Case v. CommonwealthCase v. Commonwealth
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Rossie D. Alston Jr., Kelsey, Decker
Susan M. Harris, Assistant Attorney General (Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, II, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Raymond Charles Case (appellant) appeals his conviction of driving while intoxicated in violation of
I. Background
On November 5, 2011, appellant and his friend, Deborah Wessels, attended a meeting at the Brunswick Eagles in Maryland. At some point in the evening, Ms. Wessels went out into the parking lot and observed appellant asleep in his pickup truck. Ms. Wessels was “a little worried” about appellant and tried to wake him. When Ms. Wessels was unable to awaken appellant, she decided to drive him home herself with another friend following behind so as to drive her back to the meeting afterwards.
After crossing into Virginia, Ms. Wessels testified that appellant began “slumping” and “leaning over” on her from the passenger side. According to Ms. Wessels, it became “really difficult for [her] to drive” and she could not stop appellant from leaning over on to her through the console between the two. Ms. Wessels testified that eventually she became “upset” and “disgusted” with appellant‘s behavior and she “panicked.” Ms. Wessels pulled over to the side of the road, got out of the truck, and returned with her friend to the meeting. Ms. Wessels testified that she left the motor of appellant‘s truck running.1
Sometime thereafter, around 9:30 p.m., Mark Edward Heaney looked out his window on Dutchman Creek Road in Loudoun County and observed appellant‘s pickup truck in front of a neighbor‘s house stopped on an incline, facing downhill, with its brake lights illuminated. Mr. Heaney drove his car up to appellant‘s truck and looked through the window of the passenger‘s side. Mr. Heaney observed appellant sitting in the driver‘s seat, slumped over the steering wheel, with his chin on his chest and his eyes closed. Noticing that the driver‘s side window was rolled down, Mr. Heaney walked around to the driver‘s side and observed the truck was in gear and appellant‘s foot was on the brake. Mr. Heaney could not see whether appellant was breathing, and he called 911. He then reached into the vehicle, put the truck in park, and turned on the hazard lights.
Sergeant Williams was dispatched to the scene and upon arrival, observed appellant in the driver‘s seat of the pickup truck with the motor running. When Sergeant Williams asked appellant for his driver‘s license, he fumbled around looking for it. During the encounter Sergeant Williams smelled “a very strong odor of an alcoholic beverage about [appellant‘s] person.” Additionally, appellant was “somewhat unsteady on his feet,” his eyes were bloodshot, and his face was “very flushed.” Appellant admitted to Sergeant Williams that he had been drinking and submitted to a preliminary breath test. After the preliminary breath test, Sergeant Williams arrested appellant for driving under the influence and transported appellant to the detention center where appellant submitted to a chemical test of his breath alcohol content. The results showed appellant‘s blood alcohol content was 0.14% grams per 210 liters of breath.
A bench trial commenced on November 1, 2012. At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court found appellant guilty of driving under the influence. That same day, the trial court sentenced appellant to twelve months in jail with twelve months suspended, a fine of $250, suspended appellant‘s driver‘s license for twelve months, and placed him on probation for twelve months. The trial court also required appellant to enroll in the Virginia Alcohol Safety Action Program. This appeal followed.
II. Analysis
On appeal, appellant asserts three assignments of error. First, appellant argues that the trial court erred in determining that the Commonwealth‘s evidence excluded each reasonable hypothesis of appellant‘s innocence. Second, appellant contends that the trial court erred in rejecting appellant‘s argument that the Commonwealth was required to prove that appellant possessed the requisite mens rea to justify a conviction of the offense of driving under the influence of alcohol pursuant
A. Reasonable Hypothesis of Innocence
First, appellant argues that the trial court erred in ruling that the Commonwealth‘s evidence excluded each and every reasonable hypothesis of innocence and was consistent only with appellant‘s guilt. We disagree.
“When the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction is challenged, it is [the appellate court‘s] duty to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth and to uphold the conviction unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.” Powers v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 386, 388, 177 S.E.2d 628, 630 (1970) (citing Cameron v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 108, 110, 175 S.E.2d 275, 276 (1970)).
“It is elementary that the burden is on the Commonwealth to prove every essential element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The evidence must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence and be consistent only with the guilt of an accused.” Id. “The fact finder, however, is entitled to draw inferences from proved facts, so long as the inferences are reasonable and justified.” Id. (citing Webb v. Commonwealth, 204 Va. 24, 34, 129 S.E.2d 22, 29 (1963); Bell v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 530, 533, 399 S.E.2d 450, 452 (1991)). “When facts are equally susceptible to more than one interpretation, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused, the trier of fact cannot arbitrarily adopt an inculpatory interpretation.” Moody v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 702, 706, 508 S.E.2d 354, 356 (1998) (citing Corbett v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 304, 307, 171 S.E.2d 251, 253 (1969)). “‘However, the Commonwealth need only exclude reasonable hypotheses of innocence that flow from the evidence, not those that spring from the imagination of the defendant.‘” Emerson v. Commonwealth, 43 Va. App. 263, 277, 597 S.E.2d 242, 249 (2004) (quoting Hamilton v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 751, 755, 433 S.E.2d 27, 29 (1993)). “‘The statement that circumstantial evidence must exclude every reasonable theory of innocence is simply another way of stating that the Commonwealth has the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.‘” Taylor v. Commonwealth, 61 Va. App. 13, 30, 733 S.E.2d 129, 138 (2012) (quoting Kelly v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 250, 258, 584 S.E.2d 444, 447-48 (2003) (en banc)).
In considering an appellant‘s alternate hypothesis of innocence in a circumstantial evidence case, we must determine “not whether there is some evidence to support” the appellant‘s hypothesis of innocence, but, rather, “whether any reasonable [fact finder], upon consideration of all the evidence, could have rejected [the appellant‘s] theories in his defense and found him guilty of [the charged crime] beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Emerson, 43 Va. App. at 277, 597 S.E.2d at 249 (quoting Commonwealth v. Hudson, 265 Va. 505, 513, 578 S.E.2d 781, 785 (2003)).
Appellant argues that the evidence showed that he was unconscious the entire time he was with Ms. Wessels and later when found by Mr. Heaney. With no evidence of what occurred after Ms. Wessels left and when Mr. Heaney found him, appellant contends that the Commonwealth‘s evidence failed to exclude reasonable hypotheses of innocence such as someone moving appellant from the passenger seat to the driver‘s seat while he was unconscious, or simply that appellant was unconscious the entire time, supporting appellant‘s defense of unconsciousness.2
something happened to put him behind the wheel. You know, we can search for a hypothesis, but you know, common sense doesn‘t leave the court room in terms of reasonable inferences, and that is - it is not - I do not think it is a reasonable inference that someone came upon him and dragged him over and put him behind the wheel. We know he was on the passenger side. We know he was found on the driver‘s side, and he was operating the vehicle, his foot was on the brake according to the evidence, he was credible, and that the - saw brake lights, and that the car was in drive, and the motor was running. And, I just decline to speculate . . . I think the reasonable inferences are in this particular case that - that he was left and that he changed positions, and then became the operator of the vehicle, and once he did that, I think that he is by Virginia law, guilty of driving under the influence.
We do not find the trial court‘s factual findings to be plainly wrong or without evidence to support them. The Commonwealth was not required to prove and the trial court was not required to speculate as to any possible hypothesis of innocence that may have flowed not from the evidence but from appellant‘s imagination. It was entirely reasonable that “‘[the trial court], upon consideration of all the evidence, could have rejected [the appellant‘s] theories in his defense and found him guilty of [the charged crime] beyond a reasonable doubt.‘” See Emerson, 43 Va. App. at 277, 597 S.E.2d at 249 (quoting Hudson, 265 Va. at 513, 578 S.E.2d at 785). For these reasons, we hold the trial court did not err in ruling that the Commonwealth‘s evidence excluded every reasonable hypothesis of appellant‘s innocence and was consistent only with his guilt.
B. Operation of a Motor Vehicle under Code § 18.2-266
Second, appellant argues that
i. Intent as a Requirement under Code § 18.2-266
As
Mere omission from a statute of any mention of intent should not be construed as elimination of that element from the crime. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 273 (1952). A statute‘s silence on a mens rea requirement means the court must construe the statute in light of the background rules of the common law. Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 605 (1994) (citing United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 436-37 (1978)). “The existence of a mens rea [requirement] is the rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence.” Id. (quoting Gypsum, 438 U.S. at 436). “Offenses that require no mens rea are disfavored
In light of the legislature‘s omission of a mens rea requirement in
The rationale provided in these and many other Virginia cases reflects the public safety concern underlying the purpose of Virginia‘s DUI statute: to punish an individual‘s drunken actions, not his intent. This concern is articulated in Stevenson, 243 Va. at 439-40, 416 S.E.2d at 439 (J. Compton, dissenting), cited with approval in Enriquez:
The reason for th[e] liberal interpretation of the words “operate,” “operator,” and “operating” is obvious. A motor vehicle is recognized in the law as a dangerous instrumentality when in the control of a sober person; in the control of a drunk, the dangerous instrumentality becomes lethal. Therefore, until now, the Court has interpreted the drunk-driving statute in a way that kept drunks from behind the steering wheels of motor vehicles, even when the drunk needed to “sleep it off.” Ordinary experience tells us that
one in a drunken stupor in the driver‘s seat of a vehicle is likely to arouse abruptly, engage the motive power of the vehicle, and roar away imperiling the lives of innocent citizens.
283 Va. at 516, 722 S.E.2d at 255. Thus the concern is what could happen with an intoxicated individual behind the wheel, regardless of whether he intended to be there, turn on the car, or move the vehicle. Bearing these concerns and the case law of this Commonwealth in mind, we conclude that there is no mens rea requirement in
For these reasons, we hold that the trial court did not err in rejecting any need for the Commonwealth to prove that appellant possessed the requisite mens rea to justify a conviction for the offense of driving under the influence of alcohol.
ii. Operation of a Motor Vehicle under Code § 18.2-266
Further, we affirm the trial court‘s conclusion that appellant did “operate” the vehicle as required by
It shall be unlawful for any person to drive or operate any motor vehicle, engine or train (i) while such person has a blood alcohol concentration of 0.08 percent or more by weight by volume or 0.08 grams or more per 210 liters of breath as indicated by a chemical test administered as provided in this article, (ii) while such person is under the influence of alcohol . . . .
Appellant was clearly in “actual physical control” of his truck. The truck‘s motor was running and in gear, appellant‘s foot was on the brake, and the truck was “capable of being immediately placed in motion to become a menace to the public, and to its drunken operator.” For these reasons, we hold that appellant did “operate” his truck under
C. Sufficiency of the Evidence that Appellant Consciously Moved to the Driver‘s Seat
Last, appellant argues that the trial court erred in ruling that the evidence supported the proposition that appellant consciously moved from the passenger seat to the driver‘s seat and rested his foot on the brake after Ms. Wessels left and prior to Mr. Heaney‘s arrival, thereby exposing appellant to a charge of driving under the influence.
Under settled principles, the evidence in the present case is reviewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth. Hudson, 265 Va. at 514, 578 S.E.2d at 786. That principle requires the reviewing courts to “discard the evidence of the accused in conflict with that of the Commonwealth, and regard as true all the credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth, and all fair inferences to be drawn therefrom.” Parks v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 492, 498, 270 S.E.2d 755, 759 (1980) (citation omitted). Findings of fact made by the trial judge are presumed to be correct and given deference unless plainly wrong or without evidence to support them. Carter v. Commonwealth, 42 Va. App. 681, 594 S.E.2d 284 (2004); Timbers v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 187, 503 S.E.2d 233 (1998).
The evidence showed that when Ms. Wessels left appellant in his vehicle on the side of the road, he was in the passenger seat leaning over the middle console, asleep. Ms. Wessels further testified that appellant was a “big man” and that she could not stop him from leaning over the middle console. The next person to observe appellant was Mr. Heaney at approximately 9:30 p.m. Appellant was in the driver‘s seat, slumped over the steering wheel, truck in gear, and engine running.
The trial court evaluated the credibility of Ms. Wessels and Mr. Heaney and inferred from their testimony “that [appellant] was left and that he changed positions, and then became the operator of the vehicle . . . .” We do not find the trial court‘s factual findings to be plainly wrong or without evidence to support
Affirmed.