34 W. Va. 400 | W. Va. | 1890
On the 9th day of December, 1888, Alexander Rayburn, late of Mason county, departed this life intestate. On the 4th day of May, 1889, more than thirty days having elapsed since the death of the intestate, and no distributee having' applied for administration, the clerk of the County Court of Mason county appointed James A. Rayburn temporary administrator of the goods and chattels of the decedent.
From this proceeding of the County Court, James A. Rayburn obtained an appeal to the Circuit Court of Mason county, and the Circuit Court, by order of 6th September, 1889, set aside the order of the County Court and sent the case back for further and proper proceedings therein to be had; and the case is now before this Court on writ of error to the order of the Circuit Court.
These things, as appears by this record, he had proceeded to do ; for he had the personal property appraised, and on the 6th of May, 1889, the appraisement was returned and filed. Plow far he had gone in administering the personal estate does not appear, but he certainly had commenced. And such was his plain duty under our construction, of the statute, a construction as we think, justified by its language, and required to be given as far as it can be by the ordinary exigencies of dead men’s estates. But for him there would be no safety, and at least uncertainty and confusion for those dealing with him, if the order of his appointment, valid in. the beginning, is open to be wholly sot aside and held for naught by the County Court as a matter of course, and so within their discretion and without cause shown.
The proper course for the County Court in such a case would be to have the temporary administrator before it by notice, or otherwise, and if a proper case is made for not confirming his appointment and for the appointment of some other person, to revoke his letters of administration, or order his powers as administrator to cease from that time onward; direct him to account for assets administered and turn over those unadministered to his successor. Before hearing and determining the rights and duties of parties, the common-law requires, that such party shall by notice, or otherwise, have his day in court — his opportunity to bo heard; and this rule is so fundamental that it implies that such is the meaning of the statute where it is silent on the subject.
In this ease it does not appear that the administrator pro tempore had notice. In answer to this, it is said that it was still a pending case to which the temporary administrator was a party. Even if this view is correct, it is not a matter of course that the court will refuse to confirm his appointment, but rather the contrary, if no valid objection be made. This was in part, at least; a distinct proceed
The County Court erred in wholly setting aside and holding for naught a regular and valid appointment made by its clerk. To hold that this means that his powers as administrator shall henceforth cease because the County Coui’t could do no more, is not the proper construction; because when the case arises, this Court may be constrained to hold that the County Court can do more; and to say that we will give it such construction as will give it force and effect consistent with the rules of law, no matter how informal or irregular might do, if it had been confirmed by the Circuit Court; but the Circuit Court has given it the opportunity to reconsider and correct its order in form, if not in effect.
In these exparte probate matters some regard must be given to regular and orderly proceedings ; and we are not to say that they did not mean to do á thing, because they had no power to do it. The County Court sets aside the clerk’s appointment of an administrator and orders it to be held for naught, acting, no doubt, on the theory that the appointment by the clerk gave a power inchoate and invalid unless confirmed by the court. The order of the Circuit Court also gives them an opportunity to reconsider and avoid another error appearing on the face of these proceedings. The appraisement of the personal property made and returned under oath shows the visible personal property to amount in value prima facie to seven hundred and
In my opinion the same rule should be applied, because the same reason for the rule exists as was applied in case of Hutcheson v. Priddy, 12 Gratt. 85. The language of the new order treats the appointment made by the clerk as void or at least as invalid, unless and until confirmed by the court. He might incur the liability of an executor de son tort; innocent persons dealing with him upon the faith of the authority conferred by the clerk might bo subjected to great embarrassment if not serious loss, while he, without citation or notice of any kind, so that he might be ready to conform his own arrangements with reference to the expected termination of his powers, if not to furnish the court itself with the facts necessary for the intelligent and proper action, is by an ex parte order treated as though he had never been an administrator at all. He had rights and interests in the subject. It was not a matter of course that his appointment would not be confirmed, and, in any event, no intelligent action could be taken in the premises without giving the only one who knew, an opportunity to be heard.
If a proper case is shown let the County Court appoint the widow administratrix de bonis non, but the court ought to require from her a bond in a penalty at least equal to the value of the personal estate likely to come into her hands to be administered, and unless they have a proper case her fore them for declaring the clerk’s appointment void or invalid from the beginning, let them revoke James A. Rayburn’s letters of administration or rather order his powers to cease. They now have an opportunity given them by the
Aeeirmed by a Divided CoüRT.