93 Ct. Cl. 698 | Ct. Cl. | 1941
delivered the opinion of the court:
The defendant, being in occupation as lessee of plaintiff’s premises in Newark, N. J., as quarters for its United States
The lease was then drawn on the defendant’s standard lease form and it contained, after the definite six months term to December 31, 1934, the paragraph, which is quoted in finding 8, relating to the right to renew the lease. The statement that the lease was renewable “from month to month” by the defendant must have, in the circumstances, meant that the notice incident to a tenancy from month to month was contemplated. The language is susceptible of that meaning, Hanks v. Workmaster, 75 N. J. L. 73; Decker v. Hartshorne, 65 N. J. L. 87, and if it does not receive it, an important term of the lease, suggested first by the defendant, later requested by plaintiff, and agreed to by the defendant just before the lease was executed, was inexplicably aban
April 30, 1935, the date of the termination of the lease, passed, and the defendant did not move then, nor until March 31, 1936. It paid the rent as before, which was received without comment. On March 31, 1936, the defendant moved from the premises without giving notice in advance. Plaintiff, claiming that it was entitled to thirty days’ notice, sues for the rent for the month of April 1936.
The defendant urges that its remaining in the premises after April 30,1935, and paying rent which was received by plaintiff without comment extended the previous lease, under which the defendant urges it was not obliged to give any notice. Plaintiff contends that, under the previous lease, it was entitled to notice and was similarly entitled under an extension of the lease. Plaintiff further contends that, whether or not it was entitled to notice under the previous lease, the defendant became a hold-over tenant after April 30, 1935, and as such was obliged to give a month’s notice before it could escape liability for rent. The defendant’s reply to the latter contention is that, conceding that a private tenant holding over would be so obligated, the obligation is one imposed by law rather than by contract, hence the defendant, in the statute prescribing the jurisdiction of this court, U. S. Code, Tit. 28, sec. 250, has not consented to be sued upon it.
We agree with the defendant that its obligation after April 30, 1935, was the same as before. However, as we have indicated above, we think that its obligation before that date was to give thirty days’ notice. We also think that the defendant’s obligation after April 30 was contractual within the meaning of our jurisdictional act. If one person occupies the property of another for a period under an express agreement as to the terms of his occupancy, and, after the end of the period he continues to occupy without any indication that he contemplates a change in terms, and
The question of whether a hold-over tenant, under other circumstances, could be sued in this court becomes, then, immaterial, and a case such as that of Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 287 (62 C. Cls. 270; 66 C. Cls. 764), where the defendant at the beginning of the hold-over period expressly repudiated the obligation which the plaintiif there contended it had become subject to, is not in point.
We conclude that - plaintiff is entitled to recover $1,500. It is so ordered.