deliver to her a of his complaint. *4 contention, of her relied support on Ark. R. largely P. and

Civ. 4(a) (i), service of Rule govern 4(a) that the of the the clerk provides “[u]pon filling shall complaint, forthwith issue a summons and cause it to be delivered service to a sheriff or to a the court or authorized person by appointed by law to serve Rule further 4(i) process.” provides following: service the summons is not made upon within 120 If of defendant days filing action shall be dismissed as to complaint, that after of without motion prejudice the court’s initi- upon upon defendant ative. If a motion to extend made is within 120 days filing suit, the time for service be extended the court upon of showing cause. good added.) (Emphasis

As alluded to it is uncontroverted that Daniel never service of on Diane within 120 perfected process his days filing nor did he serve a of complaint, on her or have complaint 484 an she waived service of whereby

her sign entry appearance failures, These summons within 120-day period. required asserted, Diane rendered the court without chancery authority hear or decide the divorce. chancellor parties’ disagreed, found Diane’s so-called signature parties’ specifically constituted conditional reconciliation entry agreement it, Diane submitted herself to the appearance, signing court’s Since the reconciliation had been jurisdiction. agreement and entered 93 within days (or signed mandatory 120-day from the of Daniel’s the chancellor held filing period) had Daniel with Rule Diane the chancel 4(i). complied appealed to the court of which affirmed. lor’s decision See appeals, Raymond 372, v. 70 Ark. 19 S.W.3d 52 The court of (2000). Raymond, App. decision, in a 4-2 with the chancellor’s agreed reasoning, appeals, and, existence, cases decided to Rule 4(i)’s citing prior appellate court held the in the language Diane amounted to a “substantial which constituted

signed by step” her waiver without her entry reserving objection to the trial court’s lack of We and reverse and jurisdiction. disagree decree. dismiss chancellor’s divorce

Arkansas law is settled that service of valid long process is a court over a defendant. Tuckerv. necessary give 61, 275 Ark. 628 S.W.2d 281 Halliman v. Johnson, (1982) (citing Stiles, 249, 250 464 S.W.2d 573 and Southern Kansas (1972), Holt, 165, Lines Co. v. 192 Ark. 90 S.W.2d 473 Stage (1936)). Moreover, summons is due necessary satisfy process require 244, ments. v. Potlatch 326 Ark. 930 S.W.2d 355 Thompson Corp., It under (1996). is also Arkansas law that service mandatory must he within made after the unless extend, there is a motion to and if service is not obtained within the made, and no such motion is dismissal 120-day period required motion or the court’s own initiative. SeeArk. R. Civ. P. upon upon Inc., 559, Works, v. Forrest 4(i); Machine 301 Ark. Lyons City S.W.2d 220 the trial (1990) (under 4(i), court’s dismissalof the case for failure to make service of summons was seealso mandatory); Keener, Foods,Inc. v. Southeast 335 Ark. 979 S.W.2d 885 (1998); Sullivan, 318 Ark. Lawson (1994); Dougherty Edmondson, S.W.2d

Our case law is well-settled ser equally statutory vice of common-law must requirements, being derogation rights, construed and with them must be exact. strictly compliance

485 Inc., 373, Interiors, 921 324 Ark. S.W.2d 944 (1996) Carruth Design 461, Cos., Ark. 768 531 Wilburn Keenan 298 S.W.2d (citing Farris, 505, and Edmonson v. 263 Ark. 617 S.W.2d (1989), Carruth, In this court held that the same (1978)). reasoning applies rules, to service court and that requirements imposed proceed conducted where the service was invalid renders ings attempted court, initio. therefrom void ab The Carruth judgments arising from Tuckerv. further held that actual knowl Johnson, quoting supra, Carruth, aof does not validate defective edge proceeding terms, 324 Ark. at 375. Stated different rule is that a general entered without or the judgment person subject Wilson, matter or in excess of the court’s void. is Neal v. power 900 S.W.2d 177 (1995). established this foregoing legal principles require court to hold the chancellor’s decree Daniel divorce to awarding because, be void as out Diane was never pointed indisputably summons; served with a of Daniel’s neither did Daniel file a motion to extend the time or obtain a waiver and entry Diane waived service of appearance whereby summons or pro cess. While Daniel Diane had been made aware that Daniel argues divorce, had filed a this limited actual was insufficient knowledge for the lower court to Tucker, over Diane. acquire jurisdiction See supra. do, as we we Daniel’s holding that Diane’s reject argument

signing filed 93 Daniel’s with the time complied 120-day period Daniel submits that required by 4(i). there is no specific for how a requirement enter their and that party appearance action of a defendant an intention to enter an showing appear ance, whether formal or informal writing parol voluntary on him. For appearance this he binding proposition, relies on Robinson v. 195 Ark. Bossinger, S.W.2d and the (1938), therein: following language answers, continuance, trial, A who party consents to a goes cause, takes an appeal, or does substantial act in a he although summons, has not been served with is deemed to have entered his unless he objects to the preserves juris- protest diction of his person. case, In addition to the Robinson Daniel also Kirk v. cites Bonner, 57 S.W.2d 802 for the (1930), rule that a *6 in court be formal but in voluntary appearance by writing, Kirk, the defendant executed a the issuance proper pleading waiving of summons and At the time of both entering appearance. Kirk, however, Robinsonand of Rules Civil Procedure had not words, been In other Rule was not in effect yet promulgated. 4(i) Likewise, and therefore not in those cases. court was this argued not faced with the due or issues considered jurisdictional cases, our later discussed where this court held that a (1) valid service of a court over process necessary give jurisdiction defendant; actual of a (2) does not validate knowledge proceeding a defective if service of summons is not made (3) process; upon defendant within 120 the case must dismissed; and where (4) service was proceedings attempted invalid render therefrom void and ab initio judgments arising subject to collateral attack at time.

We extend treatment of this because the point only dissenting mentions Ark. R. Civ. P. and 12(a), which are opinion (b), (h)(1), not Rule for the time in argued by 12(a) parties. provides which a defendant must file his answer after the service of summons him, and on and Rule a defendant complaint 12(b) to raise requires his defenses in his or for responsive pleading, eight specified defenses, motion. These defenses include lack by of jurisdiction over the of and of ser- person, insufficiency process, insufficiency vice of The 12(b)(2), (4), dissenting opinion that, submits under Rule 12(h)(1)(A) the defenses of lack (B), insufficient service are waived if the personal defendant fails to to those defenses motion under object Rule 12 or include such defenses in the defendant’s original responsive The dissent because Diane failed to file a pleading. urges defenses, motion these she waived them. raising The dissent is Here, mistaken. service is not the issue. Daniel obtained insufficient Diane, and, fact, no serviceof his and summons on Thus, has never been furnished a Diane was complaint. in no to file a motion to dismiss position any type responsive Rule 12 does not pleading. to the simply facts or situation apply before us.

The similar to the discussed dissenting opinion, argument above, asserts Diane had waived defense she had because she entered her in Daniel’s proceeding by signing conditional reflected dissent, of the divorce Daniel. style citing is not cases, formal necessary that a submits pleading number Suchor, Divilbliss in a See proceeding. effectuate “appearance” Mut. Ins. Co. v. Farm Bureau 600 (1992); 841 S.W.2d Arkansas (1993); 865 S.W.2d Dep’t Campbell, *7 Farris, 482 (1992); Ark. 832 S.W.2d v. Servs. Human 451 (1986). 713 S.W.2d Norsworthy, Norsworthy course, must one give to the dissent’s Of proposition, accept in to refer to it order construction to the agreement liberal the reconciliation kind. Unquestionably, as a any pleading — not a it it is an responsive is what says agreement to relief from can the said Nor agreement request pleading. whether to decide on is the appeal the court. Again, only question was a waiver of service of the process. the signed agreement parties must, we reach the inevi- the as we strictly, Construing agreement to a lawful the does not amount table conclusion that it. did Diane waive service nor by signing service process, that none of the cases cited in the dissent We further out point case, The Divilbliss for of its is theory position. supportive Procedure, 55 of the Arkansas Rules of not involved Rule example, fact, served, been the defendant Divilblisshad but issue 4(i); took servicethat there was whether the defendant Next, the under Rule Farm 55(b). constituted the and undermines Bureau case is also not dissent helpful actually There, with its defendant Bureau was never served Farm position. but its Defend- was sent process, attorney complaint. answer, ant’s but also reserved attorney responded by filing timely the the lack and defendant’s court’s objection jurisdiction the insufficient service of The Farm Bureau court upheld trial court’s dismissal of the and with agreed plaintiff’s complaint, answer, that, the lower court the defendant filed an it had while and reserved its therefore had not entered its properly objections dissent, Farris, The third case cited the is also of no appearance. the value to dissent’s That decision discusses theory. merely earlier distinction between general special appearances announced the rule as as a either moves prevailing long party lack before to dismiss for (or objects jurisdiction) personal plead- merits, with on or combines the objection ing merits, and this objection response preserved last, obviates the And the dissent appearance.” procedure “special There the cites of its out-of-state Norsworthy support position. served, but he a motion to defendant was with evidently responded dismiss, the Arkansas challenging court’s chancery jurisdiction. However, while the defendant court’s questioned chancery he relief in jurisdiction, affirmative the form of a sought so the stay Texas Arkansas courts could have direct communication in accordance with the Uniform Child Act. The Custody Jurisdiction court held such a Norsworthy court for affirmative request relief amounted to a conclusion, general our appearance. study of Rule 12 and the cases cited in the dissent show are in no they ' way situation now controlling before us.

As a final Daniel argument, asserts that laches prevents Diane from decree, to set least, aside petitioning at the time Diane contention, decree. In signed of this he support cites Self, (1995), its Self statement that laches “has been in numerous cases where applied one has remarried, obtained an invalid party divorce and but the first then waits too under the spouse facts of the long case particular *8 to her assert to have the void right vacated.” Id. at judgment 636. However, bemay in that easily the initial distinguished, Self decree voidable; was held to be case, in the instant merely Self decree was void ah initio. when the Certainly, 1997 decree May filed, was under Rule 120-day had period 4(i) and as passed, discussed in detail the reconciliation did nothing to validate the Thus, service under the Rule. Daniel’s to attempt invoke laches as a defense is because the trial court had misplaced no or jurisdiction hear the cases in the authority first see place, Tucker, much less consider such a supra, defense or argument. Cf. Farm Bureau Mutual Co., Ins. supra. conclusion, we hold that the chancellor erred in grant Daniel’s motion for

ing summary judgment to set petition decree, aside the divorce and that order is reversed and hereby dismissed without prejudice.

Brown, Imber, dissent. JJ., Thornton, Imber, Justice, The dissenting. Annabelle Clinton holds that the majority today Washington Chan- County Court was without cery jurisdiction enter a decree of divorce in the action filed Mr. by because he failed Raymond to perfect service Ms. upon within 120 Raymond days filing for divorce. I must dissent because the fails to majority recognize that service defendant, be waived process may as Ms. did in this case. Raymond of that or waiver service is

“Service process necessary the due of the United States order satisfy process requirements Stevens, 464, 466, Meeks v. 301 Ark. 785 S.W.2d 18 Constitution.” out, As the mandates that service 4(i) (1990). majority points or be made within filing must be dismissed as to defendant not served. Ark. R. issue, P. Service of the failure of 4(i). Civ. jurisdictional the trial court of over the which deprives jurisdiction person 680, 681, v. 316 Ark. defendant. See Sides 874 S.W.2d 373 Kirchoff, (1994). however, fails to majority, recognize juris personal

diction is defense can waived the defendant. Arkansas Farris, 575, 578, Human Servs. 832 S.W.2d 482 Dep’t of Rules and 12(h)(1) set forth the (1992). 12(b)(5) clearly procedure defense. Sublett v. raising insufficiency-of-service-of-process 58, 63, 330 Ark. Where a defendant Hipps, that the trial believes court lacks over her personal because of insufficient service of she take one of three process, may actions to her defense: she file a (1) motion to dismiss preserve may her for failure to obtain service of complaint against (2) process; she file a in which she responsive assertsthe defense of pleading service; insufficient or she (3) choose not to may simply appear to contest Hamm Child jurisdiction. Support Enforcement, Officeof 391, 394, Farris, 985 S.W.2d 742 (1999); ArkansasDHS. v. Ark. R. Civ. P. 12. If a defendant does supra; without first appear a motion to dismiss for insufficient service or this asserting defense in her first responsive waives defense pleading, based of the service upon insufficiency Hamm v. *9 OCSE, Hale, See also Wallacev. 341 supra. Ark. 20 S.W.3d 392 Farm Bureau (2000); Mut. Ins. v. Co. 315 Ark.. Campbell, Ark. (1993); R. Civ. P. 12(h). It is in this action that Mr. undisputed failed to Raymond service Ms. perfect within 120 upon Raymond the however, for divorce. He complaint argues, Ms. Raymond waived defense based any insufficient service upon when she entered an in the divorce action appearance the condi- by signing tional The agreement. dismisses majority summarily Mr. because he Raymond’s argument cited to cases only pre-rule and did not take into support argument account due process concerns. Mr. should not be Raymond’s argument so dis- quickly case, missed. As noted an in a by entering appearance defendant waives her defense of insufficient service of process. OCSE, Hamm v. Farm Bureau v. A waiver of supra; Campbell,supra. Meeks, service ameliorates due concerns. See Stevensv. therefore, is Ms. whether entered supra. question, Raymond an in the divorce action when she entered into the appearance conditional reconciliation I believe did. agreement. defendant,

An overt action other than part court, the case as in objecting jurisdiction, is an recognizes 479, 487, v. appearance. Norsworthy Norsworthy, Suchor, 8, 15-16, S.W.2d 451 Divilbliss v. (1986); S.W.2d 600 If the defendant action that is engages service, not defensive the purely prior asserting insufficiency an Hale, is entered and the defense is waived. Wallacev. A defensive action an such supra. is as purely engaging However, Farm Bureau discovery. formal Campbell,supra. plead not to effectuate ing an necessary Divilbliss v. “appearance.” Suchor, See, Farm Bureau v. supra. (a for e.g., Campbell,supra request Farris, affirmative Arkansas DHS v. relief); (a motion supra request and a counsel to motion to ing appointment intervene response a third motion party); Norsworthy (a Norsworthy,supra stay proceedings). case,

In the instant Ms. a document Raymond entitled signed “Conditional Reconciliation This was in Agreement.” agreement form the of a document At the legal filing. head of prepared the action, is the agreement divorce style pending containing court, name of the of the case style indicating plaintiff defendant, and the docket number to the case. The assigned itself agreement states that it is to be filed as an attachment to clearly for divorce in the Court of complaint Chancery Washington Arkansas. The County, further if agreement Ms. provides Raymond alcohol rehabilitation successfully completes program months, and abstains from alcohol for a Mr. six period Raymond would dismiss in the pending Washington Circuit Court. County

There can be doubt no the conditional recon by signing ciliation Ms. knew she was Raymond into an entering within the confines divorce action in the pending states, Court. As Washington County Chancery actual majority of a action does not validate knowledge defective pending *10 Inc., Interiors, Carruth v. 921 s.W.2d 944 Design However, in this case went involvement Ms. Raymond’s She committed an overt of its mere knowledge pendency. beyond be filed the conditional act by signing defensive was not the court. this agreement purely with Signing To by entering of Ms. Raymond. contrary, part to a course of action committed Ms. Raymond into agreement, under determining in the divorce parameters proceedings, from that forward. the divorce would By point proceed it a of the divorce into this and making part entering entered an and submitted Ms. Raymond proceeding, defense of thereby herself to court’s jurisdiction, waiving any insufficient service of ARCP Rule 4 in majority’s interpretation summary, the onus of Rule defense of insuffi-

this case shifts whereby asserted must be cient service specifically preserved. process holds that service of instead insufficient The majority’s opinion waived. In so it unless doing, preserved specifically abolishes our line of to the For this effectively precedent contrary. reason, I must dissent. respectfully this dissent. JJL,join Thornton,

Brown

Case Details

Case Name: Raymond v. Raymond
Court Name: Supreme Court of Arkansas
Date Published: Feb 1, 2001
Citation: 36 S.W.3d 733
Docket Number: 00-751
Court Abbreviation: Ark.
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