Raymond Muzquiz v. City of San Antonio

TUTTLE, Before GODBOLD and MORGAN, Judges: Circuit TUTTLE, Judge: Circuit are Plaintiffs former San po- Antonio and firemen licemen who challenge the operation city’s Firemen’s and Po- Pension Fund. licemen’s The remaining are defendants the Pension Fund Board of Trustees and its members as individu- al defendants. party Pursuant to Article 6243f of Vernon’s Texas Civil Statutes of San Antonio maintains a pen- policemen to which all sion fund obliged are firemen contribute por- tion of their salaries. The pension fund death provides and disability benefits for injured officers in the line duty, and retirement provides benefits. Should an public employment officer leave before eligible he however, benefits, these specifically the Act provides: 'of member either of said “[N]o or of Departments said Fund shall to any ever be entitled refund from said Fund account of the money deducted from amount of their pay money . is in itself public money, to be declared and the property of said Fund for the benefit qualifying of the members for bene- fits, beneficiaries.” 6243f, Article 19. The plaintiffs § filed action seeking this class a refund of jurisdiction, court’s we consider that they contributed while they amounts disposed should of. or firemen in serving policemen were Antonio.1 The Pension Fund Board of Trustees and the named individuals comprising The district granted court defendants’ contend, word, the Board in a that they summary judgment, motion for holding are immune from suit under be- provisions the no-refund of Article they “persons”, cause are not since 6243f were constitutional. performing governmental functions appeal. and that the reasoning by which the Su- Monroe, preme Court in supra, arrived at I. JURISDICTION the decision that the term “every per- son” in 1983 did not comprehend plaintiffs primarily jurisdic assert and, later, city, in Moor v. tion under U.S.C. ju and its Alameda, comprehend did not counterpart county, risdictional 28 U.S.C. requires that actual designated persons 1343.2 Section 1983 provides: § acting governmental as trustees of a who, under color of person “Every agency also be held not to be compre- State, any ... any statute hended within “person” the word in this any citi- . . . subjects statute. ... United States zen of Supreme Neither the Court nor this any rights deprivation Court has thus far limited the scope of laws, by the Constitution secured comprehensive 1983. most § discus- injured in party liable shall sion of the extension of the Monroe and law, equity, or suit in any action principle later Kenosha in this Circuit is for redress.” proceedings proper v. in Adkins Duval Board, School (5th Cir., Court has held that the 511 F.2d 690 1975). In that “person” plaintiff term is used in 1983 case a sued § Duval County municipal corporations, not include does Board in its corporate School capacity. 167, Pape, stated, 365 opinion Monroe 81 S.Ct. as to the issue rele- 473, (1961); 492 City 5 L.Ed.2d of Keno- question vant to the now before us: Bruno, 507, 93 sha things “Two should be noted to the (1973). Relying 37 L.Ed.2d on Keno- argument concerning the far-reaching court sha district dismissed the effect of the district court’s decision. party, Antonio as a San found First, issue not whether jurisdiction would lie school board can be sued. Personal its Pension Fund and individual board jurisdiction of the defendants is not members. questioned. We are confronted Although subject the issue is not by jurisdiction, raised with matter e., i. party, of either briefs the correctness whether a cause of action against a court’s recognizable the trial determination that school board in federal Fund Board of Trustees and its by courts was created Second, 1983. § subject members to suit responsibility our is not to decide Congress under U.S.C. was raised § could or whether should es- parties argument. at oral such a cause action, tablish event, question since touches on the whether a similar cause of action may originally was 1. This suit filed as class action also asserted under 2. The represent purporting Stipulations par- class of all former 1331. The U.S.C. § Houston, Dallas, however, policemen clear, and firemen of El that no class make it ties Antonio; $10,000 the action was severed Paso and amounts to the need- claim member’s separate class actions. Walker v. into four § ed under Houston, (S.D.Tex. F.Supp. properly 1971) action was held to be and each judge. single district considered (S.D.Tex.1971). F.Supp. 1117 legislature Florida has designated jurisprudence, exist under some other governmental entity to be Congress in sued in but whether fact did di- its own name in two instances and cause of action in the rect a name of the governing authority Unlike school boards. constitutional the third does not change decisions, our determination here can charac- ter of the suit, suit. The Congress be corrected itself if it however styled, is against governmental another result. desires subdivision itself in each case. no controlling We can find distinc- board, tion between a Florida school We have recently held that the vari governmental entity, and a Florida ous arms of government, state such as municipality or a Florida county, that Department of Highways, are not suggest Congress would in- ‘persons’ within the meaning of purview clude one within the Tucker, Cheramie v. 587- statute, and not the other two. All (5th Cir.), denied, cert. authority for their three find existence 42 L.Ed.2d 107 in the Florida Constitution. See (1974). F.S. That decision would seem to VIII, A.Const. Art. and 2 §§ logically follow Monroe, Moor, IX, Counties, municipalities Art. and Kenosha. All of those precedents granted and school districts are dealt specifically political subdivi power partici- in the Constitution to state, e., sions of a i. municipalities establishing pate in taxes and tax and counties. If the subdivisions of a respective purposes, rates ‘persons’ state were not under § VII, Art. pow- F.S.A.Const. which § the state itself was obviously not such by their respective gov- er is exercised a ‘person’ therefore, and the entities erning bodies. See F.S.A. 200.011. through § which the state functions provided has legislature each with should be excluded. An analysis of significant governmental power with the approach taken by the Supreme operate respective which to for its pur- in Kenosha Monroe, and and poses. seq. See F.S.A. 125.001 et § expression that Court’s of what (counties); (mu- 165.01 et seq. F.S.A. § legislative views the intent to have nicipalities); F.S.A. 230.01 seq. § et Congress been when passed the Civil (school districts). Rights Act of seems to require the conclusion that § was similar legislative In an exercise of discre- ly not directed at county school legislature tion the Florida has chosen boards.” designate to the school board as a case, In the Adkins the opinion also ‘body corporate’ purposes, for all in- said: “We have recently decided that a cluding institution and defense of suits Texas school district which ‘under Texas involving official action. See F.S.A. law, is in the nature of a municipality’ It has similarly 230.21. chosen § to (emphasis added) is ‘person’ not a as that the governing authority of a mu- term is used in 1983. Sterzing § v. Fort county nicipality generally operate Independent Bend School District, 496 county in the name of the or munici- (5th F.2d 93 n.2 1974)”. Cir. including pality, suing and being sued is, thus, It ‘body corporate’. apparent as a See F.S.A. that our in 125.15, quiry 165.08. Each here is whether gov- of these §§ San Antonio entities, Police district, and Firemen’s ernmental school Pension Board of Trustees county municipality, operate duties, and a can has such pow ers, purposes and entity only through as an as would designat- its make it of governing authority, ed municipality”. so, school “the nature of a If board, county commissioners, and then the Board of Trustees cannot be not, If fact sued under then it city § council. The can.3 course, respect dealing, capacities, question to with the which we are here 3. We itself, opinion. and not with the indi- deal in the later Board of also named their individual who are viduals po- not a just simply is Board “The While determination wheth political nor a subdi- corporation litical Police and Firemen’s er the not have It does of the State. vision “person” Trustees is a Fund Board of sub- political of a the attributes any of meaning ques is a within subdivision con- political A division. law, Pape, Monroe v. tion of federal See area geographical templates: 187-192, supra, elections, public of- boundaries, public must look to state law to the Court general and a ficials, taxing power powers and duties determine The board or benefit. purpose public entity pur created. The purpose .” attributes of these none are of this fund set out above. poses Antonio, pursuant San Vernon’s Civil view of the Tex- Art. 6243f of Statutes to be the seems What an pension fund to which all funds serve pension maintains is as Court obliged They firemen are differ policemen and function. private essentially portion of their salaries. funds as set pension contribute independent from are the unions employers named defendants trustees or labor by other up possesses The Board public of this fund. none are the beneficiaries in that powers governmental just the broad funds could Such employees. controlling in to be Adkins v. with the up we held set been well have Duval School Board. It is not to a or in- contributing bank employees any governmental trustee, responsible broad and in that company as surance function, thereby serving per- in would be function identical case statutory trustees, utilizing public As officials terest. Board without formed responsible only analysis agree, we members the ben With this as trustees. sum, of the trust. while this Board of Trustees eficiaries and conclude provides Art. 6243f that the and is thus municipality” 21 of “like a not obliged pay “person” un- Antonio suit as immune money procured between deficiencies der paid, the Act and benefits under none Further, we believe the individual theless, the Board of Trustees functions subject members of the Board are to suit statutory trustees group as a of rather can under 1983. There be no serious § governmental body; par as a it than that question “persons”; uniquely governmental takes of no re suggested has never been the word to it sponsibilities: administers the meaning whereby have some arcane Although fund. not binding trust on beings “persons” would some human be Court, we think the decision of the Nothing would not. in either but others Appeals Texas Court of Civil in Bolen v. Pape City v. or Bruno v. Monroe of Ke Firemen, of Policemen Board & Fire that suggests special nosha some mean Operators’ Trustees Alarm of San Anto- applied be to the term as it ing should nio, Texas, 904, 905, 308 S.W.2d most Indeed, used in 1983. in both Monroe § the nature clearly states of this Board: Bruno v. Pape City of Kenosha Supreme carefully Court that the noted State, “The Board is not the nor is it jurisdictional immunity enjoyed by the a county, city, any a a town or municipalities the two in the cases was corporation political or subdivision of by the individual party not shared de The Board is simply State. fendants. statutory group trustees charged management

with the of the Pension Pape Supreme In Monroe v. Court Firemen, Funds of the Policemen and Ap- a decision of the Court of reversed Operators City Fire Alarm Circuit which had peals Seventh Antonio.” damages action against an dismissed City Chicago. officers of the police the Bolen said in further The Court affirming against the dismissal case: allege a proper jurisdictional failure to grounds now well-known that upon the basis.” “person” was in to be § word including municipali- as not agree construed 511 F.2d at We with the Kloster, “Accordingly Harper said: we court in ty, the Court (4th 1973) the motion to dismiss the com- Cir. hold that when stated: City Chicago was plaint against Monroe, nevertheless, “In the Court But since the com- properly granted. to applied held that municipal § not have been dismissed plaint should employees officers and when damages judgment officials the against the must sought. were . We see no In Bruno v. City be and is reversed.” give reason to Kenosha wider ap- Kenosha, case in which the suit had plication.” only against the two cities of been filed view, In our the fact that both Sterz- Racine, Wisconsin, seeking Kenosha and ing and United Farmworkers of Florida Housing Project, supra, involved claims Supreme injunction, Court noted an Attorney General of the that state injunctive principally for is an relief ir- as a defendant and re- had intervened distinction. In relevant Kenosha respect case manded the both to specifically rejected and for posture case further the idea that nature of the relief light allegations in consideration sought jurisdiction. can affect complaint that the suit was based nothing legislative “We find in the question jurisidiction federal as well on Monroe, history in discussed in the It was clear as on 1983. thus that the § actually language by Congress, used recognizing right Court was generic suggest ‘person’ word maintain action plaintiff his was intended § bi- attorney general under § application municipal furcated cor- two against the cities involved if he es- porations depending on the nature of jurisdictional tablished the amount re- sought against the relief them.” question jurisdiction federal quired for 513, 93 412 U.S. at S.Ct. at 2226. In our under view, argument this forecloses the Court has specifically This held can be solely our earlier cases limited proceed against actions can injunctive sought cases where relief is defendants, party despite municipal city officers. the ultimate fact that City.” “surely felt United The argument the Supreme Housing Farmworkers Florida Court’s construction of the word “per- Beach, Project, Ray Inc. v. of Del son” created bulwark 799, Florida, (5th 1974); F.2d 493 802 Cir. against any action which might result in making inroads on a city’s financial Sterzing Independent Fort Bend District, 92, 93, (5th n.2 School structure is completely answered, it 1972). In Adkins v. Duval County Cir. us, by seems to the fact the Court Board, seeking a case reinstate School ment, seemed the not least concerned about relief, pay and back we stat whether damages against substantial the ed: police officers the Chicago paid only pockets be out of of the cases us “In all before none officers individual or out of appropri- members of the of the individual three by city ations made government, and no officials of the school boards or by Moreover, insurers. nothing were defendants when the boards clearly could more demonstrate the were dismissed. Had there been fact cases defendants, Supreme that the Court party intended merely whom this language construe the previously ‘per- Court has held comprehending a municipality purposes of 42 rather sons’ for U.S.C. any granting than sort not, 1983, the trial court could blanket immu- or nity county to a a course, by its have dismissed suits for Monroe long-established rule that while decision, than Court’s treatment of generally state action county action parties County in Moor v. of Alame- the Fourteenth purposes for Amendment, da, case supra. In that the Court held county a defendant is not County that the of Alameda was like a necessarily a state defendant pur- municipality and thus not comprehended the Eleventh poses of Amendment.” 1983, within and that the plaintiff section; sue it under could not ever, how- County v. Luning, supra, In Lincoln opinion, in the same the Court held to in the quot- the case referred footnote plaintiff, being above, non-resident ed Court said: California, State adequately al- regard objection, “With first leged diversity jurisdiction and that the may be observed that the it records of County of Alameda was a citizen of the years this court for the last 30 are full of California for diversity pur- State counties; against it of suits and would poses, and could be sued. though by general seem as consent the confusion Some seems to have arisen jurisdiction of the federal courts in such, which have courts not been frequently has become suits established. with interpretation concerned of the Civ- irrespective general of this acqui- But Rights il Acts to the extent escence, jurisdiction of the circuit to have seem assumed that since the Su- beyond question. courts Elev- preme Court—in Monroe—held that a jurisdic- Amendment limits the enth city could not be 1983, sued under § only as to suits tion state. could not be sued at all in a federal by Marshall, Chief Justice It was said district court. Moor v. County of Bank in Osborn v. United [The] [of clearly puts Alameda that matter to rest. 738, States], 9 Wheat. L.Ed. [6 Moreover, a clear answer to those who amendment, ‘the eleventh 204] Jordan, contend that Edelman v. grant- which restrains 651, 1347, U.S. S.Ct. 39 L.Ed.2d 662 by the constitution over suits ed (1974)gives instruction to the states, effect that necessity is of limited holding the Monroe should be expanded in which the to those suits state is a municipalities to cover govern- and other on the record.’ While party mental entities on theory some of sover- was held this statement Court in eign immunity protection under the Ayers, 443, Re case of In Amendment, Eleventh is some 216], S.Ct. L.Ed. to be too [31 Edelman, language in itself. In narrow, footnote yet by juris- that decision the page 94 S.Ct. on page 1358, respect diction was limited said: real, in which the state is a those cases defendant; nominal, and while if not “ . may As be seen from territorially part county is the state, Bd., Griffin’s School [Griffin politically corpo- it is also a yet L.Ed.2d 256] pow- created such ration of Lincoln v. Luning, citation given to it the state. ers as 33 L.Ed. 766 part is a respect it state (1890), county occupy does not remote sense in which only in that position as a for purposes same State town, municipal corpora- or other city, of the Eleventh Amendment. See also part said to be a may be tion County Alameda, v. Moor 693, 411 U.S. Metropolitan Company Railroad state. 1785, 93 S.Ct. 36 L.Ed.2d 596 Columbia, 1, 132 v. District of U.S. 10 (1973). The fact that the county poli- 19, 231.” 33 L.Ed. S.Ct. by the county cies executed officials in case cited Mr. Jus The other subject were Griffin to the commands Rehnquist, writing for the tice Amendment, Fourteenth footnote, above Moor v. in the county was not able to invoke the Alameda, already has County been protection of the Eleventh Amend- on above. It would seem commented ment, is no more than a recognition of

1001 clear, therefore, argument they Similarly their are that none of the consid- hearing sovereign erations of entitled to notice before immunity or Elev- deprived property enth Amendment can be fails. immunity from suit imported should be into a court’s consid- plaintiffs argue also eration toas whether one section of equal protection they were denied inas the civil rights acts is to be construed as civil in An much servants San permitting or denying plaintiff to sue obliged participate tonio were not to in particular governmental minor agency program, and pension the same further or official. police and firemen in small Texas similarly are Art. cities not affected II. CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS plain 6243f. While is true that differently raise were plaintiffs myriad consti- tiffs treated cer challenges pro- employees, no-refund it does tutional tain other Art. 6243f this difference in visions of V.T.C.S. our seem to us that treat merit, view, any way them irrational or a none of and we ment was in equal protection. accordingly Certainly affirm the district court’s violation of class, summary judgment. in grant policemen as a firemen San cannot be as a Antonio considered “sus plaintiffs claim first that the class,” requiring pect scrutiny thus strict refusal of the Pension Fund Board to legislative purposes for the differ refund their contributions constitutes a ence in treatment.5 Nor could the inter taking of property their without compen plaintiffs assert in est their contribu sation, in violation of the Fourteenth though tions to the Pension Fund Amendment. While earlier cases have personal right.6 as some fundamental termed the benefits due from such a classification, suspect or an in Absent governmental pension fund a “bounty” some fringement right, fundamental “privilege,” or a and accordingly refused permissible is deemed if a classification payment grounds order on the have a it is found to “reasonable rela sovereign gratuities could withhold its legitimate governmental tionship” to will,4 rely we do not on this distinction interest. privileges between Rather, rights. and vested legislatures presumed “State view, our in there was no “tak within their have acted constitutional ing” which would require compensation. that, in power despite prac- fact While the contributed to the tice, inequali- their laws result in some Fund, they in turn pro received statutory discrimination ty. A will event tection death disability aside if state of facts not be set far in excess their contributions. This may justify it.” be conceived protection long continued so as they re Maryland, 420, 366 U.S. McGowan v. employed mained police firemen or 1101, 1105, 425-26, 6 81 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. They men. thus enjoyed benefits of (1961). 393 during contributions their term of employment, and compensation no other policemen Antonio is due them. pen- in a different participate firemen Protection, opments Equal See, Reis, 464, 82 g., Pennie 10 e. v. Law — 1065, (1969). Harv.L.Rev. 1124-27 149, (1889); Goodwin, In Re L.Ed. 426 S.Ct. 33 (6th 1932); MacLeod v. Fer 57 F.2d 31 Cir. Among rights voting, fundamental are: such nandez, (1st 1938); Morgan F.2d 101 20 Cir. v. Blumstein, 330, 995, Dunn 405 92 v. U.S. S.Ct. States, (5th 1941); United 115 F.2d 426 Cir. travel, (1972); Shapiro 31 L.Ed.2d 274 v. States, Rafferty (3d United 210 F.2d 934 v. Cir. 618, Thompson, States, 1954); Anderson United Wade, (1969); privacy, L.Ed.2d 600 Roe v. Jones, 1953); (9th Stouper U.S. Cir. (1973); (1960). App.D.C. 284 F.2d 240 course, and, Alabama, speech, Mills v. (1966). 86 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d properly court dismissed such an 5. The district generally Devel- argument “absurd.” See compelling state demonstrate than program city employees; sion statutory scheme.8 its interest for they eligible substantially great- in the event er benefits of death or dis- argue Finally plaintiffs ability. city employees Other contribute 6243f of Art. provisions no-refund salary, their are eligible less of for re- guaran constitutionally their affected funds, participate Security, in Social and constitute to travel also right teed enjoy far fewer benefits. Given the na- argument Neither attainder. bill policemen ture of the work of and fire- Certainly plaintiffs any substance. men, this difference in treatment seems they refunds because not denied were eminently reasonable. The Texas Su- they lost their contri travel: wished preme previously Court has construed they resigned pub their because butions pension provisions 6243f, finding attainder is a A bill of employment. lic special treatment of po- firemen and with inflicting penalty act legislative licemen to be based on the hazardous Cummings v. trial. State judicial out quality of their work. Firemen’s and Missouri, Wall. L.Ed. Policemen’s Civil Service Commission v. here, was exacted penalty (1866). No Wells, 157 Tex. 306 S.W.2d were plaintiffs we have found for (1957). We find the state supreme which property deprived not court’s construction of legislative a claim. purpose for the statute convincing. sum, plaintiffs entered into in treatment Similarly the difference employment had as one of and firemen in policemen between mandatory contributions to its conditions cities7 from those in smaller cities larger Police and Antonio Firemen’s the San legis on the basis of the justified be can Fund; Art. 6243f became its differing haz perception lature’s of their contracts of an element terms of the work. ards provisions The no-refund employment. and, are reasonable in our Art. 6243f larger firemen in cities Policemen and view, constitutional. portion of a more substantial contribute Affirmed. eligible and are for far earnings, their rea- The defendants benefits. greater GODBOLD, (dissenting Circuit provi- that the sonably argue no-refund part). the state to maintain the enable sions agree that this 1983 suit can I do benefits, thereby attracting and level the Board of maintained While the retaining qualified officers. Fund, is, of the Pension to have conceded the appear entity agency. Nor Board as an rationality pension statutory fiscal jurisdiction un- that there is agree I argue Dandridge v. Wil- do scheme, they against the individual mem- der liams, Board for relief other that a state’s bers (1970) held injunctive. declaratory and than cannot be of its affairs protection fiscal only jurisdic- hold that federal such a statute. The justify dis- used to the individual Trustees of tion is over Dandridge found in- properly trict court pur- and then Pension Fund involved fundamental as it applicable, injunctive declaratory re- poses requirement the resultant rights language mined from the of the Act as well as 6243j no-re- contain the same does not 7. Art. legislative history. plaintiff’s interrog- popula- its applies provisions, to cities of fund atory legislative purpose 400,000. as to 150,000 called for a le- between tion gal not a factual conclusion. At the time the plaintiffs also contend that the district district court ruled on the 8. The defendants’ motion discovery summary improperly plaintiffs’ closed before de- and the court interrogatories partial summary judgment as to answered cross-motion for fendants provisions. liability, purpose for the no-refund no material issue of fact remained dis- legislative puted. is deter- behind a statute intent jurisdiction of imposition In the exercise that (5) lief. of a constructive the of entry judgment direct I would “on the amount of in money trust the the (against only members) FIREMEN AND defendant POLICE- declaring plaintiffs are not OF entitled PENSION FUND AN- MEN’S TONIO, SAN holding their prayer belongs to relief which to Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs, injunction properly was equal present for an denied. val- Class extent, more, agree money no To that of all the withheld the De- ue opinion 69; 73). Tuttle’s on (A. the mer- see also A. fendants.” its. complaint, XVI the (6) Section of beginning, “Restitution,” (at

In the necessary 70), is A. to entitled these identify correctly who the requested: of relief were defendants forms what the relief is are and that is asked. request this Court for Plaintiffs named in the caption The defendants of injunction mandatory compelling the the complaint are of San Anto give accounting Defendants an of nio, Board of Trustees the Pension the Plaintiffs’ and Class all Plaintiffs’ Fund, and “the members of Board, said and to contributions refund in individually and their capacity as present amount or value of said contri- of said Board.”1 members The District plus value the money butions dismissed the against action earned Defendants on said body In the city. complaint the alternatively funds and/or a reasona- at plaintiffs refer times to the Pension interest, just and/or ble rate of for as a defendant. Fund This ambiguity compensation Plaintiffs for the un- no substantive makes difference since plus taking, attorney’s constitutional this purposes for case the collective and costs. fees Board Trustees of the Fund and the (7) plaintiffs request Elsewhere “a sin- itself are same arm agency or liquid judgment” fund gle for amounts city.2 contributed, money wrongfully earned Judge Tuttle describes this case as an thereon, attorney costs and fees and any seeking a refund” of “action amounts legal or equitable other relief to the Pension Fund. contributed I have (A. 70). just court deems deference, say, with this an is (8) plaintiffs And elsewhere ask for a description. complaint incorrect it- justly compensating them for suit to be much self shows more than damage injury” or “special under each Plaintiffs claimed to be that. entitled to alleged of their five causes of one action. following: at least alleged “special damages” include A(1) declaration that the Texas stat- compensation taking for “just of Plain- 6243f, ute, (A. Article unconstitutional private prop- and Class Plaintiffs’ tiffs’ 61, 74). use,” and also' public for such sums erty (2) injunction An against the enforce- present value money as will (A. 74). of that statute ment compensate and make justly accounting, whole, (3) restitution, considering “An that some con- them dam- general special, both were made in 1930’s and ages, tributions and/or cent dollars” just compensation taking “100 and are now 1940’s Class dollars,” “19 private property repaid in cent and to Plaintiffs’ to be 61; (A. 75). money see also A. the value amounts of use.” include 72— defendants contributions earned (4) “Damages and/or refunds 72-75). (A. above-styled Fund and/or Antonio, First, over as to the Board ego (A. alter said Pension Fund.” Pension Fund—the 62). entity. Pape, Monroe v. governmental below, However, persons ambiguity serving discussed this 1. Seven named this theory plus helps lay capacity John Does as well. bare erroneous is a suit individuals. mere 1004 473, exception, 492 Tuttle es 167, 5 L.Ed.2d 81 S.Ct. roe-Kenosha U.S.

365 Bruno, developed sentially ignores v. area of City of Kenosha and (1961), 2222, upon phrase He centers 507, 37 L.Ed.2d law. 93 S.Ct. federal 412 municipality” used in dealt with the im nature of specifically “in the (1973), 109 Sterzing Independent v. Fort Bend of Chi municipalities, munity of District, (CA5, 1974), Similarly 496 F.2d 92 City of Kenosha. and the cago School v. to a Texas school district. respect was involved in Moor municipality is, course, Alameda, 693, of not a 411 93 means of phrase County of That of a 1785, (1973), where but a statement conclusion. analysis L.Ed.2d 596 36 S.Ct. a decision in this case that Court held counties reach Supreme To of the Pension immunity. the same of Trustees protected Board were municipality” nature of a underlying grant of “in the rationale however, opinion points been ex out immunity, majority held to governmental variety governmental powers of lacks broad a wide Board tend to enough. This is not It Courts have indi The Circuit and functions. entities. immunity governmental entity, extends such if true cated states,3 departments city, possesses gov or broad agencies a state counties,5 state,4 agencies agencies powers functions it falls ernmental municipal of cities6 the Monroe-Kenosha departments and various within exemption. But entities.7 such char governmental corporation In deter acteristics, though bring the Board of sufficient an mining whether Trustees of Monroe-Kenosha, falls within are not entity Pension Fund the Mon within 2051, 837, Tucker, 44 See, grds., 95 S.Ct. g., v. 493 F.2d 586 421 U.S. on other e. Cheramie 3. 868, 126, (1975) (state housing denied, finance (CA5), 621 419 U.S. 95 S.Ct. cert. (1974); agency). U. S. ex rel. Gittle 107 42 L.Ed.2d County Philadelphia, F.2d 84 413 macker v. See, g., United Farmworkers of e. Florida 5. denied, 1046, 1969), (CA3, cert. 396 U.S. 90 Beach, City Delray Housing Project, Inc. v. 696, (1970); 24 L.Ed.2d 691 U. S. ex rel. S.Ct. (CA5, 1974) Fla., (county 799 area 493 F.2d Illinois, (CA7, 1965); F.2d 120 Willi 343 Lee v. McCorkle, board); Robinson v. planning 462 California, (CA9, 1965). 352 F.2d 474 v. ford denied, 1042, (CA3), cert. 409 U.S. 93 F.2d 111 See, Tucker, 529, (1972) (county g., hospi 4. e. v. 493 F.2d 586 L.Ed.2d 492 Cheramie 34 S.Ct. denied, 868, 126, (CA5), tal). 419 U.S. 95 S.Ct. cert. (1974) (state department of 107 42 L.Ed.2d See, City Hamtramck, g., v. e. Garrett 503 highways); United Farmworkers of Florida (CA6, 1974) (city planning 1236 F.2d commis Beach, City Delray Project, Housing v. Inc. sion); Hathaway City Hospital, v. Worcester 1974) (CA5, (state depart Fla., F.2d 799 493 (CA1, 1973) (city hospital); 475 F.2d 701 Leh control); Sykes California, pollution v. ment of Pittsburgh, (CA3, 474 F.2d man v. 21 (CA9, 1974) (state department of F.2d 197 497 1973) (city commission); civil service Hen vehicles); Dept. State Burris v. of Pub motor Department, Police v. Worcester schel 445 Carolina, (CA4, 491 F.2d 762 of So. Welfare lic 1971) (city (CA1, police department); F.2d 624 department public welfare); (state 1974) S., (CA8, 1971) (city 439 F.2d 1118 Davis v. U. Everette, (CA3, 1973), 516 489 F.2d v. Curtis public welfare); department of U. S. ex rel. denied, 94 416 U.S. 40 cert. Philadelphia, v. 413 Gittlemacker (state (1974) bureau of correc 774 L.Ed.2d tions); 1969), denied, (CA3, cert. F.2d 84 396 U.S. Court, Supreme Coopersmith v. State (1970) (city 24 L.Ed.2d 90 S.Ct. Colorado, (CA10, 1972) (state 465 F.2d 993 Illinois, hospital); U. S. ex rel. Lee v. 343 F.2d court, court, appeals, supreme court of district 1965) (city police department). (CA7, association); Mangum, Avins v. bar state See, Metropolitan g., 1971) (state university); e. Jorden (CA2, Utilities Zuck F.2d District, (CA8, 1974) (utilities Division, 498 F.2d Depart dis- Appellate Second erman v. gas, services). providing York, water and sewer trict ment, of State of New Wright Ass’n, Compare v. Arkansas 1970) Activities (CA2, (New Appellate York 421 F.2d (CA8, 1974), where it was held Wyman, 501 F.2d Division); 414 F.2d 170 Rosado regulatory agency sup- gnds., that “a established and 1969), (CA2, rev’d on other systems ported by school (1970) (state local the State on 25 L.Ed.2d 442 voluntary basis” which “was not created services); department v. Wash of social Clark by any statute of (CA9, 1966) (state the Constitution the State bar ington, 366 F.2d Community was not immune from a of Arkansas” association). see Forman v. But Services, Inc., (CA2, 1974), action. rev’d necessary to its being obviously within Antonio is “person,” that ex not a emption. Entities do not possess Board of Trustees of the Pension Fund, governmental powers broad through and func entity an which that city can, do, and frequently functions, tions fall within should excluded from the the Monroe-Kenosha exemption.8 “person.” term involving cases entities lacking such There is a close connection between functions, powers and deciding the fac City the of Antonio and the San the tor is not characteristics of the enti Board of Fund and the Trustees thereof. ty in isolation viewed but rather pur the The Board of Trustees consists of the poses status of the entity revealed Antonio, mayor aldermen, of two San of by analysis its relationship to the councilmen or commissioners of San An- larger governmental body with which it tonio, two active San Antonio firemen The inquiry is connected. in such a case policemen. and two active San Antonio becomes whether the body is so 6243f, Vernon’s Ann.Civ.St. art. 2.§ Be- administratively, functional connected— ly, fiscally, 1, 1963, ginning August City the of San in other ways a—to required pay Antonio was into the state, county city that it is not suable money $30,- Fund sums of (varying from 1983, not under because of § its charac $40,000 per month) 000 to until “the an independent teristics as entity but be city Board notifies Fund is cause it is effect an arm or agency of actuarially sound.” Vernon’s Ann.Civ.St. state, city or county. 6243f, 4. The city pays art. in an § recently matching

This court reviewed the ra amount the sums deducted tionale of Monroe-Kenosha and the of legis police- from the salaries firemen and history of lative 1983 on art. 6243f, § which men. Vernon’s Ann.Civ.St. those based and city cases are concluded 4. In addition contributes § much all of groups entities parking wider than sums collected from simply mu meters. nicipalities 6243f, outside the “person” term Vernon’s Ann.Civ.St. art. 16. § therefore, and, are not suable city additionally under authorized to money 1983. Adkins v. Duval County contribute the Fund from § Board, School oth- (CA5, F.2d 1975).9 511 690 sources. Vernon’s In er Ann.Civ.St. art. decisions, reviewing prior 6243f, our we 16. The Treasurer of San noted Anto- municipalities, designated counties and specifically nio is to be the states within certainly Fund, fall Treasurer of the collecting Monroe-Kenosha all Furthermore, immunity. and, since money paid into on the obviously monthly “state itself . basis Board, written list from [is] of ., . ‘person’ the entities out through paying benefits. Vernon’s state 6243f, which the functions should be 6. Any ex Ann.Civ.St. art. de- §§ 511 F.2d at cluded.” 693. ficiency the money procured Consistent between analysis, with this since City of the Fund and amount of the pay- See, Sykes California, Comment, g., Suing v. e. 1974) (state department 497 F.2d 197 9. See Public Entities Under (CA9, Rights of Pape motor vehi Act: Monroe the Federal Civil cles); Reconsidered, Housing United Farmworkers of Florida 43 U.Colorado L.Rev. 111 Beach, Project, Delray Fla., (1971): Inc. v. suggested 493 even been that the “[I]t 1974) (state department (CA5, cities, pol holding apply F.2d 799 in Monroe should control); Everette, However, parishes. lution Curtis v. attempt F.2d counties and 1973), (CA3, denied, distinguish cert. rationally Monroe cannot be (1974) (state 40 L.Ed.2d 774 supported bureau within the framework of that case. corrections); Pittsburgh, legisla- Lehman v. The Monroe decision was based (CA3, 1973) (city history Rights 474 F.2d 21 civil service the Civil Act tive commission); reasoning U. ex require S. rel. Gittlemacker and the Philadelphia, (CA3, type F.2d gov- no matter the same result what denied, 1969), entity being cert. was ernmental sued.” (1970) (city hospital). For oth 3-7, supra. examples see er footnotes its liability law civil question made of the Fund is eral un- paid by merits out v. Metropolitan Jorden City of der 1983.” San Antonio. Vernon’s Ann. District, (CA8, 6243f, art. F.2d Utilities Civ.St. “private” 1974). “pub- The term [versus The extent of this administrative, aby device accomplishes semantical lic”] and fiscal functional interrelation com- importation. same essentially the pels conclusion Board of upon language relies Tuttle the Pension Fund is in es- city. a Texas decision.10 an arm of the This de sence drawn cision, non-mu- with Texas constitu nicipal character of the concerned Board of Trus- tees, provisions types restrict the by the tional majority discovered on this that can be made was neither revealed of investments appeal, by nor cities, counties, state, and other towns claimed below. To the subdivisions, corporations contrary, plaintiffs in their complaint political de- policy of state as the considerations ego scribed alter involved (A. 61, largely 62). precedent unrelated to the They also and alleged Fund that us. Federal courts must “operates question the Pension Fund for before the ben- decisions, upon of and the their own based efit under direction make law, govern the status (A. 66) of City of San Antonio.” federal (emphasis “person” as a added). agency In the under face the mental revealed facts claims, cling Unless we to the plaintiffs’ and to view U.S.C. the Board in Monroe independent, the non-governmental as an rudder of en- Kenosha, we will find ourselves lost tity purposes for and overlooks the court a sea of state decisions conclud interrelationship between Fund in and that various entities are or are ing and does violence to the concept of mu- “governmental entities” nicipal corporation purposes immunity not discussed in state particular Monroe and Kenosha. This of some constitutional is say not to every public statutory provision. State court deci entity that performing some us in larger may guide understanding, that a as function and sions gov- related matter, purposes, the functions entity might perform ernmental a factual enjoys entity question. in immunity. Monroe-Kenosha and status Necessarily court, resolving legal the is body of federal law must this But develop on a basis, case-by-case and, indeed, immunity, must sue of Monroe-Kenosha proc- that already ess is well direction multitudinous way. under take See foot- law, above,11 3-8, cited supra. body damage actions brought in order to hold actually by is ruse which person- claim personally liable for officers maladminis over the state jurisdiction sought al is to of positions. See, or abuse their tration exercised.” Keckeisen Independent be Strickland, - -, Wood g., e. 612, 1062, District School 992, (1975); 43 L.Ed.2d 214 Mon S.Ct. 1975) (emphasis added). (CA8, Such a 167, Pape, 187, 365 U.S. roe v. us today. is before ruse kind of (1961). L.Ed.2d Although public repre- on the fisc that attack is jurisdiction court has a federal to hear by Warner and sented case claims, appear such none to be raised in at the core of what was discussed strikes complaint before us. the The Trustees’ and Moor v. in Monroe of Alame- purely here is presence nominal.14 of da, supra. Both those decisions traced In Warner v. Board of history of the legislative Rights of the Civil the Pension Fund Police of the City compelling of New and found Act indications Orleans, 74-2303, No. a companion did “Congress not intend . case that before this pending panel, plaintiffs impose liability on vicarious munici- to substantive of raised claims like for violations federal civil palities those in they the instant employees.” Moor, their case, supra, rights eschewed n.27, “individual liability” charade at 710 93 S.Ct. at Trus- 411 met head-on tees and the 610 n.27. situation at as L.Ed.2d Tuttle’s really They existed. explicitly trivializes those stated decisions. Sure- opinion they that did not desire a judgment represent and Moor Monroe more than ly Board against pleading members as city individuals of artful a rule —name and had no intent that the and one Board mem- is barred from ac- as defendant fact, complaint prede- specifi- In is what that there been numerous obvious cally present asks. for whose acts trustees cessor Board not held could re- members out, already pointed 13. As some of the claimed sponsible. specifically asked is relief itself, and the Fund is described as a Warner also sought in a dec “defendant.” constitutionality as to laration stat here, There, as example, ute. exists period relief is 14. For claimed for a enter such declaration. extending back to the 1930’s. It is of time (1973), reject- L.Ed.2d 315 treasury; name public cess ed this: through defendants officials public them condemn pay- that these pretended It is not funds. personal from the come are to ments Appel- appellants. these resources the far-reach- gloss over majority contemplate expressly lees by noting of their action implications ing ex- rather, involve substantial will, not “the Court seemed Monroe in funds of penditures about whether sub- concerned the least state. offi- damages against police stantial Chicago would be City of cers thing is one to tell the Commis- It pockets of the indi- only out paid of Social Services he must sioner appropriations or out officers vidual the federal comply standards for city government, or by the made the state is to future if have the agree cases insurers.” pro- federal funds in the benefit abuse of his au- an individual’s where It quite he administers. an- grams deci- alleged municipality’s thority is thing to order Commissioner indemnify employees insure its sion reparation to make use state funds that does not concern us. question is a past. appear The latter would part could be viewed as payments Such to fall afoul of the to us Eleventh city pays for its consideration if that basic constitution- Amendment pay at- We services. officers’ is to be conceived of provision al on the offi- passing to them tention Id., any present force. at 236- having liability, just as we would personal cers’ omitted). (footnotes whether the offi- not consider ordinarily 94 S.Ct. at liability his own insur- taken out had cial If interpreta at 673-674. present a case like the policy. ance one, set forth in Monroe and tion however, question who it is “is to be conceived of as having Moor crucial, ultimately pay will intended force,” then the any present fiction possibility that a it raises because present case adopted in the must be re Congress bar intended to jurisdictional Edelman was an jected. Since Eleventh There quite be evaded. is will erect present and our case inquiry Amendment payment by city between difference statutory, I make no contention that voluntarily as a undertaken form “expands” Monroe.16 Edelman What it reasons, or for other compensation, to remind us that damage do is does involuntary payment by city against to be purporting officers suits in the nature of the is inherent reality against in be suits may claim. plaintiffs’ that, itself when government this is in Edelman v. Jor Supreme Court The put on so, do not blinders to courts avoid 651, 1347, 94 dan, S.Ct. 39 415 U.S. apparent. seeing what is (1974), was faced with an 662 L.Ed.2d out, Judge points to the one undertaken in As Tuttle similar we and effort courts, post-Kenosha, In Edelman plaintiffs case. present held alia, proceed to obtain welfare 1983 actions can sought, against inter ben that § parties withheld officers as wrongfully State individual efits defendant relief, despite escape injunctive To the state’s Elev Illinois. fact defense, the ultimate would Amendment “sure enth City.” ly be felt United Farm state officials as de named Court, Housing Project, Florida quoting Inc., workers of fendants. See, g., Chambers, e. Gresham v. Wyman, supra. v. 467 F.2d 226 Rothstein from denied, 921, (CA2, 1974); F.2d 687 1972), Harper cert. 411 93 501 v. (CA2, scope majority issue before us is the agree § mu- 1983 that neither with the jurisdictional counterpart, wholly and its im- 28 U.S.C. nicipalities officers are nor their 1343(3). damages § in federal courts. suits for mune from

1009 (CA4, 1973);17 what claims for relief Kloster, F.2d 1134 should 486 be treated Jacksonville, analytically as distinct from claims Cason Wilson, against 1973); municipality, Bramlet (CA5, what rejected claims should be 1974); Ybarra v. (CA8, as subterfuges F.2d Hills, that contravene the 503 F.2d 250 exemption Altos Los of 1974). Town Edelman v. Jor 1983 announced also Monroe ? See (CA9, 675, at at S.Ct. 415 U.S. dan, supra, It appear that the courts’ will (dictum). 679-80 at 1361, ingness to take in in not, however, foreclose does Kenosha junction suits officers has between these distinctions all any and stemmed from the well-established fic for such mone suits and suits injunction parte Young, tion of Ex 123, refunds. In Keno pension relief tary 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908). Under said: the Court sha doctrine, a state official who seeks legislative in the nothing We find to enforce an unconstitutional act is to Monroe, or in the history discussed “stripped that extent of his official or by Congress, actually used language representative character and is subjected generic “per- word suggest person consequence in his of his intended to have 1983was in § son” individual conduct.” Id. at 28 S.Ct. municipal application bifurcated at 52 L.Ed. at The case stands depending on the nature corporations as a familiar cornerstone of our legal sought against relief' them. system, and one readily can understand Monroe, Since, held in as the Court why the courts in cases have had undertake to “Congress bring did not no about qualms distinguishing between within the am- corporations municipal city and its officials in the injunction . are out- bit of” § context. Ybarra v. City See of Town of purposes equi- ambit for of its side Hills, supra, Los Altos at 252-53. At the damages. well as for table relief time, although same these courts have broadly sometimes stated that named at at city may officials be sued under § (citations omitted). Man- L.Ed.2d ifestly, points Tuttle to no decision sus terms, by its mere- language, taining an award from municipal funds based on the re- distinctions ly precludes means of a suit municipal “municipal corpora- when sought lief officers.18 problem the defendants. tions” when a complaint us is different: The distinction between an injunction before defendant, as the official against city officials and one against names Harper officials, Tuttle’s reliance on however, is nosha. The named school mis- Harper plaintiffs placed. sought proper declar- were found to be defendants. Al- atory injunctive only. though per opinion attempt relief No curiam is somewhat ambiguous, was made in that the conclusion case to is proper may funds. as to the obtain named officials well have only remedy referred of reinstatement Sterzing Independent v. Fort Bend School to be considered on equitable remand. Such District, (CA5, 1974), 496 F.2d 92 involved a non-monetary against relief officials is of by a school 1983 action teacher obtain permissible. course The citation Sterzing, damages and reinstatement after he had been 93, n.2, 496 F.2d at to United Farm Workers of discharged teaching wrongfully posi- his from Housing Project, supra, supports Florida juris- rights. his in violation of constitutional tion only diction to this extent. Insofar as the de- damages awarded The District Court de- may permit cision monetary award of appeal On nied reinstatement. court held damages, appear it would money had District denied reinstate- pockets would have had come from the improper reasons and ment for therefore the individual defendants rather than the “fully remand should recon- District Court expresses The district. decision ap- school no remedy. appropriate This court fur- sider” proval employing the defendant officials as the defendant Texas school held that dis- ther tools to reach school into the district fisc. trict, municipali- “in the nature of a is ty,” suit under from was immune Monroe-Ke- commonplace and some ais city itself consequences. real-life may have

times mean, example, that the re for may It will not against one official granted lief United See Farm successor. his bind Inc., Housing Project, of Florida workers n.3; Mayor cf. at 802 supra, Equality v. Educational

Philadelphia 605, 622, 94 S.Ct. 415 U.S. League, (1974); Spomer 1334, L.Ed.2d Littleton, (1974). The drawn line majority unprecedent nothing device and

ed; pleading ais it the Pension

more, inasmuch are nominal defendants

Trustees recovery assets a is not personal whose contemplated.

seriously against the Board Trus- action The Fund, Board, as a tees Sherby, Legal James W. Aid Soci- The action be dismissed. should Louis, Mo., ety, appellant. for St. of that Board members the individual Hamilton, Jean C. Atty., Asst. U. S. insofar as seeks be dismissed should Louis, Mo., appellee. for St. The action monetary relief. declaratory for OOSTERHOUT, Before VAN Senior relief, however, is maintaina- ROSS, injunctive Judge, Circuit BRIGHT and Cir- relief, to that respect reach Judges. With cuit ble. and concur Part II of the merits PER CURIAM. opinion. Judge Tuttle’s appeal judg- is an from the final This (Judge

ment district court Har- sustaining the motion of the per) Secre- tary summary judgment affirming Secretary’s plain- final decision that requirements met the has not tiff Brown disability benefits. trial court in opinion, published at a well-reasoned (E.D.Mo.1974), F.Supp. has demon- BROWN, Jr., Appellant, Arthur O. plaintiff that the had a full and strated evidentiary hearing at fair the adminis- level, Secretary’s and that the trative de- Caspar WEINBERGER, Secretary of plaintiff termination not entitled Health, Education and disability supported benefits is sub- Welfare, Appellee. evidence. stantial No. 74-1955. affirmed of dismissal is Appeals, United States Court of Judge Harper’s basis upon report- Eighth Circuit. opinion. ed Sept. 8, Submitted Sept.

Decided notes of federal precise question. No has addressed The majority describe the function of court, well respected, however can state as “essentially private,” the Fund point- body of law federal that override ing out what it does could be as respect to with guides us performed well non-governmental agency such a bank or an insurance Second, to the majority’s theory I turn company. This is a dubious distinction jurisdiction is over the indi- there best, since many at functions actually Board of vidual members Trustees performed by garbage collection cities— types of sought. to all relief respect operation hospitals, and for example— grant is believe there to I be, are, and at can times contracted out declaratory and injunctive relief non-governmental agencies or left to no more but than that. the Trustees private sector. The Eighth Circuit recently “import declined to the of- Obviously “persons” the Trustees are ten nebulous distinction they between beings. are in the sense human proprietary governmental drawing functions But before conclusions municipal corporation of a into suit, the fed- amenability the Trustees’ about Firemen, Texas, nio, (Tex.Civ.App., & v. Board of Policemen 308 S.W.2d 904 10. Bolen (Writ Ref.) Operators’ 1957) San Anto- Fire Alarm 3-8, supra. 11. See footnotes personal ever suffer really consider what is ber defendants lia should one Rather, said, litigation. Upon piercing bility. they in this desired a stake really there is no veil— that would force judgment veil—indeed Board plaintiffs what the serve easy perceive as conduits for it is members an seeking accounting, mind. In claims processing paid be have refunds, restitution, damages for wrong pension out fund and from no taking, imposition of a construc source. District Judge ful in that trust, plaintiffs striking directly just tive treated suit as was, case what it pocket of Pension It the only for the Fund. in which claim against one apparent, example, that perfectly capacities is in their official trustees was a trust is sought to be prayer the constructive for a declaration that would have on a fund in requiring imposed the effect of the Board to and bank pockets accounts the indi refunds.15 The instant plaintiffs make Trustees, but upon vidual the assets of made no such have er, affirmative disclaim Fund.12 the Pension target minimum that unmistakable. want in this case judgment need read the complaint. One enforceable assets of the agree Eighth with the Circuit’s through medium a statement recent “individuals and naming judgment debtors color, acting under associations of state Board of the members Trustees.13 are not immune to law sanctions of is quite case different from This those Acts Rights may sued, Civil in which plaintiffs situations unless is clear court that the

Case Details

Case Name: Raymond Muzquiz v. City of San Antonio

Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Date Published: Oct 8, 1975

Citation: 520 F.2d 993

Docket Number: 74-3177

Court Abbreviation: 5th Cir.