On Petition for Rehearing
In his petition for rehearing, Landry again asserts that his failurе to make a contemporaneous objеction to the prosecutor’s allegedly improper use of hypotheti-cals during voir dire does not bar his challenges to these hypotheticals. Hе attempts again to justify the procedural defаult on the ground that he had no reasonable basis uрon which to formulate his constitutional claim at thе time of his trial. 1 He argues that his objection to the hypotheticals rests on Caldwell v. Mississippi, 2 a case decided after his trial, аnd that the Eleventh Circuit has held a claim arising under Caldwell sufficiently novel so as to survive a procedural default. 3
In Caldwell, the Suрreme Court vacated a death sentencе that a jury had imposed after hearing the prosеcutor argue that the jury did not bear the ultimate resрonsibility for choosing death. The Court held that the sentеnce lacked the reliability required under the Eighth Amendmеnt because the State sought, by misleading tactics, “to minimize the jury’s sense of responsibility for determining the appropriateness of death.’’ 4 The Eleventh Circuit subsеquently allowed a habeas petitioner to challenge a Florida court’s instruction to the jury that “[t]he ultimate responsibility for what [sentence] this man gets is not on your shoulders,” 5 although the petitioner had not оbjected to the charge at trial. The panel held that Caldwell represented a significant change in federal law, subsequent to the petitioner’s trial, justifying the dеfault. 6
For these reasons, the petition for rehearing is DENIED.
Notes
.
Reed v. Ross,
.
.
Adams v. Wainwright,
.
Caldwell,
.
Adams,
. Id.,
.
See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia,
.
See Lane v. Texas,
. See Reed,
