105 Neb. 456 | Neb. | 1920
Action, based upon thé workmen’s compensation law, in which the plaintiff, an employee of the school district of the City of Lincoln, a municipal corporation, seeks to recover compensation for injuries sustained by him in the course of and growing out of that employment.
The question for decision is whether or not employees bf the school district come within the compensation law. It is contended by the defendant that no employees of the state, or of any subdivision thereof, are within the law, except in those instances where they are employed in some enterprise carried on for pecuniary gain or profit.
The sections of the statute, particularly involved, are as follows:
Section 3647: “The provisions of this act shall apply to the state of Nebraska and e’sery governmental agency •created by it, and to every employer in this state employing one or more employees, in the regular trade, business, profession or vocation of such employer.” Rev. St. 1913, as amended by Laws 1917, ch. 85.
Section 3655: “The following shall constitute ‘employers’ subject to the provisions of this article:
“(1) The state and every governmental agency created by it.
“(2) Every person, firm or corporation * * * who is engaged in any trade, occupation, business or profession.”
“(1) Every person in the service of the state or of any governmental agency created by it, under any appointment or contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written, but shall not include any official of the state or any governmental agency created by it, who shall have been elected or appointed for a regular term of office, or to complete the unexpired portion of any regular term.
“(2) Every person in the service of an employer who is engaged in any trade, occupation, business or profession.
“(3) It shall not be construed to include any person whose employment is casual, or not for the purpose of gain or profit hy the employer, or which is not in the usual course of the trade, business, profession or occupation of his employer.” Rev. St. 1913, as amended by Laws 1917, ch. 85.
It is urged that the term “gain or profit” should not be construed in the ordinary sense of pecuniary gain or profit, but that the phrase should be held to designate any employment which should be found to be carried on for the benefit or advantage of the employer. We do not believe the statute capable of that construction. The original conception of workmen’s compensation laws seems to have been' based upon the principle that the servant should no longer be required to bear loss in consequence of personal injuries, sustained in and growing out of the service rendered his employer, since the benefit of that service, based in part upon the personal hazard and risk of loss to the servant, was i eceived by the eraplc yer. It was not, however, intended that such loss should simply be shifted from the employee and saddled upon the employer, and he made to carry the burden alone, but that such loss through injuries, sustained by the employee, should be treated as a part of the cost of service to the employer, and he, in fixing the price of his product, could reimburse himself by pass
Though it is true, as argued, that, in the case of employment by the state, the cost of service, including the payment of compensation for injuries, is equitably passed on to society through the process of taxation, still, it seems clear to us, that fact does not affect nor alter the meaning to be given to the terms now under consideration. Were we to interpret the words “gain or profit” to mean benefit or advantage, pecuniary or otherwise, that an employer might receive through an employment carried on by him, such meaning must apply not only to state employments but also to all other employments covered by the statute. That interpretation would only lead to uncertainty and confusion, which, under the plain wording of the statute, does not now exist.
That the phrase was intended to mean pecuniary gain or profit finds some support in the following cases: Allen v. State, 160 N. Y. Supp. 85; Redfern v. Eby, 102 Kan. 484; Gray v. Board of Commissioners of Sedgwick County, 101 Kan. 195; Sexton v. Public Service Commission, 167 N. Y. Supp. 493.
In this light and by reason of the common and ordinary meaning of the words used, we believe the statute, on that question, is not open to construction.
By a literal reading of the provisions of the statute in connection with subdivision “(3),” last above quoted, the term “employee” covers only such employees, whether in
It is quite apparent that the “casual” employee in the service of the state, covered by subdivision “(3)” of the statute, just as in the case of other- employment, was intended to be excluded from the act; also that any employee, who was not engaged in the regular business and activities carried on by the state and its subdivisions, was to be excluded. The term “employer” is expressly defined to include “the state and every governmental agency created by it,” and, by reading that definition into the clause in question, the express language, as employed and interpreted by the legislature, would exclude from the operation of the law every employee of the state and of its subdivisions who is not employed “for the purpose of gain or profit by the state, or by any governmental agency created by it.”
The plaintiff contends that, should the literal wording of the act confine the act, in its operation, to those employees only who are employed for pecuniary gain or profit of the state and its subdivisions, then the literal 'wording must be found to be in conflict with the express purpose and intent of the act, and that such intent must be allowed tp prevail. By the earlier provision of the act, every person in the service of the state, except officers holding for a regulár term of office, is mentioned as being included within its operation. That provision, however, is not more general in its terms than the like provison covering private employments. It is necessary for the court, then, first to determine, from the language used,-whether there can be any logical reason for the exception, as applied to state employees, or whether the exception is out of harmony with the act and opposed to a clearly expressed intent to the contrary.
It is no doubt the rule, as stated in State v. Drexel, 75 Neb. 614, that the object of the court, when it construes an act of the legislature, is to ascertain the intention of the lawmakers and to follow that intention when clearly as
We conclude, however, that those rules are no aid to the court in the present case. It is not for the court to say, where the language of the statute leads to 'logical conclusions, that its literal wording will not be followed, simply because it does not embrace cases which seem, for no good reason, to have been excluded. ' It is true that the workmen’s compensation law is broad in its application. It is not confined to hazardous employments and covers a great mass of employees, engaged in private enterprises, whose duties are similar to the duties of the great majority of state employees.. Clerical and office service is within the broad comprehension of the act. If the legislature, however, has not done so, the court cannot provide that the beneficent purposes of the act shall be extended to1 state employees who are not employed for gain or profit, though they may be found to be engaged in the same character of work, subjected to the same exposures, and whose loss through injury enters as much, in principle, into the actual cost of service as if the service were performed for a private, enterprise, carried on for profit. We have repeatedly given the act, as to the classes of workers brought within it, a liberal construction, but the rule, allowing a liberal construction of a statute, does not warrant us in overriding its terms in order to widen the remedy or bring about objects or results not within its expressed intent.
It must be remembered that the state and its governmental agencies could not be held liable under the common law for personal injuries sustained by its servants in line of employment, though due to its own negligence, nor could such a recovery be had under the law as it existed in this state at the time of the enactment of the workmen’s compensation act. The state could, however, be held for
The primary object of compensation acts was to do away with the inadequacies and defects of the common-law remedies, to destroy the common-law defenses, and, in the employments affected, to give compensation, regardless of the fault of the employer. These remedies did not apply to state employees, not engaged in business enterprises carried on for profit, and the state employments, not within the common-law remedies, do not seem to have been expressly brought within the scope of our compensation law.
A statute in the state of Kansas specifically provides that municipal and county employees, who are not engaged for business gain or profit, shall not come within the act. We cannot say that the Kansas law is either absurd or unreasonable, for it follows the line of demarcation between those classes of cases where recovery could be had at common law, and those classes where such recovery was not allowed. The language of our statute is in accord with an intent and purpose, on the part of the legislature, to follow that line of demarcation.
The compensation act- of the state of California was under consideration by the supreme court of that state and a question of statutory construction, very similar to that in the case here, was there presented. The court held in Miller v. Pillsbury, 164 Cal. 199, that, since by the wording of the statute it was doubtful whether or not the state, under certain circumstances, should or should not be included within the act, the statute, therefore, would be con
For the reasons given, it is our opinion that the act does not cover the plaintiff in this case, and the judgment of the lower court is therefore reversed and the case dismissed.
Reversed and dismissed.