Ray Knox v. The State of WyomingRay Knox v. The State of Wyoming
- Reporters:
- , , ,
- Before:
- Baldock
Petitioner-appellant appeals the denial of his habeas corpus petition,
I.
Within thirty days of the district court’s September 6, 1991 order denying his habeas petition, Petitioner simultaneously filed his notice of appeal and a motion for reconsideration of the judgment, ostensibly pursuant to
The government contends that we lack jurisdiction over Petitioner’s appeal. Though styled a motion for reconsideration pursuant to
Resolution of the jurisdictional issue is controlled completely by
Smith v. Barry,
— U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 678, 682, 116 L.Ed.2d 678 (1992), in which the Supreme Court held that an informal brief filed with the Court of Appeals within the
II.
Petitioner is serving a five-year federal sentence, but was returned to Wyoming pursuant to the IADA to be retried on a conspiracy to commit murder charge. See Jones v. State, 777 P.2d 54, 61 (Wyo.1989) (reversing conviction of Petitioner and his codefendant and remanding for retrial). Petitioner’s codefendant was retried and convicted. Petitioner then pleaded guilty to a lesser offense, with the understanding that the judgment would be deferred until the codefendant’s appeal was decided by the Wyoming Supreme Court. The codefendant’s appeal contained a presumably similar IADA claim. Petitioner also was allowed to petition the Wyoming Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to review the state district court’s denial of his IADA claim.
The Wyoming Supreme Court denied the petition, and decided the codefendant‘s appeal adversely. Jones v. State, 813 P.2d 629, 631-32 (Wyo.1991). The State represents that a judgment has yet to be entered against Petitioner; he has yet to be sentenced and appeal directly his IADA claims. Appellee’s Answer Brief at 5. We agree with the district court that Petitioner has failed to exhaust his state remedies. 3 See Martens v. Shannon, 836 F.2d 715, 716-18 (1st Cir.1988); Dickerson v. Louisiana, 816 F.2d 220, 224-29 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 956, 108 S.Ct. 352, 98 L.Ed.2d 378 (1987); Cain v. Petrovsky, 798 F.2d 1194, 1195 (8th Cir.1986). Petitioner merely seeks to litigate a federal defense to a criminal charge prematurely in federal court; no special circumstances excuse Petitioner from the exhaustion requirement. See Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484, 488-93, 93 S.Ct. 1123, 1126-29, 35 L.Ed.2d 443 (1973). Wyoming should be allowed to resolve Petitioner’s federal claims in the first instance.
Petitioner’s request to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED. However, Petitioner has failed to make a substantial showing of the denial of a federal right,
see Lozada v. Deeds,
— U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 860, 861-62, 112 L.Ed.2d 956 (1991); thus, Petitioner’s request for a certificate of probable cause,
SO ORDERED.
Notes
.
Smith,
112 S.Ct. at 682 (notice afforded by document, rather than its apparent purpose, determines whether document is sufficient to serve as a notice of appeal; “[i]f a document filed within the time specified by
.
If a notice of appeal is mistakenly filed in the court of appeals, the clerk of the court of appeals shall note thereon the date on which it was received and transmit it to the clerk of the district court and it shall be deemed filed on the date so noted.
9 James W. Moore, Bernard J. Ward & Jo D. Lucas,
Moore’s Federal Practice
¶ 204.01[3] (1991).
See also Smith,
112 S.Ct. at 682 (rejecting argument that timely filing of a functional notice of appeal in the court of appeals is insufficient;
. We note that Petitioner asserts that his claim is different than that of the codefendant. See Appellant’s Brief at 2. This asserted difference also supports dismissal to allow Wyoming to address petitioner’s federal claims.