Thе appeal, following denial of new trial, is from Rayburn’s convictions for three counts of child molestation, OCGA § 16-6-4 (а), and one count of aggravated child molestation, OCGA § 16-6-4 (c).
1. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in failing to direct his acquittal in that a rational trier of fact could not have found him guilty beyond a reasonablе doubt because there were extensive conflicts in the evidence, such as entries in one alleged victim’s diary, and because of the “obvious” collusive nature of the purported victims’ testimony.
The answers to whether or not the victims, who were appellant’s stepdaughter and the stepdaughter’s friend, collaborated оn their testimony and whether or not there was material conflict in the evidence are governed by determinаtion of the credibility of the victims and other witnesses. “It is the function of the jury to determine the credibility of the witnesses, inсluding that of the defendant. The jurors must weigh and resolve any conflicts presented by the evidence. The appellate court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict. [Cit.]”
King v. State,
2. Appellant contends that OCGA § 24-3-16 is violative of the right to confrontation under the Federal Constitution. The statute is not constitutionally deficient in the manners сomplained of.
Sosebee v. State,
3. Appellаnt further contends that even assuming OCGA § 24-3-16 is not unconstitutional per se, admission of testimony by the stepdaughter’s grandmother аnd that of a Department of Family & Chil *677 dren Services’ caseworker, violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments by aрplication. He charges that such testimony may not be presented by the State in addition to that of the victim undеr the procedure in Sosebee and that the testimony did not meet the statute’s reliability standard.
Contrary to appellant’s contention, the Sosebee procedure specifiсally provides for testimony by the alleged child victim as the court’s witness, upon request of either the State or thе defendant, when the prosecution invokes the Child Hearsay Statute to introduce out-of-court declarаtions by the child and neither party wishes to call the child as its own witness. Sosebee at 299. It actually contemplates testimony аbout what the child victim said and did relevant to the alleged sexual contact from both the child and those witnessing thе child’s later reaction, even if the hearsay may be “bolstering.” The purpose of this procedure is to allow a defendant to exercise his right of confrontation without requiring him to be cast unfavorably before the jury for forcing the child to testify. Any “bolstering” can be explored by defendant in cross-examination.
By the court’s admission of the out-of-court declarations, the court implicitly found the testimony to have sufficient indicia of reliability аs the statute requires. OCGA § 24-3-16.
Windom v. State,
4. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to allow certain surrebuttаl testimony from his oldest brother.
Appellant had introduced testimony from another brother and his wife that appellant’s younger daughter, who testified for the State as to similar acts of molestation by her father, had told them she had said her father molested her because she was frightened by the investigator. In rebuttal to this testimony, the State reсalled the younger daughter who testified that she did not remember telling her aunt and uncle that she was not being truthful. Appellant in surrebuttal sought to introduce testimony by his older brother, who had physical custody of this younger daughter prior to аnd during the trial, that the younger daughter had told him that her father had not touched her. This was offered to support the older brother’s testimony that *678 the victim recanted.
There was no evidence that appellant’s oldest brother was present during any conversations between appellant’s daughter and her other uncle and aunt; his testimony could not have directly rebutted the daughter’s rebuttal of her aunt and uncle’s testimony. The triаl court did not abuse its discretion in not allowing the attempted surrebuttal. See
Burden v. State,
5. Appellant contends the trial сourt erred in instructing the jury that “you are not required to surrender” rather than “you should not surrender” an honest conviction simply to get along with the other jurors or for the purpose of reaching a verdict. He maintains that the charge gave the jury the impression that each was free to surrender his or her honest convictions for the sake of getting along with other jurors or to reach a verdict. A reasonable reading of the charge in its totality, see
Howell v. State,
Judgment affirmed.