A Minulc (]l'der |"m'rn (()(i¢'€}'i} 30 United States District Court, Northern Distriet of Illinois b Name of Assi;_l_ned Judgc nunes H Alesia Sitting Judge if ()tlier or i\lagistl‘atc .chdge than Assignetl .lildge CASE NUMBER 01 C 0212 DATE Febrnary 5, 2002 CASE Alberta Raymona' vs_ Ct'ly OfC/'vt`cctgo TITLE |ln the following box (u) indicate the party filing the motion, eig., plainlil`t`. det`cndant. 3111 party nlaintil`t`. and (l)) stale brictly the nature oi` the motion hein rcsentc917 F. Supp. 577" date_filed="1996-03-01" court="N.D. Ill." case_name="Brown v. City of Chicago">917 F. Supp. 577(1\1.D. lll. 1_99()). ()n April 12, 1995, Raymond filed a charge with the lllinois Department of fluman Rights and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). ln that charge, Raymond alleged that the 1994 lieutenant examination violated Title Vll because it had an unlawful disparate impact upon minority sergeants On or about l\/lay 15, 1995, approximately forty-four other minority sergeants filed similar charges of discrimination. On December 51 1995, the plaintiffs in Br'onai amended their complaint, adding forty additional plaintiffs including Raymond. Judge Gettleman ruled that the 1994 lieutenant examination was job-related and consistent with business necessity but that the City violated 'l`itlc Vll by not including a merit selection component in the 1994 examination process See fireman v. City of`C/ir'cago, 8 F. Supp. 2d 1095" date_filed="1998-06-30" court="N.D. Ill." case_name="Brown v. City of Chicago">8 F. Supp. 2d 1095 (N.D. lll. 1998). The court then asked the parties to address the issue ofrelief. Thc City argued that the court should order that Raymond be promoted to lieutenant because she alone among the forty-four named plaintiffs had demonstrated that she would have been promoted based upon the merit selection plan. 'I`he City opposed any other court-ordered promotions Judgc Gcttleman ordered the City to promote and grant back pay to all thirteen of thc sergeants that had been chosen for promotion based upon merit selection (the “merit promotces”), including Raymond. Thc court ordered that the promotions be retroactive to /\pril o, 1995. iS`ee Brown v. (`,`r'ifvofC/iicago, 19 F. Supp. 2d 890" date_filed="1998-09-16" court="N.D. Ill." case_name="Brown v. City of Chicago">19 F. Supp. 2d 890, 892 (N.D. 111. 1998). Former Department Dcputy Superintcndent lames Whigham testified that the general counsel announced these merit promotions at a morning meeting but did not mention the names ofthe promoted personnel Six of those thirteen merit promotees have subsequently been promoted to captain or an exempt position. C. Ravmond has not Received a Commander Appointment Although Raymond claims that she is qualified for appointment to an exempt position (commandcr),2 l~lilliard has not selected her for such an appointment Raymond argues that she should have been promoted to commander instead of three other African-American female officers, who received their appointments in l\/larch 1999, February 2000, and l\/lay 2001. Shc believes that llilliard did not select her for one of these appointments out ofretaliation. Tlie Supcrintendent of police has discretion to appoint officers to exempt positions Hilliard testified that, when determining which officers he should promote to commander, he considered their integrity, character, morals, and values Hc also considered the officers’ background in the Department, particularly any actions the officers had taken to improve Department operational procedures Additionally, Hilliard looked at how the officers interactcd with young police officers as well as with citizens l~lc focused particularly upon which officers he considered to be team players and whether the officers were able to carry out the mission of the Departmentl 2ln the Department, officers above the rank of captain are referred to as “exempt” personnel Bot'h captains and lieutenants in the Department are eligible for appointment to exempt positions All three ofthe exempt positions to which Raymond claims she should have been appointed are titled “commander.” For the sake ofsimplieity, the court will usc the term “`commandet"` instead of“exempt position.” Likewisc, because an appointment to an exempt position is, for the purposes ofthis ease, a promotion, the court will use the word “prornotion” to refer to Hilliard’s personnel decisions with regard to both commander and captain 5 l~lilliard testified that Raymond’s April 12, 1995 EEOC charge against the Department, her being a plaintiff in Broiwi, or the fact that she was promoted to lieutenant by fudge Gcttleman’s 1998 court order were not factors in his not promoting her to commander. l'lilliard testified that he did not select Raymond because he did not believe that she was a team player, she did not share his vision of the Department, and he did not have confidence in heir On July 17, 2000, Raymond filed a charge ofdiscrimination with the Statc of lllinois Department of 1~1 uman Rights and the EEOC. ln that charge, she alleged tliatthe Department had retaliated against her by not promoting her to an exempt position because (1) she achieved her rank oflicutenant through a court order and (2) she filed her April 12, 1995 EEOC charge. Tliis July 17, 2000 EEOC charge provides the basis for this aetion. D. 'l`lie Collective Bargaining Agreement and Ravmond’s Unsuccessl`ul Application for Promotion to Captain Since April 21, 1999, the CBA has governed promotions to the rank of captain in the Department The CBA expressly grants the Superintendent of Police discretion to make promotions to captain and requires a lieutenant to complete two years ofscrvicc before applying for promotion to captain. A dispute arose regarding whether the merit promotces from Brown fulfilled this two-year requirement by means of their court-ordered retroactive seniorityl The merit promotccs, challenging the two-year requirement as inconsistent with their retroactive promotions from Hrown filed a motion to enforce Judge Gettlcman’s order. When the City agreed that it would not dispute that the merit promotces met the two-year requirement, the merit promotecs withdrew their motion. Although Raymond alleges in her complaint that the CBA was one of 6 the City’s retaliatory acts against her, she admits that she did not suffer any adverse employment action as a result ofthe CBA. On July 21, 2000, Hilliard outlined the application procedures for promotion to captain and instructed interested lieutenants to complete and submit application forms Raymond submitted an application but was not selected for promotion by l-lilliard. Raymond alleges that the City retaliated against her when l-lilliard did not promote her to captain in December 2000 and l an uary 2001 . ln his dcposition, Hilliard described his process for deciding which lieutenants hc should promote to captain. First, he sorted the 188 eligible applicants into three categories most qualified, qualified1 and not qualified As part ofthat initial analysis, Hilliard determined that Raymond was not qualified for promotion ln his first promotion order, dated December 29, 2000, Hilliard promoted thirty-three lieutenants to captain. Aftcr the first set of promotions he reviewed all the remaining applicants including those whom he had initially disqualified ln the second promotion ordcr, dated _lanuary 30, 2001, l~lilliard promoted an additional thirty-five lieutenants to captain According to lliiliai'd’s tcstimony, he determined that Raymond was not qualified for promotion to captain based upon his beliefs that: (1) Raymond did not share his vision ofthe Department; (2) her skills and expertise were not at the level necessary for promotion at that time; (3) she was not a “team player',” (4) she had not mcntored and tutorcd her subordinates; (5) she did not have sufficient field experience; (()) she did not have the proper demeanor to interact with officers and the command staff; and (7) he did not have sufficient confidence in Raymond to promote her. According to Hilliard, he did not consider or even know about Raymond’s /-\pril 12, 1995 EEOC eharge, her being a plaintiff`in Brown, or the f`aet that she had been promoted to lieutenant by Judge Gettleman’s 1998 court order. E. The Current Lawsuit Raymond filed this lawsuit claiming that the City violated i`itle Vll by retaliating against her f`or engaging in protected conduct She claims that it retaliated against her when: (l) it entered into the CBA; (2) Hilliard did not appoint her to commander in l\/larch 1999, February 2000, or l\/lay 2001; and (3) Hilliard did not promote her to captain in December 2000 and .lanuary 2001. 'l`hc City does not dispute that she filed her complaint within ninety days ot` receiving her right to sue letter in response to her EEOC charge of`July 17, 2000, in compliance with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)( l )_'1 'Flie City now moves f`or summaryjudgment arguing that: (l) some of Raymond’s claims are time-barred; (2) Raymond cannot establish a plain-m facie case of` retaliation because she cannot prove a causal link between her allegations of`protected activity and any adverse employment action by the City; and (3) Superintendent Hilliard had legitimate non-retaliatory reasons f`or not promoting Raymond to captain. "Raymond did not attach a copy other right to sue letter to her complaint Although 'l`itle '\/ll requires that a claimant be notified of` her right to sue bef`ore filing a complaint, it does not state any requirement that a plaintit`f`attach the right to sue letter to her complaint 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(l)(l). Fi`ni'ey v. fli’. De;)'! ()_f']’trt'). At'a', 97 C 3381, 1998 WL 26156, at *3 (N.D. lll. .lan. 12, 1998). Sec also [Chi'i'e v. City ofC/iicago, 95 C 3507, 1996 WL 264708, at *4 (l\l.D. lll. l\/lay l(), 199()) (“[:A]ttaching a right to sue letter to a complaint is not required to survive a motion to dismiss.”). ln this case, Raymond alleges in her complaint that she is filing the complaint within ninety days of receiving her notice ol` her right to sue. (Compl. 11 ll.) Det`endant, in its answer, admits that a right to sue letter was issued on October 20, 2000. (Ans. 1| ll.) Thus, based upon the representations of both parties, the court will assume that Raymond’s right to sue letter in this ease was issued on October 20, 2000_ 8 II. DISCUSSION A. Standard for Deeiding a lVlotion for Summarv Judgment lt is proper for a court to grant summaryjudgment “ifthe pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on 'file, together with the affidavits, ifany, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to ajudgment as a matter oflaw.” Fl§t). R. CI\/. P. 5()(c). A genuine issue of material fact exists for trial when, in viewing the record and ali reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-movant /lmfcrson v. Li`!)cr!.‘_i) Lobt')_)»‘, luc_, 477 U.S. 242" date_filed="1986-06-25" court="SCOTUS" case_name="Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.">477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986);5`)111`1)'1 v. iS'cvern, 129 l'*`..°>d 419, 425 (7th Cir. 1997). Thc burden is on the moving party to show that no genuine issues of material fact exist. Ce[r)l.c,\' (_'.`()r/). v. (_'.`crlrctf, 477 U.S. 317" date_filed="1986-06-25" court="SCOTUS" case_name="Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, Administratrix of the Estate of Catrett">477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); /lnrfer.s'on, 477 U.S. 242" date_filed="1986-06-25" court="SCOTUS" case_name="Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.">477 U.S. at 256. Once the moving party presents aprinm_/`ncr`c showing that it is entitled tojudgment as a matter of law, the non-moving party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials in its pleadings but must set forth specific facts showing that a genuine issue for trial exists. Ce/ote,r, 477 U.S_ at 324; /lnrferson, 477 U.S. 242" date_filed="1986-06-25" court="SCOTUS" case_name="Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.">477 U.S. at 256-57; Sc/iroen'er v. L'ttjthcmsci Germnn A.t`rft`nes, 875 F.2d 613" date_filed="1989-05-23" court="7th Cir." case_name="Christine K. Schroeder v. Lufthansa German Airlines">875 F.2d 613, 620 (7th Cir. 1989). B. Ravmond’s .Iulv 17. 2000 EEOC Charge Before addressing the merits of Raymond’s "l`itle \/ll claims, the court must first determine which ofthese claims are properly before the court. Raymond, in her complaint, cites the following allegedly retaliatory acts by the City: (l) entering into the CBA on April 21, 1999', (2) refusing to appoint Raymond as commander in l\/larch 1999, February 2000, and l\/lay 2001; and (3) refusing to promote Raymond to captain in December 2000 and January 2001.4 Raymond`s claims regarding the CBA and the l\/larch 1999 commander appointment may not have been timely asserted in an EEOC charge because thc July l7, 2000 EEOC charge upon which Raymond received her “right to sue” in this case alleges only that the City retaliated against Raymond by not selecting her for an exempt position and does not mention either the CBA or the captain promotions Further, the EEOC charge was filed before the December 2000 and January 2001 captain promotions and the February 200l commander appointment and Raymond’s claims arising from those events may not fall within the scope of her July 17, 2000 “Raymond’s complaint states: The first act ofretaliation occurred when [the City] entered into an agreement 'l`he second act of retaliation is the continuing refusal of[the City] to consider fairly plaintiff for selection to an exempt position The third act of retaliation occurred when plaintiff`was not among the lieutenants selected for appointment to the rank of captain. (Coiiipl_1|1|7, 9-10.) lnexplicably, Raymond, in her memorandum in opposition to motion for summary judgment focuses her arguments exclusively upon her not being promoted to captain. ln her memorandum, she states: Plaintiffdoes not advance any claim that defendant retaliated against her by not selecting her for an exempt position Nor does plaintiff assert any ofthe hypothetical (and time barred) claims discussed by defendant in its memoranduml The sole claim at issue in this case involves selection for the position of Captain. (Pl.’s l\/lem. in Opp’n to l\/lot. for Summ. j. at l.) (emphasis added). Although this statement could be construed as a voluntary dismissal of Raymond’s claims based on the commander position and the CBA, the court will still address these claims because they fail on the merits for reasons discussed infra Sect. ll.B.l. and ll.C. 10 EEOC charge. ln determining which claims are properly before the court, the court will first look at the timeliness of Raymond’s claims and then determine which claims fall within the scope of her EEOC charge. l. The timeliness of Ravmond’s claims The City argues that the claims regarding the CBA and the l\/larch 1999 commander appointment are not timely because Raymond did not assert them in an EEOC charge within 300 days of`their occurring Raymond does not oppose the City’s arguments on this point. 'l`he court concludes that both claims are time-barred ln lllinois, a Title \/ll plaintiffmust file a charge with the EEOC within 300 days of`the alleged discrimination Br`[ow v. Mtic/r tS`/"ie/i`st Fi'eed l`)enenberg/lmerl/ di Ru!)eiisrei'n, P. C'., l\los. 00-2467, 00-2587, 00-3098, 2001 WL 1381076, at *7 (7th Cir. Nov. 7, 2001 ). As a general rule, therefore, a court cannot consider events that occurred more than 300 days prior to the piaintiff’s filing her charge. LS`ilrcrrnojf"v. [f/. Dep 'I off/aman Servs., 258 F.3d 696" date_filed="2001-07-25" court="7th Cir." case_name="Kenneth M. Shanoff v. State of Illinois Department of Human Services">258 F.3d 696, 702 (7th Cir. 2001 ). 'l`he continuing violation doetrine, however, allows a Titlc Vll plaintiff to obtain relief for discriminatory acts that occurred before the 300-day limitations period ifthc plaintiff can link those acts with prohibited conduct that did occur within the 300-day period Ft`/i`;)ovic v. K & R f?,\y)i'ess Sys., ]rrc., 176 F.3d 390" date_filed="1999-04-28" court="7th Cir." case_name="Momcilo Filipovic v. K & R Express Systems, Incorporated">176 F.3d 390, 396 (7th Cir. 1999). The court must first determine whether the CBA and the 1\/1areh 1999 commander appointment occurred more than 300 days before Raymond filed her EEOC charge. The court then must determine whether either of the two events was part of a continuing violation. 11 Any retaliatory conduct that occurred before September 22, 1999 a 300 days before Raymond filed her July 17, 2000 EEOC charge ~ is time-barred The City and the Captain’s Association entered into the CBA on April 21, 1999, and the potentially untimely commander appointment occurred in 1\/1arch 1999. Both these events fall outside of the 300-day period Thus, both these claims by Raymond will be time-barred unless they are part ofa continuing violation The continuing violation doctrine applies only where it would be unreasonable to expect the plaintif"fto sue before the 300 days had expired, such as when the plaintiff could recognize the actionable nature ofthe conduct only in light ofsubsequcnt, additional events that occurred within the statutory time period [a'. The doctrine does not apply, however, where the plaintiff knew or “with the exercise ofreasonable diligence would have known” about the discriminatory nature of the employer’s actions l"/rice v. /lt')bott Lrif).s'_, 215 li.3d 803, 808 (7th Cir_ 2000) (quoting Mos)'rr)wirz v. Tr's. ()_/`l"’m'rfue Urir`v,, 5 F.3d 279" date_filed="1993-09-22" court="7th Cir." case_name="Merwin Moskowitz v. Trustees of Purdue University and Purdue University">5 F.3d 279, 281-82 (7th Cir. 1993)). The chenth Circuit has held that not being promoted is like being 'lired, dcmoted, or receiving a retaliatory job transfer because they are all single events, not continuing acts, and the retaliatory character ofthose events should be apparent at the time of the decision AS`ec Pi'rice, 215 1'*`.3d at 808. As discussed bclow, the 1\/1arch 1999 commander appointment and the execution ofthe CBA were isolated and significant events to which the continuing violation doctrine does not apply. Any possible retaliation that motivated the decision not to promote Raymond to commander in l\/larch 1999 should have been apparent to Raymond at that time, and she should have asserted that claim in an EEOC charge within 300 days. Sce Grr€rrri v. fit Str:tc Po/r`ce, l\lo. 12 01 C 2839, 2001 WL 1002489, at "‘3 (N.D. lll. Aug. 30, 2001) (concluding that continuing violation doctrine did not apply to police officer’s time-barred complaints that state police department discriminated against him in not promoting him to lieutenant because each denial of a promotion constituted a “separatc and concrete discriminatory act,” from which the discriminatory character should have been apparent). Likcwisc, Raymond knew of the potentially retaliatory nature of the CBA when it was executed in April 1999. Raymond and the other merit promotees from limer challenged the CBA in their October 1, 1999 motion to enforce fudge Gettleman’s order. Because Raymond joined in this motion, the court concludes that she knew of the potentially retaliatory character of the CBA at that time. Thcrefore, the continuing violation doctrine does not apply to Raymond’s claim regarding the CBA. See Place, 215 F.3d at 808 (holding that the continuing violation doctrine does not apply where plaintiff knows at the time of thc act that it was discriminatory and that it harmed her) (quoting Mos/t.r)i/vr`lz, 5 F.3d 279" date_filed="1993-09-22" court="7th Cir." case_name="Merwin Moskowitz v. Trustees of Purdue University and Purdue University">5 F.3d at 281-82). Because Raymond did not assert her claims regarding the l\/larch 1999 commander appointment and the CBA in an EEOC charge within 300 days and because the continuing violation doctrine does not apply to these claims, the court deems them time-barred Therefore, the court grants the City’s motion for summary judgment on Raymond’s claims regarding the CBA and the l\/larch 1999 commander appointment 2. 'l`lie Scope of Ravmond’s EEOC Charge Raymond did not assert her claims regarding the December 2000 and lanuary 2001 promotions to captain or the l\/lay 2001 commander appointment in her July 17, 2000 EEOC 13 charge. ln fact, when she filed the charge, the events giving rise to those claims had not yet occurred 'l`he court must determine whether it must consider those claims in ruling on this motion. As a general rule, a Title Vll plaintiffmay not bring claims in a lawsuit that she did not first assert in an EEOC charge. F/a/ierry v. Marc/zand, No. 00 C 565, 2001 WL 1242884, at *2 (N.D. lll. Oct. 17, 2001) (citing H(rrpcr v. Godji'ey Cc)., 45 F.3d 143" date_filed="1995-02-27" court="7th Cir." case_name="Gregory Harper v. Godfrey Company and D.B. Barcom, Incorporated">45 F.3d 143, 147-48 (7th Cir. 1995)). Therc is, however an exception to this rule. A plaintiff`may assert a claim in her complaint that she did not include in her EEOC charge if she can satisfy a two-prong test: (1) the claim must be “like or reasonably related to” her EEOC charge, and (2) the claim must be one that would “reasonably develop from an EEOC investigation into the original charge.’1 Flr.rherry at *2 (citing ]]rn';)cr, 45 F.3d 143" date_filed="1995-02-27" court="7th Cir." case_name="Gregory Harper v. Godfrey Company and D.B. Barcom, Incorporated">45 F.3d at 148). Applying this test, the court concludes that it must consider Raymond’s claims of retaliation regarding the City’s refusal to promote her to captain and the l\/lay 2001 commander appointment As for the first prong, in the chenth Circuit, a claim in a plaintiffs complaint is reasonably related to her EEOC charge if there is some factual relationship between the two claims F/n/ierl_v, at *2 (citing ch'pcr, 45 F.3d 143" date_filed="1995-02-27" court="7th Cir." case_name="Gregory Harper v. Godfrey Company and D.B. Barcom, Incorporated">45 F.3d at 148). At a minimum, the complaint and the 355 EEOC charge must “‘describe the same conduct and implicate the same tirr/i'vir!um'.s'. Snrole/r v. l"(rfr)s )'"(ir/'r Po/'r`c:c Dep ’{, i\lo. 99 C 8001, 2001 WL 699946, at *2(1\1.[). lll. June 21, 2001) (cmphasis addcd) (quoting C/iee/c v. W. & S. Lr`je his Co., 31 F.3d 497" date_filed="1994-08-01" court="7th Cir." case_name="Loretta Cheek v. Western and Southern Life Insurance Company">31 F.3d 497, 501 (7th Cir. 1994)). Here, both the complaint and EEOC charge allege that Hilliard refused to promote Raymond in retaliation for her obtaining a promotion by court order and filing charges against thc Department "l"hus, the complaint and EEOC charge implicate the same individual 4 llilliard -- and the same conduct ~ not promoting Raymond in retaliation for the sarno protected activity. Therefore, the court finds that Raymond’s claims in her complaint regarding promotion to captain and the 1\/1ay 2001 commander appointment are reasonably related to her EEOC claims regarding promotion to an exempt position Scc Smo!e/r, at *3 (concluding that the first prong ofthe test was satisfied where all of`plaintiffpolice officer’s claims named local police ehiefas the decision-maker and alleged that he was being retaliated against for filing claims of discrimination against the police department). As for the second prong, the Seventh Circuit has noted that it is difficult for courts to determine when a claim would reasonably develop from an EEOC investigation because it requires a court to speculate as to what the EEOC might or might not discover in an investigation Smci'c/r, at *3 (quoting C/rcck, 31 F.3d 497" date_filed="1994-08-01" court="7th Cir." case_name="Loretta Cheek v. Western and Southern Life Insurance Company">31 F.3d at 500). This speculation is limited however, to events that occurred during the pendency ofthe charge before the EEOC. //emi)n'ge \f. C/ii'cngr) Pnb. Sc')’i., 786 F.2d 280" date_filed="1986-03-10" court="7th Cir." case_name="Sampath K. Hemmige, and Cross-Appellee v. Chicago Public Schools, and Cross-Appellants">786 F.2d 280, 283 (7th Cir. 1986). '1`lic court concludes that the EEOC investigation into Raymond ’s claim regarding the February 2000 commander appointment could not have revealed her claims regarding not being promoted to captain or her claim regarding the 1\/1ay 2001 commander appointment because the events giving rise to those claims occurred after the EEOC concluded its investigation and issued Raymond’s right to sue letter on October 20, 2000_ The claims regarding the December 2000 and january 2001 captain promotions and the 1\/1ay 2001 commander appointment thus fall outside the scope of Raymond’s July 17, 2000 EEOC charge and are not properly before the court See Dfrrrfr`u-»rr/ v. Wor)r/s Di'v_, Hesslon Cor;)_, 15 86 C 20375, 1989 WL 97842(1\1.[). 111. July l l, 1989) (holding that an event that occurred after the EEOC issued a right to sue letter was not within the scope ofthe EEOC charge because it could not have been within the scope of the EEOC’s investigation). ln any event, even if Raymond’s claims regarding promotion to captain as well as her claim regarding the l\/lay 2001 commander appointment were properly within the scope of`her july 17, 2000 EEOC charge, all three ofthose claims would fail on their merits because (1) Raymond fails to establish a prima facie case for rctaliation, as discussed inji'a Sect. ll.C.2 and (2) she fails to establish that the City’s stated non-diseriminatory reasons for her not being promoted were pretextual1 as discussed infra Sect. 11.C.4.. '1"hus the court grants the City’s motion for summaryjudgment as to Raymond’s claims regarding the December 2000 and the .lanuary 2001 promotions to captain and the 1\/1ay 2001 commander appointment C. Ravmond’s Title Vll Retaliation Claim The only one ofRaymond’s claims properly before thc court is her claim that she should have received the Fcbruary 2000 commander appointment The City argues that it is entitled to summary judgment because Raymond has failed to establish a primrrfricr`e case of retaliation insofar as she has not proven a causal connection between her protected activity and the adverse employment action Raymond responds that she is not required to prove causation and that, conscqucntly, she has established her ;)ri)iicifnci`e casc. 'l`he court agrees with the City. Title \/11 prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee who has made a charge of discrimination 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). ln this casc, Raymond provides no direct evidence that the City was retaliating against her. Consequently, the court will analyze her claim 16 under the burden-shifting approachl Sce Lalvrmr` v. (,'()r)/t Connfy, 269 F.3d 785q 790 (7th Cir. 2001) (noting that plaintiff who had presented no direct evidence of retaliatory intent had to proceed under the burden-shifting approach). Under the burden-shifting approach, the plaintiff must first establish a pit/iia facie case. Dunn v. Norri'sfrr)m, [nc.',, 260 F.3d 778" date_filed="2001-08-10" court="7th Cir." case_name="Harry C. Dunn, III v. Nordstrom, Inc.">260 F.3d 778, 784 (7th Cir. 2001 )_ lfthc plaintiffis able to establish aprimrrfncie case, the defendant may avoid liability by articulating a lcgitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action !rr'. 1f` the defendant is able to do so1 the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff, who must prove that the defendant’s allegedly nondiscriminatory reason was merely pretextual !rf. The court will first resolve the parties’ dispute as to the elements of a retaliation claim and will then determine whether Raymond has established a prima/ncic case. l. Elements ofa Title VII retaliation claim '1`he parties disagree as to the elements ofapri`iiirifnc."c case for 'l`itlc \/11 retaliation in the Seventh Circuit. The City argues that, in order to establish a;)rr`mnj&a:'r`c case ofrctaliation1 a plaintiff must prove that: (1) she engaged in a statutorily-protected activity; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action subsequent to her participation in that activity; and (3) there was a causal link between the adverse action and the protected activity. Raymond argues that she need not prove a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action 'I`hc court agrees with the City. The Sevcnth Circuit has consistently required a Titlc \/ll retaliation plaintiffto establish a causal connection between her protected activity and any adverse employment action Set’ e_g. I.ri/vnm`, 269 li.3d at 11 (requiring retaliation plaintiff to prove protected activity, adverse 17 employment action, and causal link between the two). /lccoi'r/ Dumi, 260 F.3d 778" date_filed="2001-08-10" court="7th Cir." case_name="Harry C. Dunn, III v. Nordstrom, Inc.">260 F.3d at 784; Ho_[fiiirnr- Dr)iiibrowsfri v. Ar/r'ngton far 7 Rncecourse, fric., 254 12 .3d 644, 653 (7th Cir. 2001 ); Krna.s'e v. Cl'r'!_i) ry“`Lri(/`rc).s'.s'e, 246 F.3d 995" date_filed="2001-04-10" court="7th Cir." case_name="Leanna Krause v. City of La Crosse">246 F.3d 995, 1000 (7th Cir. 2001). Raymond is unable to provide the court with any mandatory authority in support of her argument that no proof`ofcausation is required in retaliation cases. lnstead, Raymond cites only Judge Posner’s concurring opinion in Bourbon v. Knrrrrt (l'oi';)., 223 F.3d 469" date_filed="2000-08-04" court="7th Cir." case_name="Kenneth Bourbon v. Kmart Corporation">223 F.3d 469, 473 (7th Cir. 2000) (Posncr, J. concurring). The court will not follow a concurring opinion in the face ofclear Seventh Circuit precedent on point See Ewr`ng v. O'[)’rr`cn, 60 F. Supp. 2d 813" date_filed="1999-08-19" court="N.D. Ill." case_name="Ewing v. O'BRIEN">60 F. Supp. 2d 813, 819 (N.D. lll. 1999) (refusing to follow a concurring opinion from a Suprcme Court case because the Seventh Circuit had consistently held otherwise on the issue). Becausc Raymond’s argument is unsupported by any mandatory authority and calls for a departure from clear Seventh Circuit precedcnt, the court finds her argument unpersuasive and concludes that she must, under chenth Circuit 1aw, prove a causal connection as an element of lierprr`nir:jricr'e case ofrctaliation. The court must now determine whether Raymond has satisfied all three elements ofherprr`niri_frici`e case. 2. Ravmond’s Prima Fa.c."e Case ln order to establish aprimrr/`rrci`e case ofretaliation, a plaintiff must prove that: ( l) she engaged in a statutorily-protectcd activity; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action subsequent to her participation in that activity; and (3) there was a causal link between the adverse action and the protected activity. Dunn, 260 F.3d 778" date_filed="2001-08-10" court="7th Cir." case_name="Harry C. Dunn, III v. Nordstrom, Inc.">260 F.3d at 784. The City admits that (1) Raymond’s filing of her April 12, 1995 EEOC charge and being a plaintiff in l)’rr)wn are 18 protected activities under Title '\/11, and (2) the City admits that Raymond’s not being promoted to captain or commander could constitute adverse employment actions.5 The City argues that Raymond has not established a ;)ri`mnjricie case for retaliation because she has not proven a causal connection between her participation in protected activities and the adverse employment actions. 'l`o demonstrate a causal link in a retaliation casc, thc plaintiff must show that the employer would not have taken the adverse action “but for” the plaintist protected activity. [_)timi, 260 F.3d 778" date_filed="2001-08-10" court="7th Cir." case_name="Harry C. Dunn, III v. Nordstrom, Inc.">260 F.3d at 784. The City offers two arguments to support its conclusion that Raymond has failed to prove a causal connection between her protected activities - filing her April 12, 1995 EEOC chargc, being a plaintiffin Br()wn, and being promoted to lieutenant by court order and the City’s not promoting her. First, the City argues that Raymond has produced no evidence of causation Second, the City argues that Raymond cannot create an inference of causation Raymond does not oppose the City’s arguments and relies solely upon her argument that she is not required to prove causation as part of her prr`iirr:_/rzci`e casc. 'l`he court agrees with the City and concludes that Raymond has not demonstrated a causal link and, therefore, that she has not established a prinmfnci`e casc. 5As discussed Suprn Sect. 11.13.1., Raymond’s claims based on the CBA are time-barred Neverthcless, this claim would fail on the merits bccausc, by defaulting on the City’s chucsts for Admission, Raymond has admitted that She suffered no detriment or adverse employment action as a result of the CBA. (Def`.’s ch. for Admis. 11 52.) liurthermore, at l{aymond’s dcposition, her attorney stipulated that she had not been injured and Raymond testified that she had been allowed to apply for promotion to Captain despite the two-year requirement (Raymond’s Dcp. l 18: 8-19.) Consequently, Raymond would be unable to succeed on the merits ofher claim regarding the CBA as she would bc unable to establish the second element of a ;)rimnjrrcie case of`retaliation: an adverse employment action 19 a. Evidence of causation The City argues that the undisputed facts prove that there is no evidence of a causal connection between Raymond’s protected activities and the adverse employment actions because llilliard did not even know about the protected activities Raymond does not oppose the C.`it'y’s arguments, nor does she provide evidence to support her argument that Hilliard knew about her filing the EEOC charge, being a plaintiffin Brown, and being promoted to lieutenant by Judgc Gettleman`s ordcr. lnstead, she attacks the credibility of l`lilliard’s deposition testimony The court finds the C.`ity’s arguments that l-lilliard did not know about Raymond’s protected activities convincing and thus need not address the City’s other arguments on this point The Sevcnth Circuit has held that a retaliation plaintiff cannot establish a causal link when the person who made the decision that constituted the adverse employment action did not know about the plaintiff"s protected activity. Mr.inrr)tr;"v. Wni')l'er M/g. C`r)., 210 li.3d 750, 755 (7th Cir. 2000). The court must determine whether Hilliard knew about Raymond’s EEOC chargcs, her being a plaintiff in Bi'r)rwi, or her promotion to lieutenant by Judge Gcttlcman’S order. lfhe did not, then Raymond cannot establish the required causal connection llilliard testified at his deposition that he did not know whether Raymond had ever filed an EEOC` charge regarding the 1994 lieutenants’ examination Hilliard testified that he never saw Judgc Gcttleman’s court order in Brown prior to his deposition and that he learned about the decision from the general counsel According to the testimony of former Department Deputy Superintendcnt James Whigham, the general counsel announced the court-ordered merit promotions at a morning meeting but did not mention the names ofthe promoted personnel "l`he 20 City argues that this evidence establishes that Hilliard was unaware of Raymond’s protected activities and that, consequently, Raymond cannot establish causation in this casc. Raymond, instead of providing evidence that Hilliard knew about her April 12, 1995 EEOC chargc, her being a plaintiff in Brown, or her being promoted to lieutenant by Judge Gettleman’s order, argues that llilliard’s testimony is not credible First7 she argues that llilliard’s testimony that he did not know about her involvement in Broi-vn was not credible She offers no evidence in support of this argument and argues merely that the City’s decision to oppose intervention in Brown was a major policy decision in which ajury would expect llilliard to have been involved Second, she argues that Hilliard’s entire deposition - and, therefore, his testimony that he did not know about Raymond’s April 12, 1995 EEOC charge, her being a plaintiff in Bi'own, or her promotion to lieutenant by Judgc Gcttleman’s order - is not credible because of a series of inconsistencies that she claims diminish the credibility of his testimony. The court finds each ofthose arguments to be unpersuasive and will address each ofthem in turn First, Raymond’s attempt to establish Hilliard’s knowledge of Raymond’s being a plaintiff in Brr)u»'n or her promotion to lieutenant by _ludge Gettleman’s court order is unpersuasive She argues that the City’s decision to oppose intervention in Brown by all the merit promotees except for her was a major policy decision for the Department that ajury would expect to be made by Hilliard Raymond, however, cites no evidence of the Departmcnt’s decision-making structure regarding litigation strategy or any other evidence to support her argument Accordingly, she has not met her burden of creating a disputed issue of fact as to 21 l-lilliard’s testimony that he did not know about Raymond’s protected conduct Sec Sc/rroedei', 875 F.2d 613" date_filed="1989-05-23" court="7th Cir." case_name="Christine K. Schroeder v. Lufthansa German Airlines">875 F.2d at 620. Second, Raymond ’s series ofattacks upon Hilliard ’s credibility, discussed in more detail infra Sect. 11.C.4., fail to create an inference that l~lilliard was being untruthful when he stated that he did not know about Raymond’s April 12, 1995 EEOC charge, her being a plaintiff in Bi~own, or her promotion to lieutenant by Judgc Gettleman’s court order. lt is true that a fact- finder rnay infer intentional discrimination from an employer’s untruthfulness /llexnnr/er v. Wis. Dep ’I o_/`]*/crrif/i & Frrirn`[_y Servs., 263 F.3d 673" date_filed="2001-08-27" court="7th Cir." case_name="Robert E. Alexander v. Wisconsin Department of Health and Family Services, Susan Moritz, Claire Nagel">263 F.3d 673, 683 (7th Cir. 2001). Raymond f`ails, however, to support her arguments with sufficient evidence to establish that Hilliard’s testimony was not true. Scc id (stating that the court’s only inquiry in reviewing a grant ofsummaryjudgment is “whether the plaintiff has provided evidence from which a rational trier of fact could infer that the cmployer’s stated reasons for taking the adverse action were lies.”). '1"hcrefore, the court concludes that Raymond has failed to create an inference that l"l i l liard ’s testimony that he d id not know about Raymond’s April 12, 1995 EEOC chargc, her being a plaintiff in Brown, or her promotion to lieutenant by ludge Gcttleman’s court order was not credible. Conscqucntly1 the court finds that the evidence demonstrates that Hilliard did not know about Raymond’s April 12, 1995 EEOC charge, her role as a plaintiffin Brown, or that she was promoted to lieutenant by fudge Geftleman’s court order. Bccause Raymond cannot prove that Hilliard knew about Raymond’s protected activities, the court concludes that Raymond has no evidence ofa causal connection between her protected conduct and Hilliard’s decision to not promote hcr. Sce Mnm'ou/; 210 1*`.3d at 755. Even if, however, Raymond could establish that 22 Hilliard knew about her protected activities, too much time passed between those protected activities and llilliard’s promotion decisions to give rise to an inference of causation b. Inference of causation The City argues that the amount of time that passed between Raymond’s protected activities (filing her April 12, 1995 EEOC charge,joining the l>’rown litigation on December 5, 19951 and receiving her promotion on September 16, 1998) and the adverse employment action (the February 2000 commander appointment) was too great to support an inference that the protected activities caused the adverse employment actions Raymond does not offer any arguments on this issue. 'I`hc court agrees with the City, The Seventh Circuit has acknowledged that the amount oftime that passes between an employce’s protected activity and an adverse employment action can create an inference of causation Lm'vmn', 269 1"`.3d at 790. l'lowcver, the longer the time between the protected conduct and the adverse employment action, the weaker the inference that the employer engaged in the adverse employment action due to the protected conduct fr[. In order for a plaintiffto establish a causal connection using only evidence oftemporal proximity, the plaintiff`must show that the employcr’s action followed fairly soon after the employee’s protected conduct Ho[/`iirnn~i'_')ombrows/tr`, 254 F.3d at 653-54. ln this case, the promotion at issue occurred on February l, 2000. 'I`his promotion occurred more than fourteen months after Raymond’s promotion to lieutenant on l\lovember 6, 1998, almost five years after she filed her May 15, 1995 EEOC charge, and more than five years after she joined Brr)wii as a plaintiff on December 5, 1995. Based upon Seventh Circuit 23 precedent all three ofthesc intervals oftimc are too long to raise an inference ofcausafion. See Pri/uck v_ Goo(fing Rrrbf)er Co., 221 P`.3cl 1003, 1010 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that one year was too long an interval to raise an inference ofretaliation). Sce also An'asr/mi/i'i v. C.`ir_i) of(`,`/n`crigo, 164 F.3d 353" date_filed="1998-12-28" court="7th Cir." case_name="Indira ADUSUMILLI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF CHICAGO, Defendant-Appellee">164 F.3d 353, 363 (7th Cir. 1998) (eight month interval too long to raise inference ofretaliation); Drivr`n'sc)n v. Mr'rielfort C/t`m`€, Lm’., 133 F.3d 499" date_filed="1998-01-07" court="7th Cir." case_name="Barbara Davidson v. Midelfort Clinic, Ltd.">133 F.3d 499, 51 l (7th Cir. 1998) (five month interval too long). ('.`onsequently, the court concludes that, in this case, too much time passed between the protected conduct and the adverse employment actions to raise an inference ofcausation. ’l`hc undisputed facts do not support a conclusion that any of` Raymond’s protected activities caused Hilliard to pass her over for promotion 'l`hercfore, Raymond cannot establish aprimri_/ricic case of retaliation Accordingly, the court grants the City’s motion for summary judgment 3. 'I`he Citv’s legitimate reasons for not promoting Ravmond Even if Raymond could establish aprimafircie retaliation case, the City has provided a legitimatc, non-discriminatory reason to support the decision not to promote Raymond. .S'ee Dtimr, 260 F.3d 778" date_filed="2001-08-10" court="7th Cir." case_name="Harry C. Dunn, III v. Nordstrom, Inc.">260 F.3d at 784 (noting that, under 'l`itle Vll retaliation burden-shifting analysis, even if plainti ffcan establish aprr'mnjiicr'e casc, defendant may avoid liability by articulating legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its action). 'l`hc City argues that Hilliard had legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for not promoting Raymond. Particularly, the City argues that, because appointments to captain and exempt ranks are discretionary, the Superintendent is entitled to promote personnel in whom he has confidence and who he believes share his goals for the Department Furthermore, Hilliard has explained his 24 reasons for not promoting Raymond l)articularly, l-lilliard testified that Raymond was not qualified for promotion bccause: (l) he did not believe that she shared his vision of the Department; (2) she did not have the necessary skills and expertise; (3) he did not consider her to be a team playcr; (4) he did not believe that she had the demeanor to interact with other officers and the command staff; (5) he did not believe that she had rncntored and tutorcd young officcrs; and (6) he did not have sufficient confidence in Raymond. Accordingly, the court concludes that the City has met its burden of production by articulating legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for not promoting Raymond. 'l`he court must now determine whether Raymond satisfies her burden of`proving that Hilliard’s reasons for not promoting her were pretextual 4. Ravmond’s Pretext Arguments Bccause the City has articulated non-retaliatory reasons for not promoting Raymond, the burden now shifts back to Raymond, who must prove that the City’s stated reasons were merely pretextual Scc [)unn, 260 F.3d 778" date_filed="2001-08-10" court="7th Cir." case_name="Harry C. Dunn, III v. Nordstrom, Inc.">260 F.3d at 784. Raymond argues that llilliard’s explanation for not promoting Raymond was not credible and that llilliard’s lack of credibility is probative circumstantial evidence that Hilliard`s actual reasons for not promoting her were retal iatory. 'l`hc City replies that Raymond’s arguments are not properly supported because some facts that Raymond cites are supported only by Raymond’s self-serving affidavit and other facts arc not supported as required by Local Rule 56. l. A court’s only concern in determining whether an employer`s articulated reasons are pretextual is whether the defendant honestly believed its rcasons, regardless of whether those 25 reasons are trivial or even baseless Bi'r`// v. Lante Corp_, 1 19 F.3d 1266, 1270 (7th Cir. 1997). l\/lerc proof by a plaintiffthat the cmploycr’s assessment of her skills is incorrect is insufficient to establish pretext Olserr v. Mrirs/rn[/ & flslej) Coi'/)., 267 F.3d 597" date_filed="2001-09-25" court="7th Cir." case_name="Michael J. Olsen v. Marshall & Ilsley Corporation">267 F.3d 597, 602 (7th Cir. 2001). lnstcad, the plaintiff must prove that the employer lied about its explanations Jo/mson v. Nom’sn'om, lirc., 260 F.3d 727" date_filed="2001-07-20" court="7th Cir." case_name="Gail Johnson v. Nordstrom, Inc., James M. Johansson and Richard J. Archer">260 F.3d 727, 732 (7th Cir. 2001). lt is true that a factfinder may infer intentional discrimination from an cmploycr’s untruthfulness Sce Ai’cu'rinr/er, 263 F.3d 673" date_filed="2001-08-27" court="7th Cir." case_name="Robert E. Alexander v. Wisconsin Department of Health and Family Services, Susan Moritz, Claire Nagel">263 F.3d at 683. However, a plaintiff still must provide evidence to support her arguments that the cmploycr’s stated reasons for the adverse employment action were not truc. Wcr'sf)rr)t v. Mcri. Coff. o/`Wis., 79 F.3d 677" date_filed="1996-03-28" court="7th Cir." case_name="Sabina U. Weisbrot v. Medical College of Wisconsin">79 F.3d 677, 682 (7th Cir. 1996). The court must determine whether Raymond has supported her arguments with sufficient evidence to establish that Hilliard was lying, in order to determine whether she has succeeded in giving rise to an inference that the City was intentionally retaliating against her when she was not promoted Raymond’s arguments fail because ( l ) her self-serving affidavit is insufficient to support her attempts to rebut l-lilliard’s negative assessment of her qualifications and (2) her other arguments are not supported with any evidence a. Raymond’S Self-Serving Affidavit Raymond’s self-serving affidavit is insufficient to support her attempts to rebut l*lilliard’s negative assessment ofher qualifications lt is established precedent in the Seventh Circuit that a non-moving party cannot defeat a motion for summaryjudgment with a self-serving affidavit devoid of`any factual support in the record A[biero v. Cin omei/cr:/cec, 246 17.3d 927, 933 (7th Cir. 2001 ). Similarly, the Seventh Circuit has held that “an cmployce’s self-serving statements 26 about his ability are insufficient to contradict an employer`s negative assessment of that ability.” (}r.isrovr'cfi v. AT&TCoimnum'cnlions, fric., 972 F.2d 845" date_filed="1992-08-18" court="7th Cir." case_name="Edward Gustovich v. At & T Communications, Inc.">972 F.2d 845, 848 (7th Cir. 1992). Several of Raymond’s arguments that seek to rebut Hilliard’s testimony regarding her abilities arc supported only by her own self-serving affidavit First, Raymond relies upon her affidavit to support her claims that her “vision" ofthe Department is the same as l~lilliard’s and that she is a “team player." Becausc l-lilliard testified that Raymond does not share his “vision” and that she is not a “tcam player,” Raymond must support her claims with evidence other than her self-serving affidavit Ser> (itr.s'!r)i)ic/i, 972 F.Zd at 848. Second, Raymond argues that she was selected to be “training coordinator" because of hcr skills in mentoring and training and that her “cxccptional” job perforn"rancc ratings as “training coordinator” reflect a high level of success in mentoring and training Shc argues that this evidence contradicts Hilliard’s testimony that she had not conducted training or engaged in mcntoring. ln support of these arguments however, Raymond offers only her self-serving affidavit She does not attach her evaluation or any other evidence to prove that her “exceptional” ratings were based upon her skills as a mentor and trainer_ Therefore, although Raymond has established that she holds the position of “training coordinator,” she has not provided a factual basis to support her claims of excellent mentoring and training skills Raymond argues that llilliard’s testimony that she does not possess the "skills and expertise" or the demeanor necessary for captain is contrary to the facts /\s a lieutenant Raymond had been assigned as acting watch commander, the primary duty ofa captain, nearly 27 every other working day. She argues that, because no Department district commander ever criticized her performance as acting watch commander, she possesses the skills and expertise necessary for promotion to captain Shc bases her argument that she possessed the demeanor to interact with other officers and command staff upon her self-described “success” as watch commander. Raymond, however, provides no evidence to support her positive self-assessment, which provides the sole basis for her argument l\/Ieanwhile1 the City submits Department disciplinary records to support its claims that, on two separate occasions, Raymond received criticism for her performance as watch commander. ln the first incidcnt, Assistant Dcputy Supcrintendent Peska criticized Raymond for failing to process a civilian Department employee who had been arrested for driving under the influence According to Peska, Raymond was "confused regarding her responsibilities as the watch commander investigating the situation.” (Def.’s Rcsp. to Pl.’s Statement ofAdd’l l\/Iaterial Facts, Ex. 2().) /\dditionaily, Raymond was reprimanded for being involved in a traffic accident outside the boundaries of her assigned district Rayrnond’s self-serving affidavit is thus insufficient to call into question llilliard’s testimony that Raymond was not qualified for promotion b. Raymond’s Factually Unsupported Assertions The rest of Raymond’s arguments regarding l~lilliard’s credibility are totally without evidentiary support A Titlc \/ll plaintiff cannot defeat summary judgment merely by questioning thc credibility of the decision-maker’s explanation for the adverse employment activity. (}i`miii()poti!os v. Bmc/i & lic)c/r, 109 F.3d 40(), at 41 l (7th Cir. 1997). lnstead, the 28 plaintif`f`i)iuis'lpoi'ul to credence that suggests that the decision-maker did not honestly believe his own explanation [r/. (emphasis added). As discussed below1 Raymond’s arguments regarding Hilliard’s truthfulness lack evidentiary support and are therefore unpersuasive liirst, Raymond argues that lklilliard’s claim that she did not have sufficient operational experience to merit promotion to captain is inconsistent with her record of service with the Department Raymond, howevcr, takes Hilliard’s claim out of the context of the rest of his deposition ln fact, Hilliard acknowledged,just a few lines later in the dcposition, that Raymond had served in administrative and field positions1 as had most of the other candidates for promotion to captain Furtl'icrmore, althouin Raymond has established that she held field positions during her employment with the Department, she has not established that l'lilfiard’s opinion that she had gained insufficient experience in those positions was not honestly-held 'f`hc court is, thereforc, unpersuaded by Raymond’s argument on this point See /)’aren v. C'i!_i-' of Hig/i/(iim.' Pm'/r, No. 97 C 1539, 1998 WL 9017()0, at *4(1\1.1). lll. Dec. 17, 1998) (stating court’s conclusion in an employment discrimination case that plaintiffs reliance upon decision-makcr’s deposition testimony was misplaced because it was taken out of context). /\dditionally1 Raymond argues that the percentages ofminorities promoted to captain by Hilliard contradict Hilliard’s testimony that he did not consider race in making the promotions in support of her arguments, Raymond cites the first four paragraphs of her Local Rulc 5().1 statement 'l`hose paragraphs, however1 are not properly part of this record on summary judgment because they are not supported by citations to any evidence and, thus, do not comply with the local rule. See LOC. R, 5(). 1 (b)(3) (requiring non-moving party to support her statement 29 of additional material facts with references to affidavits or other supporting materials). See also Brasi`c v. Het`nemann ’s, Inc., 121 F.3d 281" date_filed="1997-07-30" court="7th Cir." case_name="Nellie BRASIC, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HEINEMANN’S INC., Bakeries, Defendant-Appellee">121 F.3d 281, 286 (7th Cir. 1997) (affirrning the district eourt’s refusal to consider portions of plaintiffs statement of additional facts that were not supported by specific references to evidence). The court thus disregards this argument as being without factual support The court finds that Rayrnond has not met her burden of bringing forth evidence that creates a disputed issue of material fact regarding Hilliard ’s stated reasons for not promoting her. Several of her claims were supported only by her self-serving affidavit and other claims Were unsupported by any evidence. Because all her arguments were without factual support, they were insufficient to create an inference that Hilliard’s deposition testimony was not credible and that he was trying to cover up discriminatory reasons for not promoting Raymond. See Alexander, 263 F.3d at 683. Accordingly, the court concludes that Raymond has not proven those stated reasons to be pretextual. Therefore, the court grants the City’s motion for summary judgment III. CONCLUSION F or the foregoing reasons, the court grants defendant’s motion for summary judgment Date: EE_B 05 Zggz James H. Alesia United States District Judge 30