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Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co.
435 U.S. 151
SCOTUS
1978
Check Treatment

*1 RAY, GOVERNOR OF WASHINGTON, et al. v.

ATLANTIC RICHFIELD CO. et al. Argued 31, No. 76-930. October March 197 7 Decided *2 Supp.-, -F. in part, affirmed part, reversed in and remanded. J., opinion delivered the Court, White, J., in which C. Burger, and Stewart JJ., joined; but all Parts Y and ofVII Blackmun, JJ., joined; and in all but Parts IV and VI Stevens, Powell of which JJ., joined. and Rehnquist, Brennan, Marshall, Marshall, J., opinion concurring filed an part dissenting part, in which *3 JJ., joined, and post, p. J., Brennan Rehnquist, filed an Stevens, opinion concurring dissenting and in part, J., joined, Powell, post, p. 187. Gorton, Slade pro se, Attorney of General Washington, argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs Roe, Jr., Charles B. were Senior Attorney Assistant General, Robert E. Mack and Kirkby, Richard L. Assistant Attorneys Engdahl, David E. General, Special Attorney Gen- Assistant eral, Christopher T. Bayley, se, pro Goeltz, Thomas A. John E. Keegan, Eldon V. C. Greenberg, Frank, Richard Thomas A. Brucker, H. S. and James N. Barnes.

Richard Sherwood argued E. the cause for appellees. With him on the Boyd Eight, B. Ira were Feinberg, Ray M. brief Saman, mond W. Robart, James L. Wagoner. and David E. * *Anthony Attorney Troy, General, F. Ryan, Jr., James E. Deputy Attorney General, Young, and John Hardin Attorney General, Assistant filed a brief for the Virginia Commonwealth of as amicus urging curiae reversal. urging

Briefs of amici curiae by Eugene Massey affirmance were filed A. by for the American Shipping, Institute of Merchant John M. Cannon for Legal Foundation, by Mid-America and David Owen R. for the Maritime Law Association of the States. United by

Briefs of amici curiae were filed Solicitor General McCree and by William F. Sheehan III States; for the United Younger, Evelle J. opinion Court. of the White delivered Justice Me. Safety Waterways Act of Ports and Pursuant ed., (1970 seq. 1221 et 33 U. § (PWSA), 424, S. C. Stat. naviga- (1970 ed., Supp. V), V), S. C. 391a Supp. and U. along the lying body of inland water Puget Sound, tion is controlled Washington,1 of coast State northwest subjects also law. The PWSA by federal major respects oil characteristics operating and rule the federal tankers. Extr. Laws, 1st 1975 Wash. when ch. arose

This case General, Attorney and Shute, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, E. Clement California, Attorney General, for the State Deputy Knight, Foster C. M. Avrum States as follows: respective joined their certain officials Sagalkin, Attor- Alaska, Assistant Gross, Attorney and General Sanford Ann Attorney Georgia, and Bolton, General of General; ney Arthur K. Amemiya, Attorney General; Y. Attorney Ronald Estes, Staff Assistant General; Attorney John Lau, Deputy K. Hawaii, Laurence and General of Lindholm, Missouri, Assistant and Robert M. Attorney Ashcroft, General Pennsylvania, and Kane, Attorney General Attorney General; Robert P. LaFollette, General; C. Attorney Bronson Eichbaum, William Assistant Attorney Assistant Wisconsin, Priebe, Theodore Attorney General follows: respective States as officials for their General; and certain Rich Attorney Maryland, Warren K. Burch, B. General Francis Attorney Attorneys General; Wier, Richard Schaffer, Assistant Earl G. *4 Maine; Attorney Delaware; Joseph Brennan, General of E. of General Minnesota; Lefkowitz, J. Louis Attorney Spannaus, General of Warren Attorney York; Michaelson, C. General New Julius Attorney General Wayne Florida; Shevin, Attorney Island; General Robert L. Rhode Kidwell, Attorney of Idaho. General L. inlets, 2,500 square estuary consisting miles of an Puget is Sound Washington. More than part of bays, in northwestern and channels flats, marshes, tidal Sound, and numerous located within 200 islands are along the of shoreline. wetlands, are found miles and beaches recreational, provide scientific, and educa and shorelines Sound’s waters uses, for navigational well as and commercial opportunities, as tional Sound, to the is connected Washington and others. The which citizens by navigated Fuca, constantly by the Juan de is Strait of Pacific Ocean great vessels and a water resource of value and recreational commercial State, well as to the United States. as Sess., Wash. Code Rev. 88.16.170 et seq. (Supp. 1975) (Tanker Law), was adopted with the aim of regulating in particular respects the design, size, and of oil movement tankers in Puget Sound. In response to the constitutional challenge to brought by the law appellees herein, the Dis- trict Court held that under the Supremacy Clause, VI, Art. cl. 2, of the Constitution, declares that the federal law supreme “shall be the Law of the Land,” the Tanker Law could not coexist with the PWSA totally and was invalid. Atlantic Evans, Co. v. No. (WD C-75-648-M Wash. Richfield Sept. 24, 1976).

I adjacent Located six Sound are oil refineries hav- ing a total processing capacity combined of 359,500 barrels of oil per day. In 1971, appellee Atlantic Richfield Co. began (ARCO) operating oil refinery an Cherry at Point, situated in the northern part of the Sound. Since then, oil processed crude refinery at that princi- has been delivered by pally pipeline from by Canada2 and tankers from the Gulf; Persian tankers will also be used to transport oil there from the terminus of the Pipeline Trans-Alaska Valdez, Alaska. Of the 105 tanker deliveries of oil crude to the Cherry refinery Point through from 1972 by were means of in tankers of 40,000 excess deadweight (DWT),3 tons and, prior to the effective date of the Tanker 15 of them Law, were means of tankers in excess 125,000 DWT. Appellee Seatrain Lines, Inc. (Seatrain), owns or charters 12 tanker foreign domestic and of which commerce, argument during Attorney were informed We oral General pipeline Washington Cherry that the longer Canada to Point is no Arg. 6. service. of Oral Tr. 3 The term “deadweight purposes tons” is defined for of the Tanker Law cargo-carrying capacity vessel, including necessary oils, as fuel potable waters, expressed stores, and long (2,240 pounds per tons *5 long ton). through operates DWT. Seatrain also

four exceed facility subsidiary corporation shipbuilding a wholly a owned con- recently or is constructed in New York where it City, capacity. 225,000 DWT structing each with a tankers, four ARCO effective, became day On the Tanker Law for the District Court suit in the United States brought declar- seeking judgment Washington, Western District enjoining its enforce- and ing the statute unconstitutional plain- as to intervene permitted was later ment. Seatrain local officials and were tiff. Named as defendants The Law.4 the Tanker responsible the enforcement by federal alleged pre-empted that the statute was complaint was thus invalid PWSA, that it particular and law, alleged that Supremacy It was also Clause. under on commerce imposed burden interstate an undue law I, 3, and Clause, 8,§ cl. violation of the Commerce Art. foreign o'f affairs. with the federal interfered court three-judge 2284, a §§ Pursuant to 28 U. C. S. the case. convened to determine was on District Court argued before the The was briefed case of facts. Also before stipulation of a detailed the basis curiae, which as amicus was the brief the United States court entirety in its pre-empted Tanker Law was contended that the legislation.5 three-judge other federal by the PWSA ruling plaintiffs States, and the United agreed with the court were of the Tanker Law operative provisions all of enjoining appellants and their successors pre-empted, chapter.6 probable jurisdiction noted enforcing the We Against Pollution, groups Oil National Four environmental —Coalition Fund, Environmental Defense Inc.— Federation, Club, and Sierra Wildlife attorney King County, Wash., intervened prosecuting defendants. longer its since modified views and no contends States has The United respects pre-empted by all Tanker Law in federal law. challenged jurisdiction defendants District Court’s over The state sovereign immunity asserting They under the Eleventh Amendment. them,

157 the appeal, State’s 430 S.U. 905 (1977), meanwhile having stayed injunction. 429 (1977). U. 1035 S.

II The prior Court’s cases indicate that when a State’s exercise of its police power challenged is under Supremacy Clause, “we start with the assumption that historic police powers of the States were be superseded Act Federal unless that was the clear and purpose manifest of Congress.” Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 (1947) ; U. 230 218, S. Jones v. Packing Co., Rath S. Under 519, U. the relevant cases, one of legitimate is inquiries whether Congress has either explicitly implicitly declared that prohibited States are regulating aspects the various operations oil-tanker the Tanker Law is concerned. Rice, As Court noted in supra, at 230: congressional] purpose may

“[The be evidenced in sev- ways. eral The regulation may scheme of federal so be pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Con- gress left room no for the it. Penn- supplement States to sylvania Comm’n, R. Co. v. Public Service 250 U. S. 569; Patterson, Butter v. U. 148. Co. S. Cloverleaf Or Congress the Act of touch in which the may field is system federal interest so dominant the federal will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on subject. Davidowitz, same Hines v. 312 U. S. object Likewise, sought to be obtained the federal by may law obligations imposed and the character of v. purpose. reveal same Southern R. Railroad Co. parte Young, recognized that in Ex 209 U. S. 123 the Court held (1908), against suit in federal the Eleventh Amendment does not bar court injunction against purpose obtaining official an his enforce state alleged unconstitutional, urged of a law but the District ment application. decision or to its The District Court overrule that restrict request here, reject repeated so. Court declined do we it. v. Commission, & R. Co. 439; U. Charleston W. C. S. Co. v. York Central R. Co., 597; New S. Varnville U. R. Coast Line Atlantic 147; Napier Winfield, 244 U. S. v. Co., supra.” *7 Inc., Terminal, 411 Air Lockheed City Burbank v.

Accord, (1973). U. S. 633 624,

Even, legis foreclosed state Congress completely if has not extent to the is void a state statute particular in area, lation a A con statute. a valid federal actually conflicts with that it both federal and with compliance will be found “where flict Florida ,” impossibility . . physical . regulations a 142-143 Paul, 132, Growers, 373 U. S. Inc. v. Lime & Avocado to the an obstacle where the state “law stands (1963), or objec purposes and of the full and execution accomplishment 312 67 52, U. S. Davidowitz, Hines v. Congress.” tives Co., 526, 540-541. Packing supra, at Rath Jones (1941); v. (1976). 363 Bica, 424 U. 351, De Canas S. v. Accord, Ill to an examination we mind, in turn principles With these Law. of the Tanker provisions operative the three of each of 1975), (Supp. §88.16.180 Rev. Code first address Wash. We of at tankers registered7 oil both enrolled requires by the licensed State pilot on to take a DWT least District The Puget Sound. navigating Washington while “enrolled a tanker required law as the that insofar held Court it was pilot board, on local have a trade” to coastwise agree. 364. We 215, 46 C. §§ U. conflict S. in direct steam seagoing “every coastwise provides Section . ,. . of the United States laws navigation subject to vessel under way, when under ... register, shall, under sailing trade or or coastwide “engaged domestic those are Enrolled vessels engaged in trade with those registered vessels are fishing,” whereas used for Inc., Products, 272- Douglas S.U. Seacoast foreign v. countries.

the control and pilots direction of licensed the Coast Guard.” Section 215 adds that or municipal State “[n]o government impose shall upon pilots of any steam vessels obligation procure or a State other license addition to that issued by the United States . . It goes on explain ...” the statute shall not be any construed to regula- “affect tion established by any the laws of State, requiring vessels entering or leaving port in any such State, other than coast- wise vessels, steam pilot duly to take a licensed authorized by the laws of such . State . (Emphasis added.) . long Court has held that these two together statutes read give the Federal Government exclusive regulate pilots on enrolled they vessels and preclude State imposing its own pilotage requirements upon them. See Anderson Co., v. Coast S. S. 225 U. (1912); S. 187 Pacific Spraigue v. Thompson, 118 90 (1886). U. S. Thus, *8 extent that the Tanker requires Law enrolled tankers to take on state-licensed pilots, correctly the District concluded, Court as State now concedes, that it was in conflict with federal law was and therefore invalid. opinion

While the of the court pilot below indicated provision of only the Tanker Law was void to the extent applied to tankers enrolled in the the judg- coastwise trade, ment in entirety. itself declared the statute null and void its part excepted of the statute was from the scope No of just injunctive judgment overly relief. The was broad, may it is clear that regulate pilots as States of enrolled equally they impose pilotage it is clear that are free to vessels, registered entering on requirements leaving vessels and their vessels, Included within the definition steam vessels are “[a]11 size, tonnage propulsion, manner of self- regardless or whether not, freight propelled carrying passengers or for hire or and whether or not, liquid cargo bulk is— . . . that shall have on board in which any (A) oil, any or in combustible, (B) inflammable or or kind form, (C) designated polluting as a hazardous substance ... . . . V). (2) (1970 ed., Supp. 391a 46 U. S. C. § was ports. only provide, § Not does 46 U. 215 so as S. C. above, (5) PWSA, § noted but also does so authorizes the (5) (1970 ed., Supp. V), TJ. C.- which § S. Transportation “require pilots self-propelled on cir- engaged foreign trades areas and under required otherwise pilot cumstances where a is not State having jurisdiction on of an to be board until the State law area requirement pilot in that area involved establishes as involved . . .” Accordingly, or under the circumstances . require registered now was free to appellees agree, State DWT on 50,000 in excess of to take a state-licensed tankers entering Puget pilot upon Sound.

IV Law, which (2) next with 88.16.190 of the Tanker We deal 40,000 from registered oil tankers of requires enrolled and “standard possess following all DWT features”: horsepower horsepower in the ratio of one

“(a) Shaft tons; and deadweight one-half each two and “(b) screws; Twin liquid oil and underneath all

“(c) bottoms, Double cargo compartments; one working operating, order

“(d) Two radars radar; and must be collision avoidance systems position location navigational “(e) other Such fi>time the board may prescribed time *9 ..” pilotage commissioners .. the stating that if however, contains a proviso,

This section tugs with tug of a or under escort “tanker is ballast is of percent equivalent to five horsepower aggregate shaft an design require- the deadweight ,” of that tanker . . . tons the held invalid Court applicable. The District ments are Law. of the Tanker design/tug requirement alternative this design require- foregoing the as we hold that agree insofar We ments, standing alone, are invalid in the light of the PWSA and its regulatory implementation.

The PWSA contains two Titles representing somewhat over- lapping provisions designed safety to insure vessel and the protection of the navigable waters, their shore resources, and areas from tanker cargo spillage. The focus of I, Title S. 1221-1227 (1970 §§ U. C. ed., Supp. is traffic control V), ports; local Title IPs principal concern is tanker and construction.9 For present purposes the relevant part is Title 46 U. II, C. (1970 § S. 391a ed., Supp. V), which amended Tank Vessel ofAct Stat. as 4417a, § Rev. Stat. added,

Title II begins by declaring protection life, of property, and the marine requires environment harm promulgation “comprehensive of minimum standards design, construction, alteration, repair, maintenance, operation” for vessels carrying cargoes pri- certain in bulk, marily oil and fuel (1). tankers. 391a To implement twin goals providing safety protecting for vessel marine provided Secretary environment, is Department in which the Coast Guard is “shall located10 such regulations establish” rules and may necessary with respect the design, construction, operation to respect covered vessels and with to mat- variety related ters. In issuing Secretary § 391a is to regulations, the kinds and grades permitted consider to be on cargo such vessels, board to consult with agencies, other federal identify separately regulations for vessel established protect and those marine environment. Ibid. compares Report high “providing The Senate Title surface I safer ways automobiles,” and traffic Title II is controls while likened “providing highways.” Rep. automobiles those S. No. safer to transit (1972) 92-724, pp. Report.). 9-10 (Senate Department Transportation. The Coast Guard located “Secretary” Department. Thus to the references are to *10 inspection for of vessels for com- (5) provides 391a Section No ves- pliance Secretary’s safety regulations.11 with the any specified II on subject may sel have board of Title inspection has been issued to' the cargoes until a certificate of such “indicating that permit vessel and a thereon endorsed section and provisions of this compliance is in with the vessel for established here- regulations the rules and vessel cargo such grades and showing the kinds under, transport.” provided It is may on board such vessel have Secretary is section the under this inspection lieu of certificates foreign nations valid accept from vessels treaty by United “recognized under law or inspection States.” inspect tank vessels II

Title also directs to issue required which he is regulations compliance with the (6).12 § 391a of the marine environment. protection for the must separate regulations, these Compliance with design to the Secretary's safety regulations respect current The (1976). 30-40 appear at 46 CFR Parts equipment of vessels tank of certificates regulations provides for the issuance Section 31.05-1 applicable law complying with the inspection to covered vessels carriage showing approval for the thereon regulations and for endorsement provides that "such cargoes particular specified. operate.” permit as a for such vessel to endorsement shall serve II, delegate, his Secretary, through Coast As directed Title (n) (4) regulations Guard, (1976), has issued rules and 49 CFR 1.46 see relating tank protection marine environment to United States (1977). carrying CFR Part 157 These oil in domestic trade. 33 specified regulations initially standards in. designed to conform to the were convention, supplemented been a 1973 international but have since requirements going beyond the additional for new vessels convention. (1976). They in the Reg. 54177 also been to vessels Fed. have extended trade, appears foreign including foreign-flag It vessels. Ibid. rulemaking engaged proceeding which looks Coast Guard is now imposition stringent toward the still more construction Reg. standards. Fed.

satisfy specified standards,13 and consequent the privilege of having on board the cargo by relevant are evidenced certifi- cates of compliance by issued Secretary by appropriate or endorsements on the vessels' inspection. certificates of Cer- tificates period are valid for the specified by Secretary and are subject to revocation when it is found does vessel comply not with the upon conditions certificate was In lieu of issued.14 compliance certificate of his own regulations environmental relating to vessel construc- design, tion, alteration, Secretary and repair, may, not, but need accept valid foreign certificates from evidencing com- pliance with rules regulations and issued under a con- treaty, vention, agreement providing reciprocity recognition of certificates or similar documents. §391a(7)(D). statutory pattern

This shows that insofar as Congress, design characteristics are has concerned, entrusted to the Sec- retary duty determining which oil tankers are suffi- ciently safe to be in navigable allowed proceed to waters of the United Congress States. This indicates to us that design intended uniform national standards and construc- tion of imposition tankers that would foreclose different stringent or more requirements. state In particular, we (7) (A) (1970 part, eel., Supp. Title II in relevant S. C. 391a U. V), provides: regulations possible,

“Such shall, rules and to the but include not be extent ability limited improve maneuvering stopping to standards to vessel and possibility collision, and otherwise reduce the or other grounding, accident, damage and to reduce to the marine environment normal operations ballasting deballasting, cargo handling, vessel such as other activities.” It should be also noted that the under Title II adequately to personnel charge insure trained are tankers. He certify cargo authorized “tankermen” the kinds of that the is, qualified holder such judgment Secretary, certificate safety. ed., handle (9) aboard vessels with S. 391a (1970 U. C. § Supp. Y). vessel found to anticipate that a it, Congress

see did Secretary’s design and construction compliance with the equivalent, Secretary’s permit, or its holding regulations be barred carry cargo would nevertheless the relevant United waters navigable in the operating state law from constitute its characteristics ground on the States hazard. an undue holding prior cases slightest do not in the question

We *12 conform “reason- registered vessels must that enrolled and pro- nondiscriminatory and environmental able, conservation Sea- Douglas v. imposed a State. . tection measures . .” v. citing Smith Products, Inc., 277 (1977), 431 U. coast S. Massachusetts, v. 71 Manchester Maryland, (1855); 18 How. Cement Co. v. (1891); Huron Portland U. S. that the mere fact Detroit, (1960). Similarly, 362 U. S. the comply with and found to' inspected has been a vessel prevent a State Secretary’s safety regulations does not vessel such purposes, other enforcing having local laws city or from of the Ibid. But none abatement law. a local smoke laws to fed- application the state sustaining relevant cases licensing or vessels did the federal erally inspected licensed or rule federal a substantive inspection procedure implement by the object sought to be achieved also law addressed the Co. v. Huron Portland Cement regulation. state challenged overlap “no was Detroit, plain that for made there example, and that inspection laws scope ship the federal between the Id., 446. . there involved. at municipal ordinance .” . to insure inspection statutes of the “federal purpose [was] safety protection of vessels seagoing ... aifor[d] the “[b]y navigation,” contrast, while of maritime perils the elimination Detroit ordinance aim [was] sole enhance the cleanliness the health and pollution protect air Id., community.” at the local Washington, involved similar (1937), S. Kelly U. v. Motor that the Federal the Court concluded There, situation. Act, Boat although applicable to the vessels in question, was of limited scope and did not provision include inspec- "the tion of the hull and machinery respondents’ motor-driven tugs order to safety insure or determine seaworthiness ...,” as long as tugs did carry not in.fla.m- passengers, freight, Id., at 8. liquid mable cargo. It followed inspec- that state tion to insure was not in conflict federal law, Court holding also the limited regulations federal did imply an intent to exclude of those mat- ters not touched the federal statute.

Here, we have Huron very Portland situation Cement Co. v. Detroit and Kelly Washington v. put aside. II Title aims at insuring vessel safety protecting marine environment; and must all design issue and construction regulations necessary deems he these ends, considering specified after statutory standards. The federal scheme thus precisely aims same ends as does (2) § 88.16.190 of the Tanker Law. under the Furthermore, after PWSA, considering statutory issuing standards *13 design requirements all that in his judgment necessary, are the Secretary inspects sufficiently and certifies each safe vessel as protect to the marine or permit environment and its issues equivalent carry cargoes. Refusing accept to tank-vessel the federal judgment, the State now seeks exclude however, by having from Sound certified the as acceptable design they satisfy dif- unless characteristics, higher design requirements imposed by ferent and state law. Supremacy judgment The Clause dictates that federal that prevail navigate a vessel is safe to United waters over States contrary judgment. state frus- requirements Enforcement state would at least congressional trate what seems to us to be the evident inten- regime controlling the tion to establish a uniform federal design original oil tankers. The Tank Vessel amended Act, uniform set and a “reasonable sought to effect Title II, ,” . construction . concerning ship . regulations of rules and far (1936); and Sess., 2d Rep. Cong., H. No. 74th. R. II Title amendments evincing purpose, a different design concerned, is tanker strongly indicate that insofar standards federal anticipated enforcement of Congress different to mandate pre-empt would state efforts that requirements.15 design higher respect speak with one voice

That the Nation was to his- legislative supported tanker-design standards congres- reveals decided II, particularly of Title tory for standards preference arriving international sional that recognizes Report Senate building The tank vessels. for international traditionally been an area “has design vessel “international solu- action,” rather than national of marine problem preferable area since tions this are Congress did Report 23. Senate pollution is world-wide.”16 would Secretary’s safety regulations provide that ship design previously and construction The has observed Court Washington, Kelly In for national attention. standards are matters v. inspection (1937), upholding 302 U. S. 1 in the course was involved, the Court the state law particular vessels there stated comprehensive “a and that code” may regula- provisions to fall within the class of “it be deemed has may example, Congress Congress provide.

tions which- alone can For vessels, designs equipment standards and structure and establish may properly be prescribe operation, for their which could not rules Washington might left action of the States. State diverse designs, equipment sort, Oregon prescribe standards, and rules one another, Id., so at 14r—15. California on.” another, standards, Congress tanker-design Here, unto itself the matter taken provisions Law’s are unenforceable. the Tanker *14 fully Report in it is Elsewhere the Senate stated: “The committee comprehensive respect with concurs multilateral action to standards that construction, operation the design, maintenance and for the tankers protection preferable be of the marine environment would far to unilateral Report imposition of Senate 23. standards.” apply to ships foreign holding compliance certificates under regulations arrived at international agreement; but, end, protection regulations environmental were made applicable to as foreign well as to American vessels since it thought was necessary be for the achievement of the Act’s purposes.17

Although not acceding to the request those thought who foreign that should completely exempt vessels be regu- lation under II,18 Congress Title did not abandon effort achieve agreement international proper design on what the standards should It II be. wrote into Title a deferral proce- dure, requiring at outset his transmit proposed protection regulations environmental rules and with respect design vessel to the appropriate international forums consideration as international standards. 391a In (7)(B). order to facilitate the international consideration design specified of these II requirements, Title rules regulations governing foreign vessels and United States engaged foreign vessels trade could not become effective January 1, 1974, they before unless consonant with an were agreement. international §391a(7)(C). As noted requirement “commit- Report, Senate this demonstrated the strong protection tee’s intention standards for multilaterally if but possible, marine be adopted, environment any Report Senate adopted event.” 28. preference

Congress expressed a for international action foreign II Report eliminating The notes that vessels from Title Senate possibly self-defeating,” approximately “ineffective, because would navigable are in the waters of United States 85% Secretary’s Id., registry. Report making 22. The foreign at adds only put compet applicable ships to American them at a regulations would Ibid. foreign-flag disadvantage ships. itive Department Transportation, Department of State and the nations, expressed foreign Title II’s authorization well as concern about Id., foreign imposition the unilateral standards on vessels. *15 would or could anticipated foreign that vessels expressly sufficiently by safe for certification the Secre be considered by treaty arrived at tary requirements if satisfied the they II leaves no convention; or it therefore clear Title design or stricter impose room for the different States has enacted with Congress those which requirements than has having internationally adopted them or hope A law accepted as the result of international accord. state part of would (2), such as the first 88.16.190 in this area, inter achieving congressional uniform, desire frustrate object sought “the is thus at odds with national standards and obliga the character to be obtained II] [Title Corp., Fe Elevator by it . . Rice v. Santa imposed tions . Court was respect, In District S., 331 U. at 230. this quite correct.19

V as a under federal law is certified course, Of tanker characteris- design and construction as its safe vessel insofar ignore is free to not mean that it does tics are concerned that do regulations or or rules valid state federal otherwise speaks of the establishment Title II are that because We unconvinced Growers, Lime & Avocado Florida comprehensive “minimum standards” requires recognition of state Paul, (1963), S. 132 Inc. v. 373 U. prescribed. In that impose higher than the standards pre-emption, but regulation against claims of sustained the state case, we statutory rely solely reference to “minimum standards” on the did not we resolving litmus-paper test issues of furnished or indicate Indeed, provisions in the Federal Act in were other pre-emption. there against displacement strongly federal question even more that “militate[d] regula Furthermore, regulations.” Id., the federal at 148. of [the] local pre-empt state law were drafted administered claimed to tions orderly promote “designed to no more than organizations and were do Id., among growers.” Florida competition the South [avocado] sufficiently Congress promulgation directed it is clear that Here enforcement, level, national national as well as on the standards being privileged satisfying law having design characteristics federal cargoes in United States carry waters. tank-vessel constitute specifications. construction Regis- *16 tered vessels, for example, as we already have indicated, must observe Washington's pilotage requirement. In our view, both enrolled registered and vessels comply must also the provision of the requires Tanker Law tug that for escorts tankers over 40,000 DWT satisfy that do design pro- the specified visions (2). §88.16.190 This conclusion requires I analysis Title 33 U. PWSA, S. 1221-1227 §§C. (1970 ed., Supp. Y).

A In prevent order to damage to and shore vessels, structures, as well as areas, environmental harm navigable to waters and the might resources therein result or struc- vessel I ture Title damage, authorizes the to establish and operate systems” “vessel traffic ports subject services and for congested to traffic,20 as well as require ships comply to systems with the and necessary to have the equipment do (2). Secretary may §§ so. and “control ves- (1) 1221 sel under by specifying traffic” various hazardous conditions the times for vessel movement, establishing speed size and operating limitations and conditions, by restricting vessel 20 enacted, From 1950 until the Coast carried PWSA was Guard out safety port program pursuant delegation its ato from the of his President authority Magnuson Act, under the 50 U. S. That Act based C. § authority promulgate governing operation President’s rules upon inspection of country’s vessels his determination national security Rep. 92-563, (1971) (House endangered. p. was H. R. No. Report). The House Committee that considered Title I of the PWSA authority intended to broaden Coast for Guard’s establish rules port safety protection Report the environment. The Committee states: important purpose. enactment R.

“The of H. 8140 would serve an dual First, capability it would the Coast bolster Guard’s to handle adequately problems safety pollution marine serious and water today. Second, remedy long-standing us problem confront it would concerning statutory port program.” basis the Coast safety for Guard’s Ibid. operation having particular operat-

vessel to those vessels ing opera- which he for necessary characteristics considers safe (3). tion under the circumstances. In addition, § Secretary may require foreign trade to engaged carry having until pilots jurisdiction the State establishes minimum pilot requirement, (5); may he establish § safety equipment requirements structures, § shore (7); may and he or other establish waterfront zones or conditional access when limited, controlled, measures necessary protection structures, waters, for the vessels, areas, shore carrying responsibilities

In his under the Sec- Act, out *17 may doing In retary regulations. so, § issue rules and 1224. might variety a of interests that he is directed to consider wide possible of his as environ- authority, affect the exercise such degree involved, impact, scope and hazards mental including minimum inter- traffic characteristics and “vessel traffic, volume, with the flow of commercial traffic ference cargoes, the usual of local types vessels, sizes and nature (b) provides 1222 1222 (e). factors.” Section § and similar I sub- “prevent political is to a or nothing in Title State higher only prescribing for structures division thereof from safety standards those safety equipment requirements than may chapter.” prescribed pursuant this delegate, authority, through his Exercising Secretary, this 33 Navigation Safety Regulations, Guard, has issued the Coast (1977)). Fed. Of Reg. at 42 5956 (adopted CFR Part 164 case, promulgated to this he particular importance containing general rules, System Traffic Vessel Sound requirements, reporting vessel movement rules, communication for ship rules movement separation scheme, special a traffic geographic coordinates descriptions and Strait, Rosario lanes, specification traffic zones and and separation points.21 33 CFR Part reporting and precautionary areas published operating manual have an authorities Local Coast Guard B Subpart (1976), Reg. (1977). as Fed. amended, There is also delegated Coast Guard district commanders captains ports Secretary’s and to exercise the powers under and (3) anchoring, § to direct the mooring, movements of vessels; temporarily routing to establish traffic schemes; specify speed vessel limitations and size operating conditions. CFR 160.35 Traffic Rosario Strait is subject prohibiting to a local Guard Coast rule “the passage more than one 70,000 through DWT vessel Rosario Strait in any either direction given During time.” periods of bad weather, size limitation is reduced approximately 40,000 App. DWT.

B provision A tug-escort not a design is such as requirement, is promulgated operating under Title It more II. is akin to an arising rule peculiarities of local waters that call special precautionary such, meas- measures, and, clearly ure Secretary’s authority within the reach of the under 1221 (3) (iii) §§ (iv) speed to establish “vessel size limitations and vessel and to restrict operating conditions” operation vessel to those “particular operating charac- capabilities merely teristics and Title however, . . . .” I, authorizes *18 Secretary and does to issue require regula- implement tions to provisions Title; assuming prevents safety that 1222 (b) issuing “higher from a State infra, equipment requirements 174, or safety standards,” see it does with only respect so standards requirements to those may “which prescribed to pursuant chapter.” be this The relevant I inquiry respect to under Title power to impose State’s thus tug-escort rule whether is Secretary for has either own promulgated tug requirement his Puget Sound tanker navigation or has decided that no such containing system Puget explanatory the vessel traffic for Sound App. materials.

172 appear It does not to imposed at all. should be

requirement has, however, course. He yet has taken either us that he rulemaking, Reg. 41 Fed. of proposed an notice issued advance Safety Regulations Navigation amend his (1976), 18770 to require to 164 so as (1977), CFR Part I, under Title 33 issued in confined waters.22 operating for tug escorts certain “are intended rules, adopted, if says The notice that these Cap- industry and for the maritime provide guidance uniform may be (1976). It Reg. Port.” tains of the Fed. forthcoming pre-empt will the State’s rules that that will re- until the State’s occurs, but that present tug-escort rule, Clause.23 give way Supremacy under the quirement need not it make substantial purposes Nor for does constitutional satisfy that Law those vessels difference that under the Tanker exempted are in effect requirements State’s rulemaking proposed “The Coast notice of states: The advance amending Federal Part 164 of Title Code of considering is Guard require tug assistance for vessels Regulations minimum standards for potential collisions,rammings, operating in waters to reduce the for confined states Reg. It groundings in these areas.” Fed. following developing rules: size will be considered in that the factors availability multiple propulsion, screws or bow displacement, vessel, availability standards, controllability, cargo, thrusters, type of Id., predicted weather conditions. at 18771. actual or adverse delegates through his Appellees Coast insist Guard already require tugs Puget his Sound has exercised necessary and not be extent he deems State should therefore impose provisions. Appellees or other permitted to submit letters stricter required indicating have evidence local Coast Guard authorities liquefied tug petroleum gas and on occasion escorts for carriers one us; type part another evidence not before of vessel. This record say accepting it, settled but even we cannot that federal authorities have upon tug whether and in what circumstances escorts for oil tankers required. subject tug Sound should be escorts The entire action, by placed Secretary’s agenda, seemingly been on the definitive proposed rulemaking the notice of to in the referred text. *19 tug-escort requirement.24 Given validity general of a' prescribing

rule tug for escorts all Washington is also tankers, privileged, insofar Supremacy as the Clause is concerned, waive for the rule having specified tankers design character- istics.25 For this reason, we conclude that the District Court erred in holding that the alternative of tug requirement (2) § 88.16.190 was invalid because its conflict with the PWSA.

VI We cannot arrive at the respect same conclusion with to the remaining provision of the Tanker Law at issue here. Sec- tion 88.16.190 any excludes from (1) Puget Sound under any circumstances tanker in In 125,000 excess our DWT. fact, In at the time entering Puget of trial all tankers were Sound required tug escort, to have a tanker no then afloat had ah of design required by features App. Tanker Law. agree appellees’ We do tug-escort provi with assertion that the sion, requirements is an design Law, alternative to the of the Tanker pressure exert will on comply design tanker owners to with the standards achieving they beyond hence is an indirect method what submit is power tug appellee under Title II. The all of cost escorts for year. $277,500 per ARCO’s tankers Sound is estimated at While negligible amount, only not a it is a fraction of the estimated cost of outfitting single required by tanker with features 88.16.190 § (2). Technology Congress The Officeof Assessment has estimated constructing just screws, new tanker with a double bottom and twin two required features, roughly $8.8 add of a would milhon to the cost 150,000 Thus, contrary appellees’ contention, tanker. DWT it is very provision pressure operators doubtful that will tanker into com plying specified (2). tug with the standards 88.16.190 While § provision may penalty noncompliance as a viewed State’s design requirements, it does not as an the accom obstacle to “stan[d] plishment purposes objectives Congress.” and execution of the full Davidowitz, Hines v. 312 U. effect of overall S. ovqr (2) require tug 88.16.190 is to tankers DWT to have a they navigate Puget Sound, way escort while a result in no inconsistent with currently implemented. being as it is PWSA *20 I provision this is invalid in view, light Title and the Secretary’s actions taken thereunder. premise the begin

We with the speed limitations,” to establish “vessel size and 1221 (3)(iii), § and that local Guard have been Coast officers power Furthermore, authorized to this on exercise his behalf. 1222 (b), by § permitting impose higher equip- the State to (cid:127)ment or safety standards “for structures only,” impliedly higher forbids state implication standards vessels. The is strongly supported by legislative history of the PWSA. Report House explains original wording The bill did “not it absolutely make clear that the Coast Guard regulation of preempts vessels in field” action this says that provide positive § was amended to (b) “a statement retaining jurisdiction State over structures and making clear that State regulation of vessels is not contem- plated.” Report House on Relying the legislative history, appellants argue that

. preclusive of 1222 (b) effect equip- restricted to vessel ment requirements. The argu- belies statute, however, this ment, expressly “safety it reaches vessel standards” as well A equipment. limitation on vessel size would seem to fall squarely within category standards, since the Secretary’s authority impose size limits on navigat- ing Puget designed Sound is prevent damage to vessels and navigable waters and is couched controlling terms of vessel traffic in areas “which he especially determines to be hazardous.” pertinent

The inquiry point at this thus becomes whether the Secretary, through his delegate, has addressed and acted upon question of size limitations. Appellees and the United States insist that he has done so his local navigation rule with respect to Rosario Strait: prohibits The rule passage more than one DWT vessel through Rosario Strait in either direction at any given time, and in periods of approximately is reduced to weather,

bad “size limitation” sufficiently us, appears DWT. On the before record 40.000 the issue clear that federal authorities have indeed dealt with circum- of size and have determined whether and what tanker size is to limit Sound. navigation stances purports large Tanker ban on impose general Law *21 more Secretary’s response but been much tankers, a the not may limited one. Because under the (b) § State by impose prescribed standards than those the higher safety Secretary (1) under Title the limitation 88.16.190 I, § size may not be enforced. position appellees

There is also force to and the imposed United States that the size Tanker regulation by the if Law, pre-empted under Title is similar to or indis I, tinguishable from II reserves design requirement which Title to the regime. may federal This be true if the limit size represents a judgment that, as a matter of protection environmental should not exceed generally, tankers In event, per DWT. the State should not be 125.000 prevail by contrary design judgment mitted over a made pursuit federal inter authorities of uniform national and goals. if Washington’s national On other exclusion hand, of large reality tankers from is in based on water Puget Sound depth peculiarities, Sound or on other local respect appear Tanker Law in this would to be within the scope Title in which event also state and federal law I, represent contrary would limitation judgments, and the state way.26 give would have to conclusion large

Our State’s ban on tankers history consistent with the of Title I. In exer- legislative cising Title, his under the is directed

26 appears depth feet, It minimum that the water in Rosario Strait is 60 65, according App. which to the used standards the United States at the 1973 International on Marine Pollution would accom Conference Id., modate vessels well in excess DWT. at 80. consistency in order “to agencies with other assure to consult fully and also to “consider ...,”§ (c), regulations may be affected variety wide of interests . . . consistency of twin (e). These themes — substance of consideration —reflect thoroughness Report good The House indicates that Reports. Committee House who testified before the number of the witnesses I Title points of strong subcommittee stated that of the one envisioned imposition “the of federal control in areas was uni- will and enforcement regulatory the bill which insure Report House formity throughout all the covered areas." expressed by 8.27 Such a view was the Commandant 27During hearings House, Representative in the example, Keith expressed might regulations concern that States on their own enact restrict already ing vessels, noting had done He the size Delaware so. stated that do not want the States to resort to actions individual “[w]e adversely Hearings 867, our national interest.” on H. H. R. affect R. H. 8140 before Subcommittee on Coast Coast and Guard, R. *22 Survey, Navigation of Geodetic the House Committee on Merchant and (1971). Fisheries, Cong., Sess., Marine and 92d 1st Commandant Guard, responded Bender, of Admiral the Coast the Coast Guard preferable approach problem giant for the to the of the “believe[s] particular tankers to be resolved on an international Ibid. basis.” representative A of the Sierra Club testified before the Senate committee considering suggested advisability and regulations limiting the PWSA of Hearings of the size vessels. on S. 2074 before Senate Committee on Commerce, Cong., Sess., response 92d In suggestion, 1st to this Inouye questioned necessary regula- Senator whether the result of such a tankers, tion would not be an increase in the number of so as to meet the requirements acknowledged Nation’s for oil. The Sierra Club witness controversy among company there was “some people even the oil as to hazardous, be ships would the most more smaller or fewer bigger ships.” Id., stipulation at 81. This statement is consistent with the of facts, App. which states:

“Experts good dispute differ and there is faith as to whether the move- by ment of oil number smaller of tankers in excess of DWT Puget poses compared Sound spillage increased risk of risk an to the oil by larger of movement a similar amount of oil of smaller number tankers in Sound.” pointed Admiral Guard, Bender,

Coast who out that with a operated federally traffic system, necessary research and development could authority be carried out a single and country then utilized applied around the “with differences . . . particular ports to the ....’’ Ibid. He added that the same of the agency Federal Government that developed traffic systems responsible should then be for enforcing them. Ibid. Report *23 on tanker size and that he should act only balancing after all of the competing interests. While anticipated it was not product the final of this deliberation would be the promulga- of tion systems applicable traffic across the board to all United ports, States it was anticipated that there would abe single decisionmaker, rather than a different one in each State.

Against this background, we think pre-emptive impact 178 congressional expression understandable 1222 ail (b) is § (b), would § without we Furthermore, even

intent. tankers absolute ban on Tanker Law’s reluctant sustain recog previously The Court than DWT. larger 125,000 affirmatively of . . . federal officials “where nized that failure of a on character full takes exercise their approved appropriate is regulation no such ruling that permitted are not statute,” of the States policy to the pursuant Beth regulation. such a power to enact police to use their Board, York Relations New State Labor lehem Steel Co. v. Line R. Atlantic Coast Napier v. 767, (1947); 330 U. S. in this case think that Co., We U. S. 605 operations on the a ban Secretary’s promulgate failure to on Puget takes Sound oil DWT tankers excess stat policy of the a clear above, character. As noted such a wide carefully consider “the Secretary shall is ute exercise of by the variety may be affected of interests appli he shall restrict 1222(e), and that authority,” § his they are where to those areas of vessel size limitations cation In the Sec necessary. Sound, the case particularly authority in accordance with his retary has exercised a vessel-traffic- promulgated and has statutory directives on the only a narrow limitation system which contains control we conclude supertankérs. being case, This operation of enforcing the limita precluded size Washington Tanker Law.28 contained in the tion support appellants’ position in other federal for the find no We e., i. they Pollution Con legislation the Federal Water cite, environmental seq. 1251 et 816, 1972, 33 U. S. C. 86 Stat. trol Act Amendments § Management 1972, V); Act of (1970 ed., Supp. the Coastal Zone seq. (1976 ed.); 1451 et Deepwater and the 1280, 16 S. C. Stat. U. § seq. (1970 et ed., 2126, 33 U. C. Port Act of 88 Stat. S. V). contemplate cooperative state-federal Supp. those statutes While efforts, they intent, to the expressly state that contrast regulatory Furthermore, concerns the none them PWSA.

VII appellees’ reject also additional constitutional chal- We requirement for vessels not lenges tug-escort to the State’s this Appellees standards.29 contend that satisfying design its PWSA, not the provision, pre-empted by if the violates even regulate attempt Clause because it is an indirect Commerce of equipment regulation an area tankers, uniform national rule. appellees that contend necessitates a that previously rejected claim, concluding We have this provision may simply tug-escort requirement be viewed as a compliance with forcing since it does not have the effect 25, design specifications provision. set forth See n. apparent Commerce supra. viewed, So it becomes that prevent enacting a Clause does a State pilotage require- in its to a local type. this Similar nature tug a vessel on a escort when ment, requirement a take regula- entering particular body type of water is not the Cooley uniform rule. See v. tion national that demands Wardens, appear Nor does Board How. requirement impedes the free and from the record compelling tankers, an there is a need for or size of oil area uniformity decisionmaking. urge United as amicus curiae the Tanker

Appellees and the States Act, policy Merchant size limit also conflicts with the of the Marine Law’s seq. (1970 1985, C. 1101 et ed. -and amended, U. S. Stat. program thereunder Supp. and the tanker construction established Y), duty implementation its under the Act to Administration in Maritime adequate program develop and well-balanced merchant fleet. Under this an subsidized, including sizes is tankers of tankers of various construction rejected The Maritime Administration far in excess of DWT. building larger for the suggestions that no subsidies be offered rely on it. argument, but we need not There is some force to tankers. 29Although grounds, reach these the District Court did not additional sufficiently questions, legal record seems are issues involved complete a remand to the District their resolution here without to warrant Court. *25 cost commerce, for the foreign flow of interstate

efficient per cent is than one 120,000 of for a DWT tanker less tug escort re- Puget processed of oil at Sound barrel of oil and the amount provision’s enforce- a result of the fineries has not declined as (2) § hold 88.16.190 App. Accordingly, we that ment. Clause. is under the Commerce of Tanker Law not invalid that with the claim Similarly, agree we cannot additional Federal Govern- interferes with the tug-escort provision appellees’ foreign Again, to conduct affairs. ment’s of contention the overall effect argument is on the based that outfitting into their tanker owners (2) 88.16.190 is coerce § so, that design requirements. Were specified with the provision that constituted an invalid might agree we attempt to achieve with the Federal Government’s interference design. on the tanker agreement international no however, does more than it, The we view provision as require- a require tug Puget Sound, use of within escorts consequences. We, ment with international insignificant for either § decline to declare 88.16.190 invalid therefore, (2) urged appellees. reasons the additional Court Accordingly, judgment three-judge District in is part part, is affirmed in and reversed and the case re- proceedings opinion. for further consistent with manded this

It is so ordered. Brennan Marshall, Justice whom Mr. Justice Mr. Rehnquist concurring part join, and Mr. Justice part. dissenting opera- Tanker Law issue here has three Washington every that provisions: (1) requirement

tive a oil tanker pilot deadweight (DWT) employ tons or a larger 50.000 navigating Washington licensed the State of while 88,16.180 Code adjacent waters, Sound and Wash. Rev. (Supp. 1975); (2) requirement every oil tanker of from possess DWT either certain features or 40.000 utilize tug escorts while operating Puget Sound, § 88.16.190 (2); and (3) size limitation, tankers in barring excess 125,000 DWT from the Sound, § 88.16.190

I agree with the Court the pilotage requirement is pre-empted only with respect to I enrolled vessels. also agree tug-escort requirement fully at least until valid, such time as the Transportation delegate or his promulgates a tug-escort federal rule after full decides, consideration, that no such I necessary. join rule is therefore I, II, Parts III, Y, and VII opinion. of the Court’s In the posture current I this case, however, see no need *26 to speculate, as the Court does, validity on the the features to requirement. the tug alternative the effec- Since tive date of the Tanker Law, including all those tankers — owned or by chartered appellees employed tug escorts —have rather than attempting satisfy to safety require- the alternative expense ments. The of compliance, moreover, relative makes it extremely unlikely, at least the foreseeable future, that any tankers will be constructed to meet the redesigned requirements.1 law’s Indeed, the Court itself concludes that (2) “may § 88.16.190 be simply tug-escort require- viewed as ment since it does not forcing have the effect of compliance with design specifications the set forth in provision.” the Ante, ante, at see at n. 179; 25, Accordingly, 180. I join cannot opinion. Part IV of the Court’s

I cannot agree also with the Court’s conclusion in VI of Part opinion its that the size limitation contained in the Tanker Law 1 According record, currently to the no tanker afloat has all by prescribed features the Tanker Law. Neither Atlantic Richfield nor plans modify any currently operation Seatrain has to satisfy tankers to design standards, economically “because such retrofit is not feasible under anticipated current and App. Moreover, market conditions.” 67. being majority constructed Seatrain will not meet the of the ante, design requirements, and, convincingly demonstrates, Court likely at 173 n. the Tanker Law not tanker induce owners to incorporate specified design features into new tankers. conclu- this To reach Supremacy Clause.

is invalid under the I analysis Title on an primarily relies sion, the Court there- actions Secretary Transportation’s PWSA and the authority Secretary I the Court that agree under. based on the characteristics size limitations establish vessel impose is not free to waters,2 that a State particular Secretary has exercised requirements more once stringent rele- balancing after all decided, or has appropriate. would not be a size limitation factors, vant I pre-empt not own force the other Title does its hand, On “merely since it authorizes size, all state vessel regulations to issue require does Ante, Thus, implement provisions of the Title.” point . . pertinent inquiry at this notes, as the Court . “[t]he has addressed Secretary, through delegate, his whether the [is] Ante, at 174. upon question and acted of size limitations.” the Coast Secretary’s delegate, that the The Court concludes of size limitations has in fact considered the issue Guard, contrary to the one judgment and reached a Sound princi- in the Tanker Law. Under well-established embodied “ 'only to the displaced law should ples, however, state ”of’ the aims protect extent the achievement of necessary *27 2 provision The relevant of Title I states: any vessel, prevent damage to, “In order or the destruction or loss of bridge, in of the United navigable or other structure on or waters immediately States, any adjacent those land or shore area structure waters; protect navigable and the resources therein from and to waters resulting damage, destruc- environmental harm from vessel or structure department in the Coast tion, or which Guard loss, may— operating especially

“(3) in areas he determines to be control vessel traffic which visibility, weather, hazardous, conditions of reduced adverse vessel or under by— congestion, or other hazardous circumstances operating “(iii) speed limitations and vessel vessel size establishing V). (3) (iii) (1970 ed., Supp. 1221 . U. C. conditions . . .” 33 S.

183 'the law; federal whenever we possible, should “reconcile operation statutory both schemes with one another rather ” holding completely than ousted.’ Merrill [the scheme] Pierce, Ware, Lynch, Fenner & Smith 414 127 v. U. S. Silver (1973), quoting Exchange, v. New York Stock 373 Bica, U. 424 341, 361, accord, S. De Canas v. U. S. (1963); principles, 351, 357-358, light Viewed of these n. the record simply support finding does not the Court’s conflict between state and federal law.

The Coast Guard’s unwritten navigation rule,” “local prohibits passage 70,000 through more than one DWT vessel any Rosario given time, Strait at is the evidence cited sole the Court to show that size limitations for have Puget Sound Ante, been considered federal 174-175. authorities. On this however, the deter- record, rule cannot said to reflect a mination that the size limitations forth in the Tanker Law set inappropriate are or unnecessary. there is no indication First, that in establishing vessel traffic rule for Rosario Strait Guard for promulgating Coast considered the need size limita- tions the entire even Second, assuming Sound.3 Rosario rule Strait resulted from consideration of the size issue respect to the entire appellees have not demon- area, any The Rosario “size Strait limitation” is not contained in written regulation, rule or and the record does not indicate how came into only following existence. The reference the record is the statement stipulation of facts: prohibits passage 70,000 “The Coast Guard than one DWT more thrpugh any given During in either vessel Rosario Strait direction at time. periods weather, of bad approximately the size limitation is reduced to App. 65. DWT.” System, 161, Subpart B Sound Vessel Traffic CFR Part (1976), amended, Reg. (1977), any 42 Fed. does not size contain limitation, necessity apparently and the for such a limitation was never rulemaking process. during Reg. (1973) considered See 38 Fed. *28 (notice proposed rulemaking); (1974) (summary Reg. Fed. during rulemaking). comments received the judgment contrary to rule evinces a

strated the express terms Tanker Under the provisions the Law. schemes vessel-traffic-control PWSA, existence of local must, whether, determining in the weighed be balance imposed.4 be should what federal size limitations extent, “size Rosario is no in the record that the Strait There evidence prior consideration or even under limitation” was existence have left appellees Tanker Law.5 Thus passage own limited inference that the Coast Guard’s unrebutted the entirely with, consistent upon, rule was built and is therefore Law’s by the Tanker already framework created restrictions. finding of its

Perhaps in of the tenuousness recognition I, sug under the Court regulation conflict with federal Title Tanker Law imposed the size gests limitation Ante, II of the PWSA. might pre-empted also be under Title In particular, Court theorizes “represents a state might pre-empted judgment rule if it protection as a matter of and environmental that, Ibid. DWT.” generally, tankers should not exceed It is Law (Emphasis added.) clear, however, that Tanker problems arising reaction to out of tanker merely was a measure operations general, but instead was tailored respond particular, local conditions —in the unusual unique provides part: I in relevant Title for, determining any need the substance rale “In of, among shall, other hereunder or the exercise of things, other consider—

“(6) systems, services, schemes; and existing vessel traffic control “(7) practices (e) (1970 .” C. local and customs . . . 33 U. S. V). ed., Supp. stipulation specify The when the size rule Rosario of facts does not apparently Strait was in force at the time established. rale was stipulation entered, supra, was see n. into gone the Tanker Law had but prior to effect that time.

susceptibility Puget spills to from damage large Sound oil peculiar navigational and problems associated tanker operations is pre the Sound.6 there no basis for Thus, under II.7 emption Title following The Tanker Law contains the statement of intent and

purpose: danger spills, legislature transpor- of the

“Because finds petroleum products tation oil and refined Puget crude tankers on adjacent potential and great important Sound waters creates a hazard to jobs natural resources of dependent and to and incomes on these resources. legislature recognizes Puget adjacent

“The also Sound and waters are a relatively irregular confined salt water environment with and shorelines greater therefore is a long-term damage there than usual likelihood of from any large spill. oil legislature recognizes “The further that certain areas of Sound adjacent space

and maneuvering large waters have limited a oil tanker many navigational that these waters contain natural obstacles well high density pleasure as a of commercial and boat traffic.” Wash. Rev. 1975). (Supp. Code 88.16.170 navigational

The natural compounded by hazards in the fog, Sound are currents, conditions, density tidal and wind high in addition to the App. vehicle traffic. 69.

Among space the “areas . . . maneuvering large limited oil [with] tanker,” by Washington Legislature, referred to undoubtedly is Rosario Strait. Strait is less than point, one-half mile at wide its narrowest G, portions Exh. of the shipping through depth route the Strait have a only App. (A 190,000 60 feet. approx- 65. DWT tanker has a draft of imately feet, 120,000 and a approximately DWT tanker draft Id., 80.) feet. finding In addition to the Tanker Law’s size limit inconsistent with the thereunder, PWSA federal suggests actions the Court argument” some force that the “[t]here size limit conflicts with program the tanker construction established the Maritime Administra pursuant tion Act, Ante, the Merchant Marine at 179 n. 28. rely The Court argument, does not on this however, totally and it is lacldng in factual basis. it While is true that construction of tankers larger than DWT has been program, subsidized under the almost two-thirds of the tankers have been or being are constructed have been smaller 125,000 DWT, than App. 60; remainder, the smallest size Washington’s I hold that would reasons, For similar water Clause. Since the Commerce not violate does regulation port vary conditions navigational other depth tug pilotage and access—like of tanker local port, *30 cer- river harbor and and other requirements, —is the absence in necessary, even perhaps appropriate, and tainly Cooley Board g., v. See, e. action. of determinative federal Catlettsburg, Co. v. (1852); Packet Wardens, 12 299, How. demon- Appellees have (1882). 559, S. 562-563 U. or irrational limit is an Law’s size the Tanker strated that pro- safety and environmental promoting ineffective means of large feet —too in of 60 225,000 drafts well excess vessels with are DWT supra, any the refineries 6, dock at pass Strait, n. or through Rosario see refinery Cherry Point has a (Atlantic at Richfield’s Puget on Sound on Sound feet; other five refineries none of the depth dockside of 55 large as depth to accommodate tankers even sufficient dockside 47-48, 80). App. DWT. invalidating 125,000 DWT Appellees argument final advance one Relying Supremacy on well-established under the Clause. size limit give it licensing and vessel proposition that federal enrollment waters, navigate in state trade and to engage in coastwise (1977); Douglas Inc., 265, 276, Products, 280-281 Seacoast 431 U. S. v. (1824), that Ogden, 1, appellees assert Gibbons v. 212-214 9 Wheat. any that have Washington may of its waters tankers not exclude pursuant federal vessel licensed, registered, to the and been enrolled laws, 221, 251, 263. enrollment, licensing 46 U. registration, S. C. §§ the same assuming carries with it registration vessel Even proposition licensing, argument ignores a privileges this as enrollment by Notwithstanding the appellees: as well one relied on established as the impose upon by license, may privileges vessel “States conferred federal nondiscriminatory conservation and environ- federal licensees reasonable, Douglas police power.” protection within their mental measures otherwise supra, Huron Cement Products, Inc., g., e. Portland v. Seacoast 277; see, Massachusetts, Detroit, (1960); Manchester Co. v. v. 362 U. S. Maryland, Tanker Smith v. 18 How. 71 (1891); S. 240 U. protection appears size to be a reasonable environmental Law’s limitation infra, imposed evenhandedly against both measure, is see n. residents and nonresidents of the State. nor

tection,8 provision imposes have shown they any that the substantial burden foreign on interstate or commerce.9 Con sequently, it is that appellees clear have not their carried provision’s impact burden of showing on interstate or foreign clearly commerce “is to the excessive relation putative Inc., Church, local benefits.” Pike Bruce v. 137, 142 (1970). U.S.

I appellees’ do not find any arguments persuasive. other I would therefore imposed sustain size limitation Tanker Law. Stevens, Justice Powell whom Me. Justice

Me. joins, concurring part dissenting part.

The federal interest in uniform regulation of commerce on the high seas, reinforced the Supremacy Clause, “dictates the federal judgment that a vessel to navigate safe *31 prevail United waters judg- States over the contrary state Ante, ment.” at For reason, explains 165. that as the Court in of Part IY its opinion, reject we must the judgment expressed by Washington of Legislature the the State that stipulation by quoted ante, Court, 27, merely The at 176 n. that good-faith dispute large establishes there is toas whether exclusion of spillage tankers will in fact Puget reduce the risk of oil in A Sound. conflicting showing there is evidence is not sufficient to undercut the presumption police power that a State’s been a has exercised in rational See, g., Chicago, Co., manner. e. Firemen v. &R. 1. P. U. S. R. 138-139 larger Exclusion of 125,000 any tankers than in DWT not resulted in processed reduction the amount oil Puget at Sound refineries. according App. Moreover, record, 120,000 to use of a DWT 150,000 tanker rather than a shipping DWT increases tanker the cost Valdez, Alaska, Cherry oil from by per barrel, $.02 Point a $.04 mere id., 64; specify and record does not data relevant for the cost Gulf-Cherry Finally, appellees Persian Point route. offered no concrete any disruption significant operations, any evidence of in their tanker or of they decrease in market own, value the tankers that a result as provisions. the Tanker Law’s cannot deadweight tons 125,000 tanker

an oil “stand- unless Puget possesses navigate in Sound safely (2) 88.16.190 of the Wash- § safety prescribed features” ard imposing statute holds, Court the state As the ington Code.1 I believe, follows, invalid. It design requirements .is those any on may special restrictions impose not the State satisfy these invalid criteria. do vessels may not exclude correctly holds that State Court inconsistently but it Sound category vessels costly requirement on impose tug-escort State to a allows the requirement This tug-escort and no others. those rule from which are safety tankers terms, general its not, by Quite the invalid features.2 exempt possess if they (2) (Supp. 1975) reads as follows: Washington Code 88.16.190 Rev. forty registered, or to one “(2) tanker, An whether enrolled oil may beyond deadweight proceed twenty-five tons hundred and thousand possesses (1) if such all of points subsection tanker enumerated following features: standard horsepower

“(a) horsepower in of one to each two and the ratio Shaft tons; deadweight one-half

“(b) screws; and Twin liquid

“(c) cargo compartments; bottoms, Double underneath all oil “ (d) working operating, one of which must be Two order and radars radar; and collision avoidance systems may navigational position

“(e) location Such other pilotage commissioners: prescribed from time to time the board of forty twenty-five “Provided, hundred That, if such one thousand tug deadweight tugs is in or is under escort of ton tanker ballast *32 deadweight equivalent aggregate horsepower percent to an shaft five tanker, (2) apply: shall of that of this not subsection section tons may equivalencies further, tug horsepower shaft Provided That additional by required established rule and be under certain conditions as Washington pursuant chapter transportation commission utilities forty further, That a tanker of less than thousand 34.04 RCW: Provided subject provisions deadweight to the is not Act].” tons [this require 173, tug-escort ante, Court, The seems to characterize “general rule.” ment as such merely proviso is tug-escort requirement

contrary, Tanker Law Washington of (2) 88.16.190 section § —the imposed only on it is prescribes design requirements; that The requirements. those comply not with that do tankers of those state enforcement prohibits federal interest of a enforcement prohibit should also requirements with them. comply for failure to penalty special vindicated, be uniformity is to If interest in the federal one by any State’s imposed burden magnitude special rules is invalid noncompliance with its attempt penalize imposed by Wash- penalty tug-escort The consequence. no per $277,500 appellee approximately ARCO ington will cost determined cannot be of that cost year. significance The which would investment capital with by comparison simply design Washington’s invalid complying be involved this initial recognized it should specifications. Rather, by similar multiplication subject is to addition burden multi- not so whether or Moreover, in other States.3 action impairs restriction imposition any special plied, uniform standards provide determination congressional construction.4 design and vessel Washington’s enacting legislation similar possibility States’ requiring payment of a legislation enacted Alaska has remote. requirements, to state that do not conform charge” “risk 1977), is consid seq. (Sept. and California et Ann. 30.20.010

Alaska Stat. et al. Brief for of California comparable legislation. See State ering n. 2. Amici Curiae 3 case, effort the State’s small cost in the individual matter how No safety must be viewed general determinations on vessel its to enforce here providing Congress’ objective of to the “obstacle” attainment as an Davidowitz, 312 design. Hines v. See comprehensive standards for vessel adopt any cannot mean that the State 52, This does not U. S. mean that tug-escort requirements, but it does imposing general rules are requirements on determinations those cannot condition not con burdens law, “imposing] additional pre-empted thus federal Bica, n. 6. 424 U. S. by Congress.” De Canas v. templated *33 an tug-escort requirement persuaded I that the am Since requirements, the invalid inseparable appendage I therefore infects the other. necessarily one invalidity of the Court’s V and VII of from Parts dissent respectfully opinion.5 lived, validity Washington’s tug-escort provision may short regulations

despite today’s contemplating opinion. The is now area, majority pre-empt they may in this and even the concedes that Ante, regulation. impact State’s at 172. While this lessens legal poses scheme, State’s and the threat federal agency the imminence of issue is not affected action. While the House notes of importance uniformity regulation enforcement, Report the Senate stresses the careful consideration that Secretary must give various authority factors before his I. exercising under Title It states “is required to balance a number con- including siderations scope degree vessel hazard, traffic characteristics, peculiar conditions to a particular port or waterway, environmental economic factors, impact, so Report forth.” Senate It was also “anticipated 34. that the exercise provided regarding . . . the estab- lishment speed size limitations not be [would] imposed but rather universally, exercised due [would] consideration to the factors” set forth above and with due regard “such matters as combinations horsepower, drafts depth of vessels, rivers, and width of channels, design types vessels involved, Id., and other relevant circumstances.” We read these Congress statements that it indicating desired someone with possible an overview of all the ramifica- tions of the oil tankers to promulgate limitations

Case Details

Case Name: Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co.
Court Name: Supreme Court of the United States
Date Published: Mar 6, 1978
Citation: 435 U.S. 151
Docket Number: 76-930
Court Abbreviation: SCOTUS
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