When this case was first before us, judgment for the plaintiff was reversed, by a divided court, on a ground which rendered unnecessary decision of an alleged error in the admission of evidence of prior accidents.
1
Our judgment was reversed by the Supreme Court,
The prior accidents, nine in number, were listed in defendant’s answer to plaintiff’s 27th interrogatory. Each accident was described merely as a collision between a train and a motor vehicle at substantially the same place where plaintiff was injured, i. e., near the intersection of Forbes Avenue and Waterfront Avenue. The collisions occurred during a period from January 4, 1946 to February 9, 1953. In none of them does it appear that any railroad employee or other person sustained injuries. The defendant argues that since these collisions were not shown to have been caused in a manner similar to the plaintiff’s accident they were not relevant. The list of them was admitted for the sole purpose of supporting the plaintiff’s claim that the Railroad knew or reasonably ought to have known that the particular location was an unsafe place to put him to work because of his inexperience and the claimed inadequacy of instructions given him as to his duties. For this limited purpose we think the list of prior accidents was admissible. District of Columbia v. Arms,
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
. Cahill v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R. Co., 2 Cir.,
